Evaluation of Smart Grid and Civilian UAV Vulnerability to GPS Spoofing Attacks

Evaluation of Smart Grid and Civilian UA V Vulnerability to GPS Spoo?ng Attacks Daniel P.Shepard,Jahshan A.Bhatti,and Todd E.Humphreys

The University of Texas at Austin

Aaron A.Fansler

Northrop Grumman Information Systems

BIOGRAPHIES

Daniel P.Shepard is pursing a Ph.D.in the Depart-ment of Aerospace Engineering and Engineering Me-chanics at The University of Texas at Austin,where he also received his B.S.He currently works in the University of Texas at Austin Radionavigation Lab. His research interests are in GNSS security,estima-tion and?ltering,and guidance,navigation,and con-trol.

Jahshan A.Bhatti is pursuing a Ph.D.in the Depart-ment of Aerospace Engineering and Engineering Me-chanics at the University of Texas at Austin,where he also received his M.S.and B.S.He is a member of the UT Radionavigation Laboratory.His research interests are in the development of small satellites, software-de?ned radio applications,space weather, and GNSS security and integrity.

Todd E.Humphreys is an assistant professor in the department of Aerospace Engineering and Engineer-ing Mechanics at the University of Texas at Austin, and Director of the UT Radionavigation Laboratory. He received a B.S.and M.S.in Electrical and Com-puter Engineering from Utah State University and a Ph.D.in Aerospace Engineering from Cornell Univer-sity.He specializes in applying optimal estimation and signal processing techniques to problems in ra-dionavigation.His recent focus is on radionavigation robustness and security.

Aaron A.Fansler serves as cyber critical infras-tructure protection(CCIP)program manager for Northrop Grumman Information System.He ob-tained a Master’s degree from Capitol College in in-formation assurance and is currently working on a Ph.D.in information assurance.ABSTRACT

Test results are presented from over-the-air civil GPS spoo?ng tests from a non-negligible stand-o?dis-tance.These tests were performed at White Sands Missile Range(WSMR)against two systems depen-dent on civil GPS,a civilian unmanned aerial vehi-cle(UAV)and a GPS time-reference receiver used in “smart grid”measurement devices.The tests against the civil UAV demonstrated that the UAV could be hijacked by a GPS spoofer by altering the UAV’s per-ceived location.The tests against the time-reference receiver demonstrated the spoofer’s capability of pre-cisely controlling timing from a distance,which means a spoofer could manipulate measurements used for smart grid control without requiring physical access to the measurement devices.Implications of spoo?ng attacks against each of these systems are also given. Recommendations are presented for regulations re-garding GPS receivers used in critical infrastructure applications.These recommendations include creat-ing a certi?cation process by which receivers are de-clared spoof-resistant if they are able to detect or mit-igate spoo?ng attacks in a set of canned scenarios. The recommendations also call for a mandate that only spoof-resistant receivers be used in applications classi?ed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)as national critical infrastructure.

I.Introduction

The design of the Global Positioning System came together over Labor Day weekend in1973.A group of hard-working engineers,mostly Air Force o?cers, decided over that weekend that the GPS satellites would broadcast two di?erent types of signals,a pre-cise military signal and a so-called clear access or C/A signal.The military signal would later be encrypted to prevent unauthorized use and imitation.But the clear access signal,true to its name,would be freely

Copyright c 2012by Daniel P.Shepard, Jahshan A.Bhatti,Todd E.Humphreys,and Aaron A.Fansler Preprint of the2012ION GNSS Conference Nashville,TN,September19–21,

2012

accessible to all.Detailed and accurate speci?cations for the clear access signal were later distributed to encourage its use.

The early designers of the GPS system,for whose tireless e?orts we are all indebted,knew GPS was go-ing to be valuable for civilians across the globe,but they never could have imagined just how valuable. An intentional degradation of the C/A signals called selective availability was discontinued by presidential order in2000.Instantaneously,every GPS receiver across the globe went from errors the size of a foot-ball?eld to errors the size of a small room.It is hard to overstate the impact of this improvement in ac-curacy.Before selective availability was turned o?, there were no in-car navigation systems giving turn-by-turn directions,because back then civilian GPS could not tell you what block you were on,let alone what street.For geolocation,accuracy matters. Things have only improved over the last decade. With more ground stations,better algorithms,more open-access signals,and better receivers,civil GPS—the family of open-access signals to which all civilians have access—can now tell you not only what street you are on,but what part of the street.The accuracy, transparency,and low cost of civil GPS have enabled a?restorm of innovation.After2000,any engineer designing a system for which accurate timing or lo-cation was important found GPS to be an almost ir-resistible option.As a result,civil GPS receivers are built deeply into our national infrastructure:from our smartphones to our cars to the Internet to the power grid to our banking and?nance institutions. Some call GPS the invisible utility:it works silently, and for the most part perfectly reliably,in devices all around us of which we are scarcely aware. However,the same transparency and predictability that has made civil GPS signals so wildly popular has given rise to a signi?cant vulnerability.Transparency and predictability make the civil GPS signals easy to imitate or counterfeit.Civil GPS signals are like Monopoly money:they have a detailed structure but no built-in protection against forgery.The fact that civil GPS is so easy to counterfeit,or“spoof,”would not be of importance if GPS were not so popular and its use so widespread.However,this is not the case. In2001,the U.S.Department of Transportation(US-DOT)evaluated the transportation infrastructure’s GPS vulnerability and?rst raised concern over the

