凯南长电报英文版

The Long Telegram

George Kennan

Moscow

22 February 1946

Answer to Dept’s 284, Feb. 3,11 involves questions so intricate, so delicate, so strange to our form of thought, and so important to analysis of our international environment that I cannot compress answers into single brief message without yielding to what I feel would be dangerous degree of oversimplification. I hope, therefore, Dept will bear with me if I submit in answer to this question five parts, subjects of which will be roughly as follows:

(1) Basic features of postwar Soviet outlook.

(2) Background of this outlook.

(3) Its projection in practical policy on official level.

(4) Its projection on unofficial level.

(5) Practical deductions from standpoint of US policy.

I apologize in advance for this burdening of telegraphic channel; but questions involved are of such urgent importance, particularly in view of recent events, that our answers to them, if they deserve attention at all, seem to me to deserve it at once. There follows:

Part 1: Basic Features of Postwar Soviet Outlook as Put Forward by Official Propaganda Machine, Are as Follows

(a) USSR still lives in antagonistic "capitalist encirclement" with which in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence. As stated by Stalin in 1927 to a delegation of American workers: "In course of further development of international revolution there will emerge two centers of world significance: a socialist center, drawing to itself the countries which tend toward socialism, and a capitalist center, drawing to itself the countries that incline toward capitalism. Battle between these two centers for command of world economy will decide fate of capitalism and of communism in entire world.

(b) Capitalist world is beset with internal conflicts, inherent in nature of capitalist society. These conflicts are insoluble by means of peaceful compromise. Greatest of them is that between England and US.

(c) Internal conflicts of capitalism inevitably generate wars. Wars thus generated may be of two kinds: intra-capitalist wars between two capitalist states and wars of intervention against socialist

world. Smart capitalists, vainly seeking escape from inner conflicts of capitalism, incline toward latter.

(d) Intervention against USSR, while it would be disastrous to those who undertook it, would cause renewed delay in progress of Soviet socialism and must therefore be forestalled at all costs.

(e) Conflicts between capitalist states, though likewise fraught with danger for USSR, nevertheless hold out great possibilities for advancement of socialist cause, particularly if USSR remains militarily powerful, ideologically monolithic and faithful to its present brilliant leadership.

(f) It must be borne in mind that capitalist world is not all bad. In addition to hopelessly reactionary and bourgeois elements, it includes (1) certain wholly enlightened and positive elements united in acceptable communistic parties and (2) certain other elements (now described for tactical reasons as progressive or democratic) whose reactions, aspirations and activities happen to be "objectively" favorable to interests of USSR. These last must be encouraged and utilized for Soviet purposes.

(g) Among negative elements of bourgeois-capitalist society, most dangerous of all are those whom Lenin called false friends of the people, namely moderate-socialist or social-democratic leaders (in other words, non-Communist left-wing). These are more dangerous than out-and-out reactionaries, for latter at least march under their true colors, whereas moderate left-wing leaders confuse people by employing devices of socialism to serve interests of reactionary capital.

So much for premises. To what deductions do they lead from standpoint of Soviet policy? To following:

(a) Everything must be done to advance relative strength of USSR as factor in international society. Conversely, no opportunity must be missed to reduce strength and influence, collectively as well as individually, of capitalist powers.

(b) Soviet efforts, and those of Russia’s friends abroad, must be directed toward deepening and exploiting of differences and conflicts between capitalist powers. If these eventually deepen into an "imperialist" war, this war must be turned into revolutionary upheavals within the various capitalist countries.

(c) "Democratic-progressive" elements abroad are to be utilized to maximum to bring pressure to bear on capitalist governments along lines agreeable to Soviet interests.

(d) Relentless battle must be waged against socialist and soial-democratic leaders abroad.

Part 2: Background of Outlook

Before examining ramifications of this party line in practice there are certain aspects of it to which I wish to draw attention.

First, it does not represent natural outlook of Russian people. Latter are, by and large, friendly to outside world, eager for experience of it, eager to measure against it talents they are conscious of possessing, eager above all to live in peace and enjoy fruits of their own labor. Party line only represents thesis which official propaganda machine puts forward with great skill and persistence to a public often remarkably resistant in the stronghold of its innermost thoughts. But party line is binding for outlook and conduct of people who make up apparatus of power--party, secret police and Government--and it is exclusively with these that we have to deal.

