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Semantics and Progmatics

Pragmatics and Semantics

Around the middle of the twentieth century, there were two opposing camps within the analytic philosophy of language. The first camp —IDEAL LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY, as it was then called — was that of the pioneers, Frege, Russell, Carnap, Tarski, etc. They were, first and foremost, logicians studying formal languages and, through them, “language” in general. They were not originally concerned with natural language, which they thought defective in various ways;1 yet in the 1960s, some of their disciples established the relevance of their methods to the detailed study of natural language (Montague 1974; Davidson 1984). Their efforts gave rise to contemporary FORMAL SEMANTICS, a very active discipline developed jointly by logicians, philosophers, and grammarians.

The other camp was that of so-called ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHERS, who thought important features of natural language were not revealed but hidden by the logical approach initiated by Frege and Russell. They advocated a more descriptive approach and emphasized the pragmatic nature of natural language as opposed to, say, the formal language of Principia Mathematica. Their own work2 gave rise to contemporary pragmatics, a discipline which, like formal semantics, has been developed successfully within linguistics over the past forty years.

Central in the ideal language tradition had been the equation of, or at least the close connection between, the meaning of a sentence and its truth conditions. This truth conditional approach to meaning is perpetuated to a large extent in contemporary formal semantics. On this approach a language is viewed as a system of rules or conventions, in virtue of which (i) certain assemblages of symbols count as well-formed sentences, and (ii) sentences have meanings which are determined by the meanings of their parts and the way they are put together. Meaning itself is patterned after reference. The meaning of a simple symbol is the conventional assignment of a worldly entity to that symbol: for example, names are assigned objects, monadic predicates are assigned properties or sets of objects, etc. The meaning of a sentence, determined by the meanings of its constituents and the way they are put together, is equated with its truth conditions. For example, the subject-predicate construction is associated with a semantic rule for determining the truth conditions of a subject-predicate sentence on the basis of the meaning assigned to the subject and that assigned to the predicate. On this picture, knowing a language is like knowing a theory by means of which one can deductively establish the truth conditions of any sentence of that language.

This truth-conditional approach to meaning is something that ordinary language philosophers found quite unpalatable. According to them, reference and truth cannot be ascribed to linguistic expressions in abstraction from their use. In vacuo, words do not refer and sentences do not have truth conditions. Words-world relations are established through, and indissociable from, the use of language. It is therefore misleading to construe the meaning of a word as some worldly entity that it represents or, more generally, as its truth-conditional contribution. The meaning of a word, insofar as there is such a thing, should rather be equated with its use-potential or its use-conditions. In any case, what must be studied primarily is speech: the activity of saying things. Then we will be in a position to understand language, the instrument we use in speech. Austin?s theory of speech acts a nd Grice?s theory of speaker?s meaning were both meant to provide the foundation for a theory of language, or at least for a theory of linguistic meaning. Despite the early antagonism I have just described, semantics (the formal study of meaning and truth conditions) and pragmatics (the study of language in use) are now conceived of as complementary disciplines, shedding light on different aspects of language. The heated arguments between ideal language philosophers and ordinary language philosophers are almost forgotten. Almost, but not totally: as we shall see, the ongoing debate about the best delimitation of the respective territories of semantics and pragmatics betrays the persistence of two recognizable currents or approaches within contemporary theorizing.

1. Abstracting semantics from pragmatics: the Carnapian approach

The semantics/pragmatics distinction was first explicitly introduced by philosophers in the ideal language tradition. According to Charles Morris, who was influenced by Peirce, the basi c …semiotic? relation is triadic:

a linguistic expression is used to communicate something to someone. Within that complex relation several dimensions can be isolated: In terms of the three correlates (sign vehicle, designatum, interpreter) of the triadic relation of semiosis, a number of other dyadic relations may be abstracted for study.

One may study the relations of signs to the objects to which the signs are applicable. This relation will be called the semantical dimension of semiosis...The study of this dimension will be called semantics. Or the subject of study may be the relation of signs to interpreters. This relation will be called the pragmatical dimension of semiosis,...and the study of this dimension will be named pragmatics…The formal

relation of signs to one another...will be called the syntactical dimension of semiosis,...and the study of this dimension will be named syntactics. (Morris 1938: 6-7) Carnap took up Morris?s distinction and introduced an order among the three disciplines, based on their degree of abstractness. In semantics we abstract away from more aspects of language than we do in pragmatics, and in syntax we abstract away from more aspects than in semantics:

If in an investigation explicit reference is made to the speaker, or, to put it in more general terms, to the user of a language, then we assign it to the field of pragmatics. (...) If we abstract from the user of the language and analyze only the expressions and their designata, we are in the field of semantics. And if, finally, we abstract from the designata also and analyze only the relations between the expressions, we are in (logical) syntax. (Carnap 1942: 9) In the theorist?s reconstruction of the phenomenon, we start with the most abstract layer (syntax) and enrich it progressively, moving from syntax to semantics and from semantics to pragmatics. Syntax provides the input to semantics, which provides the input to pragmatics.

In what sense is it possible to separate the relation between words and the world from the use of words? There is no doubt that the relations between words and the world hold only in virtue of the use which is made of the words in the relevant speech community: meaning supervenes on use.3 That is something the logical empiricists fully admitted. Still, a distinction must be made between two things: the conventional relations between words and what they mean, and the pragmatic basis for those relations. Though they are rooted in, and emerge from, the use of words in actual speech situations, the conventional relations between words and what they mean can be studied in abstraction from use. Such an abstract study constitutes semantics. The study of the pragmatic basis of semantics is a different study, one which belongs to pragmatics or (as Kaplan puts it)

METASEMANTICS:

The fact that a word or phrase has a certain meaning clearly belongs to semantics. On the other hand, a claim about the basis for ascribing a certain meaning to a word or phrase does not belong to semantics. (...) Perhaps, because it relates to how the language is used, it should be categorized as part of (...) pragmatics ..., or perhaps, because it is a fact about semantics, as part of (...) Metasemantics. (Kaplan 1989b: 574)

In the same Carnapian spirit Stalnaker distinguishes between DESCRIPTIVE semantics and FOUNDATIONAL semantics:

“Descriptive semantics”... says what the semantics for the language is, without saying what it is about the practice of using that language that explains why that semantics is the right one. A descriptive-semantic theory assigns semantic values to the expressions of the language, and explains how the semantic values of the complex expressions are a function of the semantic values of their parts.(...) Foundational semantics [says] what the facts are that give expressions their semantic values, or more generally, (...) what makes it the case that the language spoken by a particular individual or community has a particular descriptive semantics. (Stalnaker 1997: 535)4

The uses of linguistic forms on which their semantics depends, and which therefore constitute the pragmatic basis for their semantics, are their past uses: what an expression means at time t in a given community depends upon the history of its uses before t in the community. But of course, pragmatics is not merely concerned with past uses. Beside the past uses of words (and constructions) that determine the conventional meaning of a given sentence, there is another type of use that is of primary concern to

pragmatics: the current use of the sentence by the speaker who actually utters it. That use cannot affect what the sentence conventionally means, but it determines another form of meaning which clearly falls within the province of pragmatics: what the speaker means when he says what he says, in the context at hand. That is something that can and should be separated from the (conventional) meaning of the sentence. To determine “what the speaker means” is to answer questions such as: Was John?s utterance intended as a piece of advice or as a threat? By saying that it was late, did Mary mean that I should have left earlier? Like the pragmatic basis of semantics, dimensions of language use such as illocutionary force (Austin, Searle) and conversational implicature (Grice) can be dealt with in pragmatics without interfering with the properly semantic study of the relations between words and their designata. So the story goes. There are two major difficulties with this approach to the semantics/pragmatics distinction — the Carnapian approach, as I will henceforth call it. The first one is due to the fact that the conventional meaning of linguistic forms is not exhausted by their relation to designata. Some linguistic forms (e.g. goodbye, or the imperative mood) have a “pragmatic” rather than a “semantic” meani ng: they have use-conditions but do not “represent” anything and hence do not contribute to the utterance?s truth conditions.

Because there are such expressions — and because arguably there are many of them and every sentence contains at least one —we have to choose: either semantics is defined as the study of conventional meaning, or it is defined as the study of words-world relations. We can?t have it both ways. If, sticking to Carnap?s definition, we opt for the latter option, we shall have to acknowled ge that “semantics”, in the sense of Carnap, does not provide a complete (descriptive) account of the conventional significance of linguistic forms.

