经济学人精读(第二季)教材

经济学人精读（第二期）教材有道考神团队@陈曲Frank

致各位亲爱的同学们：

大家好，我是有道考神团队的陈曲老师。继暑假7.18-7.23，我们成功了开启第一期经济学人课程后（https://https://www.wendangku.net/doc/6511486781.html,/course/detail/1954?keyfrom=xue/list），秋季开学季我们迎来了第二期的课程。

感谢大家选择经济学人课程，我们的课程时间持续一周，具体为：

9月19日19:00-20:00 精讲篇章1 – Seize the day（经济类）

9月20日19:00-20:00 精讲篇章2 – Planet of the Phones（科技类）

9月21日19:00-20:00 精讲篇章3 – The whole world is going to university（教育类）9月22日19:00-20:00 精讲篇章4 – Space and the city（经济类）

9月23日19:00-20:00 精讲篇章5 – Artificial Intelligence（科技类）

9月26日19:00-20:00 精讲篇章6 – The weaker sex（社会类）

请大家注意以下注意事项：

1.讲义以课文为主，请各位同学课前预习课文，查出不认识的单词。

2.请各位同学准备好笔记本，授课时做好笔记，微博坚持晒笔记和打卡将有陈曲老师专属

的礼品赠送。

3.除了课文外，陈曲老师还精心挑选了课后的阅读篇章。供大家研读学习。

4.关于这些文章，大家既可以阅读讲义，也可以在群里下载期刊的pdf格式。

5.我的新浪微博：@陈曲Frank，微博里会持续有一些更新内容，大家可以借鉴。

特别鸣谢eco中文网，讲义中大量的翻译均有其提供！译文仅作参考！

大家一起学习一点真正的英语（Authentic English）！

Passage 1: Seize the day

Jan 17th 2015 | From the print edition

The fall in the price of oil and gas provides a once-in-a-generation opportunity to fix bad energy policies.

MOST of the time, economic policymaking is about tinkering at the edges. Politicians argue furiously about modest changes to taxes or spending. Once in a while, however, momentous shifts are possible. From Deng Xiaoping s market opening in 1978 to Poland s adoption of “shock therapy” in 1990, bold politicians have seized propitious circumstances to push through reforms that transformed their countries. Such a once-in-a-generation opportunity exists today.

The plunging price of oil, coupled with advances in clean energy and conservation, offers politicians around the world the chance to rationalise energy policy. They can get rid of billions of dollars of distorting subsidies, especially for dirty fuels, whilst shifting taxes towards carbon use.

A cheaper, greener and more reliable energy future could be within reach.

The most obvious reason for optimism is the plunge in energy costs. Not only has the price of oil halved in the past six months, but natural gas is the cheapest it has been in a decade, bar a few panicked months after Lehman Brothers collapsed, when the world economy appeared to be imploding. There are growing signs that low prices are here to stay: the rising chatter of megamergers in the oil industry is a sure sign that oilmen are bracing for a shake-out. Less noticed, the price of cleaner forms of energy is also falling, as our special report this week explains. And new technology is allowing better management of the consumption of energy, especially electricity. That should help cut waste and thus lower costs still further. For decades the big question about energy was whether the world could produce enough of it, in any form and at any cost. Now, suddenly, the challenge should be one of managing abundance.

Clean up a dirty business

That abundance provides the potential for reform. Far too many economies are littered with the detritus of daft energy policies, based on fears about supply. Even though fracking has boosted America s oil output by two-thirds in just four years, the country still bans the export of oil and restricts exports of natural gas, a legacy of the oil shocks of the 1970s—and a boondoggle for American refiners and petrochemical firms. Congress also keeps handing out money to Iowa s already coddled corn farmers to produce ethanol and has not reviewed generous subsidies for nuclear power despite the Fukushima disaster and ruinous cost over-runs at new Western plants. Instead, it has spent four long years bickering about whether to allow the proposed Keystone XL pipeline to Canada s tar sands. In Europe the giveaways are a little different—billions have gone to wind and solar projects—but the same madness often prevails: Germany s rushed exit from nuclear power ended up helping boost American coal and Russian gas.

The most straightforward piece of reform, pretty much everywhere, is simply to remove all the subsidies for producing or consuming fossil fuels. Last year governments around the world threw $550 billion down that rathole—on everything from holding down the price of petrol in poor countries to encouraging companies to search for oil. By one count, such handouts led to

extra consumption that was responsible for 36% of global carbon emissions in.

Falling prices provide an opportunity to rethink this nonsense. Cash-strapped developing countries such as India and Indonesia have bravely begun to cut fuel subsidies, freeing up money to spend on hospitals and schools. But the big oil exporters in the poor world, which tend to be the most egregious subsidisers of domestic fuel prices, have not followed their lead. Venezuela is close to default, yet petrol still costs a few cents a litre in Caracas. And rich countries still underwrite the production of oil and gas. Why should American taxpayers pay for Exxon to find hydrocarbons? All these subsidies should be binned.

What a better policy would look like

That should be just the beginning. Politicians, for the most part, have refused to raise taxes on fossil fuels in recent years, on the grounds that making driving or heating homes more expensive would not only annoy voters but also hurt the economy. With petrol and natural gas getting cheaper by the day, that excuse has gone. Higher taxes would encourage conservation, dampen future price swings and provide a more sensible way for governments to raise money.

An obvious starting point is to target petrol. America s federal government levies a tax of just 18 cents a gallon (five cents a litre)—a figure that it has not dared change since 1993. Even better would be a tax on carbon. Burning fossil fuels harms the health of both the planet and its inhabitants. Taxing carbon would nudge energy firms and consumers towards using cleaner fuels. As fuel prices fall, a carbon tax is becoming less politically daunting.

That points to the biggest blessing cheaper energy brings: the chance to inject some coherence into the world’s energy policies. Governments have a legitimate role in making sure that energy is abundant, clean and secure. But they need to learn the difference between picking goals and deciding how to reach them. Broad incentives are fine; second-guessing scientists and investors is not. A carbon tax, in other words, is a much better way to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases than subsidies for windmills and nuclear plants.

By the same token, in the name of security of supply, governments should be encouraging the growth of seamless global energy markets. Scrapping unfair obstacles to energy investments is just as important as dispensing with subsidies. The more cross-border pipelines and power cables the better. America should approve Keystone XL and lift its export restrictions, while European politicians should make it much easier to exploit the oil and gas in the shale beneath their feet.

This ambitious to-do list will drive regiments of energy lobbyists potty. But for the first time in years it is within the realm of the politically possible. And it would plainly lead to a more efficient and greener energy future. So our message to politicians is a simple one. Seize the day.

中文翻译

第一篇：抓住现在

石油和天然气价格的下跌为修正差劲的能源政策提供了一代人只有一次的机遇。

在大多数时间中，经济方面的决策无非就是在做些修修补补的工作。政客们会为了税收或开支方面的些许变动而激烈争吵。然而，重大的转变，有时也是可能的。从邓小平在1978年提出市场开放到波兰在1990年接受“休克疗法”，大胆的政客始终能够抓住合适的时机推

进变革，而这些变革也改变了他们的国家。如今，像这种一代人只有一次的机会已经出现。

油价的暴跌以及清洁能源和节能方面的技术进步，为世界各国的政客理顺能源政策提供了机遇。他们一方面能够甩掉数千亿美元的各类扭曲补贴，尤其是针对肮脏燃料补贴，另一方面还能转而对碳排放行为征税。一个更加便宜、更加清洁、更加可靠的能源未来已经触手可即。

乐观的最明显理由是能源成本的大幅下降。不仅油价在过去的6个月中跌去了一半，天然气的价格也是十年中最便宜的时候，而这种情况只在雷曼兄弟倒闭后人心惶惶的那几个月中出现过。当时，全球经济似乎就要在劫难逃。如今，越来越多的迹象表明，当前的低价情况将持续下去。石油行业有关超级并购的传言正在日见增多，而这正是石油大鳄们为行业大洗牌做准备的明确信号。正如本报在本周的专题报道中所言，一个较为不受关注的事实是，各种清洁能源的价格也在下跌。与此同时，新技术正在允许人们对能源消费，尤其是电力消费，实施更好的管理。这应当有助于减少浪费，从而进一步降低成本。几十年来，涉及能源的一大问题是：世界各国能否生产出足够的能源，不管何种能源，也不管其成本如何。如今，突然之间，挑战应当是管理充裕能源的问题。

清除重污染产业

充裕性为改革提供了契机。太多的经济体遍布着各种愚蠢能源政策的残余，而这些愚蠢的政策无不是基于对能源供应的担忧而制定的。纵然压裂革命已经让美国石油产量仅在过去4年中就大涨了三分之二，但是他们仍然禁止石油出口，仍然限制天然气出口。这是上世纪70年代石油危机的遗产，也是对炼化企业的一项无效投资。国会仍旧在给艾奥瓦州早已享受特殊待遇的玉米种植者提供资金来生产乙醇，并且始终未对各种大手大脚的核能补贴进行再评估，尽管已经有福岛核灾难和西部核电站因超期服役而陷入运营成本高昂这样的事实存在。相反，国会把过去4年都花在了是否应该批准拟议中的通往加拿大油砂产地的基石XL 管道项目上面。欧洲各国的大手大脚与美国稍有不同。他们是把上百亿的资金都投入了风能和太阳能项目。但是，双方在不疯魔不成活这一点上却如出一辙：德国放弃核能的仓促之举造就了美国煤炭行业和俄罗斯天然气行业的繁荣。

对大多数国家来说，最直接的改革之举就是简单地废除为生产和消费各种化石燃料而提供的所有补贴。去年，各国政府为填补这个无底洞扔进了5500亿美元，这其中既包括穷国为保持汽油价格低廉而发放的补贴，也有为鼓励企业去寻找石油而投入的资金。据估算，这些慷慨之举带来了应为全球在1980年－2010年间36％的二氧化碳排放量负责的额外消费。