threat of GPS spoofers[1].The USDOT report noted the absence of any o?-the-shelf defense against this type of attack and recommended a study to charac-terize spoo?ng e?ects and observables.In2008,re-searchers demonstrated that an inexpensive portable software-de?ned GPS spoofer could be built from o?-the-shelf components,again highlighting the threat of spoo?ng[2].

GPS spoo?ng is the act of producing a falsi?ed ver-sion of the GPS signal with the goal of taking con-trol of a target GPS receiver’s position-velocity-time (PVT)solution.This is most e?ectively accomplished when the spoofer has knowledge of the GPS signal as seen by the target receiver so that the spoofer can pro-duce a matched,falsi?ed version of the signal.In the case of military signals,this type of attack is nearly impossible because the military signal is encrypted and therefore unpredictable to a would-be spoofer.

The civil GPS signal,on the other hand,is publicly-known and readily predictable.

In recent years,civil GPS spoo?ng has been recog-nized as a serious threat to many critical infrastruc-ture applications which rely heavily on the publicly-known civil GPS signal.A number of promising methods are currently being developed to defend against civil GPS spoo?ng attacks,but it will still take a number of years before these technologies ma-ture and are implemented on a wide scale.Currently, there is a complete absence of any o?-the-shelf de-fense against a GPS spoo?ng attack.

On invitation from the Department of Homeland Se-curity(DHS),unclassi?ed spoo?ng tests were per-formed against two di?erent systems dependent on civil GPS,a civilian unmanned aerial vehicle(UAV) and a GPS time-reference receiver used in“smart grid”measurement devices.These tests took place at White Sands Missile Range(WSMR)on June19, 2012during the DHS GYPSY test exercise.In these tests,the capability of a spoofer,developed by the University of Texas at Austin(UT)Radionavigation Lab,to alter the timing and positioning of GPS re-ceivers in these two applications was demonstrated over-the-air from a stand-o?distance of about620 m.

This report details the tests performed at WSMR during the DHS GYPSY test exercise and the spoofer used for the tests.A discussion of the e?ects of GPS spoo?ng attacks on the two tested systems is also

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provided.Finally,recommendations for regulations on spoo?ng resistance are presented.

II.Background

A.Civil UA Vs

A.1Iran Drone Incident

In December2011,Iran captured a U.S.Central In-telligence Agency(CIA)surveillance drone with only minor damage to the undercarriage of the drone, likely due to a rough landing when captured.An Iranian engineer claimed in an interview that“Iran managed to jam the drone’s communication links to American operators”causing the drone to shift into an autopilot mode that relies solely on GPS to guide itself back to its home base in Afghanistan.With the drone in this state,the Iranian engineer claimed that “Iran spoofed the drone’s GPS system with false co-ordinates,fooling it into thinking it was close to home and landing into Iran’s clutches”[3].

Although the Iranian claims are highly questionable, this incident left many unanswered questions as to the security of GPS systems on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).The CIA drone should have been guiding itself based on the encrypted military GPS signals, which would be incredibly di?cult to spoof.How-ever,some experts have conjectured that simultane-ous jamming of the military signals and spoo?ng of the civilian signals might have worked if the drone had been programmed to fall back on the civilian GPS signals in the event that the military signals were jammed.This raises the question:How di?-cult would it be to spoof a UAV guiding itself based on civilian GPS signals?

A.2FAA Modernization and Reform Act of2012

In February2012,the U.S.Congress passed the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of2012.According to the Library of Congress summary,this act“requires the Secretary[of Transportation]to develop a plan to accelerate safely the integration by September30, 2015,of civil unmanned aircraft systems(UASes,or drones)into the national airspace system[and]de-termine if certain drones may operate safely in the national airspace system before completion of the plan”[4].