Second, please note that premises on which this party line is based are for most part simply not true. Experience has shown that peaceful and mutually profitable coexistence of capitalist and socialist states is entirely possible. Basic internal conflicts in advanced countries are no longer primarily those arising out of capitalist ownership of means of production, but are ones arising from advanced urbanism and industrialism as such, which Russia has thus far been spared not by socialism but only by her own backwardness. Internal rivalries of capitalism do not always generate wars; and not all wars are attributable to this cause. To speak of possibility of intervention against USSR today, after elimination of Germany and Japan and after example of recent war, is sheerest nonsense. If not provoked by forces of intolerance and subversion, "capitalist" world of today is quite capable of living at peace with itself and with Russia. Finally, no sane person has reason to doubt sincerity of moderate socialist leaders in Western countries. Nor is it fair to deny success of their efforts to improve conditions for working population whenever, as in Scandinavia, they have been given chance to show what they could do.

Falseness of these premises, every one of which predates recent war, was amply demonstrated by that conflict itself. Anglo-American differences did not turn out to be major differences of Western world. Capitalist countries, other than those of Axis, showed no disposition to solve their differences by joining in crusade against USSR. Instead of imperialist war turning into civil wars and revolution, USSR found itself obliged to fight side by side with capitalist powers for an avowed community of aims.

Nevertheless, all these theses, however baseless and disproven, are being boldly put forward again today. What does this indicate? It indicates that Soviet party line is not based on any objective analysis of situation be yond Russia’s borders; that it has, indeed, little to do with conditions outside of Russia; that it arises mainly from basic inner-Russian necessities which existed before recent war and exist today.

At bottom of Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs i s traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, this was insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on vast exposed plain in neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia came into contact with economically advanced West, fear of more competent, more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. But this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted Russian rulers rather than Russian people; for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form, fragile and artificial in its psychological foundations, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of Western countries. For this reason they have

always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between Western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned truth about world without or if foreigners learned truth about world within. And they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.

It was no coincidence that Marxism, which had smouldered ineffectively for half a century in Western Europe, caught hold and blazed for the first time in Russia. Only in this land which had never known a friendly neighbor or indeed any tolerant equilibrium of separate powers, either internal or international, could a doctrine thrive which viewed economic conflicts of society as insoluble by peaceful means. After establishment of Bolshevist regime, Marxist dogma, rendered even more truculent and intolerant by Lenin’s interpretation, become a perfect vehicle for sense of insecurity with which Bolsheviks, even more than previous Russian rulers, were afflicted. In this dogma, with its basic altruism of purpose, they found justification for their instinctive fear of outside world, for the dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not dare not to inflict, for sacrifices they felt bound to demand. In the name of Marxism they sacrificed every single ethical value in their methods and tactics. Today they cannot dispense with it. It is fig leaf of their moral and intellectual respectability. Without it they would stand before history, at best, as only the last of that long succession of cruel and wasteful Russian rulers who have relentlessly forced country on to ever new heights of military power in order to guarantee external security of their internally weak regimes. This is why Soviet purposes must always be solemnly clothed in trappings of Marxism, and why no one should underrate importance of dogma in Soviet affairs. Thus Soviet leaders are driven [by] necessities of their own past and present position to put forward a dogma which [apparent omission] outside world as evil, hostile and menacing, but as bearing within itself germs of creeping disease and destined to be wracked with growing internal convulsions until it is given final coup de grace by rising power of socialism and yields to new and better world. This thesis provides justification for that increase of military and police power of Russian state, for that isolation of Russian population from outside world, and for that fluid and constant pressure to extend limits of Russian police power which are together the natural and instinctive urges of Russian rulers. Basically this is only the steady advance of uneasy Russian nationalism, a centuries old movement in which conceptions of offense and defense are inextricably confused. But in new guise of international Marxism, with its honeyed promises to a desperate and war-torn outside world, it is more dangerous and insidious than ever before.