不断下跌的价格为反思这种浪费提供了机会。像印度和印尼这样为现金所困的发展中国家，已经勇敢地开启了削减各种燃料补贴的改革，由此而节省下来的钱将用于医疗和教育。但是，穷国中的某些石油输出大国——他们同时往往也是在燃油补贴方面最为臭名昭著的国家——并没有效仿这些先行者。委内瑞拉已经接近违约，但是加拉加斯的汽油仍然只卖几美分一升。与此同时，富裕国家仍在包销石油和天然气产品。美国纳税人凭什么要为美孚寻找碳氢化合物买单呢？这些补贴理应被全部废除。

更好的政策会是什么样

这应当只是开始。从很大程度上来说，近年来是政客在拒绝提高化石燃料税。他们这样做是基于以下这种考虑：提高对化石燃料的征税会让驾车出行和取暖变得更加昂贵，这不仅会惹恼选民，还会伤害经济。鉴于汽油和天然气价格一天比一天便宜，这种借口已经不存在了。提高征税会鼓励环保，抑制未来的价格波动，并为政府筹集资金提供一种更加合理的方式。

第一步明显应当把目标对准汽油。美国联邦政府对汽油的征税标准只有每加仑18美分

（合每公升5美分），这是一个自1993年以来无人敢去改变的数字。相比之下，征收二氧化碳税会是一个更好的选择。燃烧化石燃料既有害于这个星球，也有害于生活在这个星球上的居民。征收二氧化碳征税会推动能源企业和消费者转而使用更加清洁的燃料。随着燃料价格的下跌，从政治层面来讲，征收二氧化碳税正在变得不再那么令人畏手畏脚了。

征收二氧化碳税指向更加便宜的能源所能够带来的最大好处：将某中连贯性注入世界能源政策的机遇。各国政府在确保能源充裕、清洁和安全方面拥有合法的角色。但是，他们需要了解选择目标与决定如何达成目标之间的不同。广泛的激励是对的；对科学家和投资者评头论足就不对了。换言之，相比为风能和核能提供补贴，征收二氧化碳税是一种更好的降低温室气体排放的方式。

同理，各国政府应当以供应安全为名，鼓励全球能源市场向一体化方向发展。废除对能源投资的各种不公平障碍恰如废除各种补贴一样重要。跨国管道越多，能源网络越好。美国应当通过基石XL项目，取消对能源出口的种种限制。欧洲政客应当让开发自己脚下的页岩油和页岩气变得更加易行。

这个野心勃勃的待办清单会令能源说客们坐卧不安。但是，这是这个清单多年来第一次有可能在政治方面获得成功。它会带来一个更加高效、更加清洁的能源未来。我们对政客们传递的信息简单明了。那就是：抓住今天。

Passage 2: Planet of the phones

Feb 28th 2015 | From the print edition

The smartphone is ubiquitous, addictive and transformative.

THE dawn of the planet of the smartphones came in January 2007, when Steve Jobs, Apple’s chief executive, in front of a rapt audience of Apple acolytes, brandished a slab of plastic, metal and silicon not much bigger than a Kit Kat. “This will change everything,” he promised. For once there was no hyperbole. Just eight years later Apple’s iPhone exemplifies the early 21st century’s defining technology.

Smartphones matter partly because of their ubiquity. They have become the fastest-selling gadgets in history, outstripping the growth of the simple mobile phones that preceded them. They outsell personal computers four to one. Today about half the adult population owns a smartphone; by 2020, 80% will. Smartphones have also penetrated every aspect of daily life. The average American is buried in one for over two hours every day. Asked which media they would miss most, British teenagers pick mobile devices over TV sets, PCs and games consoles. Nearly 80% of smartphone-owners check messages, news or other services within 15 minutes of getting up. About 10% admit to having used the gadget during sex.

The bedroom is just the beginning. Smartphones are more than a convenient route online, rather as cars are more than engines on wheels and clocks are not merely a means to count the hours. Much as the car and the clock did in their time, so today the smartphone is poised to enrich lives, reshape entire industries and transform societies—and in ways that Snapchatting teenagers cannot begin to imagine.

Phono sapiens

The transformative power of smartphones comes from their size and connectivity. Size makes them the first truly personal computers. The phone takes the processing power of yesterday’s supercomputers—even the most basic model has access to more number-crunching capacity than NASA had when it put men on the Moon in 1969—and applies it to ordinary human interactions (see article). Because transmitting data is cheap this power is available on the move. Since 2005 the cost of delivering one megabyte wirelessly has dropped from $8 to a few cents. It is still falling. The boring old PC sitting on your desk does not know much about you. But phones travel around with you—they know where you are, what websites you visit, whom you talk to, even how healthy you are.

The combination of size and connectivity means that this knowledge can be shared and aggregated, bridging the realms of bits and atoms in ways that are both professional and personal. Uber connects available drivers to nearby fares at cheaper prices; Tinder puts people in touch with potential dates. In future, your phone might recommend a career change or book a doctor’s appointment to treat your heart murmur before you know anything is amiss.

As with all technologies, this future conjures up a host of worries. Some, such as “text neck” (hunching over a smartphone stresses the spine) are surely transient. Others, such as dependency—smartphone users exhibit “nomophobia” when they happen to find themselves empty-handed—are a measure of utility as much as addiction. After all, people also hate to be without their wheels or their watch.

The greater fear is over privacy. The smartphone turns the person next to you into a potential publisher of your most private or embarrassing moments. Many app vendors, who know a great deal about you, sell data without proper disclosure; mobile-privacy policies routinely rival “Hamlet” for length. And if leaked documents are correct, GCHQ, Britain’s signals-intelligence agency, has managed to hack a big vendor of SIM cards in order to be able to listen in to people’s calls (seearticle). If spooks in democracies are doing this sort of thing, you can be sure that those in authoritarian regimes will, too. Smartphones will give dictators unprecedented scope to spy on and corral their unwilling subjects.

The naked app

Yet three benefits weigh against these threats to privacy. For a start, the autocrats will not have it all their own way. Smartphones are the vehicle for bringing billions more people online. The cheapest of them now sell for less than $40, and prices are likely to fall even further. The same phones that allow governments to spy on their citizens also record the brutality of officials and spread information and dissenting opinions. They feed the demand for autonomy and help protest movements to coalesce. A device that hands so much power to the individual has the potential to challenge authoritarianism.

The second benefit is all those personal data which companies are so keen on. Conventional social sciences have been hampered by the limited data sets they could collect. Smartphones are digital census-takers, creating a more detailed view of society than has ever existed before and doing so in real time. Governed by suitable regulations, anonymised personal data can be used, among many other things, to optimise traffic flows, prevent crime and fight epidemics.

The third windfall is economic. Some studies find that in developing countries every ten extra mobile phones per 100 people increase the rate of growth of GDP-per-person by more than

one percentage point—by, say, drawing people into the banking system. Smartphones will remake entire industries, at unheard-of speed. Uber is a household name, operating in 55 countries, but has yet to celebrate its fifth birthday. WhatsApp was founded in 2009, and already handles 10 billion more messages a day than the SMS global text-messaging system. The phone is a platform, so startups can cheaply create an app to test an idea—and then rapidly go global if people like it. That is why it will unleash creativity on a planetary scale.

By their nature, seminal technologies ask hard questions of society, especially as people adapt to them. Smartphones are no different. If citizens aren’t protected from prying eyes, some will suffer and others turn their backs. Societies will have to develop new norms and companies learn how to balance privacy and profit. Governments will have to define what is acceptable. But in eight short years smartphones have changed the world—and they have hardly begun.

中文翻译

第二篇：手机星球

智能手机无处不在，让人上瘾，具有变革性。

智能手机星球的黎明破晓于2007年1月，当时苹果的首席执行官史蒂夫.乔布斯向一大堆热情的苹果死忠们挥舞着由塑料，金属和硅组成的一块板，大小不比奇巧巧克力大多少。他承诺道：“这将改变一切”。这个承诺并没有夸张，仅仅8年后，苹果的iPhone已经是21世纪初期界定科技的例证了。

智能手机的重要性部分原因是因为它们的受众很广。它们已经成为史上销售最快的设备，销量多于之前的普通手机，也超过个人电脑，比例为4:1。如今，约有一半以上的成年人拥有智能手机；到2020年，这个数值会是80%。智能手机渗透了生活的方方面面。美国人平均每天花在手机上的时间超过2小时。当英国青少年被问到，如果从手机，电视，电脑和游戏机中选，最舍不得哪样时，他们选择了手机。将近80%的智能手机用户在起床之后的15分钟内就会查看信息，新闻或其他服务。约10%的人承认在做爱时使用了手机。

卧室还只是开始。正如汽车不仅仅是引擎，钟表不仅仅是计时工具，智能手机也不仅只是方便于上网。汽车和钟表在它们的时代如日中天，现在的智能手机也正是如此丰富着人们的生活，重塑整个行业和改变社会——在许多方面拇指一族们还无法想象。

依赖手机的现代人

智能手机的变革之力来自他们的大小和连接。大小使他们成为真正意义上的个人电脑。手机拥有昨日的超级计算机的处理能力，即便是最基本的模块也比1969年美国航天宇航局将人类送上月球时的数学运算能力更强，且这些运用被用到了普通人的互动中（见文章）。由于数据传输在这个可移动的设备上很廉价。自2005年以来，用无线流量传送1兆的价格已经从8美元下降到了几分钱，并且价格还在下降。躺在你书桌上沉闷老旧的台式机并不了解你，但一直跟着你到处走的手机却了解你——它们知道你在哪里，你访问过哪些网站，你跟谁聊天了，甚至知道你的健康状况。

大小和连接的结合意味着这个知识可以被共享和集合，将专业和个人的点滴都连接了起来。优步可以连接到附近有空的司机，廉价打车；陌陌使人结识潜在的约会对象。未来，你的手机有可能在你还没意识到不妥前就给你推荐了工作或为你预约医生治疗你的心脏杂音。