The second difficulty is more devastating. It was emphasized by Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, a follower of Carnap who wanted to apply his ideas to natural language. Carnap explicitly said he was dealing “only with languages which contain no expressions dependent upon extra-linguistic factors” (Carnap 1937: 168). Bar-Hillel lamented that this “restricts highly the immediate applicability” of Carnap?s views to natural languages since “the overwhelming majority of the sentences in these languages are indexical, i.e. dependent upon extra-linguistic factors” (Bar-Hillel 1970: 123; see Levinson, this volume for more on indexi cality). In particular, Carnap?s view that words-world relations can be studied in abstraction from use is no longer tenable once we turn to indexical languages; for the relations between words and their designata are mediated by the (current) context of use in such languages.

The abstraction from the pragmatic context, which is precisely the step taken from descriptive pragmatics to descriptive semantics, is legitimate only when the pragmatic context is (more or less) irrelevant and defensible as a tentative step only when this context can be assumed to be irrelevant. (Bar-Hillel 1970: 70) Since most natural language sentences are indexical, the abstraction is illegitimate. This leaves us with a number of (more or less equivalent) options:

1. We can make the denotation relation irreducibly triadic. Instead of saying that words denote things, we will say that they denote things “with respect to” contexts of use.

2. We can maintain that the denotation relation is dyadic, but change the first relatum—the denotans, as we might say — so that it is no longer an expression-type, but a particular occurrence of an expression, i.e. an ordered pair consisting of an expression and a context of use.

3. We can change the second relatum of the dyadic relation: instead of pairing expressions of the language with worldly entities denoted by them, we can pair them with functions from contexts to denotata. Whichever option we choose — and, again, they amount to more or less the samething — we are no longer doing “semantics” in Carnap?s restricted sense. Rather, we are doing pragmatics, since we take account of the context of use. Formal work on the extension of the Tarskian truth-definition to indexical languages has thus been called (FORMAL) PRAGMATICS, following Carnap?s usage (Montague 1968). As Gazdar (1979:2-3) pointed out, a drawback of that usage is that there no longer is a contrast between “semantics” and “pragmatics”, as far as natural language is concerned: there is no“semantics” for natural language (and

for indexical languages more generally), but only two fields of study: syntax and pragmatics.

2. Meaning and speech acts

Can we save the semantics/pragmatics distinction for natural language? At least we can try. Following Jerrold Katz, we can give up Carnap?s definiti on of semantics as the study of words-world relations, and define it instead as the study of the conventional, linguistic meaning of expression-types. “Pragmatic phenomena”, Katz says, are “those in which knowledge of the setting or context of an utterance plays a role in how utterances are understood”; in contrast, semantics deals with “what an ideal speaker would know about the meaning of a sentence when no information is available about its context” (Katz 1977: 14). This view has been, and still is, very influential. Semantics thus understood does not (fully) determine words-world relations, but it constrains them (Katz 1975: 115-16). Because of indexicality and related phenomena, purely linguistic knowledge is insufficient to determine the truth conditions of an utterance. That much is commonly accepted. What semantics assigns to expression-types, independent of context, is not a fully-fledged content but a linguistic meaning or CHARACTER that can be formally represented as a function from contexts to contents (Kaplan 1989a; Stalnaker 1999, part 1). Thus the meaning of the pronoun I is the rule that, in context, an occurrence of I refers to the producer of that occurrence. Insofar as their character or linguistic meaning can be described as a rule of use, indexical expressions are not as different as we may have thought from those expressions whose meaning is purely “pragmatic”. What is the meaning of, say, the imperative mood? Arguably, the sentences “You will go to the store tomorrow at 8”, “Will you go t o the store tomorrow at 8?”, and “Go to the store tomorrow at 8” all have the same descriptive content. The difference between them is pragmatic: it relates to the type of illocutionary act performed by the utterance. Thus the imperative mood indicates that the speaker, in uttering the sentence, performs an illocutionary act of a DIRECTIVE type. To account for this non-truth-conditional indication we can posit a rule to the effect that the imperative mood is to be used only if one is performing a directive type of illocutionary act. This rule gives conditions of use for the imperative mood. By virtue of this rule, a particular token of the imperative mood in an utterance u “indicates” that a directive type of speech act is being performed by u. This reflexive indication conveyed by the token follows from the conditions of use which govern the type. The same sort of USE-CONDITIONAL analysis can be provided for e.g. discourse particles such as well, still, after all, anyway, therefore, alas, oh, and so forth, whose meaning is pragmatic rather than truth-conditional (see Blakemore, this volume).

There still is a difference between indexical expressions and fully pragmatic expressions such as the imperative mood. In both cases the meaning of the expressiontype is best construed as a rule of use. Thus I is to be used to refer to the speaker, just as the imperative mood is to be used to perform a certain type of speech act. By virtue of the rule in question, a use u of I reflexively indicates that it refers to the speaker of u, just as a use u of the imperative mood indicates that the utterer of u is performing a directive type

of speech act. But in the case of I the token does not merely convey that reflexive indication: it also contributes its referent to the uttera nce?s truth-conditional content. In contrast, the imperative mood does not contribute to the truth-conditional (or, more generally, descriptive) content of the utterances in which it occurs. In general, pragmatic expressions do not contribute to the determination of the content of the utterance, but to the determination of its force or of other aspects of utterance meaning external to descriptive content. It turns out that there are (at least) three different types of expression. Some expressions have a purely denotative meaning: their meaning is a worldly entity that they denote. For example, square denotes the property of being square. Other expressions, such as the imperative mood, have a purely pragmatic meaning. They have conditions of use but make no contribution to content. Finally, there are expressions which, like indexicals, have conditions of use but contribute to truth conditions nevertheless. (The expression-type has conditions of use; the expression-token contributes to truth conditions.)

This diversity can be overcome and some unification achieved. First, we can generalize the content/character distinction even to nonindexical expressions like square. We can say that every linguistic

expression is endowed with a character that contextually determines its content. Nonindexical expressions will be handled as a particular case: the case in which the character is “stable” and determines the same content in every context. Second, every expression, whether or not it contributes to truth-conditional content, can be construed as doing basically the same thing—namely, helping the hearer to understand which speech act is performed by an utterance of the sentence. A speech act typically consists of two major components: a content and a force (Searle 1969; see also Sadock, this volume). Some elements in the sentence indicate the force of the speech act which the sentence can be used to perform, while other elements give indications concerning the content of the speech act. Unification of the two sorts of elements is therefore achieved by equating the meaning of a sentence with its speech act potential. On the view we end up with —the speech-act theoretic view —semantics deals with the conventional meaning of expressions, the conventional meaning of expressions is their contribution to the meaning of the sentences in which they occur, and the meaning of sentences is their speech act potential. Pragmatics studies speech acts, and semantics maps sentences onto the type of speech act they are designed to perform. It follows that there are two basic disciplines in the study of language: syntax and pragmatics. Semantics connects them by assigning speech act potentials to well-formed sentences, hence it presupposes both syntax and pragmatics. In contrast to the Carnapian view, according to which semantics presupposes only syntax, on the speech-act theoretic view semantics is not autonomous with respect to pragmatics: There is no way to account for the meaning of a sentence without considering its role in communication, since the two are essentially connected... Syntax can be studied as a formal system independent of its use (...), but as soon as we attempt to account for meaning, for semantic competence, such a purely formalistic approach breaks down, because it cannot account for the fact that semantic competence is mostly a matter of knowing how to talk, i.e. how to perform speech acts. (Searle, “Chomsky?s Revolution in Linguistics”, cited in Katz 1977: 26) There are other possible views, however. We can construe semantics as an autonomous discipline that maps sentences to the type of thought they express or the type of state of affairs they describe. That mapping is independent from the fact that sentences are used to perform speech acts. Note that communication is not the only possible use we can make of language; we can also use language in reasoning, for example. Be that as it may, whoever utters a given sentence — for whatever purposes —expresses a thought or describes a state of affairs, in virtue of the semantics of the sentence (and the context).5

Let us assume that the sentence is uttered in a situation of communication. Depending on the audience-directed intentions that motivate the overt expression of the thought or the overt description of a state of affairs in that situation, different speech acts will be performed. Those audience-directed intentions determine the force of the speech act, while the thought expressed by the sentence or the state of affairs it describes determines its content. In this framework, pragmatic indicators like the imperative mood can be construed as conventional ways of making the relevant audience-directed intentions manifest. Their meaning, in contrast to the meaning of ordinary words like square, will be inseparable from the speech act the sentence can be used to perform. It is therefore not the overall meaning of the sentence that must be equated with its speech act potential. The major part of linguistic meaning maps linguistic forms to conceptual representations in the mind or to things in the world in total independence from communication. It is only a small subset of linguistic expressions, namely the pragmatic indicators and other expressions (including indexicals) endowed with use-conditional meaning, whose semantics is essentially connected with their communicative function. Whichever theory we accept, semantics (the study of linguistic meaning) and pragmatics (the study of language use) overlap to some extent (see Figure 1). That overlap is limited for the theories of the second type: the meaning of a restricted class of expressions consists in conditions of use and therefore must be dealt with both in the theory of use and the theory of meaning. According to the first type of theory, there is more than partial overlap: every expression has a use-conditional meaning. Since, for that type of theory, the meaning of a sentence is its speech act potential,

semantics is best construed as a sub-part of speech act theory. 原文11

Pragmatics (theory of use)

Semantics (theory of use potential)

Semantics (theory of meaning)

Pragmatics (theory of use)

Pragmatic meaning of indicators

Theory 2 Theory 1

Figure 1

3. Literal meaning vs. Speaker’s meaning

Let us take stock. The view discussed in section 1 was based on the following

assumptions:

(i) semantics and pragmatics are two complementary, non-overlapping disciplines.