Such civilian UAVs would be primarily guided by civil GPS,which has been shown to be readily spoofa-ble in the lab.This would create a signi?cant po-tential hazard in the national airspace if the prob-lem of civil GPS spoo?ng is not?xed.Thousands of civilian UAVs(operated by postal services,police departments,research institutions,and others)could populate the skies in only a few years while still be-ing vulnerable to remote hijacking via GPS spoo?ng.

The passing of the FAA Modernization Act further emphasizes the need to examine the vulnerability of UAVs to GPS spoo?ng.

B.Synchrophasors

As electric power grids continue to expand through-out the world and transmission lines are pushed to their operating limits,the dynamic operation of the power system has become more of a concern and more di?cult to accurately model.More e?ective real-time system control is now seen as key to preventing wide-scale cascading outages like the2003Northeast Black-out[5].For years,electric power control centers have estimated the state of the power system(the posi-tive sequence voltage and phase angle at each net-work node)from measurements of power?ows.But for improved accuracy in the so-called power system state estimates,it will be necessary to feed existing estimators with a richer measurement ensemble or to measure the grid state directly.

Alternating current(AC)quantities have been ana-lyzed for over100years using a construct developed by Charles Proteus Steinmetz in1893,known as a “phasor”[6].In power systems,the phasor construct has commonly been used for analyzing AC quantities, assuming a constant frequency.A relatively new syn-chronization technique which allows referencing mea-sured current or voltage phasors to absolute time has been developed and is currently being implemented throughout the world.The measurements produced by this technique are known as“synchronized phasor measurements”or“synchrophasors.”Synchropha-sors provide a real-time snapshot of current and volt-age amplitudes and phases across a power system, and so can give a complete picture of the state of

a power system at any instant in time.This makes

synchrophasors useful for measurement,analysis,and control of the power grid.

A device used to measure synchrophasors is called 3

a phasor measurement unit(PMU).In a typical de-ployment,PMUs are integrated in protective relays and are sampled from widely dispersed locations in the power system network[7].In order to make ac-curate measurements of phase angles,PMUs must have a synchronized timing source accurate to better than26.5μs according to the IEEE C37.118Standard “Synchrophasors for Power Systems”[8].PMUs are synchronized with respect to the common time source of a GPS time-reference receiver to satisfy this accu-racy requirement.This raises two questions:

1.Can a civil GPS spoofer cause the time-reference receivers used to synchronize PMUs to violate the IEEE standard for synchrophasor measurements in a realistic scenario?

2.What e?ects could violating the standard have on control systems reliant on synchrophasor measure-ments?

III.Civil GPS Spoo?ng

The spoofer used for these tests was an improved ver-sion of the spoofer originally reported in Ref.[2].A picture of the civil GPS spoofer,developed by the UT Radionavigation Laboratory,is shown in Fig.1. It is the only spoofer reported in open literature to date that is capable of precisely aligning the spread-ing codes and navigation data of its counterfeit signals with those of the authentic GPS signals at the target receivers antenna.Such alignment capability allows the spoofer to carry out a sophisticated spoo?ng at-tack in which no obvious clues remain to suggest that an attack is underway.The spoofer is implemented on a portable software-de?ned radio platform with a digital signal processor(DSP)at its core.This plat-form comprises:

?A Radio Frequency(RF)front-end that down-mixes and digitizes GPS L1and L2frequencies.

?A DSP board that performs acquisition and track-ing of GPS L1C/A signals,calculates a navigation solution,predicts the L1C/A databits,and produces a consistent set of up to14spoofed GPS L1C/A signals with a user-controlled?ctitious implied navi-gation and timing solution.

?An RF back-end with a digital attenuator that con-verts the digital samples of the spoofed signals from the DSP to analog output at the GPS L1

frequency

Fig.1.The Civil GPS Spoofer.

with a user-controlled broadcast power.

?A single-board computer(SBC)that handles com-munication between the spoofer and a remote com-puter over the Internet.

A.Receiver/Spoofer Architecture

The spoofer was designed to operate in conjunc-tion with a software-de?ned GPS receiver.This de-sign aids the spoofer in producing counterfeit sig-nals which are initially precisely aligned with the au-thentic signals by leveraging the information obtained about the authentic signals through normal receiver operation.As can be seen from the block diagram of the spoofer in Fig.2,the spoofer control module uti-lizes the GPS observables(code phase,carrier phase, and Doppler frequency)and navigation solution out-put from the coupled receiver.These observables are modi?ed using a linearized measurement model and used to simulate n simulated or“spoofed”GPS signals whose suggested position-velocity-time(PVT) solution is o?set,by a user controlled amount,from the navigation solution of the coupled receiver.The spoofer also requires predicted navigation data from the coupled receiver or an external source,which al-lows the spoofer to produce GPS signals which are nearly indistinguishable from the authentic GPS sig-nals.Additional details on this architecture are pro-vided in Ref.[2]and[9].