如同所有科技一样，智能手机的未来也给人带来了一些担忧。有一些问题肯定是暂时的，比如，“短信脖”（低头看手机对脊椎有压迫），但其他的问题，比如智能手机用户在两手空

空时有“无手机焦虑症”，这种依赖性既是使用方法的问题也是因为用手机上了瘾。但话说回来，人们没有车或没戴手表时，也会觉得不开心。

更大的担忧是隐私问题。智能手机的存在可能使得一个站在你旁边的人能够将你最隐私或最尴尬的时刻发布到网上。许多APP供应商知道你的很多信息，并在没有恰当公开的情况下出售数据；手机隐私政策通常又很冗长，堪比“哈姆雷特”。如果被泄露的文件真实，英国信号情报机构GCHQ为了窃听人们的手机通话成功的黑客了SIM卡的供应商（见文章）。如果连民主国家中的间谍都在做这样的事情，那些专制政权肯定也会这么做。智能手机给了独裁者空前的监事范围，控制住他们不喜欢的国民。

赤裸的应用程序

然而有三大好处可以权衡对于隐私的这些顾虑。首先，独裁者并不能自行其道，智能手机犹如车辆一样将数十亿之多的人送上网。目前最便宜的智能手机只要不到40美元，价格很有可能还会降的更低。政府用来监视公民的手机也同样记录了官员的暴行，并传播了信息和不同观点。它们供给了自制的需求并使得人们凝聚起来进行抗议活动。一个设备能给予个人如此强大的力量，使人们能有机会挑战独裁主义。

第二个好处是这些个人数据是很多公司都在意的。传统的社会科学受限于数据收集的局限性。智能手机如数字普查员，创建的社会观念比以往任何时候都要详细，并不断的在实行。只要有合适的监管制度，匿名的个人数据可以用于许多方面，如提高车流量，防止犯罪和对抗传染病。

第三个颇另人意外的好处在于经济方面。一些研究发现，在发展中国家，每100个人每多10台手机，人均GDP的增长率超过1%，比如说通过把人们吸引近银行体系。智能手机能以前所未有的速度重塑所有行业。优步这个软件家喻户晓，在55个国家中运行，但也才迎来了第五个年头。WhatsApp成立于2009年，处理的信息已经达到每天100多亿条，比全球手机短信系统还多。手机对新兴公司是一个平台，它们可以很廉价的开发一个应用程序来测试自己的想法，如果人们喜欢的话，就可以迅速进行全球推广。这就是为什么智能手机将在行星尺度释放创造力。

种子科技的本质就是向社会提出难题，特别是当人们开始适应它们的时候。智能手机别无二致。如果公民被窥看而不受保护，有一些人可能会感到痛苦，另一些人置之不理。社会将不得不制定新的标准，公司也要学会如何平衡隐私和利润。政府需要定义什么是可以接受的。但在短短8年间，智能手机已经改变了世界，而一切才刚开始呢。

Passage 3: The world is going to university

Mar 28th 2015 | From the print edition

More and more money is being spent on higher education. Too little is known about whether it is worth it

“AFTER God had carried us safe to New England, and we had builded our houses, provided necessaries for our livelihood, reared convenient places for God’s worship and settled Civil Government, one of the next things we longed for and looked for was to advance learning and perpetuate it to posterity.” So ran the first university fundraising brochure, sent from Harvard

College to England in 1643 to drum up cash.

America’s early and lasting enthusiasm for higher education has given it the biggest and best-funded system in the world. Hardly surprising, then, that other countries are emulating its model as they send ever more of their school-leavers to get a university education. But, as our special report argues, just as America’s system is spreading, there are growing concerns about whether it is really worth the vast sums spent on it.

The American way

The modern research university, a marriage of the Oxbridge college and the German research institute, was invented in America, and has become the gold standard for the world. Mass higher education started in America in the 19th century, spread to Europe and East Asia in the 20th and is now happening pretty much everywhere except sub-Saharan Africa. The global tertiary-enrolment ratio—the share of the student-age population at university—went up from 14% to 32% in the two decades to 2012; in that time, the number of countries with a ratio of more than half rose from five to 54. University enrolment is growing faster even than demand for that ultimate consumer good, the car. The hunger for degrees is understandable: these days they are a requirement for a decent job and an entry ticket to the middle class.

There are, broadly, two ways of satisfying this huge demand. One is the continental European approach of state funding and provision, in which most institutions have equal resources and status. The second is the more market-based American model, of mixed private-public funding and provision, with brilliant, well-funded institutions at the top and poorer ones at the bottom.

The world is moving in the American direction. More universities in more countries are charging students tuition fees. And as politicians realise that the “knowledge economy” requires top-flight research, public resources are being focused on a few privileged institutions and the competition to create world-class universities is intensifying.

In some ways, that is excellent. The best universities are responsible for many of the discoveries that have made the world a safer, richer and more interesting place. But costs are rising. OECD countries spend 1.6% of GDP on higher education, compared with 1.3% in 2000. If the American model continues to spread, that share will rise further. America spends 2.7% of its GDP on higher education.

If America were getting its money’s worth from higher education, that would be fine. On the research side, it probably is. In 2014, 19 of the 20 universities in the world that produced the most highly cited research papers were American. But on the educational side, the picture is less clear. American graduates score poorly in international numeracy and literacy rankings, and are slipping. In a recent study of academic achievement, 45% of American students made no gains in their first two years of university. Meanwhile, tuition fees have nearly doubled, in real terms, in 20 years. Student debt, at nearly $1.2 trillion, has surpassed credit-card debt and car loans.

None of this means that going to university is a bad investment for a student. A bachelor’s degree in America still yields, on average, a 15% return. But it is less clear whether the growing investment in tertiary education makes sense for society as a whole. If graduates earn more than non-graduates because their studies have made them more productive, then university education will boost economic growth and society should want more of it. Yet poor student scores suggest otherwise. So, too, does the testimony of employers. A recent study of

recruitment by professional-services firms found that they took graduates from the most prestigious universities not because of what the candidates might have learned but because of those institutions’ tough selection procedures. In short, students could be paying vast sums merely to go through a very elaborate sorting mechanism.

If America’s universities are indeed poor value for money, why might that be? The main reason is that the market for higher education, like that for health care, does not work well. The government rewards universities for research, so that is what professors concentrate on. Students are looking for a degree from an institution that will impress employers; employers are interested primarily in the selectivity of the institution a candidate has attended. Since the value of a degree from a selective institution depends on its scarcity, good universities have little incentive to produce more graduates. And, in the absence of a clear measure of educational output, price becomes a proxy for quality. By charging more, good universities gain both revenue and prestige.

What’s it worth?

More information would make the higher-education market work better. Common tests, which students would sit alongside their final exams, could provide a comparable measure of universities’ educational performance. Students would have a better idea of what was taught well where, and employers of how much job candidates had learned. Resources would flow towards universities that were providing value for money and away from those that were not. Institutions would have an incentive to improve teaching and use technology to cut costs. Online courses, which have so far failed to realise their promise of revolutionising higher education, would begin to make a bigger impact. The government would have a better idea of whether society should be investing more or less in higher education.

Sceptics argue that university education is too complex to be measured in this way. Certainly, testing 22-year-olds is harder than testing 12-year-olds. Yet many disciplines contain a core of material that all graduates in that subject should know. More generally, universities should be able to show that they have taught their students to think critically.

Some governments and institutions are trying to shed light on educational outcomes. A few American state-university systems already administer a common test to graduates. Testing is spreading in Latin America. Most important, the OECD, whose PISA assessments of secondary education gave governments a jolt, is also having a go. It wants to test subject-knowledge and reasoning ability, starting with economics and engineering, and marking institutions as well as countries. Asian governments are keen, partly because they believe that a measure of the quality of their universities will help them in the market for international students; rich countries, which have more to lose and less to gain, are not. Without funding and participation from them, the effort will remain grounded.

Governments need to get behind these efforts. America’s market-based system of well-funded, highly differentiated universities can be of huge benefit to society if students learn the right stuff. If not, a great deal of money will be wasted.

参考译文

第三篇：全世界都在上大学

越来越多的钱被花在高等教育上，至于是否值得却不得而知。

“在上帝把我们平安地带到了新英格兰之后，我们建造了自己的房屋，提供了生活必需品，为敬拜上帝建立了便利之所，设立了公民政府。下一步我们所期望的事情之一就是发展教育，并延泽子孙万代。”1643年从哈佛学院发送给英国筹措资金的第一本大学筹款宣传册如是说。

美国对高等教育先行一步且持之以恒的热情，让它拥有了世界上最大、得到了最好资金支持的大学体系。其他国家纷纷效仿美国模式，输送越来越多的高中毕业生去接受大学教育也就毫不奇怪了。但是，正如我们的特别报道所述：就在美国的大学模式广泛传播之际，有关花在高等教育上的大笔资金是否物有所值的担忧也在增长。

美国之道

由美国创造的现代研究型大学是牛津大学、剑桥大学和德国的研究类机构的合体，已经被世界奉为金标准。大规模的高等教育始于19世纪的美国，20世纪传播到欧洲和东亚，现在几乎在除了撒哈拉以南非洲地区的世界各地蓬勃发展。在2012年之前的20年里，全球大学入学率，即大学学生占适龄人口的比例，从14%上升到32%；与此同时，入学率超过50%的国家从5个增加到54个。大学入学率的增速之快，甚至超过了汽车这种最终消费品的需求增速。对学位的渴求是可以理解的：如今学历是获得一份体面工作的必要条件，也是一张中产阶级的入场券。

广义地说，有两种方式可以满足如此巨大的需求。一是欧洲大陆的方法，即政府拨款提供资金，大部分院校都拥有均等的资源和地位。二是更加基于市场的美国模式，即私人和公共资助并行，其特点是办学出色且资金充裕的院校位于顶层，而资金匮乏的院校则处于底层。