It should not be thought from above that Soviet party line is necessarily disingenuous and insincere on part of those who put it forward. Many of them are too ignorant of outside world and mentally too dependent to question [apparent omission] self-hypnotism, and who have no difficulty making themselves believe what they find it comforting and convenient to believe. Finally we have the unsolved mystery as to who, if anyone, in this great land actually receives accurate and unbiased information about outside world. In atmosphere of oriental secretiveness and conspiracy which pervades this Government, possibilities for distorting or poisoning sources and currents of information are infinite. The very disrespect of Russians for objective truth--indeed, their disbelief in its existence--leads them to view all stated facts as instruments for furtherance of one ulterior purpose or another. There is good reason to suspect that this Government is actually a conspiracy witin a conspiracy; and I for one am reluctant to believe that

Stalin himself receives anything like an objective picture of outside world. Here there is ample scope for the type of subtle intrigue at which Russians are past masters. Inability of foreign governments to place their case squarely before Russian policy makers--extent to which they are delivered up in their relations with Russia to good graces of obscure and unknown advisers whom they never see and cannot influence--this to my mind is most disquieting feature of diplomacy in Moscow, and one which Western statesmen would do well to keep in mind if they would understand nature of difficulties encountered here.

Part 3: Projection of Soviet Outlook in Practical Policy on Official Level

We have now seen nature and background of Soviet program. What may we expect by way of its practical implementation?

Soviet policy, as Department implies in its query under reference, is conducted on two planes: (1) official plane represented by actions undertaken officially in name of Soviet Government; and (2) subterranean plane of actions undertaken by agencies for which Soviet Government does not admit responsibility.

Policy promulgated on both planes will be calculated to serve basic policies (a) to (d) outlined in part 1. Actions taken on different planes will differ considerably, but will dovetail into each other in purpose, timing and effect.

On official plane we must look for following:

(a) Internal policy devoted to increasing in every way strength and prestige of Soviet state: intensive military-industrialization; maximum development of armed forces; great displays to impress outsiders; continued secretiveness about internal matters, designed to conceal weaknesses and to keep opponent in the dark.

(b) Wherever it is considered timely and promising, efforts will be made to advance official limits of Soviet power. For the moment, these efforts are restricted to certain neighboring points conceived of here as being of immediate strategic necessity, such as northern Iran, Turkey, possibly Bornholm. However, other points may at any time come into question, if and as concealed Soviet political power is extended to new areas. Thus a "friendly" Persian Government might be asked to grant Russia a port on Persian Gulf. Should Spain fall under Communist control, question of Soviet base at Gibraltar Strait might be activated. But such claims will appear on official level only when unofficial preparation is complete.

(c) Russians will participate officially in international organizations where they see opportunity of extending Soviet power or of inhibiting or diluting power of others. Moscow sees in UNO not the mechanism for a permanent and stable world society founded on mutual interest and aims of all nations, but an arena in which aims just mentioned can be favorably pursued. As long as UNO is considered here to serve this purpose, Soviets will remain with it. But if at any time they come to conclusion that it is serving to embarrass or frustrate their aims for power expansion and if they

see better prospects for pursuit of these aims along other lines, they will not hesitate to abandon UNO. This would imply, however, that they felt themselves strong enough to split unity of other nations by their withdrawal, to render UNO ineffective as a threat to their aims or security, and to replace it with an international weapon more effective from their viewpoint. Thus Soviet attitude toward UNO will depend largely on loyalty of other nations to it, and on degree of vigor, decisiveness and cohesion with which these nations defend in UNO the peaceful and hopeful concept of international life, which that organization represents to our way of thinking. I reiterate, Moscow has no abstract devotion to UNO ideals. Its attitude to that organization will remain essentially pragmatic and tactical.

(d) Toward colonial areas and backward or dependent peoples, Soviet policy, even on official plane, will be directed toward weakening of power and influence and contacts of advanced Western nations, on theory that insofar as this policy is successful, there will be created a vacuum which will favor Communist-Soviet penetration. Soviet pressure for participation in trusteeship arrangements thus represents, in my opinion, a desire to be in a position to complicate and inhibit exertion of Western influence at such points rather than to provide major channel for exerting of Soviet power. Latter motive is not lacking, but for this Soviets prefer to rely on other channels than official trusteeship arrangements. Thus we may expect to find Soviets asking for admission everywhere to trusteeship or similar arrangements and using levers thus acquired to weaken Western influence among such peoples.

(e) Russians will strive energetically to develop Soviet representation in, and official ties with, countries in which they sense strong possibilities of opposition to Western centers of power. This applies to such widely separated points as Germany, Argentina, Middle Eastern countries, etc.