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Fig.2.A block diagram of the Spoofer.

B.Attack Strategy

The spoofer operates by ?rst acquiring and tracking GPS L1C/A signals to obtain a navigation solution.It then enters its “feedback”mode,in which it pro-duces a counterfeit,data-free feedback GPS signal that is summed with its own antenna input.The feedback signal is tracked by the spoofer and used to calibrate the delay between production of the digi-tized spoofed signal and output of the analog spoofed signal.This is necessary because the delay is non-deterministic on start-up of the receiver,although it stays constant thereafter.

After feedback calibration is complete and enough time has elapsed to build up a navigation data bit library,the spoofer is ready to begin an attack.Ini-tially,it produces signals that are aligned with the au-thentic signals at the location of the target antenna to within a few meters,but have low enough power that they remain far below the target receiver’s noise ?oor.The spoofer then raises the power of the spoofed sig-nals slightly above that of the authentic signals.At this point,the spoofer has taken control of the vic-tim receiver’s tracking loops and can slowly lead the spoofed signals away from the authentic signals,car-rying the receiver’s tracking loops with it.The tar-get receiver can be considered completely captured when either one of the following are true:(1)each spoofed signal has shifted by 2μs relative to the au-thentic signals,or (2)each spoofed signal is at least 10dB more powerful than the corresponding authen-tic signal.The latter option ensures that there is no signi?cant interaction between authentic and spoofed signals by simultaneously jamming and spoo?ng.

The UT spoofer and attack strategy have been tested against a wide variety of civil GPS receivers and have always been successful in commandeering the tar-get receiver.Several of the receivers that have been spoofed are highlighted in Ref.[10].C.Proximity Spoo?ng Attack

The spoo?ng tests performed in the past using the UT spoofer can all be considered to be proximity spoo?ng attacks.A proximity spoo?ng attack,as depicted in Fig.3,is a class of spoo?ng attacks where the spoofer is located within a few meters of the target receiver,so the distance between the spoofer and target receiver can be neglected.This attack scenario is described in detail in Ref.[2]and signi?cantly decreases the complexity of carrying out an attack.It should be noted that past tests have been performed through-cable or in an RF-shielded enclosure to avoid violating FCC regulations by broadcasting in the GPS band.D.Spoo?ng at a Distance

For an attack against a UAV,the only way the spoofer could be assured to be a negligible distance from the target receiver is if the spoofer were attached to the UAV.It is unlikely that this would be the case,so an attack against a UAV will not fall under the cate-gory of a proximity spoo?ng attack.For that matter,physical security of a receiver would often prevent proximity spoo?ng in most realistic scenarios.This requires the spoofer to consider the e?ects of spoo?ng from a non-negligible distance away if precise align-ment of the counterfeit and authentic signals is de-

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Fig.3.A diagram of a proximity spoo?ng attack.

sired.In fact,?ne-grained control of a UAV via GPS spoo?ng is only possible with a meter-level accurate suggested position.Modi?cations were made to the UT spoofer to account for these e?ects so that meter-level accurate suggested position was achieved during the tests.

IV.UA V Spoo?ng Demonstration A.The UA V

The UAV spoo?ng tests targeted a UT-owned Hor-net Mini UAV supplied by Adaptive Flight,which is shown in Fig.4.The Hornet Mini is roughly ?ve feet long and weighs about 10pounds when fully loaded.The Mini’s sophisticated avionics package loosely couples an altimeter,a magnetometer,and a MEMS IMU package to a GPS receiver via an ex-tended Kalman ?lter.

The results of the spoo?ng tests with the Hornet Mini also apply to other similarly-designed UAVs;those whose navigation systems are centered on civil GPS.The UAVs designed in this way include those used in most non-US-military applications.It should be noted that no special alterations where made to the Hornet Mini for this test—it was in its “as sold”or “stock”con?guration.B.Setup

A schematic of the setup used for the spoo?ng tests against the civil UAV at WSMR appears in Fig.5.The spoofer was located on a hilltop with the receive antenna on the far side of the hilltop from the trans-mit antenna as shown in Fig.6.The UAV site

was

Fig.4.The Hornet Mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV),owned by the UT,used in the spoo?ng tests.

located in a sandy basin approximately 620m from the transmit antenna.C.Procedure

The UAV was commanded by its ground controller to hover approximately 40feet above ground level at the UAV site.After the initial ground control command was sent,the UAV maintained its hovering position automatically based on the navigation solution of its extended Kalman ?lter,which is based in part on GPS.At this point in the test procedure,the spoofed signals were not being broadcast:the UAV was only under the in?uence of the authentic GPS signals.The spoofer was then commanded to begin transmit-ting spoofed signals.To ensure seamless capture of the UAV’s GPS unit,the code phases of the spoofed signals were aligned to within meters of the authen-