世界正在朝着美国模式前行。越来越多国家里，有越来越多的大学在向学生收取学费。而且正如政治家们所认识到的，“知识经济”需要一流的研究，因此公共资源正在向少数享有特权的机构集中，打造世界一流大学的竞争日趋激烈。

在某些方面，这样是极好的。正是因为最优秀大学的许多发现，才使这个世界更加安全、富裕和有趣。但是这样做的成本却在增加。世界经合组织国家在高等教育上的花费占了GDP 的1.6%,2000年这个比例是1.3%。如果美国模式继续传播，这一比例仍将上升。美国在高等教育上的投入是GDP的2.7%。

如果美国从高等教育中得到了与其投入相等的回报，这当然好了。就科研角度而言，可能确实如此。2014年，全世界发表的论文被引用次数最多的20所大学里有19所属于美国。但是就教育而言，情况就不太明晰了。美国大学毕业生在国际数学和读写能力排名中得分低下，且仍在下滑。针对学术成就的最新研究表明，45%的美国学生在大学头两年几无所获。与此同时，按实质计算，学费在近20年翻了一番。学生债务接近1.2万亿美元，已经超过了信用卡债务和汽车贷款。

但这并不是说读大学对于学生而言是糟糕的投资。在美国，一个学士学位平均仍有15%的回报。但是对整个社会而言，对高等教育越来越多的投资是否合理仍不明朗。如果大学毕业生比非大学毕业生赚得多，是因为大学学习使之拥有更高的效率，那么大学教育将会推动经济增长，社会对其的需求也会更多。但是大学生成绩之差却表明事实并非如此，雇主的评价也证实了这一点。针对专业服务公司的招聘情况研究发现，这些公司从最知名的名牌大学选择毕业生不是因为这些候选人在大学里学到了什么，而是因为这些院校严格的选拔程序。简而言之，学生花费巨资肯那个仅仅是为了通过一个十分复杂的删选机制。

如果说美国大学的投资的确不值，那为何会这样呢？主要原因是高等教育的市场运转不佳，正如医疗保健市场一样。政府以研究成果来奖励大学，所以教授们也就集中精力在科研

上。学生们渴望院校的一张毕业证书，希望以此来给雇主深刻印象；雇主们感兴趣的是求职者所在院校的选拔机制。既然一所精挑细选的院校的学位价值在于它的稀缺性，那么优秀的大学也就没有多少动力来培养更多的毕业生了。此外，在教育产出缺乏明确衡量标准的情况下，价格成了质量的代名词。收费越来越高，这让优秀的大学名利双收。

值得吗？

信息量更多会使高等教育市场运作地更好。与期末考试并存的通用测试，能够提供一个对大学教育表现可衡量的标准。学生能对学校哪方面教得好、雇主能对求职者学到了多少，都有更好的了解。资源将会流向那些投资有所回报的大学，远离那些没有价值的大学。院校也会拥有动力来提高教学质量，使用技术来降低成本。迄今为止并未实现改革高等教育承诺的在线课程，也将开始产生更大的影响力。政府因此会对社会是否要在高等教育上增加或减少投入有更好的了解。

怀疑论者争辩道，大学教育太复杂了以至于不能用这种方法来衡量。诚然，衡量一个22岁的大学生肯定比衡量12岁的孩子来得困难。但是很多学科包含了一组核心的内容，是所有这些学科毕业生们应该懂得的。更广泛地说，大学应该要展现出他们教会学生批判性思维的能力。

一些政府和院校正在尝试阐明教育带来的结果。少数美国州立大学系统已经对大学毕业生进行普通测试，测试正传播到拉丁美洲。最重要的是，世界经合组织针对中学教育的国际学生能力评估计划给了政府重重一击，在高等教育上也值得一试。这需要测试学科知识以及推理能力，从经济学和工程学开始，使制度和国家制度一样（？）。亚洲政府十分渴望这样的制度，一部分是因为他们相信对大学质量的衡量将帮助他们的国际学生市场；而对没什么怕失去也没什么能赚到的富裕国家来说，恰恰相反。没有这些国家的资金和参与，这些努力都将止步不前。

政府需要支持这些努力。如果学生们学习正确的知识，那么美国资金充足、大学高度分化的市场化体系将是一个巨大的社会优势。否则，大量的金钱将会被浪费。

Passage 4: Space and the city

Apr 4th 2015 | From the print edition

Poor land use in the world's greatest cities carries a huge cost.

BUY land, advised Mark Twain; they're not making it any more. In fact, land is not really scarce: the entire population of America could fit into Texas with more than an acre for each household to enjoy. What drives prices skyward is a collision between rampant demand and limited supply in the great metropolises like London, Mumbai and New York. In the past ten years real prices in Hong Kong have risen by 150%. Residential property in Mayfair, in central London, can go for as much as 55,000 (82,000) per square metre. A square mile of Manhattan residential property costs 16.5 billion.

Even in these great cities the scarcity is artificial. Regulatory limits on the height and density of buildings constrain supply and inflate prices. A recent analysis by academics at the London

School of Economics estimates that land-use regulations in the West End of London inflate the price of office space by about 800%; in Milan and Paris the rules push up prices by around 300%. Most of the enormous value captured by landowners exists because it is well-nigh impossible to build new offices to compete those profits away.

The costs of this misfiring property market are huge, mainly because of their effects on individuals. High housing prices force workers towards cheaper but less productive places. According to one study, employment in the Bay Area around San Francisco would be about five times larger than it is but for tight limits on construction. Tot up these costs in lost earnings and unrealised human potential, and the figures become dizzying. Lifting all the barriers to urban growth in America could raise the country's GDP by between 6.5% and 13.5%, or by about 1 trillion-2 trillion. It is difficult to think of many other policies that would yield anything like that.

Metro stops

Two long-run trends have led to this fractured market. One is the revival of the city as the central cog in the global economic machine. In the 20th century, tumbling transport costs weakened the gravitational pull of the city; in the 21st, the digital revolution has restored it. Knowledge-intensive industries such as technology and finance thrive on the clustering of workers who share ideas and expertise. The economies and populations of metropolises like London, New York and San Francisco have rebounded as a result.

What those cities have not regained is their historical ability to stretch in order to accommodate all those who want to come. There is a good reason for that: unconstrained urban growth in the late 19th century fostered crime and disease. Hence the second trend, the proliferation of green belts and rules on zoning. Over the course of the past century land-use rules have piled up so plentifully that getting planning permission is harder than hailing a cab on a wet afternoon. London has strict rules preventing new structures blocking certain views of St Paul's Cathedral. Google's plans to build housing on its Mountain View campus in Silicon Valley are being resisted on the ground that residents might keep pets, which could harm the local owl population. Nimbyish residents of low-density districts can exploit planning rules on everything from light levels to parking spaces to block plans for construction.

A good thing, too, say many. The roads and rails criss-crossing big cities already creak under the pressure of growing populations. Dampening property prices hurts one of the few routes to wealth-accumulation still available to the middle classes. A cautious approach to development is the surest way to preserve public spaces and a city's heritage: give economists their way, and they would quickly pave over Central Park.

However well these arguments go down in local planning meetings, they wilt on closer scrutiny. Home ownership is not especially egalitarian. Many households are priced out of more vibrant places. It is no coincidence that the home-ownership rate in the metropolitan area of downtrodden Detroit, at 71%, is well above the 55% in booming San Francisco. You do not need to build a forest of skyscrapers for a lot more people to make their home in big cities. San Francisco could squeeze in twice as many and remain half as dense as Manhattan.

Property wrongs

Zoning codes were conceived as a way to balance the social good of a growing, productive city and the private costs that growth sometimes imposes. But land-use rules have evolved into

something more pernicious: a mechanism through which landowners are handed both unwarranted windfalls and the means to prevent others from exercising control over their property. Even small steps to restore a healthier balance between private and public good would yield handsome returns. Policymakers should focus on two things.

First, they should ensure that city-planning decisions are made from the top down. When decisions are taken at local level, land-use rules tend to be stricter. Individual districts receive fewer of the benefits of a larger metropolitan population (jobs and taxes) than their costs (blocked views and congested streets). Moving housing-supply decisions to city level should mean that due weight is put on the benefits of growth. Any restrictions on building won by one district should be offset by increases elsewhere, so the city as a whole keeps to its development budget.

Second,governments should impose higher taxes on the value of land.In most rich countrie s,land-value taxes account for a small share of total https://www.wendangku.net/doc/6511486781.html,nd taxes are efficient.They are d ifficult to dodge;you cannot stuff land into a bank-vault in Luxembourg.Whereas a high tax on pr operty can discourage investment,a high tax on land creates an incentive to develop unused sites .Land-value taxes can also help cater for newcomers.New infrastructure raises the value of near by land,automatically feeding through into revenues—which helps to pay for the improvements.

Neither better zoning nor land taxes are easy to impose.There are logistical hurdles,such as assessing the value of land with the property stripped out.The politics is harder still.But politicall y tricky problems are ten-a-penny.Few offer the people who solve them a trillion-dollar reward.