(ii) pragmatics deals with the use of language.

(iii) semantics deals with content and truth conditions.

Since words-world relations in natural language (hence content and truth conditions) cannot be studied in abstraction from use, those assumptions form an inconsistent triad — or so it seems. Semantics cannot be legitimately contrasted with pragmatics, defined as the theory of use, if semantics itself is defined as the study of words-world relations. In section 2 we entertained the possibility of giving up (iii). Following Katz,

we can retreat to the view that semantics deals with the conventional meaning of expressiontypes (rather than with content and truth conditions). But we have just seen that the meaning of at least some expressions is best construed as a convention governing their use. It follows that the theory of meaning and the theory of use are inextricably intertwined, in a manner that seems hardly compatible with (i). Be that as it may, most semanticists are reluctant to give up (iii). For both philosophical and technical reasons, they think the denotation relation must be the cornerstone of a theory of meaning. As David Lewis wrote in a famous passage, “semantics with no treatment of truth conditions is not semantics” (Lewis 1972: 169). I will return to that point below (§4). An attempt can be made to save the triad, by focusing on the distinction between LITERAL MEANING and SPEAKER?S MEANING. What a sentence literally means is determined by the rules of the language — those rules that the semanticist attempts to capture. But what the speaker means by his utterance is not determined by rules. As Grice emphasized, speaker?s meaning is a matter of intentions: what someone means is what he or she overtly intends (or, as Grice says, “M-intends”) to get across

through his or her utterance. Communication succeeds when the M-intentions of the speaker are recognized by the hearer.

This suggests that two distinct and radically different processes are jointly involved in the interpretation of linguistic utterances. The process of SEMANTIC INTERPRETATION is specifically linguistic. It consists in applying the tacit theory that speaker-hearers are said to possess, and that formal semantics tries to make explicit, to the sentence undergoing interpretation. By applying the theory, one can deductively establish the truth conditions of any sentence of the language. To do so, it is argued, one does not need to take the speaker?s beliefs and intentions into account: one has simply to apply the rules. In contrast, the type of competence that underlies the process of PRAGMATIC INTERPRETATION is not specifically linguistic. Pragmatic interpretation is involved in the understanding of human action in general. When someone acts,

whether linguistically or otherwise, there is a reason why he does what he does. To provide an interpretation for the action is to find that reason, that is, to ascribe to the agent a particular intention in terms of which we can make sense of the action. Pragmatic interpretation thus construed is characterized by the following three properties:

? C HARITY. Pragmatic interpretation is possible only if we presuppose that the agent is rational. To interpret an action, we have to make hypotheses concerning the agent?s beliefs and desires, hypotheses in virtue of which it can be deemed rational for the agent to behave as she does.

? N ONMONOTONICITY. Pragmatic interpretation is defeasible. The best explanation we can offer for an action given the available evidence can always be overridden if enough new evidence is adduced to account for the subject?s behaviour.

? H OLISM. Because of its defeasibility, there is no limit to the amount of contextual information that can in principle affect pragmatic interpretation. Any piece of information can turn out to be relevant and influence the outcome of pragmatic interpretation. The three features go together. Jointly they constitute what we might call the HERMENEUTIC character of pragmatic interpretation. It strikingly contrasts with the algorithmic, mechanical character of semantic interpretation.

It is important to realize that, on this view (which I will shortly criticize), semantic competence involves more than the ability to determine the context-independent meaning of any well-formed expression in the language. It also involves the ability to assign values to indexical expressions in context. Those assignments are themselves determined by linguistic rules, which linguistic rules constitute the context-independent meaning of indexical expressions. In virtue of its linguistic meaning, an indexical expression like I tells you three things: (i) that it needs to be contextually assigned a value; (ii) which aspect of the situation of utterance is relevant to determining that value; and (iii) how the value of the indexical can be calculated once the relevant feature of the context has been identified. If one adds to one?s knowledge of the language a minimal knowledge of the situation of utterance — the sort of knowledge which is available to speech participants qua speech participants — one is in a position to assign contextual values to indexicals, hence to determine the truth conditions of the utterance.

From what has been said, it follows that the context of use plays a role both in semantic and in pragmatic interpretation. But it plays very different roles in each, and it can even be denied that there is a single notion of “context” corresponding to the two roles. According to Kent Bach, there are two notions of context: a narrow and a broad one, corresponding to semantic and pragmatic interpretation respectively.

Wide context concerns any contextual information relevant to determining the speaker?s intention and to the successful and felicitous performance of the speech act...Narrow context concerns information specifically relevant to determining the semantic values of [indexicals]... Narrow context is semantic, wide context pragmatic.6

In contrast to the wide context, which is virtually limitless in the sense that any piece of information can affect pragmatic interpretation, the narrow context is a small package of factors involving only very limited aspects of the actual situation of utterance: who speaks, when, where, to whom, and so forth. It comes into play only to help determine the reference of those few expressions whose reference is not fixed directly by the rules of the language but is fixed by them only “relative to context”. And it does so in the algorithmic and non-hermeneutical manner which is characteristic of semantic interpretation as opposed to pragmatic interpretation. The narrow context determines, say, that I refers to John when John says I quite irrespective of John?s beliefs and intentions. As Barwise and Perry write, “even if I am fully convinced that I am Napoleon, my use of …I? designates me, not him. Similarly, I may be fully convinced that it is 1789, but it does not make my use of …now? about a time in 1789” (Barwise and Perry 1983: 148).

The view I have just described is very widespread and deserves to be called the Standard Picture (SP). It enables the theorist to maintain the three assumptions listed at the beginning of this section. Semantics and pragmatics each has its own field of study. Semantics deals with literal meaning and truth conditions;

pragmatics deals with speech acts and speaker?s meaning. To be sure, the “context” plays a role in semantic interpretation, because of the context-dependence of truth-conditional content. But that is not sufficient to threaten assumption (i). Because of context-dependence, semantics cannot deal merely with sentence-types: it must deal with OCCURRENCES or sentences-in-context. But this, as Kaplan writes, “is not the same as the notion, from the theory of speech acts, of an utterance of an expression by the agent of a context” (Kaplan 1989b: 584):

An occurrence requires no utterance. Utterances take time, and are produced one at a time; this will not do for the analysis of validity. By the time an agent finished uttering a very, very long true premise and began uttering the conclusion, the premise may have gone false... Also, there are sentences which express a truth in certain contexts, but not if uttered. For example, …I say nothing?. Logic and semantics are concerned not with the vagaries of actions, but with the verities of meanings. (Kaplan 1989b: 584-5)

Moreover, as we have seen, the context which is appealed to in semantic interpretation differs from the “wide” context which features in pragmatic interpretation. Semantics deals with occurrences, narrow contexts, and literal meaning; pragmatics deals with utterances, wide contexts, and speaker?s meaning. Appearances notwithstanding, the two types of study do not overlap.

4. Semantic underdetermination

Even though it is the dominant view, SP has come under sustained attack during the last fifteen years, and an alternative picture has been put forward: T RUTH-CONDITIONAL PRAGMATICS (TCP). From SP, TCP inherits the idea that two different sorts of competence are jointly at work in interlocution: a properly linguistic competence in virtue of which we access the meaning of the sentence, and a more general-purpose competence in virtue of which we can make sense of the utterance much as we make sense of a nonlinguistic action. What TCP rejects is the claim that semantic interpretation can deliver something as determinate as a truth-evaluable proposition. As against SP, TCP holds that full-blown pragmatic i nterpretation is needed to determine an utterance?s truth conditions.