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Fig.5.A schematic of the UAV test setup.

tic signals at the location of the UAV’s GPS an-tenna.The spoofed signals overpowered their authen-tic counterparts and instantly captured the tracking loops within the UAV’s GPS receiver. Immediately after capture,the spoofer induced a false velocity and corresponding position change in the UAV’s GPS receiver,drawing the position reported by the UAV’s extended Kalman?lter away from the UAV’s commanded hover position.To compensate, the UAV’s?ight controller responded by moving in the opposite direction.A safety pilot was on hand to prevent the UAV from drifting out of control. This was necessary because by commandeering the UAV’s GPS receiver,the spoofer operator e?ectively breaks the UAV autopilot’s feedback control loop. The spoofer operator must now act as an operator-in-the-loop,which requires real-time,meter-level knowl-edge of the UAV’s true location.

D.Results

Between tests at WSMR and UT,the spoofer demon-strated short-term3-dimensional control of the UAV.

Thus,it is possible to hijack a civil UAV—in this case,

a fairly sophisticated one—by civil GPS spoo?ng.

Interestingly,the Hornet Mini relies only on its al-timeter for direct measurements of its vertical posi-tion;the GPS-measured vertical position is ignored.

This can be done with reasonable accuracy because of the Hornet Mini’s short?ight endurance(about20 minutes).However,the GPS vertical velocity does a?ect the extended Kalman?lter’s vertical coordi-nate estimate because the?lter propagates GPS ve-locity measurements through a UAV dynamics model to form an a priori vertical estimate that gets updated with the altimeter measurements.This dependence on GPS velocity allowed the spoofer operator to force the UAV vertically downward in dramatic fashion in the?nal three capture demonstrations.

E.Implications

These tests have demonstrated that civilian UAVs will be vulnerable to control by malefactors with a civil GPS spoofer looking to hijack or crash these UAVs unless their vulnerability to GPS spoo?ng is 7

Fig.6.Aerial view of the test site showing the spoofer location on a hilltop and the UAV site approximately0.62 kilometers away.

addressed.There are several reasons why someone may want to spoof a drone including fear over drones invading people’s privacy.This poses a signi?cant safety concern that could result in mid-air collisions with other aerial vehicles or buildings,not to mention loss of property.

Constructing from scratch a sophisticated GPS spoofer like the one developed by UT is not easy, nor is it within the capability of the average anony-mous hacker.It is orders of magnitude harder than developing a GNSS jammer.Nonetheless,the trend toward software-de?ned GNSS receivers for research and development,where receiver functionality is de-?ned entirely in software downstream of the A/D con-verter,has signi?cantly lowered the bar to develop-ing a spoofer in recent years.As a point of reference, we estimate that there are more than100researchers in universities around the world who are well-enough versed in software-de?ned GPS that they could de-velop a sophisticated spoofer from scratch with a year of dedicated e?ort.

More worrisome is the fact that one does not have to build a sophisticated spoofer like ours,capable of

aligning its signals precisely with authentic signals at the location of a chosen target,to spoof a civil GPS receiver.A low-cost o?-the-shelf GPS signal simula-tor would not permit the kind of seamless attack we carried out,but would be adequate to confuse and disrupt the navigation system of a commercial UAV.

V.GPS Time-Reference Receiver Spoo?ng Demonstration

A.Prior Tests

In December2011,the University of Texas at Austin and Northrop Grumman Information Systems per-formed laboratory spoo?ng tests against a GPS time-reference receiver supplying timing to a PMU.The minimum threshold for success in these spoo?ng tests was to show that a GPS spoofer could force a PMU to violate the IEEE C37.118Standard“Synchropha-sors for Power Systems”[8].The standard requires

a phase angle error of less than0.573?,which can be

equivalently and indistinguishably caused by a timing error of26.5μs.

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Fig.7.A plot of the phase angle di?erence between the reference and spoofed PMUs.Normally the phase angle di?erence would be nearly zero in the absence of a spoo?ng attack.Point1marks the start of the test.Point2marks the point at which the spoofer has completely captured the target receiver.Point3marks the point at which the IEEE C37.118Standard has been broken.Point4marks the point at which the spoofer-induced velocity has reached its maximum value for the test.Point5marks the point at which the spoofed signal was removed.