中文译文

第四篇：城市土地

糟糕的土地利用方式已经成为世界大都市不能承受之重。

马克吐温曾建议说“都去买地吧”，但现在他们已经不这么做了。事实上，土地并非真的如此稀缺：仅一个德克萨斯州就能容纳整个美国人口，而且每户能有一英亩之多。在伦敦、孟买、纽约这种大都市里，地价飞涨的现实是疯狂的需求和有限的供给共同作用的结果。在过去10年里，香港的房地产价格上涨了150%。伦敦中心的梅菲尔区的住宅价格能飙至55000英镑每平米（相当于82000美元）。曼哈顿，一平方英里的的住宅价格为165亿美元。

即便是在这样的城市里，稀缺性也是人为造成的。从法律层面上对建筑的高度和密度进行限制，降低了供给，也助推了房价。伦敦经济学院的一项最新学术分析表明，土地使用管理条例令伦敦西区办公用房的价格上涨了800%，令米兰和巴黎的上涨了约300%。巨额资产掌握在现有的土地所有者手中，因为在这里建新办公楼引入竞争、分享收益，是几乎不可能的事。

一潭死水的房地产市场所带来的社会成本是巨大的，因为它影响了这里的每个人。高昂的房价迫使务工者搬到更便宜但生产力更低下的地方。根据一项研究结果显示，如果不是因为对建筑业的严格限制，旧金山湾区的就业应该比现在多五倍；再加上损失的收入和未能实现的人的潜力，这个数字能把你吓晕。如果能扫清美国境内所有限制城市增长的阻碍因素，那么国家GDP将会增加6.5%~13.5%，即10亿~20亿美元。这是任何其他政策都难以产生的巨大影响。

停滞的都市

两个长期趋势致使房产市场变得如此令人抓狂。其一是，城市的复兴成为了全球经济运转中必不可少的中心环节。在20世纪，糟糕的交通削弱了城市的吸引力；到了21世纪，数字革命修复了这一缺陷。像科技、金融这种知识密集型产业只有在人们能互相交流思想和专业技能的地方才能繁荣兴旺。伦敦、纽约和旧金山这样的大城市，其经济和人口之所以能复苏，正是得益于此。

然而，这些城市失去了一项它们曾经有过的能力：扩张以容纳所有想要移居进来的人们。一个不错的理由就是：19世纪晚期无限制的城市扩张成为了犯罪和疾病的温床。那么第二个趋势就显而易见了：城市绿化带的泛滥和分区管制。纵观整个上世纪，政府出台了数不清的土地使用法规，以至于获取一个规划许可比在雨天的下午打出租还要困难。伦敦严格控制新建任何构筑物，以防止圣保罗大教堂的景观被破坏。Google计划在其所有的山景城园区建造房屋，却以“居民可能会养宠物、并且这会令当地猫头鹰的数量减少”为理由遭到拒绝。低密度社区Nimbyish的居民可以拿规划法规做挡箭牌为所欲为，从要求亮度水平到停车空间再到阻止一切建设。

很多人认为，这样也不错啊。日益增长的人口已经令大城市的道路和十字交叉口不堪重负。被抑制的房地产价格虽然令一部分人的财富积累受到损失，但对于中产阶级来说仍然是可以承受的。发展一定要慎重，要百分之百确保公共空间和保护城市遗产：如果把决策权交给经济学家，他们一定会以迅雷不及掩耳之势把中央公园铺成水泥大道。

然而，这些理由经不起本地规划会议的仔细斟酌。房屋所有权不是人人均等的。很多家庭被高房价挡在充满活力的地区之外。都市区的房屋所有权比例在日渐式微的底特律都达到71%，这一数字比日益兴旺的旧金山的55%要高得多，这可不是巧合。你不需要建造一片摩天大楼的森林来容纳越来越多在大城市安家的人们。旧金山的面积即便折叠两次，其人口密度也才只有曼哈顿的一半。

歧路上的房地产

为了平衡不断增长且生产力强的城市中的社会利益与增长所附加的私人成本，人们想到了分区规范这个办法。但是，土地使用法规已经演变成了一个极为有害的机制：土地所有者一方面能躺着吃天上掉下来的馅饼，一方面还能光明正大地阻止任何人染指他们的不动产。现在即使能在健康地平衡公私利益方面迈出一小步，都将获得相当可观的回报。政治决策者应该把精力放在两方面。

第一，他们应该确保涉及城市规划的决策是自上而下制定的。当决策权在本地政府手中时，通常对土地使用的限制会更加严格。就单个街区而言，大量都市人口是弊（受阻碍的视野和拥挤的街道）大於利（就业和税收）。而将住房供应量的决定权交给城市政府，则更能全面地考虑城市发展所带来的好处。如果一个街区对建设作出限制，就要以另一个街区增加建设作为补偿，因此城市作为一个整体就可以确保其应有的开发预算。

其次，政府应该对地价征收重税。在大部分发达国家，地价税只占总收入中很小的一部分。地税是很有效的手段，因为你很难像藏钱一样把土地塞进卢森堡的银行保险柜里以逃避纳税。对不动产课重税会影响投资，而对土地课重税则会刺激人们开发尚未被使用的土地。地价税也有利于新来的居民。新建的基础设施能够增加附近土地的价值，然后自动转变成收入——反过来能补偿基建翻新的费用。

鉴于还有很多前期困难亟待解决，想要实施更好地分区规划或开始征收地税并不是件容易的事，比如如何刨除土地上面的房产而单独计算地价。政治方面也是个问题，但这些困难都不值一提，因为这些问题一旦解决，将会带来难以计数的丰厚回报。

Passage 5: The dawn of artificial intelligence

May 9th 2015 | From the print edition

Powerful computers will reshape humanity’s future. How to ensure the promise outweighs the perils.

“THE development of full artificial intelligence could spell the end of the human race,” Stephen Hawking warns. Elon Musk fears that the development of artificial intelligence, or AI, may be the biggest existential threat humanity faces. Bill Gates urges people to beware of it.

Dread that the abominations people create will become their masters, or their executioners, is hardly new. But voiced by a renowned cosmologist, a Silicon Valley entrepreneur and the founder of Microsoft—hardly Luddites—and set against the vast investment in AI by big firms like Google and Microsoft, such fears have taken on new weight. With supercomputers in every pocket and robots looking down on every battlefield, just dismissing them as science fiction seems like self-deception. The question is how to worry wisely.

You taught me language and...

The first step is to understand what computers can now do and what they are likely to be able to do in the future. Thanks to the rise in processing power and the growing abundance of digitally available data, AI is enjoying a boom in its capabilities (see article). Today’s “deep learning” systems, by mimicking the layers of neurons in a human brain and crunching vast amounts of data, can teach themselves to perform some tasks, from pattern recognition to translation, almost as well as humans can. As a result, things that once called for a mind—from interpreting pictures to playing the video game “Frogger”—are now within the scope of computer programs. DeepFace, an algorithm unveiled by Facebook in 2014, can recognise individual human faces in images 97% of the time.

Crucially, this capacity is narrow and specific. Today’s AI produces the semblance of intelligence through brute number-crunching force, without any great interest in approximating how minds equip humans with autonomy, interests and desires. Computers do not yet have anything approaching the wide, fluid ability to infer, judge and decide that is associated with intelligence in the conventional human sense.

Yet AI is already powerful enough to make a dramatic difference to human life. It can already enhance human endeavour by complementing what people can do. Think of chess, which computers now play better than any person. The best players in the world are not machines however, but what Garry Kasparov, a grandmaster, calls “centaurs”: amalgamated teams of humans and algorithms. Such collectives will become the norm in all sorts of pursuits: supported by AI, doctors will have a vastly augmented ability to spot cancers in medical images; speech-recognition algorithms running on smartphones will bring the internet to many millions of illiterate people in developing countries; digital assistants will suggest promising hypotheses for academic research; image-classification algorithms will allow wearable computers to layer useful information onto people’s views of the real world.

Even in the short run, not all the consequences will be positive. Consider, for instance, the power that AI brings to the apparatus of state security, in both autocracies and democracies. The capacity to monitor billions of conversations and to pick out every citizen from the crowd by his voice or her face poses grave threats to liberty.

And even when there are broad gains for society, many individuals will lose out from AI. The original “computers” were drudges, often women, who performed endless calculations for their higher-ups. Just as transistors took their place, so AI will probably turf out whole regiments of white-collar workers. Education and training will help and the wealth produced with the aid of AI will be spent on new pursuits that generate new jobs. But workers are doomed to 7.dislocations.

Surveillance and dislocations are not, though, what worries Messrs Hawking, Musk and Gates, or what inspires a phalanx of futuristic AI films that Hollywood has recently unleashed onto cinema screens. Their concern is altogether more distant and more apocalyptic: the threat of autonomous machines with superhuman cognitive capacity and interests that conflict with those of Homo sapiens.

Such artificially intelligent beings are still a very long way off; indeed, it may never be possible to create them. Despite a century of poking and prodding at the brain, psychologists, neurologists, sociologists and philosophers are still a long way from an understanding of how a mind might be made—or what one is. And the business case for even limited intelligence of the general sort—the sort that has interests and autonomy—is far from clear. A car that drives itself better than its owner sounds like a 8.boon; a car with its own ideas about where to go, less so.

...I know how to curse

But even if the prospect of what Mr Hawking calls “full” AI is still distant, it is prudent for societies to plan for how to cope. That is easier than it seems,9. not least because humans have been creating autonomous entities with superhuman capacities and unaligned interests for some time. Government bureaucracies, markets and armies: all can do things which unaided, unorganised humans cannot. All need autonomy to function, all can take on life of their own and all can do great harm if not set up in a just manner and governed by laws and regulations.

These parallels should comfort the fearful; they also suggest concrete ways for societies to develop AI safely. Just as armies need civilian oversight, markets are regulated and bureaucracies must be transparent and accountable, so AI systems must be open to scrutiny. Because systems designers cannot foresee every set of circumstances, there must also be an off-switch. These constraints can be put in place without compromising progress.From the nuclear bomb to traffic rules, mankind has used technical ingenuity and legal strictures to constrain other powerful innovations.

The spectre of eventually creating an autonomous non-human intelligence is so extraordinary that it risks overshadowing the debate. Yes, there are perils. But they should not obscure the huge benefits from the dawn of AI.