Recall that, on the Standard Picture, the reference of indexicals is determined automatically on the basis of a linguistic rule, without taking the speaker?s beliefs and intentions into consideration. Now this may be true of some of the expressions that Kaplan (1989a) classifies as PURE INDEXICALS (e.g. I, now, here) but it is certainly not true of those which he calls DEMONSTRATIVES (e.g. he, she, this, that). The reference of a demonstrative cannot be determined by a rule like the rule that I refers to the speaker. It is generally assumed that there is such a rule, namely the rule that the demonstrative refers to the object which happens to be demonstrated or which happens to be the most salient, in the context at hand. But the notions of “demonstration” and “salience” are pragmatic notions in disguise. They cannot be cashed out in terms merely of the narrow context. Ultimately, a demonstrative refers to what the speaker who uses it refers to by using it.

To be sure, one can make that into a semantic rule. One can say that the character of a demonstrative is the rule that it refers to what the speaker intends to refer to. As a result, one will incorporate a sequence of “speaker?s intended referents” into the narrow context, in such a way that the n th demonstrative in the sentence will refer to the n th member of the sequence. Formally that is fine, but philosophically it is clear that one is cheating. We pretend that we can manage with a limited, narrow notion of context of the sort we need for handling pure indexicals, while in fact we can only determine the speaker?s intended referent (hence the narrow context relevant to the interpretation of the utterance) by resorting to pragmatic interpretation and relying on the wide context. We encounter the same problem even with expressions like here and now which Kaplan classifies as pure indexicals (as opposed to demonstratives). Their semantic value is said to be the time or place of the context respectively. But what counts as the time and place of the context? How inclusive must the time or place in question be? It depends on what the speaker means, hence, again, on the wide context. We can maintain that the character of here and now is the rule that the expression refers to “the” time or “the”place of the context —a rule that automatically determines a

content, given a (narrow) context in which the time and place parameters are given specific values; but then we have to let a pragmatic process take place to fix the values in question, that is, to determine WHICH narrow context, among indefinitely many candidates compatible with the facts of the utterance, serves as argument to the character function. On the resulting view, the (narrow) context with respect to which an utterance is interpreted is not given, not determined automatically by objective facts like where and when the utterance takes place, but it is determined by the speaker?s intention and the wide context. Again we reach the conclusion that, formal tricks notwithstanding, pragmatic interpretation has a role to play in determining the content of the utterance.

The alleged automaticity of content-determination and its independence from pragmatic considerations is an illusion due to an excessive concern with a sub-class of “pure indexicals”, namely words such as I, today, etc. But they are only a special case —the end of a spectrum. In most cases the reference of a context-sensitive expression is determined on a pragmatic basis. That is true not only of standard indexical expressions, but also of many constructions involving something like a free variable. For example, a possessive phrase such as John’s car arguably means something like …the car that bears relation R to John?. The free variable R must be contextually assigned a particular value; but that value is not determined by a rule and it is not a function of a particular aspect of the narrow context. What a given occurrence of the phrase John’s car means ultimately depends upon what the speaker who utters it means. It therefore depends upon the wide context. That dependence upon the wide context is a characteristic feature of semantically indeterminate expressions, which are pervasive in natural language. Their semantic value varies from occurrence to occurrence, yet it varies not as a function of some objective feature of the narrow context but as a function of what the speaker means. It follows that semantic interpretation by itself cannot determine what is said by a sentence containing such an expression: for the semantic value of the expression — its own contribution to what is said —is a matter of speaker?s meaning, and can only be determined by pragmatic interpretation.

Once again, we find that semantics by itself cannot determine truth conditions. Content and truth conditions are, to a large extent, a matter of pragmatics. That is the gist of TCP. Consequently, most advocates of TCP hold a view of semantics which is reminiscent of that put forward by Katz. According to Sperber and Wilson (1986) and other relevance theorists (see Wilson & Sperber, this volume; Carston, this volume), semantics associates sentences with semantic representations which are highly schematic and fall short of determining truth-conditional content. Those semantic representations, which they call LOGICAL FORMS, are transformed into complete, truth-evaluable representations (which they call PROPOSITIONAL FORMS) through inferential processes characteristic of pragmatic interpretation. (Chomsky holds a similar view, based on a distinction between the logical form of a sentence, determined by the grammar, and a richer semantic representation associated with that sentence as a result, in part, of pragmatic interpretation. See Chomsky 1976: 305-6.)

This view of semantics is one most semanticists dislike. In contrast to Katz, leading semanticists like Lewis, Cresswell, and Davidson hold that “interpreting” a representation is NOT a matter of associating it with another type of representation (whether mental or lingu istic). “Semantic interpretation [thus construed] amounts merely to a translation algorithm”, it is “at best a substitute for real semantics” (Lewis 1972: 169). Real semantics maps symbols to worldly entities — things that the representations may be said to represent. Relevance theorists apparently bite the bullet. They accept that linguistic semantics (which maps sentences to abstract representations serving as linguistic meanings) is not real semantics in the sense of the model-theoretic tradition descended from Frege, Tarski, Carnap and others. But, they argue, there is no way to do real semantics directly on natural language sentences. Real semantics comes into play only after “linguistic semantics” has mapped the sentence onto some abstract and incomplete representation which pragmatics can complete and enrich into a full-fledged propositional form. It is that propositional form which eventually undergoes truth-conditional interpretation. As Carston writes, Since we are distinguishing

natural language sentences and the propositional forms [i.e. the thoughts] they may be used to express as two different kinds of entity, we might consider the semantics of each individually. Speakers and hearers map incoming linguistic stimuli onto conceptual representations (logical forms), plausibly viewed themselves as formulas in a (mental) language. The language ability — knowing English — according to this view, is then precisely what Lewis and others have derided...: it is the ability to map linguistic forms onto logical forms... In theory this ability could exist without the further capacities involved in matching these with conditions in the world. A computer might be programmed so as to perform perfectly correct translations from English into a logical language without, as Lewis and Searle have said, knowing the first thing about the meaning (= truth conditions) of the English sentence. Distinguishing two kind of semantics in this way — a translational kind and the truth-conditional — shows...that the semantic representation of one language may be a syntactic representation in another, though the chain must end somewhere with formulas related to situations and states of the world or possible worlds. (Carston 1988: 176-77)

There was a time when practitioners of model-theoretic semantics themselves thought their apparatus could not be transplanted from artificial to natural languages. Tarski thought so, for example. Following Davidson, Montague and others, it has become widely accepted that Tarskian methods are applicable to natural languages after all. Now it seems that pragmaticists are saying that that conclusion was premature: truth-conditional semantics, they hold, is applicable to the language of thought, but not, or not directly, to natural language sentences. Because of context-sensitivity, there must be an intermediary step involving both translational semantics and pragmatic interpretation before a given natural language sentence can be provided with a truth-conditional interpretation. “Linguistic semantics” and p ragmatics together map a natural language sentence onto a mental representation which model-theoretic semantics can then (and only then) map to a state of affairs in the world.

The general picture of the comprehension process put forward by relevance theorists may well be right. But it is a mistake to suggest that the model-theoretic approach to natural language semantics and TCP are incompatible. Even if, following Lewis and Davidson, one rejects translational semantics in favour of “direct” truth-conditional semantics, one can still accept that pragmatic interpretation has a crucial role to play in determining truth conditions.

First, it should be noted that referential semantics, as Lewis calls the model theoretic approach, can and must accommodate the phenomenon of context-sensitivity. Because of that phenomenon, we cannot straightforwardly equate the meaning of a sentence with its truth conditions: we must retreat to the weaker view that sentence meaning determines truth conditions. As Lewis writes, “A m eaning for a sentence is something that determines the conditions under which the sentence is true or false” (Lewis 1972: 173). That determination is relative to various contextual factors. Hence the meaning of a sentence can be represented as a function from context to truth conditions.

Since meaning is characterized in terms of reference and truth, this still counts as referential semantics.

In this framework, the role pragmatic interpretation plays in the determination of truth-conditional content can be handled at the level of the contextual factors on which that determination depends. For example, if the truth conditions of an utterance depend upon who the speaker means by she, then the speaker?s intended referent can be considered as one of the context ual factors in question. To be sure, the speaker?s referent can be determined only through pragmatic interpretation. That fact, as we have seen, is incompatible with the Standard Picture, according to which semantic interpretation by itself assigns truth conditions to sentences. But it is not incompatible with referential semantics per se. From the role played by pragmatic interpretation in fixing truth conditions, all that follows is that truth-conditional semantics has to take input from pragmatics. That is incompatible with the claim that semantics is autonomous with respect to pragmatics (as syntax is with respect to semantics). But this claim is not essential to referential semantics. Several theorists in the model-theoretic tradition have rejected it explicitly (see e.g. Gazdar 1979: 164-8 for an early statement). As Levinson (2000a: 242) writes, “there is every reason to try and reconstrue the

interaction between semantics and pragmatics as the intimate interlocking of distinct processes, rather than, as traditionally, in terms of the output of one being the input to the other.”I conclude that referential semantics and TCP are compatible. We can maintain both that semantics determines truth conditions and that, in order to do so, it needs input from pragmatics. The two claims are compatible provided we give up the assumption that semantics is autonomous with respect to pragmatics. If, for some reason, we insist on keeping that assumption, then we must indeed retreat to a translational view of semantics. Thus Carston (1988: 176) writes: “Linguistic semantics IS autonomous with respect to pragmatics; it provides the input to pragmatic processes and the two together make propositional forms which are the input to a truth-conditional semantics.” But this vie w, which distinguishes two kinds of semantics, is not forced upon us by the simple fact that we accept TCP. We need to posit a level of TRANSLATIONAL semantics distinct from and additional to standard truth-conditional semantics only if, following Katz, we insist that linguistic semantics must be autonomous with respect to pragmatics.