(f) In international economic matters, Soviet policy will really be dominated by pursuit of autarchy for Soviet Union and Soviet-dominated adjacent areas taken together. That, however, will be underlying policy. As far as official line is concerned, position is not yet clear. Soviet Government has shown strange reticence since termination hostilities on subject foreign trade. If large-scale long-term credits should be forthcoming, I believe Soviet Government may eventually again do lip service, as it did in 1930’s, to desirability of building up international economic exchanges in general. Otherwise I think it possible Soviet foreign trade may be restricted largely to Soviet’s own securi ty sphere, including occupied areas in Germany, and that a cold official shoulder may be turned to principle of general economic collaboration among nations.

(g) With respect to cultural collaboration, lip service will likewise be rendered to desirability of deepening cultural contact between peoples, but this will not in practice be interpreted in any way which could weaken security position of Soviet peoples. Actual manifestations of Soviet policy in this respect will be restricted to arid channels of closely shepherded official visits and functions, with superabundance of vodka and speeches and dearth of permanent effects.

(h) Beyond this, Soviet official relations will take what might be called "correct" course with individual foreign governments, with great stress being laid on prestige of Soviet Union and its representatives and with punctilious attention to protocol, as distinct from good manners.

Part 4: Following May Be Said as to What We May Expect by Way of Implementation of Basic Soviet Policies on Unofficial, or Subterranean Plane, i.e., on Plane for Which Soviet Government Accepts No Responsibility.

Agencies utilized for promulgation of policies on this plane are following:

1. Inner central core of Communist parties in other countries. While many of persons who compose this category may also appear and act in unrelated public capacities, they are in reality working closely together as an underground operating directorate of world communism, a concealed Comintern12 tightly coordinated and directed by Moscow. It is important to remember that this inner core is actually working on underground lines, despite legaity of parties with which it is associated.

2. Rank and Communist parties. Note distinction is drawn between these and persons defined in paragraph 1. This distinction has become much sharper in recent years. Whereas formerly foreign Communist parties represented a curious (and from Moscow’s standpoint often inconvenient) mixture of conspiracy and legitimate activity, now the conspiratorial element has been neatly concentrated in inner circle and ordered underground, while rank and longer even taken into confidence about realities of movement--are thrust forward as bona fide internal partisans of certain political tendencies within their respective countries, genuinely innocent of conspiratorial connection with foreign states. Only in certain countries where communists are numerically strong do they now regularly appear and act as a body. As a rule they are used to penetrate, and to influence or dominate, as case may be, other organizations less likely to be suspected of being tools of Soviet Government, with a view to accomplishing their purposes through [apparent omission] organizations, rather than by direct action as a separate political party.

3. A wide variety of national associations or bodies which can be dominated or influenced by such penetration. These include: labor unions, youth leagues, women’s organizations, racial societies, religious societies, social organizations, cultural groups, liberal magazines, publishing houses, etc.

4. International organizations which can be similarly penetrated through influence over various national components. Labor, youth and women’s organizations are prominent among them. Particular, almost vital, importance is attached in this connection to international labor movement. In this, Moscow sees possibility of sidetracking Western governments in world affairs and building up international lobby capable of compelling governments to take actions favorable to Soviet interests in various countries and of paralyzing actions disagreeable to USSR.

5. Russian Orthodox Church, with its foreign branches, and through it the Eastern Orthodox Church in general.

6. Pan-Slav movement and other movements (Azerbaijan, Armenian, Turcoman, etc.) based on

racial groups within Soviet Union.

7. Governments or governing groups willing to lend themselves to Soviet purposes in one degree or another, such as present Bulgarian and Yugoslav governments, North Persian regime, Chinese Communists, etc. Not only propaganda machines but actual policies of these regimes can be placed extensively at disposal of USSR.

It may be expected that component parts of this far-flung apparatus will be utilized, in accordance with their individual suitability, as follows:

(a) To undermine general political and strategic potential of major Western Powers. Efforts will be made in such countries to disrupt national self-confidence, to hamstring measures of national defense, to increase social and industrial unrest, to stimulate all forms of disunity. All persons with grievances, whether economic or racial, will be urged to seek redress not in mediation and compromise, but in defiant, violent struggle for destruction of other elements of society. Here poor will be set against rich, black against white, young against old, newcomers against established residents, etc.

(b) On unofficial plane particularly violent efforts will be made to weaken power and influence of Western Powers [on] colonial, backward, or dependent peoples. On this level, no holds will be barred. Mistakes and weaknesses of Western colonial administration will be mercilessly exposed and exploited. Liberal opinion in Western countries will be mobilized to weaken colonial policies. Resentment among dependent peoples will be stimulated. And while latter are being encouraged to seek independence [from] Western Powers, Soviet dominated puppet political machines will be undergoing preparation to take over domestic power in respective colonial areas when independence is achieved.