中文翻译：

第五篇：人工智能的曙光

强大的电脑将重塑人类的未来如何保证利大于弊？

史蒂芬·霍金警告说："人工智能全面发展可能导致人类的灭绝。"伊隆·马斯克担心，

人工智能（Artificial intelligence，简写成Al）的发展或许会成为人类现存的最大威胁。比尔盖茨也催促人们警惕人工智能。

人们担忧这些人类制造的讨厌鬼会成为人类的主人，或是手握人类的生杀大权，这种想法并不新鲜。不过一位知名的宇宙论者、硅谷企业家和微软的创立者——绝不会是勒德分子(英国1811年～1816年间以捣毁机器等手段反对资本家压迫的人)——反对像谷歌、微软这样的大公司对人工智能进行大规模的投资，他说，现如今，上述担忧有了新的意义。有了可以装在口袋里的超级电脑和可以藐视一切领域的机器人，仅仅将人们的担忧当做杞人忧天似乎有些自欺欺人了。问题在于，即便忧虑，也要忧虑到点子上。

你教会我语言，然后……

首先要弄清楚电脑现在能够做什么，以及将来或许能够做什么。得益于数据处理能力的增强和有效数据的大幅增加，人工智能的能力得到了爆炸性的提升（见文章）。如今，“深度学习”系统通过模仿人脑神经元的层次结构，消化大量数据，学习执行某些任务，从模式识别到翻译，几乎和人类做得一样出色。因此，以前需要人脑来做的事——从阐释图片到玩视频游戏“青蛙过河”——都成了电脑程序能力范围内的事了。DeepFace是脸书2014年首次推出的一项人脸识别技术，它的精确度高达97%。

更为关键的是，这种能力精确而具体。如今，粗暴的数据处理能力给智能蒙上了一层假象，人类思维有自律、利益和欲望，而人工智能完全不同。在通常人类意识中，广泛、顺畅的推测、评判以及决断能力都与智力息息相关，但是电脑还没有任何类似的能力。

即便如此，人工智能也足够强大了，人类生活因其产生了戏剧性的变化。人工智能让人类可以做更多的事，进行更广泛的尝试。就拿象棋来说吧，现在谁也下不过电脑。但是世界上最好的棋手却不是机器，而是象棋大师加里·卡斯帕罗夫所说的“半人马兽”：是人类和算法的集合体。将来这样的集合体会成为各个领域的常态：有了人工智能，医生使用医学影像诊出癌症的能力大大增强；发展中国家几百万目不识丁的人们也能用智能手机上的语音识别程序上网；个人数字助理会建议对那些有潜力的假说进行深入的学术研究；图像分类程序使得可穿戴电脑能够将有用信息整合到人类对现实世界的看法中。

其实，在短期内，人工智能的影响也有消极的一面。举个例子，假使独裁国家和民主国家都运用人工智能增强了国家安全这个“半人马兽”的实力。它们可以监控数以百万的谈话，通过声音或面部识别将任何一个公民从人群中检索出来，这对人们的自由造成了严重的威胁。

即使社会收益上涨, 许多人也会因为人工智能的广泛应用而失去工作。起初，“计算员”可以算个苦力活——以前通常是女性担任，她们替上司做没完没了的计算。她们因晶体管的诞生而被取代，同样，人工智能也很可能让整个白领阶层失业。教育和培训会有所帮助，借助人工智能创造出的财富将被用于新的领域，而这些新的领域又会创造新的工作机会。但是工作者们注定要陷入迷茫和混乱。

然而这种监控和混乱并非霍金、马斯克、盖茨所担心的，这也并非好莱坞未来主义人工智能电影在近期大量上映的原因。总的来说，他们的忧虑更加高瞻远瞩，更加悲观：如果机器具有自主意识，具有的超人的认知能力，而这些机器的利益与现代智人相冲突，这就构成了威胁。

这样的人工智能个体还远未实现；实际上，我们或许永远也创造不出这样的人工智能个体。虽然近百年来，对大脑的研究十分兴盛，但是心理学家、神经学家、社会学家以及哲学家对思维是如何产生的——或者思维是什么——都知之甚少。一辆自动驾驶汽车，如果比它的主人还要开的好，听起来似乎是个进步；而一辆自己决定开到哪的汽车，听起来就不是那么让人开心了。

……我知道如何咒骂

不过即使霍金先生所说的“全方位”人工智能的前景仍然渺茫，人们也会谨慎地计划，怎样处理“全方位”人工智能。这看起来挺难，实际上更简单。特别是人类已经创造出具有超人能力的自主实体，而现阶段这些实体和我们还没有什么共同利益。政府官员，市场和军队——都能做一些无须援助、无组织的人类所不能做的事情。如果没有采取恰当的方式，用法律和规则拉力管理它们，它们都需要独立运行，自主掌控，都可能产生很大的危害。

这些相似点让那些担忧焦虑者稍感安心；他们还建议人们采取具体措施以便安全发展人工智能；正如军队需要民众的监督，市场需要管控，官员行事应当制度透明、有理有据，人工智能系统也应当接受公众的仔细审查。因为系统的设计者不可能预见到每一种情形，必须设置一些可以阻止状况的关卡。将这些关卡摆在合适的位置，它们就不会阻碍进步。从核爆炸到交通规则，人类通过技术创新和法律条款限制了其他的强大发明。

对创造一种除了人类之外的、具有自主能力的高智商个体的恐惧已经超越了讨论本身。是的，它是有风险的。但不应该因此而阻碍人工智能可能带来的巨大福利。

Passage 6: The weaker sex

May 30th 2015 | From the print edition

Blue-collar men in rich countries are in trouble. They must learn to adapt

AT FIRST glance the patriarchy appears to be thriving. More than 90% of presidents and prime ministers are male, as are nearly all big corporate bosses. Men dominate finance, technology, films, sports, music and even stand-up comedy. In much of the world they still enjoy social and legal privileges simply because they have a Y chromosome. So it might seem odd to worry about the plight of men.

Yet there is plenty of cause for concern. Men cluster at the bottom as well as the top. They are far more likely than women to be jailed, estranged from their children, or to kill themselves. They earn fewer university degrees than women. Boys in the developed world are 50% more likely to flunk basic maths, reading and science entirely.

One group in particular is suffering (see article). Poorly educated men in rich countries have had difficulty coping with the enormous changes in the labour market and the home over the past half-century. As technology and trade have devalued brawn, less-educated men have struggled to find a role in the workplace. Women, on the other hand, are surging into expanding sectors such as health care and education, helped by their superior skills. As education has become more important, boys have also fallen behind girls in school (except at the very top). Men who lose jobs in manufacturing often never work again. And men without work find it hard to attract a permanent mate. The result, for low-skilled men, is a poisonous combination of no job, no family and no prospects.

From nuclear families to fissile ones

Those on the political left tend to focus on economics. Shrinking job opportunities for men, they say, are entrenching poverty and destroying families. In America pay for men with only a

经济学人科技类文章中英双语

The Brain Activity Map 绘制大脑活动地图 Hard cell 棘手的细胞 An ambitious project to map the brain is in the works. Possibly too ambitious 一个绘制大脑活动地图的宏伟计划正在准备当中，或许有些太宏伟了 NEWS of what protagonists hope will be America’s next big science project continues to dribble out. 有关其发起人心中下一个科学大工程的新闻报道层出不穷。 A leak to the New York Times, published on February 17th, let the cat out of the bag, with a report that Barack Obama’s administration is thinking of sponsoring what will be known as the Brain Activity Map. 2月17日，《纽约时报》刊登的一位线人报告终于泄露了秘密，报告称奥巴马政府正在考虑赞助将被称为“大脑活动地图”的计划。 And on March 7th several of those protagonists published a manifesto for the project in Science. 3月7日，部分发起人在《科学》杂志上发表声明证实了这一计划。 The purpose of BAM is to change the scale at which the brain is understood. “大脑活动地图”计划的目标是改变人们在认知大脑时采用的度量方法。 At the moment, neuroscience operates at two disconnected levels. 眼下，神经学的研究处在两个断开的层次。 The higher one, where the dimensions of features are measured in centimetres, has many techniques at its disposal, notably functional magnetic-res onance imaging, which measures changes in tissues’ fuel consumption. 在相对宏观的层次当中各个特征的规模用厘米来衡量，有很多技术可以使用，尤其是用来测量组织中能量消耗变动情况的核磁共振成像技术。 This lets researchers see which bits of the brain are active in particular tasks—as long as those tasks can be performed by a person lying down inside a scanner. 该技术可使研究人员找出在完成具体的任务时，大脑的哪些部分处于活跃状态。At the other end of the scale, where features are measured in microns, lots of research has been done on how individual nerve cells work, how messages are sent from one to another, and how the connections between cells strengthen and weaken as memories are formed. 而另一个度量的层次则要求用微米来测量各种特征，这一层次的研究很多都是关于单个神经细胞是如何工作的、信息在神经细胞之间是如何传递的以及当产生记忆的时候神经细胞之间的联系是如何得到加强和减弱的。 Between these two, though, all is darkness. 然而，位于这两个层次之间的研究还处于一片漆黑当中。 It is like trying to navigate America with an atlas that shows the states, the big cities and the main highways, and has a few street maps of local neighbourhoods, but displays nothing in between.