5. Varieties of meaning

Meaning comes in many varieties. Some of these varieties are said to belong to the field of semantics, others to the field of pragmatics. What is the principle of the distinction? Where does the boundary lie? Before addressing these questions, let us review the evidence by actually looking at the varieties of meaning and what is said about them in the literature on the semantics/pragmatics distinction.

As we have seen, there are several levels of meaning. When an utterance is made, the sentence-type that is uttered possesses a linguistic meaning (level 1). More often than not, that meaning is not a complete content: to get a complete content, one must resolve indeterminacies, assign values to indexical expressions, etc. The richer meaning thus determined is the literal content of the occurrence, which depends not merely upon the conventional significance of the expression-type, but also on features of the context of use (level 2). At level 3, we find aspects of meaning that are not part of the literal content of the utterance. Those aspects of meaning are not aspects of what is said. Rather, the speaker manages to communicate them indirectly, BY saying what she says. Conversational implicatures and indirect speech acts fall into that category. This division into three levels — linguistic meaning, literal content, and conveyed meaning — is incomplete and very rough, but it will do for my present purposes.

Besides the division into levels, there is a further distinction between two types of meaning: descriptive meaning and pragmatic meaning. Both types of meaning can be discerned at the three levels listed above. At the first level, descriptive meaning maps linguistic forms to what they represent; pragmatic meaning relates to their use and constrains the context in which they can occur. At the next level, this corresponds to the distinction between the descriptive content of the utterance (the state of affairs it represents) and its role or function in the discourse. Something similar can often be found at the third level, since what is conveyed may itself be analysable into force and content. This gives us six aspects of meaning, corresponding to the six cells in Table 1.

descriptive meaning pragmatic meaning

linguistic meaning A B

literal content C D

conveyed meaning E F

Table 1

In what follows I will briefly consider the six aspects in turn. Of each aspect I will ask whether, according to the literature, it pertains to semantics, to pragmatics, or to both. In cell A, we find the descriptive meaning of expression-types (e.g. the meaning of words like square or table). That is clearly and unambiguously part of the domain of semantics. No one will disagree here. When we turn to cell B things are less clear. The pragmatic meaning of indicators pertains to semantics insofar as semantics deals with linguistic meaning. Many people hold that view. Some theorists insist on excluding that sort of meaning from semantics, because it is not relevant to truth conditions (Gazdar 1979). Even if one is convinced that

semantics with no treatment of truth conditions is not semantics, however, it seems a bit excessive and

unnatural to hold that semantics deals only with truth conditions. Still, the meaning of pragmatic indicators

is best handled in terms of conditions of use or in terms of constraints on the context, and that provides us

with a positive reason for considering that it belongs to the field of pragmatics. This does not necessarily

mean that it does not belong to semantics, however. It is certainly possible to consider that the meaning of

pragmatic indicators is of concern to both semantics and pragmatics (§2). Let us now consider the aspect of

meaning that corresponds to cell D. In context, the meaning of pragmatic indicators is fleshed out and made

more specific. For example, an utterance of an imperative sentence will be understood specifically as a

request or as a piece of advice. Or consider the word but, which carries what Grice (1967) calls a CONVENTIONAL IMPLICATURE, that is, a non-truth-conditional component of meaning conventionally associated with the expression. The word but in the sentence type “He is rich, but I like beards” signals an argumentative contrast between “he is rich” and “I like beards”, but that contrast cannot be specified in

vacuo. To understand the contrast, we must know which conclusion the antecedent “he is rich” is used to argue for, in the context at hand. According to Ducrot (1972: 128-31), but indicates that the following conditions are contextually satisfied: the first clause p supports a certain conclusion r, while the second clause q provides a stronger argument against that very same conclusion. (As a result, the whole conjunction argues against r.) Just as one must assign a referent to the third-person pronoun in order to understand the literal content of “he is rich”, in order t o grasp the literal content of the conjunction “He is rich but I like beards” one must assign a value to the free variable r which is part and parcel of the meaning of but, e.g. “…so I won?t marry him”. Yet the indication thus fleshed out remains external to the utterance?s truth-conditional content: it belongs only to the “pragmatic” side of literal content. Because that is so, and also because the specific indication conveyed by but heavily depends upon the context (which provides a value for the free variable), it does not feel natural to say that that aspect of the interpretation of the utterance is semantic. Many theorists hold that the conventional meaning of but (cell B) belongs to semantics (as well as, perhaps, to pragmatics), but many fewer would be willing to say the same thing concerning the specific suggestion conveyed by a contextualized use of but. In the case of the imperative sentence which, in context, may be used either to request or to advise, the contrast is even more dramatic. As far as I can tell, no one is willing to say that the specific illocutionary force of the utterance belongs to semantics, even among those who consider the meaning of moods (cell B) as semantic.

What about the descriptive side of literal content (cell C)? That, as we have seen, belongs both to semantics

and to pragmatics. Pragmatics determines the value of indexicals and other free variables, and semantics,

with that input, determines truth conditional content. Most theorists think the literal truth conditions of an

utterance fall on the semantic side of the divide, however, even though pragmatics plays a crucial role. The

reason for that asymmetry is that it is the words themselves which, in virtue of their conventional

significance, make it necessary to appeal to context in order to assign a semantic value to the indexicals and

other free variables. In interpreting indexical sentences, we go beyond what the conventions of the language

give us, but that step beyond is still governed by the conventions of the language. In that sense pragmatics is subordinated to semantics in the determination of truth-conditional content.

That conclusion can be disputed, however. According to TCP, the pragmatic processes that play a role in

the determination of literal content (PRIMARY pragmatic processes, as I call them) fall into two categories.

The determination of the reference of indexicals and, more generally, the determination of the content of

context-sensitive expressions is a typical BOTTOM-UP PROCESS, i.e. a process triggered (and made

obligatory) by a linguistic expression in the sentence itself. But there are other primary pragmatic processes

that are not bottom-up. Far from being triggered by an expression in the sentence, they take place for purely

pragmatic reasons. To give a standard example, suppose someone asks me, at around lunch time, whether I am hungry. I reply: “I?ve had a very large breakfast”. In this context, my utterance conversationally implicates that I am not hungry. In order to retrieve the implicature, the interpreter must first understand

what is said — the input to the SECONDARY pragmatic process responsible for implicature generation. That input is the proposition that the speaker has had a very large breakfast... when? No time is specified in the sentence, which merely describes the posited event as past. On the other hand, the implicature that the speaker is not hungry could not be derived if the said breakfast was not understood as having taken place on the very day in which the utterance is made. Here we arguably have a case where something (the temporal location of the breakfast event on the day of utterance) is part of the intuitive truth conditions of the utterance yet does not correspond to anything in the sentence itself.7 If this is right, then the temporal location of the breakfast event is an UNARTICULATED CONSTITUENT of the statement made by uttering the sentence in that context. Such unarticulated constituents, which are part of the statement made even though they correspond to nothing in the uttered sentence, are said to result from a primary pragmatic process of FREE ENRICHMENT —“free” in the sense of not being linguistically controlled (see Carston, this volume). What triggers the contextual provision of the relevant temporal specification in the above example is not something in the sentence but simply the fact that the utterance is meant as an answer to a question about

the speaker?s present state of hunger (a state that can be causally affected only by a breakfast taken on the same day). While the assignment of values to indexicals is a bottom-up, linguistically controlled pragmatic process, free enrichment is a top-down, pragmatically controlled pragmatic process. Both types of process are primary since they contribute to shaping the intuitive truth conditions of the utterance, the truth conditions that in turn serve as input to secondary pragmatic processes.

Since the pragmatic processes that come into play in the determination of truth conditional content need not be linguistically triggered, pragmatics is not subordinated to semantics in the determination of truth-conditional content. Hence truth-conditional content (cell C) is as much a matter of pragmatics as a matter of semantics, according to TCP.