In these tests,the phase angle of the spoofed PMU was monitored as well as the phase angle from a non-spoofed PMU in the same room.Figure7shows the measured phase angle di?erence between the refer-ence PMU,which was fed the true GPS signal,and the spoofed PMU throughout one entire test.This value would normally be less than a few degrees in the absence of spoo?ng,since the two PMUs are co-located.After the initial ten minute capture and carry-o?,which proceeds slowly to avoid detection, the spoofer accelerates its timing carry-o?and the reference and spoofed phase angles quickly diverge. Figures8through12show pictures of an oscillo-scope and the synchrophasor screen at di?erent times throughout the test.The oscilloscope shows two pulse-per-second(PPS)signals,with the upper yel-low pulse coming from a reference clock being fed true GPS and the lower blue pulse coming from the spoofed timing receiver.Both PPS signals are ini-tially aligned with each other,as seen in8.The syn-chrophasor screen displays the PMU phase angle data in real-time as phasors with the nominal60Hz op-erating frequency subtracted from the phase angle. The red and green phasors show the phase data from the reference and spoofed PMUs respectively.These

phasors are within a few degrees of each other at the beginning of the test,as seen in8.

At the time shown in Fig.10,the IEEE C37.118Stan-dard was broken.The spoofer was easily able to break this standard and go much further.The spoofer-induced phase angle error exceeded10o within15 minutes of the start of the test,as shown in Fig.11.

By the end of the test,the spoofer-induced phase an-gle error exceeded70o,as shown in Fig.7.

This test demonstrated that a proximity spoo?ng attack against a PMU can induce large,spoofer-controlled errors in the phase angle measured by the PMU in a relatively short period of time without causing any alarms in the system.A complete de-scription of these tests and their implications can be found in Ref.[11].

B.Setup

The setup for the WSMR time-reference receiver spoo?ng test was exactly the same as for the UAV spoo?ng tests,shown in Fig.5,on the spoofer end, and the target site was also at the same location, shown in Fig. 6.At the target site,there were two GPS time-reference receivers.The?rst time-reference receiver was representative of the ones used for PMU networks and served as the target of the spoo?ng attack.The other time-reference receiver was used as a time reference during the testing by un-plugging the GPS antenna before the spoo?ng attack began.This forced the receiver into its“holdover”

or GPS-denied mode.While in holdover mode,the time-reference receiver was able to ride through the spoo?ng attack using its highly stable ovenized crys-tal oscillator(OCXO)to maintain accurate timing.

C.Procedure

Before the spoo?ng attack began,the time alignment of the two time-reference receivers was observed on an oscilloscope using the IRIG-B output from the tar-get receiver and the PPS output from the reference receiver.The oscilloscope was set to trigger on the PPS output from the reference receiver.Once the two receivers agreed to within100ns,which is typi-cal for these two receivers,the reference receiver was unplugged from the antenna and allowed to transi-tion into holdover mode.Data was recorded from the oscilloscope to demonstrate this time alignment.

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Fig.8.Pictures of the oscilloscope(left)and synchrophasor(right)screen at the start of the test,which is marked as point1in Fig.7.

Fig.9.Pictures of the oscilloscope(left)and synchrophasor(right)screen at about620seconds into the test,which is marked as point2in Fig.7.

Fig.10.Pictures of the oscilloscope(left)and synchrophasor(right)screen at about680seconds into the test,which is marked as point3in Fig.7.

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Fig.11.Pictures of the oscilloscope (left)and synchrophasor (right)screen at about 870seconds into the test,which is marked as point 4in Fig.

7.

Fig.12.Pictures of the oscilloscope (left)and synchrophasor (right)screen at about 1370seconds into the test,which is marked as point 5in Fig.7.

At this point,the spoofer began transmitting spoofed signals that were initially nearly perfectly aligned with the authentic signals at the target site.The spoofed signals overpowered their authentic coun-terparts and instantly captured the tracking loops within the target receiver.The spoofer then began to drag the timing of the target receiver away from the truth until it reached 1μs of induced timing er-ror.This was chosen to demonstrate that the spoofer had precise control over the target receiver’s timing.Data was recorded from the oscilloscope to show that a 1μs induced timing error was achieved.

Finally,the spoofer was commanded to cease trans-mitting the spoofed signals.Once the target re-ceiver reacquired the authentic signals and corrected

its timing,data was recorded from the oscilloscope to demonstrate that the reference receiver did not drift signi?cantly in timing during the test.D.Results

Figure 13shows the data taken from the oscilloscope from before the spoo?ng attack began.This demon-strates that the two time reference receivers agree to within 100ns nominally.Figure 14shows the data taken from the oscilloscope from the end of the spoof-ing test,where the spoofed time-reference receiver has a spoofer-induced timing error of almost exactly 1μs.This shows that the spoofer was able to precisely con-trol the timing of the spoofed receiver during the test.