考研英语经济学人文章阅读训练2020021502

Youngsters’job preferences and prospects are mismatched 年轻人的工作偏好与就业前景不相匹配 Teenage picks 青少年的选择 The world of work is changing.Are people ready for the new job outlook? A survey of15-year-olds across41countries by the OECD,a club of mostly rich countries,found that teenagers may have unrealistic expectations about the kind of work that will be available. 职业的世界正在发生变化。人们做好准备接受新的就业观了吗？世界经合组织（一个以发达国家为主的组织）对41个国家的15岁青少年进行了一项调查，结果发现青少年对于未来可能从事的工作抱有不切实际的期望。 Four of the five most popular choices were traditional professional roles: doctors,teachers,business managers and lawyers. Teenagers clustered around the most popular jobs,with the top ten being chosen by47%of boys and53%of girls.Those shares were significantly higher than when the survey was conducted back in2000. 在五个最受欢迎的职业选择中有四个是传统的职业角色：医生、教师、企业经理和律师。青少年对于最受欢迎工作的选择呈现了聚集性，有47％的男孩和53％的女孩选择了排在前十位的职业。这一比例显著高于2000年调查时的水平。 The rationale for this selection was partly down to wishful thinking on the part of those surveyed(designers,actors and musical performers were three of the top15jobs).Youth must be allowed a bit of hope. 受访者做出这一选择往往是出于自己的一厢情愿（最受欢迎的15个职业中有3个分别是设计师、演员和歌手）。我们必须给年轻人一点希望。

13英语阅读-经济学人《Economics》双语版-Go forth and multiply

《经济学家》读译参考（第13篇）：一路繁衍——你知道外来入侵物种吗？ Go forth and multiply 一往无前，生生不息 WHAT makes for a successful invasion? Often, the answer is to have better weapons than the enemy. And, as it is with people, so it is with plants—at least, that is the conclusion of a p_______①published in ★Biology Letters[1] by Naomi Cappuccino, of Carleton University, and Thor Arnason, of the University of Ottawa, both in Canada. 怎样才能成功入侵？答案常常是：拥有比敌人更好的武器。人是这样，植物也是如此——至少，《生物书简》上发表的一篇论文是这么认为的，作者是来自加拿大加里敦大学的纳奥米?卡普奇诺和渥太华大学的索尔?阿纳森。 The phenomenon of alien species ★popping up[2] in unexpected parts of the world has grown over the past few d________② as people and goods become more mobile and （1）?plant seeds and animal larvae have ★hitched[3] along for the ride?. Most such aliens blend into the ecosystem in which they arrive without too much fuss. (Indeed, many probably fail to establish themselves at all—but those failures, of course, are never noticed.) Occasionally, though, something ★goes bananas[4] and starts trying to take the place over, and an invasive species is born. Dr Cappuccino and Dr Arnason asked themselves w_______③. 过去的几十年，随着人和货物的流动日益频繁，植物种子和动物幼体也乘机“搭便车”四处播散，世界各地无意间出现了越来越多的外来物种。这些外来物种大多数都轻而易举地融入了所到之处的生态系统。（事实上，许多物种可能还没有站稳脚跟——当然，人们从未注意到这一点。）不过，偶尔也有某些物种疯狂繁殖，开始企图占领原有物种的生长空间，一种入侵物种就这样形成了。卡普奇诺和阿纳森对此感到百思不得其解。 One hypothesis is that aliens leave their predators b________④. Since the predators in their new homelands are not adapted to exploit them, they are able to reproduce unchecked. That is a nice idea, but it does not explain why only certain aliens become invasive. Dr Cappuccino and Dr Arnason suspected this might be because native predators are [b]（2）

经济学人

China in Laos Busted flush How a Sino-Lao special economic zone hit the skids May 26th 2011 | BOTEN, LAOS | from the print edition ?Tweet ? Soon all this will be jungle again AT HOME and abroad, China is a byword for fast-track development, where yesterday’s paddy field is tomorrow’s factory, highway or hotel. Less noticed is that such development can just as quickly go into reverse. Golden City, in Boten, just over the border from China in tiny Laos, is a case in point. When a Hong Kong-registered company signed a 30-year, renewable lease with the Lao government in 2003 to set up a 1,640-hectare special economic zone built with mainland money and expertise, Golden City was touted as a

考研英语经济学人文章阅读训练2020082202

Cloth of gold 一块价值堪比黄金的布 Why the economic value of a face mask is$56.14 为什么说一个口罩的经济价值是56.14美元 After a brutal first six months of the year,governments across the world are hoping for an economic bounce-back.Rich-world GDP fell by about 10%in the first half of2020. 在经历今年上半年的残酷考验后，世界各国政府都期待经济能够触底反弹。2020年上半年，发达国家的GDP下降了约10%。 Yet much has changed since—including that more people are now wearing masks.Economists,obsessed with translating everything into GDP,wonder if more widespread face-covering could help the recovery.然而，自从越来越多的人戴上口罩后，情况发生了显著变化。经济学家痴迷于用GDP来解释一切事物，如今他们想知道，随着更多的人戴上了口罩，经济能否走向复苏。The thinking goes that masks can,in part,substitute for lockdowns. People wearing them need not be discouraged as much from using public transport.More shops and offices might be able to reopen,albeit while practising social distancing. 这种想法基于这样一个逻辑，戴口罩在一定程度上可以代替封锁措施。当人们戴上口罩后，就不必再对公共交通工具进行限制了。更多的商店和办公室也将重新开放，尽管是在保持社交距离的前提下。 Calculations from Goldman Sachs,a bank,suggest that a15 percentage-point rise in the share of the population that wears masks

经济学人双语阅读 1教学文案

经济学人双语阅读1

经济学人杂志双语阅读 Consumer spending in Asia：Shopaholics wanted Consumer spending in Asia亚洲消费状况 Shopaholics wanted 购物狂时代该来了？ Jun 25th 2009 | HONG KONG From The Economist print edition Can Asians replace Americans as a driver of global growth? 亚洲人能够代替美国人做全球经济的发动机吗？ ASIA'S emerging economies are bouncing back much more strongly than any others. While America's industrial production continued to slide in May, output in emerging Asia has regained its pre-crisis level (see chart 1). This is largely due to China; but although production in the region's smaller economies is still well down on a year ago, it is rebounding in those countries too. Taiwan's industrial output rose by an annualised 80% in the three months to May compared with the previous three months. JPMorgan estimates that emerging Asia's GDP has grown by an annualised 7% in the second quarter. 时下亚洲新兴经济体们的恢复势头比其他任何国家都要迅猛。在美国工业生产继续下滑的5月，亚洲新兴国家的产出已经回到了它们危机前的水平(见表一)。这很大程度上要归功于中国，此外尽 管该地区较小经济体的生产比去年仍有所下降，但最近这些国家也

经济学人双语阅读：政治遗传学 人体政治

【经济学人】双语阅读：政治遗传学人体政治 Science and technology 科学技术 The genetics of politics 政治遗传学 Body politic 人体政治 Slowly, and in some quarters grudgingly, the influence of genes in shaping political outlook and behaviour is being recognized 在某些方面，塑造政治前景和行为的基因影响正在慢慢地被人们所接受，虽然还是不情愿。 IN 1882 W.S. Gilbert wrote, to a tune by Sir Arthur Sullivan, a ditty that went I often think it's comical how Nature always does contrive/that every boy and every gal that's born into the world alive/is either a little Liberal or else a little Conservative. 在1882年，W.S吉尔伯特写的一首小诗-是为阿瑟-沙利文爵士的一首曲子而作，我一直认为，大自然的精工雕作是那么可笑/每个出生到这个世界上，并存活下来的男孩和女孩们/不是有一点自由倾向，就是有一点保守。 In the 19th century, that view, though humorously intended, would not have been out of place among respectable thinkers. 在十九世纪，这个观点虽然有一点幽默的意味，但是在那些备受尊敬的思想家眼中，也并不是一无是处。 The detail of a man's opinion might be changed by circumstances. 一个人意见的详细观点可能会由于环境而改变。 But the idea that much of his character was ingrained at birth held no terrors. 但是，这种与生俱来的，由他的性格决定的观念也没什么恐怖的。 It is not, however, a view that cut much ice in 20th-century social-scientific thinking, particularly after the second world war. 然而，它在二十世纪的社会科学思想中没有占到一席之地，特别是二战之后。 Those who allowed that it might have some value were generally shouted down and sometimes abused, along with all others vehemently suspected of the heresy of believing that genetic differences between individuals could have a role in shaping their behavioural differences. 那些认为它有一些价值的人们发出的呐喊，通常会被持不同观点人们的声音所掩盖，有时还会遭到辱骂，和那些对当时的异端邪说----即个体之间的遗传差异在塑造他们各自不同的行为上起了一定的作用----有些猜测的人们一样受到不公平对待。

考研英语经济学人文章阅读训练一

Tencent Video battles iQiyi in China’s streaming wars腾讯视频与爱奇艺之中国流媒体大战 But the two big Chinese streaming platform may onc day settle into a cosy duopoly 但两大平台在未来某天或将实现双头垄断 L aunched in2010,iQiyi has grown used to the foreign press calling it“the Netflix of China”.Not the worst nickname,given the videostreaming pioneer’s success.But Gong Yu,iQiyi’s founder and boss,insists that his firm is more accurately described as“Netflix plus”.A bold claim for a loss-making business worth one-fifteenth as much as America’s(cash-generating)entertainment powerhouse with a market value of$214bn.Still,Mr Gong has a point. 创立于2010年的爱奇艺常常被外国媒体称为“中国版网飞”。鉴于这家流媒体先驱的成功，这一称号也算名副其实。但爱奇艺创始人兼老板龚宇坚称，准确来说，爱奇艺是“加强版网飞”。对于这家仍在亏损的公司来说，这种说法有些张狂，作为美国娱乐业巨头的网飞现已实现盈利，市值高达2140亿美元，而爱奇艺市值仅为其十五分之一。不过，龚宇所言仍有些许道理。 Like Netflix,iQiyi offers customers a deep catalogue of licensed and original content.Unlike Netflix,which relies almost entirely on subscription fees,iQiyi has multiple revenue streams.“Membership fees”,which start from19.8yuan ($2.87)a month,accounted for just over half of iQiyi’s7.4bn yuan in revenues in the second quarter. 爱奇艺和网飞一样，也为客户提供海量版权及原创影视作品。但不同于几乎完全依赖会员费的网飞，爱奇艺拥有多项收入来源。在爱奇艺第二季度74亿元的营收中，每月19.8元（约合2.87美元）起的“会员费”占比刚刚过半。 The rest came mainly from an online store(which sells“entertainment-related merchandise”),a nascent mobile-gaming arm,an e-book business and advertisements;iQiyi operates a“freemium”model which allows stingier users to stream some content free of charge provided they agree to watch ads.