In order to reconcile the two views, some theorists are willing to distinguish two sorts of literal content. The first type of literal content is “minimal” in the sense that the only pragmatic processes that are allowed to affect it belong to the bottom-up variety. That minimal content is semantic, not pragmatic. Pragmatic processes play a role in shaping it, as we have seen, but they remain under semantic control. In our example, the minimal literal content is the proposition that the speaker has had a large breakfast (at some time in the past). The other notion of literal content corresponds to what I have called the “intuitive” truth conditions of the utterance. Often — as in this example — that includes unarticulated constituents resulting from free enrichment. That content is not AS literal as the minimal content, but it still corresponds to “what is said” as opposed to what the utterance merely implies. (In the example, what the speaker implies is that he is not hungry; what he says, in the nonminimal sense, is that he?s had a large bre akfast that morning.) What is said in that nonminimal sense is what relevance theorists call the EXPLICATURE of the utterance.

Even if we accept that there are these two sorts of content, one may insist that the intuitive (nonminimal) content also is semantic, simply because it is the task of semantics to account for our truth-conditional intuitions. So there is no consensus regarding cell C. As for cells E and F, if they host only meanings that are indirectly conveyed and result from secondary pragmatic processes, there is general agreement that they fall on the pragmatic side of the divide. On the other hand, if we insist that the nonminimal content talked about above is properly located in cell E, while only the minimal content deserves to remain in cell C, then there will be disagreement concerning the semantic or pragmatic nature of the aspect of meaning corresponding to cell E. There may also be disagreement regarding the phenomenon of generalized conversational implicature, which belongs to semantics according to some authors, to pragmatics according to others, and to an “intermediate layer” according to still others (Levinson 2000a: 22-27; the …semantic?approach is argued for in Chierchia 2001).

From all that, what can we conclude? The situation is very confused, obviously, but it is also very clear. It is clear that the semantics/pragmatics distinction as it is currently used obeys several constraints simultaneously. Something is considered as semantic to the extent that it concerns the conventional,

linguistic meaning of words and phrases. The more contextual an aspect of meaning is, the less we are tempted to call it semantic. The difference of treatment between cells B and D provides a good illustration of that. At the same time, something is considered as semantic to the extent that it concerns the truth conditions (or, more generally, the descriptive content) of the utterance. The less descriptive or truth-conditional an aspect of meaning is, the less we are tempted to call it semantic. On these grounds it is clear why there is no disagreement regarding cells A and D. A-meaning is both descriptive and conventional; D-meaning is both nondescriptive and contextual. Those aspects of meaning unambiguously fall on the semantic and the pragmatic side respectively. B and C raise problems because the relevant aspects of meaning are conventional but not truth-conditional, or truth-conditional but not conventional (or not conventional enough).

The semantics/pragmatics distinction displays what psychologists call “prototypicality effects”. It makes perfect sense with respect to Carnapian languages: languages in which the conventional meaning of a sentence can be equated with its truth conditions. Such languages constitute the prototype for the semantics/pragmatics distinction. As we move away from them, the distinction becomes strained and less and less applicable. Natural languages, in particular, turn out to be very different from the prototype — so different that it is futile to insist on providing an answer to the twin questions: What is the principled basis for the semantics/pragmatics distinction? Where does the boundary lie? Answers to these questions can still be given, but they have to rely on stipulation.

References

Austin, J. (1975). How to Do Things with Words. 2nd ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Bach, K. (1997). The Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction: What It Is and Why It Matters.Linguistische Berichte 8: 33-50.

Bar-Hillel, Y. (1970). Aspects of Language. Jerusalem: The Magnes Press.

Barwise, J. and J. Perry (1983). Situations and Attitudes. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press/Bradford Books. Carnap, R. (1937). The Logical Syntax of Language. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Carnap, R. (1942). Introduction to Semantics. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Carston, R. (1988). Implicature, Explicature, and Truth-Theoretic Semantics. In R.

Kempson (ed.), Mental Representations: The Interface between Language and Reality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 155-181.

Chomsky, N. (1976). Conditions on Rules of Grammar. Linguistic Analysis 2: 303-351.

Davidson, D. (1984). Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Gazdar, G. (1979). Pragmatics: Implicature, Presupposition and Logical Form. London:Academic Press. Grice, P. (1989). Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Hintikka, J. (1968). Logic and Philosophy. In R. Klibansky (ed.), La Philosophie

Contemporaine, 1: Logique et Fondements des Mathématiques, Florence: La Nuova Italia, pp. 3-30. Kaplan, D. (1989a). Demonstratives. In J. Almog, H. Wettstein and J. Perry (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 481-463.

Kaplan, D. (1989b). Afterthoughts. In J. Almog, H. Wettstein and J. Perry (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 565-614.

Katz, J. (1975). Logic and Language: An Examination of Recent Criticisms of Intensionalism. In K. Gunderson (ed.), Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis:University of Minnesota Pres, pp. 36-130. Katz, J. (1977). Propositional Structure and Illocutionary Force. New York: Crowell.

Levinson, S. (2000). Presumptive Meaning s. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press/Bradford Books.

Lewis, D. (1969). Convention. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Lewis, D. (1983). Philosophical Papers, Volume 1. New York: Oxford University Press.

Montague, R. (1968). Pragmatics. In R. Klibansky (ed.), La Philosophie Contemporaine,1: Logique et Fondements des Mathématiques, Florence: La Nuova Italia, pp. 102-122.

Montague, R. (1994). Formal Philosophy: Selected Papers (R. Thomason, ed.). New Haven: Yale University Press.

Morris, C. (1938). Foundations of the Theory of Signs. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science 1:2, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Recanati, F. (1993). Direct Reference: From Language to Thought. Oxford: Blackwell. Reichenbach, H. (1947). Elements of Symbolic Logic. London: Macmillan.

Searle, J. (1969). Speech Acts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sperber, D. and D. Wilson (1986). Relevance: Communication and Cognition. Oxford: Blackwell. Stalnaker, R. (1997). Reference and Necessity. In B. Hale and C. Wright (eds.), A

Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 534-554.

Stalnaker, R. (1999). Context and Content. New York: Oxford University Press.

1 There are a few exceptions. The most important one is Reichenbach, whose insightful “Analysis of

conversational language” was published in 1947 as a chapter — the longest — in his Elements of Symbolic Logic.

2 The most influential authors were Austin, Strawson, Grice, and the later Wittgenstein. Grice is a special case, for he thought the two approaches were not incompatible but complementary.

3 “The relations of reference which are studied in semantics are neither directly observable nor independe nt of what men do and decide. These relations are in some sense themselves established and …upheld? through human behavior and human institutions... In order to understand fully the basis of semantics, we are thus led to inquire into the uses of our symbols which bring out the ways in which the representative function of our language comes about.” (Hintikka 1968: 17-18)

4David Lewis makes a similar distinction. A language, Lewis says, is “a set-theoretic abstraction which can be discussed in complete abstra ction from human affairs” (1983: 176). More precisely it is “a set of ordered pairs of strings (sentences) and meanings” (1983: 163). On the other hand language (as opposed to“a language”) is “a social phenomenon which is part of the natural history of human beings; a sphere of human action, wherein people utter strings of vocal sounds, or inscribe strings of marks, and wherein people respond by thought or action to the sounds or marks which they observe to have been so produced”(1983: 164). When we observe the social phenomenon, we note regularities, some of which are conventions in the sense of Lewis (1969). To provide a proper characterization of the linguistic conventions in force in the community we need the abstract notion of language: we need to be able to abstractly specify a certain language L in order to characterize the speech habits of a community by saying that its members are using that language and conforming to conventions involving it.

5 Because of indexicality, a sentence expresses a complete thought or describes a complete state of affairs only with respect to a particular context; but that determination is independent from issues concerning illocutionary force.

6 From the handout of a talk on …Semantics vs Pragmatics?, delivered in 1996 and subsequently published as Bach 1999a. See also Bach (this volume).