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Fig.13.Time alignment of the reference PPS (top blue dashed line)and the spoofed IRIG-B time code (bottom red line)before the spoo?ng attack

began.Fig.14.Time alignment of the reference PPS (top blue dashed line)and the spoofed IRIG-B time code (bottom red line)at the end of the spoo?ng attack.

Figure 15shows the data taken from the oscilloscope from after the spoo?ng test,once the spoofed receiver reacquired the authentic signals and corrected its tim-ing.This demonstrates that the reference receiver did not drift signi?cantly in timing during the test,which means that any change in relative timing between the reference and spoofed receivers can be attributed to the e?ects of the spoofer.E.Implications

In a practical scenario,a malefactor may seek to sub-vert the control objectives of electric power

authori-Fig.15.Time alignment of the reference PPS (top blue dashed line)and the spoofed IRIG-B time code (bottom red line)after the spoo?ng attack ended.

ties by altering their perception of the current state of the power grid.The end goal of the malefactor may be to cause damage to power grid equipment or lo-cal blackouts.Between this demonstration of timing control from a distance and the prior tests described in detail in Ref.[11],it has been demonstrated that a sophisticated spoo?ng attack can alter the phase an-gle measurements of a PMU network without needing physical access to the devices themselves.The sim-plest synchrophasor-based control scheme relies solely on phase angle di?erences between two PMUs as an indicator of a fault condition.Thus,a malefactor could accomplish his goals by targeting important power grid nodes (i.e.areas with high power ?ow)with a GPS spoo?ng attack which alters the timing in a way that increases the phase angle di?erences between nodes in the area.This type of attack would likely be indistinguishable from an actual fault and cause corrective actions to be taken when none are necessary.

PMUs are not currently being used for control pur-poses in the U.S.,but the industry and government are pushing for more e?cient distribution of power which will require the accuracy and data rates that PMUs provide for state estimation of the power grid.However,other countries are already beginning to im-plement synchrophasor-based control schemes.One example of a currently operational synchrophasor-based control system is the Chicoasen-Angostura transmission link in Mexico [12].This transmission line links large hydroelectric generators in Angos-

12

tura to large loads in Chicoasen through two400-kV transmission lines and one115-kV transmission line. PMUs are stationed at each end of the transmission line and are setup to automatically trip the hydro-electric generators o?ine in the event that the phase angle di?erence between the two PMUs exceeds10o. This system was implemented to protect the gener-ators against fault conditions.If a spoofer were to attack this system in Mexico or a similar implemen-tation elsewhere,then the spoofer could easily cause an unnecessary generator trip in a matter of minutes. Beyond tripping a single generator,there is poten-tial for the e?ects of a spoo?ng attack to propagate through the grid and cause cascading faults across the grid.This was best demonstrated by the2003North-east Blackout,which originated with the tripping of a single transmission line[5].In a little more than an hour,this event cascaded into a large scale blackout that left50million people without power for four days and cost an estimated six billion dollars.Although fu-ture control systems are being designed to prevent an event from scaling to this magnitude,a single spoofer targeting the right node would likely still have wide reaching e?ects if a malefactor had knowledge of the power grid architecture.Additionally,a network of spoofers carrying out a coordinated spoo?ng attack against various nodes on the power grid could greatly increase the area of e?ect.

VI.Fixing the Problem of GPS Spoo?ng There is no quick,easy,and cheap?x for the civil GPS spoo?ng problem.Moreover,not even the most e?ec-tive GPS spoo?ng defenses are foolproof.In contrast to message authentication,such as is used to sign data transmitted across the Internet,the security of GPS signal authentication is much weaker and demands a probabilistic model.Nonetheless,there are many pos-sible remedies to the spoo?ng problem that,while not foolproof,would vastly improve civil GPS security. These defenses include placing cryptographic signa-tures in the navigation messages or spread-spectrum codes on either the wide-area augmentation system (WAAS)or GPS satellites,antenna-based defenses, and jamming detectors.A discussion of the advan-tages and disadvantages of some of these defences is given in Ref.[13].The ideal spoo?ng defense is one which:

1.would reliably detect a sophisticated spoo?ng at-

tack,such as the one conducted at WSMR,with a low probability of false alarm

2.could be implemented in the short term

3.would not signi?cantly increase the cost of a GPS-

based navigation system

4.would be applicable to a broad range of GPS de-

pendent systems

VII.Recommendations

It is the authors’recommendation that for non-recreational operation in the national airspace,civil UAVs exceeding18lbs be required to employ naviga-tion systems that are spoof-resistant.Additionally, the authors recommend that GPS-based timing or navigation systems having a non-trivial role in sys-tems designated by DHS as national critical infras-tructure be required to be spoof-resistant.