《经济学人》英中对照翻译版(考研英语必备)

来源于https://www.wendangku.net/doc/6511486781.html,/wordpress/（The Economist《经济学人》中文版）和https://www.wendangku.net/doc/6511486781.html,/（《The Economist》《经济学人》中文版） 11月10, 2008 [2008.11.08] 美国大选：无限期望 America's election：Great expectations NO ONE should doubt the magnitude of what Barack Obama achieved this week. When the president-elect was born, in 1961, many states, and not just in the South, had laws on their books that enforced segregation, banned mixed-race unions like that of his parents and restricted voting rights. This week America can claim more credibly that any other western country to have at last become politically colour-blind. Other milestones along the road to civil rights have been passed amid bitterness and bloodshed. This one was marked by joy, white as well as black (see article). 相信无人质疑奥巴马于本周取胜的重要意义。这位新总统出生于1961年，那时美国很多州的法律都要求强化种族分离、禁止像奥巴马父母那样的跨族通婚、限制选举权利；这些不仅限于南部地区，而出现在全国范围内。从本周开始，美国可以更加自信的宣称：任何其他的西方国家都变得有些政治色盲了。在通向民权的道路上，其它里程碑似的重大历史事件都是在痛苦与血泊中通过的；而此次总统选举则以愉快著称，受到了包括白人及黑人在内的全国选民的称赞。 Mr Obama lost the white vote, it is true, by 43-55%; but he won almost exactly same share of it as the last three (white) Democratic candidates; Bill Clinton, Al Gore and John Kerry. And he won heavily among younger white voters. America will now have a president with half-brothers in Kenya, old schoolmates in Indonesia and a view of the world that seems to be based on respect rather than confrontation. 奥巴马丢掉了大约43%-55%的白人选票，这是不争的事实；但他与过去三位白人民主党候选人–克林顿、戈尔和肯尼迪–得到的白人选票几乎相同。同时，他在年轻一代的白人选民中取得了重大胜利。这位新总统有一个同父异母的兄弟在肯尼亚，有老同学在印尼，他的世界观似乎建立在尊重而不是对抗的基础之上。 That matters. Under George Bush America’s international standing has sunk to awful lows. This week Americans voted in record-smashing numbers for many reasons, but one of them was an abhorrence of how their shining city’s reputation has been tarnished. Their country will now be easier for its friends to like and harder for its foes to hate. 这很重要。在布什治下，美国的国际声誉降到了糟糕地步。本周美国选民的投票数量突破了历史纪录，其中原因很多，有一个就是他们对曾经辉煌无比的城市形象已然黯淡无光而感到愤恨。现在他们的国家将会更易赢得朋友的喜爱，而不易引起敌人的仇恨。 In its own way the election illustrates this redeeming effect. For the past eight years the debacle in Florida in 2000 has been cited (not always fairly) as an example of shabby American politics. Yet here was a clear victory delivered by millions of volunteers-and by the intelligent use of technology to ride a wave of excitement that is all too rare in most democracies. Mr Obama showed that, with the right message, a candidate with no money or machine behind him can build his own.

经济学人双语阅读3

经济学人杂志双语阅读：Fatalism v fetishism宿命论VS进口至上说 Economics focus 经济聚焦 Fatalism v fetishism 宿命论VS进口至上说 Jun 11th 2009 From The Economist print edition How will developing countries grow after the financial crisis? 金融危机后发展中国家将如何成长？ FORTY years ago Singapore, now home to the world's busiest port, was a forlorn outpost still garrisoned by the British. In 1961 South Korea was less industrialised than the communist north and dependent on American aid. In 1978 China's exports amounted to less than 5% of its GDP. These countries, and many of their neighbours, have since traded their way out of poverty. Given their success, it is easy to forget that some development economists were once prey to “export fatalism”. Poor countries, they believed, had little to gain from venturing into the world market. If they tried to expand their exports, they would thwart each other, driving down the price of their commodities. 现今世界最繁忙的港口坐落于新加坡-在40年前它还只是英国人驻军的遥远哨所。1961年的南朝鲜靠美国援助度日，在产业化的路上远远落后于他们北面的社会主义邻居。1987年的中国出口额占GDP总量不到5%。之后，这些国家和他们的邻居们靠开放商路脱离了贫穷。在这些国家成功的光环下，过去许多发展经济学家深受“出口宿命说”(注一)折磨的往事被淡忘了。他们曾经相信，穷国投身全球市场并无利可图。一旦他们试图扩大出口，那么穷国之间便会互相伤害并造成他们出产的商品价格下降。 The financial crisis of the past nine months is stirring a new export fatalism in the minds of some economists. Even after the global economy recovers, developing countries may find it harder to pursue a policy of “export-led growth”, which served countries like South Korea so well. Under this strategy, sometimes called “export fetishism”, countries spur sales abroad, often by keeping their curr encies cheap. Some save the proceeds in foreign-currency reserves, rather than spending them on imports. This strategy is one reason why the developing world's current-account surplus exceeded $700 billion in 2008, as measured by the IMF. In the past, these surpluses were offset by American deficits. But America may now rethink the bargain. This imbalance, whereby foreigners sell their goods to America in exchange for its assets, was one potential cause of the country's financial crisis. 过去九个月里的金融危机在某些经济学家的脑海里搅起了新的出口宿命论。就算是在金融危机过后，也许发展中 国家也可能会觉得他们要想采用那种使南朝鲜一类的国家受益颇多的“出口带动型增长”政策变得更加困难了。在这种被称为“出口至上主义”的策略下，政府常以保持本国货币的廉价来激励跨国贸易。一些国家选择把出口收益存入外汇储备，而不是用它们来进口。国际货币基金组织统计出，2008年发展中国家的经常账户(注二)有7千亿美元的结余，这(出口至上主义的策略)也许就是原因之一。在过去，这些结余会被美国的贸易逆差抵消。但是美国现在可能要重新考虑一下

经济学人双语版1

Europe's debt crisis 欧洲债务危机 Spot the pattern 看变化模式 Jul 5th 2011, 18:55 by R.A. | WASHINGTON 2011年7月5日18：55 R.A./华盛顿 HERE'S a chart showing the yields on 10-year Greek debt over the past three months. See the pattern? 本图显示的是在过去3个月10年期希腊债券的收益率。变化模式看清楚了吧？ There's a spike, followed by a decline, followed by a higher spike, followed by a decline to a higher trough, and so on. European leaders keep taking steps to avert disaster, and each time markets are less assuaged. 有个尖峰，接着是下跌，然后又是稍高一些的尖峰，接着跌入一个较高的波谷，如此反复。欧洲国家的领导人一直在采取措施避免灾难，而每一次市场都没有大的起色。 The latest spike corresponds to the stalemate over the IMF's willingness to continue making bail-out payments without a new, long-term rescue package in place (and the corresponding disagreement over how to rollover Greek debt, plus the drama surrounding the passage of Greece's new austerity plan). The IMF agreed to keep paying, French and German banks seemed willing to sign on to a rollover plan, and Greece got its new austerity programme through parliament. But it wasn't long before trouble kicked up again. 最近的尖峰反映了这样一个困境：国际货币基金组织愿意继续救助，但又没有制定出一个长期的一揽子救助计划（同时也反映出如何缓解希腊债务各方存在分歧，以及希腊的新紧缩计划能否通过依然有变数）。国际货币基金组织同意继续提供支付，法国和德国的银行似乎愿意签署资金周转计划书，希腊国会通过了新的紧缩计划。但是，没过多久，麻烦又来了。 Moody's and Standard and Poor's have both suggested that the agreed-upon rollover plan might well constitute a default. Since that's precisely the outcome European leaders were hoping to avoid, this news has sent everyone scurrying to come up with a new and better deal. Meanwhile, Moody's has cut Portugal's debt rating to junk. Portugal may well need a new rescue package, which will surely include debate over the fate of creditors, which will mean more questions about bank finances and more brinksmanship. And the European economy continues to slow, even as the European Central Bank continues to tighten policy. 穆迪和标准普尔都暗示，商定好的周转计划很可能得不到执行。因为这种结果正是欧洲国家的领导人们想避免的，所以这条消息让每个人都急不可待地要制定出一个新的、更好的解决办法。与此同时，穆迪公司已经将葡萄牙的债务评级降至垃圾级。葡萄牙很可能需要一个新的一揽子救援计划，这必将包括对债权人命运的辩论，而辩论的内容将更多的是关于银行财政方面的问题和边缘政策。欧洲经济增长速度持续放缓，尽管欧洲央行继续收紧货币政策。 I don't know that there's any broad lesson here, other than: for all the steps already taken by European leaders, the euro zone hasn't really gotten any closer to solving the underlying issues of insolvency and institutional weakness.

经济学人阅读Not as close as lips and teeth

Not as close as lips and teeth China should not fear India’s growing friendship with Vietnam Oct 22nd 2011 | from the print edition WHEN China’s sovereignty is at issue Global Times, a Beijing newspaper, does not mince words. In September it growled that a contract between Vietnam and an Indian state-owned oil-and-gas company, ONGC, to explore in Chinese-claimed waters in the South China Sea would “push China to the limit”. Yet this month India and Vietnam have reached an agreement on “energy co-operation”. Global Times is incensed that this was signed just a day after Vietnam, during a visit to Beijing by the head of its communist party, Nguyen Phu Trong, had agreed with China on “ground rules” for solving maritime squabbles. Now, thundered the paper, “China may consider taking actions to show its stance and prevent more reckless attempts in confronting China.” The more sober China Energy News, a publication of the Communist Party’s People’s Daily, has weighed in, warning India that its “energy strategy is slipping into an extremely dangerous whirlpool.” Behind such fulminations lie two C hinese fears. One is that India’s involvement complicates its efforts to have its way in the tangled territorial disputes in the South China Sea. The