(c) Where individual governments stand in path of Soviet purposes pressure will be brought for their removal from office. This can happen where governments directly oppose Soviet foreign policy aims (Turkey, Iran), where they seal their territories off against Communist penetration (Switzerland, Portugal), or where they compete too strongly (like Labor Government in England) for moral domination among elements which it is important for Communists to dominate. (Sometimes, two if the elements are present in a single case. Then Communist opposition becomes particularly shrill and savage.)

(d) In foreign countries Communists will, as a rule, work toward destruction of all forms of personal independence--economic, political or moral. Their system can handle only individuals who have been brought into complete dependence on higher power. Thus, persons who are financially independent--such as individual businessmen, estate owners, successful farmers, artisans--and all those who exercise local leadership or have local prestige--such as popular local clergymen or political figures--are anathema. It is not by chance that even in USSR local officials are kept constantly on move from one job to another, to prevent their taking root.

(e) Everything possible will be done to set major Western Powers against each other. Anti-British

talk will be plugged among Americans, anti-American talk among British. Continentals, including Germans, will be taught to abhor both Anglo-Saxon powers. Where suspicions exist, they will be fanned; where not, ignited. No effort will be spared to discredit and combat all efforts which threaten to lead to any sort of unity or cohesion among other [apparent omission] from which Russia might be excluded. Thus, all forms of international organization not amenable to Communist penetration and control, whether it be the Catholic [apparent omission] international economic concerns, or the international fraternity of royalty and aristocracy, must expect to find themselves under fire from many, and often [apparent omission].

(f) In general, all Soviet efforts on unofficial international plane will be negative and destructive in character, designed to tear down sources of strength beyond reach of Soviet control. This is only in line with basic Soviet instinct that there can be no compromise with rival power and that constructive work can start only when Communist power is dominant. But behind all this will be applied insistent, unceasing pressure for penetration and command of key positions in administration and especially in police apparatus of foreign countries. The Soviet regime is a police regime par excellence, reared in the dim half world of Tsarist police intrigue, accustomed to think primarily in terms of police power. This should never be lost sight of in gauging Soviet motives.

Part 5. Practical Deductions from Standpoint of US Policy

In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over energies of one of world’s greatest peoples and resources of world’s richest national territory, and is borne along by deep and powerful currnts of Russian nationalism. In addition, it has an elaborate and far-flung apparatus for exertion of its influence in other countries, an apparatus of amazing flexibility and versatility, managed by people whose experience and skill in underground methods are presumably without parallel in history. Finally, it is seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality in its basic reactions. For it, the vast fund of objective fact about human society is not, as with us, the measure against which outlook is constantly being tested and re-formed, but a grab bag from which individual items are selected arbitrarily and tendenciously to bolster an outlook already preconceived. This is admittedly not a pleasant picture. Problem of how to cope with this force [is] undoubtedly greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably greatest it will ever have to face. It should be point of departure from which our political general staff work at present juncture should proceed. It should be approached with same thoroughness and care as solution of major strategic problem in war and, if necessary, with no smaller outlay in planning effort. I cannot attempt to suggest all answers here. But I would like to record my conviction that problem is within our power to solve--and that without recourse to any general military conflict. And in support of this conviction there are certain observations for a more encouraging nature I should like to make.

(1) Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic nor adventuristic. It does

not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw--and usually does--when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there need be no prestige-engaging showdowns.

(2) Gauged against Western world as a whole, Soviets are still by far the weaker force. Thus, their success will really depend on degree of cohesion, firmness and vigor which Western world can muster. And this is factor which it is within our power to influence.

(3) Success of Soviet system, as form of internal power, is not yet finally proven. It has yet to be demonstrated that it can survive supreme test of successive transfer of power from one individual or group to another. Lenin’s death was first such transfer, and its effects wracked Soviet state for 15 years. After Stalin’s death or retirement will be second. But even this will not be final test. Soviet internal system will now be subjected, by virtue of recent territorial expansions, to series of additional strains which once proved severe tax on Tsardom. We here are convinced that never since termination of civil war have mass of Russian people been emotionally farther removed from doctrines of Communist Party than they are today. In Russia, party has now become a great and--for the moment--highly successful apparatus of dictatorial administration, but it has ceased to be a source of emotional inspiration. Thus, internal soundness and permanence of movement need not yet be regarded as assured.