7 This is debatable. In Recanati (1993: 257-58), I suggest a possible bottom-up treatment of that example.

语言学基础知识

一、语言和语言学 1、语言的区别性特征：Design of features of language 任意性arbitrariness 指语言符号和它代表的意义没有天然的联系二重性duality 指语言由两层结构组成创造性creativity 指语言可以被创造移位性displacement 指语言可以代表时间和空间上不可及的物体、时间、观点 2、语言的功能（不是很重要）信息功能informative 人际功能interpersonal 施为功能performative 感情功能emotive function 寒暄功能phatic communication 娱乐功能recreational function 元语言功能metalingual function 3、语言学主要分支语音学phonetics 研究语音的产生、传播、接受过程，考查人类语言中的声音音位学phonology研究语音和音节结构、分布和序列形态学morphology研究词的内部结构和构词规则句法学syntax 研究句子结构，词、短语组合的规则语义学semantics 不仅关心字词作为词汇的意义，还有语言中词之上和之下的意义。如语素和句子的意义语用学pragmatics 在语境中研究意义 4、宏观语言学macrolingustics 心理语言学psycholinguistics社会语言学sociolinguistics 人类语言学anthropological linguistics计算机语言学computational linguistics 5语言学中的重要区别规定式和描写式：规定式：prescriptive说明事情应该是怎么样的描写式：descriptive说明事情本来是怎么样的共时研究和历时研究：共时：synchronic研究某个特定时期语言历时：diachronic 研究语言发展规律语言和言语：语言：langue指语言系统的整体言语：parole指具体实际运用的语言语言能力和语言运用：乔姆斯基(chomsky提出) 能力：competence用语言的人的语言知识储备运用：performance真实的语言使用者在实际中的语言使用二、语音学 1、语音学分支发音语音学articulatory phonetics研究语言的产生声学语言学acoustic phonetics研究语音的物理属性听觉语音学auditory phonetics研究语言怎样被感知 2 IPA（国际音标）是由daniel Jones琼斯提出的三、音位学 1、最小对立体minimal pairs 2、音位phoneme

脐带干细胞综述

脐带间充质干细胞的研究进展间充质干细胞（mesenchymal stem cells,MSC S ）是来源于发育早期中胚层的一类多能干细胞[1-5]，MSC S 由于它的自我更新和多项分化潜能，而具有巨大的治疗价值 ,日益受到关注。MSC S 有以下特点：(1)多向分化潜能，在适当的诱导条件下可分化为肌细胞[2]、成骨细胞[3、4]、脂肪细胞、神经细胞[9]、肝细胞[6]、心肌细胞[10]和表皮细胞[11, 12]；(2)通过分泌可溶性因子和转分化促进创面愈合；(3) 免疫调控功能，骨髓源（bone marrow ）MSC S 表达MHC-I类分子，不表达MHC-II 类分子，不表达CD80、CD86、CD40等协同刺激分子，体外抑制混合淋巴细胞反应，体内诱导免疫耐受[11, 15]，在预防和治疗移植物抗宿主病、诱导器官移植免疫耐受等领域有较好的应用前景；(4)连续传代培养和冷冻保存后仍具有多向分化潜能，可作为理想的种子细胞用于组织工程和细胞替代治疗。1974年Friedenstein [16] 首先证明了骨髓中存在MSC S ，以后的研究证明MSC S 不仅存在于骨髓中，也存在于其他一些组织与器官的间质中：如外周血[17]，脐血[5]，松质骨[1, 18]，脂肪组织[1]，滑膜[18]和脐带。在所有这些来源中，脐血(umbilical cord blood)和脐带(umbilical cord)是MSC S 最理想的来源，因为它们可以通过非侵入性手段容易获得，并且病毒污染的风险低，还可冷冻保存后行自体移植。然而，脐血MSC的培养成功率不高[19, 23-24]，Shetty 的研究认为只有6%，而脐带MSC的培养成功率可达100%[25]。另外从脐血中分离MSC S ，就浪费了其中的造血干/祖细胞(hematopoietic stem cells/hematopoietic progenitor cells,HSCs/HPCs) [26, 27]，因此，脐带MSC S (umbilical cord mesenchymal stem cells, UC-MSC S )就成为重要来源。一．概述人脐带约40 g, 它的长度约60–65 cm, 足月脐带的平均直径约1.5 cm[28, 29]。脐带被覆着鳞状上皮，叫脐带上皮，是单层或复层结构，这层上皮由羊膜延续过来[30, 31]。脐带的内部是两根动脉和一根静脉，血管之间是粘液样的结缔组织，叫做沃顿胶质，充当血管外膜的功能。脐带中无毛细血管和淋巴系统。沃顿胶质的网状系统是糖蛋白微纤维和胶原纤维。沃顿胶质中最多的葡萄糖胺聚糖是透明质酸，它是包绕在成纤维样细胞和胶原纤维周围的并维持脐带形状的水合凝胶，使脐带免受挤压。沃顿胶质的基质细胞是成纤维样细胞[32]，这种中间丝蛋白表达于间充质来源的细胞如成纤维细胞的，而不表达于平滑肌细胞。共表达波形蛋白和索蛋白提示这些细胞本质上肌纤维母细胞。脐带基质细胞也是一种具有多能干细胞特点的细胞，具有多项分化潜能，其形态和生物学特点与骨髓源性MSC S 相似[5, 20, 21, 38, 46]，但脐带MSC S 更原始，是介于成体干细胞和胚胎干细胞之间的一种干细胞，表达Oct-4, Sox-2和Nanog等多

北语汉语国际教育学部考研复试经验

北语汉语国际教育学部考研复试经验北语汉语国际教育学部考研复试公共课的复习对于公共课的复习，我想最重要的是要控制自己的贪欲，不要在海量的资料中迷失。时间有限你不会看完所有的资料，即便它们看上去都很美很真实。选择被时间验证过的经典书目可以有效避免浪费宝贵时间，最好的方式是向前辈咨询而不是听信各种宣传。无论英语政治还是专业课，最基础的教材都是第一位的，任何技巧都是在基础知识之上的。技巧并非投机取巧，它可以让你用最短的时间掌握对考试最有价值的东西，而努力仍是必须的。课本和历年真题是基础，其他的资料只是帮助你更好的理解考点。（一）北语汉语国际教育学部考研复试英语在英语方面我不是牛人，但近两年的学习自己也深得体会。不论你之前的英语功底有多好，考研英语都不能怠慢。因为考研英语是几位灭绝师太凑在一起将一篇浅显的文章修改地千疮百孔之后拿来考我们，所以有时是不能用正常的思维顺序去思考的。读懂文章是一方面，做对题是另一方面。而对考研单词的熟悉程度、阅读速度和对真题逻辑的研读是应对一切的法宝。首先，单词是重中之重。考研阅读本身就包含大量生词，需要联系上下文猜测，试想，如果你连最基本的单词都不认识，还怎么猜测。我习惯背小一点的单词书，总觉得大的单词书虽然每个词的意义概括的很全面，但是不方便记忆，常常是看了半天才翻过去一页，效果不好，也没有成就感。如果你不放心，可以买两种，小的用来记忆，大的当字典用来查阅。我当时买了星火的便携本。每天用一小时的时间记两三单元，前几遍先记基本意思和自己原本知道的偏义，因为考研英语虽然很少考基本意思，但考察的引申义从语境中也能根据基本义进行推断。这样反复过多次之后，我用书签盖住意思，然后看单词想它的意思，开始反应有点慢，反复过几次后逐渐快了。我觉得这个过程很重要，因为对单词的反应程度会决定阅读的速度。这之后仍有一些顽固的单词记不住，我把他们写在五颜六色的小卡片上，正面是单词，背面是意思，前前后后整理了近二十摞。每天快下自习的前几分钟就拿出来看一小摞，感觉效果很不错。对于真题中的单词我也是用这种方法记，不知道单词书和小卡片被我翻了多少遍，到最后一两周，为了节省时间背政治，我只看自己小卡片上不熟的单词，直到考研的前一天我还在背单词，不是因为还没记住，只是想保持看到单词的灵敏度和熟悉度。这种记单词的方法真得很受用。

语言学及其研究方法

1 学方法、转换生成语言学方法和综合性的方法。指出了语言研究应由“表层结构”向“深层结构”转换, 通过循序渐进的层次对比研究,抓住寓于语言深部的综合特征, 从而准确把握对比中的语言特征, 充分发挥对比语言的对策性。对比语言学(contrastive linguistics. Contrastive analysis) 在1980 年上海辞书出版社的《语言与语言学辞典》中, 将contrastive analysis 只译作“对比分析”, 许多属于对比语言学范畴的我国学者们的论著, 也大都冠以“比较”二字, 归在比较语言学的领域。也就是说, 对于对比语言学这门学科, 人们还缺乏充分认识。然而就方法论而言, 对比语言学是一门共时语言学（synchronic）, 它只是共时地对两种或两种以上语言进行考查分析, 指出它们之间的语音、语法、词汇等各个部门里的同异点, 并努力运用哲学、心理学、民族学等各学科的知识与理论去说明这些同异点之所以产生的根源。一、对比语言学的历史演变虽然对比语言学的研究经历了较长的孕育期, 但真正的研究史只有短短的五十多年。如果要讨论对比语言学的雏形, 我们可以追溯到非常久远的年代。公元初年,佛教开始传入我国; 接着, 我们中华民族光辉灿烂的古代文化传播到日本、朝鲜等国, 形成了举世瞩目的汉字文化圈。在这种吸收消化异族文化与学习吸取异邦文明的过程中, 无疑将首先对其运载工具—— 语言进行研究, 而这种研究也只能是建立在同民族的语言比较对比的基础上。因此, 从这个意义上来说, 我国古代的先哲们译释佛教经典, 五六世纪的日本人“训读”我们的古文的工作都可以认为是对比性的。不过, 事实告诉我们, 这种译释或“训读”远远不是一种建立在严格的语言科学基础上的成体系的工作, 因此, 我们无从把它划入对比语言学的范畴。而真正的对比语言学诞生于20 世纪50 年代, 它是结构主义语言理论和外国语教育发展的联合产物。19世纪末, 索绪尔树立起语言学史上第一座划时代的丰碑, 他的语言理论影响了包括布龙菲尔德在内的众多的语言学家。