(4) All Soviet propaganda beyond Soviet security sphere is basically negative and destructive. It should therefore be relatively easy to combat it by any intelligent and really constructive program.

For these reasons I think we may approach calmly and with good heart problem of how to deal with Russia. As to how this approach should be made, I only wish to advance, by way of conclusion, following comments:

(1) Our first step must be to apprehend, and recognize for what it is, the nature of the movement with which we are dealing. We must study it with same courage, detachment, objectivity, and same determination not to be emotionally provoked or unseated by it, with which doctor studies unruly and unreasonable individual.

(2) We must see that our public is educated to realities of Russian situation. I cannot overemphasize importance of this. Press cannot do this alone. It must be done mainly by Government, which is necessarily more experienced and better informed on practical problems involved. In this we need not be deterred by [ugliness?] of picture. I am convinced that there would be far less hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country today if realities of this situation were better understood by our people. There is nothing as dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown. It may also be argued that to reveal more information on our difficulties with Russia would reflect unfavorably on Russian-American relations. I feel that if there is any real risk here involved, it is one which we should have courage to face, and sooner the better. But I cannot see what we would be risking. Our stake in this country, even coming on heels of tremendous demonstrations of our

岳麓版高中历史高三三轮考前技能篇：第2课非选择题解题技巧(练习)含解析

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信任感，对那些在大萧条时期认为社会主义可以建立更为公正的社会秩序的美国人中的理想主义者嗤之以鼻，然而，他并不担心苏联对西方的军事威胁，他赞成苏联和西方达成有限的妥协。 凯南在莫斯科当了几年领事和秘书后，到国务院苏联办公室工作了一年，然后被派往布拉格和柏林，凯南在柏林时正好碰上美国对德宣战，他被关了几个月后被遣送回美国。战争期间，他在里斯本和伦敦工作，1944-1946年，他任驻莫斯科代办，战争结束时，他在那里观察苏联政权的举动和后来被称为“冷战”的开始。 1946年2月22日，任驻苏联代办的乔治·凯南向美国国务院发了一封长达8000字的电文，对苏联的内部社会和对外政策进行了深入分析，提出并最终被美国政府所采纳的对付苏联的长期战略，也就是遏制政策，对20世纪后半叶的世界政治产生了重大影响。 1947年，乔治·凯南以“X”的署名在美国《外交事务》上发表文章《苏联行为的根源》，该文明确提出美国要使用“抵抗力量”，对苏联的扩张倾向进行长期、耐心、坚定与警觉

从

从“8000字电报”看战后美国对苏遏制战略出台的考量 了解到乔治·凯南就是从遏制战略这个词开始的，书中对乔治·凯南的评论始终脱不开冷战理论家、遏制政策之父之类的文字。然而读罢他的长电报，却始终觉得此“遏制”非彼“遏制”。美国对苏联遏制政策出台的根基确实是这篇著名的电报，但其出发点却不同于乔治·凯南的最初设想。美国政府从凯南对苏联的分析中得出了不同的结论。可能是美国政府误读了凯南的本意，也有可能是它故意曲解了凯南的分析。但无论如何，这些因误解而得出的结论才是后来出台的遏制战略。 与遏制战略以防共、反共，以强硬手段遏制前苏联势力扩张，封锁孤立社会主义国家为目标不同，凯南得出抵御苏联的关键在于坚定国内立场，繁荣自身经济，稳定西方社会。凯南对苏联的了解更多来自于下层人民，因此，他对苏联人民充满了同情，认为他们只是受到了苏共宣传的蒙蔽。认为苏共的路线不代表苏联人民的意愿。“俄国人民对外部世界是友好的，他们渴求获得外国的经验，渴望同世界各地的人们比比他们所拥有的才华，特别是渴望过和平的生活，享受自己劳动的成果。党的路线只代表官方宣传机器以巧妙的手法和极大的耐心，向群众提出的论点，而群众在内心深处常常对那些论点有着惊人的抗拒情绪。”凯南本身十分敌视共产主义思想和制度，认为苏联政权将意识形态当作“扩张”的工具，在电报里将马克思思想比作是苏共扩张野心的一块遮羞布。对苏联人民的同情和对苏共的厌恶这两种感情上的矛盾让凯南对苏的策略有了双重性，有了被解释引申的可能，但感情的实际上并没有让凯南的策略也变的矛盾。凯南的策略分为三个部分，一部分是对苏共的强硬政策，一部分是对苏联人民的开放政策，还有一部分是对西方国家内部的繁荣政策。而美国政府最初只采取了凯南对苏联的强硬政策，直到冷战后期才开始对社会主义国家进行“和平演变”，又走回了凯南理论的老路上。 美国政府对苏采取强硬态度主要与凯南对苏联以下几个方面的分析有关。第一，苏联由于自身民族历史原因和意识形态影响，坚决同西方站在对立面。苏联认为自己“生活在敌对的‘资本主义包围之中’从长远来看不能和资本主义和平相处。”而从历史上来说俄罗斯民族长久以来就对自己的制度有一种自卑感，同游牧民族为邻又让他们多有一种受威胁的不安全感。苏联的敌对与不妥协态度令美国政府坚定与之斗争的想法，至此，美苏两方都认定意识形态上的矛盾是不可调和的，战时的同盟关系也随之宣告瓦解。 第二，苏联对西方的敌视是持久的，共产主义无孔不入，时刻侵蚀骚扰西方社会，必须

当代世界经济与政治(期末深刻复习)

第二章变化转型的世界格局 一、两极格局的形成和演变 （一）以美国为首的西方阵营的形成过程 ①1946年2月，（美国驻苏联代办）乔治·凯南（给美国国务院）的8000字电报，（对苏联的理论、意图、政策和做法作了全面分析） ②1946年3月，丘吉尔发表铁幕演说，呼吁美英合作，建立军事同盟，以对付苏联的威胁。 ③1946年9月，克利福德的报告《美国与苏联的关系》，正式提出对苏联实施冷战的纲领。 ④冷战开始的标志：1947年3月，杜鲁门主义。 ⑤1947年6月，马歇尔计划的提出和实施，为资本主义阵营的形成建立了经济纽带。 ⑥1949年4月，北大西洋公约组织的建立，标志着资本主义阵营的形成。 （二）以苏联为首的社会主义阵营的形成过程 ①1947年，莫洛托夫计划，与东欧各国签订贸易协定，以巩固苏联与东欧各国的经济联系。 ②1947年9月，欧洲九国共产党情报局 ③1949年1月，“经济互助委员会” ④1949年10月1日，签订《中苏友好同盟互助条约》 ⑤1955年5月5日，签订了《友好合作互助条约》，即《华沙条约》，社会主义阵营形成。 二、发展中国家崛起的三大里程碑 ①1955年万隆会议召开，标志着发展中国家的兴起。 ②1961年不结盟运动，推动了世界各国反帝、反霸、反殖民主义和维护世界和平的斗争。 ③1964年七十七国集团成立，进一步显示了发展中国家的团结和力量。

三、两极格局的终结及有没有历史进步性 冷战结束的标志：1989年12月，美苏首脑马耳他非正式会晤时，双方正式宣布美苏两国进入合作而不是竞争的新时期。 苏联解体，两极格局终结：1991年12月21日，《建立独立国家联合体协议》，宣告11国自愿组成“独立国家联合体”，苏维埃社会主义共和国联盟停止存在。 两极格局的终结虽以苏联解体、东欧剧变的形式表现出来，但从人类和平与发展这一意义上看，两极格局的终结本身具有一定的历史进步性。 ①两极格局的终结总体上是以和平的方式实现的，没有战争的硝烟，没有法律意义上的战胜国和战败国，也没有重大的旨在确立大国地位、重划势力范围和设计世界政治新蓝图的国际会议及协议。 ②人类在国际关系民主化和多样化的道路上前进了一步。 四、雅尔塔体系的内容和意义 第二次世界大战后，反法西斯同盟国领导人举行了一系列会议，主要有开罗会议、德黑兰会议、雅尔塔会议和波茨坦会议。按照以《雅尔塔协定》为主体的政治文件形成的国际关系体系就是雅尔塔体系。 内容： ①彻底击败的德国，解除德国的全部武装，消灭法西斯主义和军国主义，建立民主政治；在经济上消灭其作战潜力，迫使德国赔偿盟国所受的损失；对德国实行分区占领。 ②确定波兰疆界，恢复波兰的独立主权。 ③美英同意苏联提出的对日参战条件。