脐带血造血干细胞库管理办法(试行)

脐带血造血干细胞库管理办法（试行）第一章总则第一条为合理利用我国脐带血造血干细胞资源，促进脐带血造血干细胞移植高新技术的发展，确保脐带血造血干细胞应用的安全性和有效性，特制定本管理办法。第二条脐带血造血干细胞库是指以人体造血干细胞移植为目的，具有采集、处理、保存和提供造血干细胞的能力，并具有相当研究实力的特殊血站。任何单位和个人不得以营利为目的进行脐带血采供活动。第三条本办法所指脐带血为与孕妇和新生儿血容量和血循环无关的，由新生儿脐带扎断后的远端所采集的胎盘血。第四条对脐带血造血干细胞库实行全国统一规划，统一布局，统一标准，统一规范和统一管理制度。第二章设置审批第五条国务院卫生行政部门根据我国人口分布、卫生资源、临床造血干细胞移植需要等实际情况，制订我国脐带血造血干细胞库设置的总体布局和发展规划。第六条脐带血造血干细胞库的设置必须经国务院卫生行政部门批准。第七条国务院卫生行政部门成立由有关方面专家组成的脐带血造血干细胞库专家委员会（以下简称专家委

员会），负责对脐带血造血干细胞库设置的申请、验收和考评提出论证意见。专家委员会负责制订脐带血造血干细胞库建设、操作、运行等技术标准。第八条脐带血造血干细胞库设置的申请者除符合国家规划和布局要求，具备设置一般血站基本条件之外，还需具备下列条件：（一）具有基本的血液学研究基础和造血干细胞研究能力；（二）具有符合储存不低于1 万份脐带血的高清洁度的空间和冷冻设备的设计规划；（三）具有血细胞生物学、HLA 配型、相关病原体检测、遗传学和冷冻生物学、专供脐带血处理等符合GMP、 GLP 标准的实验室、资料保存室；（四）具有流式细胞仪、程控冷冻仪、PCR 仪和细胞冷冻及相关检测及计算机网络管理等仪器设备；（五）具有独立开展实验血液学、免疫学、造血细胞培养、检测、HLA 配型、病原体检测、冷冻生物学、管理、质量控制和监测、仪器操作、资料保管和共享等方面的技术、管理和服务人员；（六）具有安全可靠的脐带血来源保证；（七）具备多渠道筹集建设资金运转经费的能力。第九条设置脐带血造血干细胞库应向所在地省级卫生行政部门提交设置可行性研究报告，内容包括：

Semantics 语义学

Semantics 1. What is Semantics? Semantics is the study of the meaning of words, phrases and sentences.语义学是研究单词、短语和句子的意义的学科 2．Geoffrey Leech利奇Seven types of meaning7种意义类型: ①Conceptual meaning概念意义 ②Connotative meaning内涵意义 ③Social meaning社会意义 ④Affective meaning 感情意义Associative Meaning联想意义（②——⑥） ⑤Reflected meaning反射意义 ⑥Collocative meaning搭配意义 ⑦Thematic meaning主位意义 3.Conceptual meaning(概念意义)is also called “denotative”（外延义）and it is concerned with the relationship between a word and the thing it refers to.概念意义也叫外延义，它关注词语跟它所指称事物之间的联系 Conceptual meaning is meaning given in the dictionary. 4.Associative meaning (联想意义) is the total of all the meanings a person thinks of when they hear the word Associative meaning is the meaning which a word suggests or implies. 5.Thematic meaning (主位意义) is “what is communicated by the way in which the message is organized in terms of order and emphasis.”它是由词序和词语重音所决定的 6. The Referential Theory（指称理论）： ① The Referential Theory ② The Semantic Triangle ③ Sense and Reference 7.The referential theory指称理论 is the theory of meaning which relates the meaning of a word to the thing it refers to.指称论是把词语意义跟它所指称的事物联系起来的理论 8. The semantic triangle语意三角 is the indirect relation between a word and a thing it refers to and it is mediated by concept.语意三角指词和所指事物之间没有直接关系，它们是以概念为中介的 9.Sense (涵义) is a set of properties possessed by a name. 10.Reference (指称) is the symbolic relationship that a linguistic expression has with the concrete object. 11. The sense of an expression is the thought it expresses, while its reference is the object it represents Every word has a sense, but not every word has a reference. 12. Sense Relations涵义关系 ①Synonymy（同义关系） ②Antonymy（反义关系）（Gradable、Complementary、Converse） ③Hyponymy（上下义关系） 13.But total synonymy is rare. They may differ in style, connotations and dialect.

语言决定思维

2008-01-06 14:24 许国璋先生在《中国大百科全书》（语言文字卷）对语言作了这样的解释：“语言是人类特有的一种符号系统。当作用于人与人的关系的时候，它就表达相互反映的中介；当作用于人与客观事件的关系的时候，它是认知事物的工具；当作用于文化的时候，它是文化作息的载体。”在这个定义之后，许先生从自己所定义的语言特色、语言的功能、语言的发生、语言的模式等四个方面作了较为详细的论证。传统语言观受到了来自各个方面的挑战。其中一个最为重要的挑战就是语言和思维到底是一种什么样的关系。语言与思维的关系问题是多种学科，如哲学、心理学、病理学、生物学、人类学和信息科学等都密切关注和长期争论的重大理论问题，当然更是心理语言学或语言心理学的一个重要课题。沈阳说要讨论语言和思维的关系，先要搞清楚两个问题：一是什么是“思维”；二是“语言与思维的关系”是一个什么样的问题。

那么什么是“思维”呢？沈阳在《语言学常识十五讲》中总结说：“狭义的‘思维’可以说就只是‘思考’，即只包括‘想的活动’，但是较广义的‘思维’可以说是包括‘思考’和‘思想’两个方面，即不但指不同程度或不同阶段‘想的活动’，也指不同程度或不同阶段‘想的结果’。”（1）那么“语言与思维的关系”又是一个什么样的问题呢？这实际上就是要搞清楚人是怎么“想问题”的，或者说是人们在进行“想的活动”和了解“想的结果”的时候，到底主要靠的是什么。其实语言就是思维的工具，思维的各个方面，即“想的活动”和“想的结果”，实际上都离不开语言。人们正是靠了语言才能够知道大家都想了些什么，同时也才能把思维的结果固定起来和传递下去。（2）不过仅仅说语言是思维的工具，思维离不开语言，这还比较笼统。因为从地位和作用上说，我们还不知道语言和思维是相互作用

英语语义学 Semantics

Semantics Semantics Semantics is the study of the meaning of linguistic units, words and sentences in particular. Semantics = Theory of Meaning Its goal is to reveal how language are matched with their proper meanings by the speakers of that language. Lexical semantics—the study of word meanings. it deals not only with the meanings of individual words but also the relationship between the meanings of different words. Compositional semantics—is concerned exclusively with the meanings of phrases and sentences. History of Semantics 1893 - French linguist Breal coined ―semantique‖. 1897 – Breal first use it as the science of meaning. 1900 – Its English version came out. 1980s – semantics began to be introduced into China. One of the most famous books on semantics is The Meaning of Meaning(1923). Semantic Triangle 语义三角 Concept（meaning） refers to symbolizes Symbol Thing （word）（referent） stands for The Referential Theory 指称论 Concept (Meaning): the mental image, the abstraction or generalization of objects of the same kind. Referent (Thing): the physical entity or actual object, event, idea or whatever if denoted by a word, phrase or expression. Concept VS. Referent (Thing) A referent may exist in the physical world. The concept is abstracted from the referent and labeled by a word. Sense 语义 Sense is the inherent meaning of the linguistic form independent of situational context. It’s abstract and de-contextualized. Sense Relations Sense relations between words

对比语言学的定义-起源和发展

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