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A．美国旨在欧洲复苏B．美苏冷战尚未开始 C．苏联经济亟待恢复D．美苏关系有所缓和 5．1956年2月在苏共二十大上，赫鲁晓夫提出“三和路线”，其基本构想是：与西方国家和平共处，在和平竞赛中超过美国；对社会主义国家强调一致性并谋求美国的认可；对亚非拉地区鼓吹通过和平过渡走非资本主义道路。据此，“三和路线”的提出() A．旨在谋求苏美合作主宰世界B．是苏联对西方国家作出妥协 C．大大压缩了苏联的外交空间D．导致社会主义阵营走向瓦解 6．西方一位历史学家曾对某一历史事件做出这样评价：“ 是美国政府想出来帮助欧洲树立信心用的，至少公开宣传中是这样说的，目的是使其不至于迫于苏联的压力在政治上屈服，走向绥靖和中立。”其中“”缺失的文字应是() A．杜鲁门主义B．马歇尔计划 C．北大西洋公约组织D．德国分裂 7．“冷战”时期的批评家曾指责一些军事联盟如北约组织和华约组织推动了高昂的军备竞赛，并使地区冲突一直有转变成超级大国之间核对抗的危险。这反映出在“冷战”时期() A．美苏的插手是地区冲突的根源B．和平的力量时常占据着上风 C．军备竞赛造成各国财政的困难D．军事的较量威胁到世界和平 8．二战结束后，欧洲政治家们指出：苏联并不像英国那样是一个“勉强战胜国”，而是“一个真正的战胜国”。“勉强战胜国”和

岳麓版高中历史高三三轮考前技能篇：第2课非选择题解题技巧(练习)Word版含解析

第2课非选择题解题技巧 1法律文献是人类政治文明进步的重要表现。阅读材料，回答问题。 材料一第3表债权人可将无力偿还的债务人，交付法庭判决，直到将其戴上足枷、手铐，甚至杀死或卖之为奴 ...................... 第8表凡故意伤人肢体而又未能取得调解时，则伤人者也需受同样的伤害。不过，如有人打断自由人的骨头，他须偿还300阿司罚金；如被打折骨头的是奴隶，罚金可以减 半。 (1) 材料一所述内容出自哪一法律文献？它在当时有何进步作用？ 材料二凡未经议会同意，以国王权威停止法律或停止法律实施之僭越权力，为非法权力。 凡未经议会准许，借口国王特权，为国王而征收，或供国王使用而征收金钱，超出议会 准许之时限或方式者，皆为非法。......... ................................... 《权利法案》材料三美国的国家职权分为立法、司法和行政三个部门，分别由国会、最高法院和总 统执掌，总统和议员由人民选举产生。……一一美国1787年宪法 (2) 根据材料二、三，指出英、美分别确立了怎样的政治体制？并说明其特点。 材料四“中华人民共和国是工人阶级领导的、以工农联盟为基础的、人民民主专政的国家……中华人民共和国的一切权力属于人民。人民行使权力的机关是全国人民代表大会和地方各级人民代表大会。” 一一1954年《中华人民共和国宪法》 (3) 1954年宪法是在哪次会议上制定的？该宪法确定的我国的根本政治制度是什么？ (4) 某中学历史学习兴趣小组就法律问题进行研讨探究，除了上面材料中提到的法律文献夕卜，你还能 为他们提供哪些与法律有关的文献？试举两例说明。 2 ?阅读下列材料，回答问题： 材料一总结起来说，我们面对着一个政治力量，它狂热地坚信，它和美国之间不可能有永久性的妥协办法。……如何对付这个力量的问题无疑是我国外交所面临的最巨大的 任务。它应该是我们的政治参谋班子在目前这个时刻进行工作的出发点。要以像解决战时重大战略问题一样的彻底精神和慎重态度，必要时，还要在计划工作方面作出同样大的努力，来处理这个问题。我不能在这里试图提出全部答案。但我愿意表白我的信念：这个问题是我们有能力解决的，而且不必通过一场全面的军事冲突来解决。 ――美国驻苏大使乔治凯南致国务院电报第511号(1946年)材料二冷战在欧洲和东亚展开的过程就是以政治军事对抗为基础的美苏关系形成新的 稳定状态的过程，也是双方逐渐在战略上达成均衡的过程。因为在对抗中维持稳定和均衡是双方的共同愿望，因为它们都认识到打破均衡意味着双方都不能承受的战争，是核条件下的“互相确保摧毁”…… 它们都把在经济上最终超过对方、建立更美好的社会、