Resistance to spoo?ng will be de?ned through a series of canned attack scenarios that can be recreated in a laboratory setting[14].A navigation system is de-clared spoof-resistant if,for each attack scenario,the system is either una?ected by or able to detect the spoo?ng attack.Spoo?ng detection combined with an appropriate GPS-denied mode for the UAV to fall back on will signi?cantly increase the di?culty of mounting a successful spoo?ng attack against a UAV.

Timing receivers could use a spoo?ng detection mech-anism to force themselves into a holdover mode that relies on its local oscillator,like the receiver used as

a reference in the timing tests,and send an alert that

a spoo?ng attack is occurring.

Finally,the authors recommend that a cryptographic authentication signature be developed and implemen-tated for one of the existing or forthcoming civil GPS signals.The signature should at minimum take the form of a digital signature interleaved into the navi-gation message stream of the WAAS signals.A bet-ter plan would be to interleave the signature into the CNAV or CNAV2GPS navigation message stream like the signature described in Ref.[15].The best plan for implementing a cryptographic authentica-tion signature would be to implement the signature as an spread-spectrum security code(SSSC)interleaved into the spreading code of the L1C data channel like the signature described in Ref.[16].Inclusion of a cryptographic signature would greatly aid manufac-13

turers in developing receivers that are spoof-resistant. VIII.Conclusions

Test results presented herein demonstrate that a GPS spoofer can alter a civil UAV’s perception of its lo-cation and a time-reference receiver’s perception of the current time from an appreciable distance away. The GPS receivers in both of these tests reported no alarms during the tests to indicate that they sus-pected their position-velocity-time(PVT)solution was anything other than nominal.

It was demonstrated that a civil UAV could be “steered”by a spoofer by moving its perceived loca-tion in the opposite direction of the desired motion. Coarse,short-term control of the UAV was demon-strated in all directions(east,north,and up)during the tests.Since the spoofer did not have real-time feedback of the UAV’s current position and veloc-ity,long-term control was unachievable during these tests.However,a medium-sized radar system could be used to provide this feedback,and a control loop could be designed within the spoofer to provide sta-ble control of the UAV.With the passage of the FAA Modernization Act of2012,civil UAVs could occupy the national airspace within the decade.If the issue of civil GPS spoo?ng is not?xed before then,then civil UAVs would pose a signi?cant safety concern in the national airspace that could result in mid-air col-lisions with other aerial vehicles or buildings,not to mention loss of property.

One critical infrastructure application that will soon use GPS time-reference receivers is the power grid. PMUs use time-reference receivers to time stamp their measurements,which allows power grid oper-ators to get a snapshot of the current state of the grid including phase angles.PMUs are a technology that will revolutionize power grid control and pave the way for more e?cient power distribution.However, it has been demonstrated in Ref.[11]that a spoo?ng attack can induce arbitrarily large errors in the PMU-measured phase angles by inducing timing errors in the time-reference receiver driving the PMU.This fact combined with the demonstrations of spoo?ng from a distance presented herein proves feasibility of a spoo?ng attack against a PMU in which the spoofer does not require close proximity to the PMU.Alter-ing of PMU-measured phase angles could cause power grid control systems to unnecessarily trip generators

or transmission lines.These e?ects would likely cause local area blackouts and have the potential for causing damage to power grid equipment.There also exists the potential for the e?ects to cascade into large scale blackouts similar to the2003Northeast Blackout.

There is no quick,easy,and cheap?x for the civil GPS spoo?ng problem.However,many promising tech-niques that,while not foolproof,would vastly improve civil GPS security have been and are being developed.

These defenses include placing cryptographic signa-tures in the navigation messages or spread-spectrum codes on either the WAAS or GPS satellites,antenna-based defenses,and jamming detectors.

It is the authors’recommendation that for non-recreational operation in the national airspace,civil UAVs exceeding18lbs be required to employ nav-igation systems that are spoof-resistant.Addition-ally,the authors recommend that GPS-based tim-ing or navigation systems having a non-trivial role in systems designated by DHS as national critical in-frastructure be required to be spoof-resistant.Re-sistance to spoo?ng will be de?ned through a series of standardized tests that require the receiver to de-tect or mitigate the spoo?ng attack.This combined with regulations concerning GPS-denied modes for systems reliant on GPS would greatly increase the di?culty of mounting a successful spoo?ng attack.

Finally,the authors recommend that a cryptographic authentication signature be developed and implemen-tated for one of the existing or forthcoming civil GPS signals.Inclusion of a cryptographic signature would greatly aid manufacturers in developing receivers that are spoof-resistant.

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15

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题目智能电网的现状和发展趋势 姓名卢乾坤学号2012416464 院系工学院 专业电气工程及其自动化 指导教师蔡彬职称教授 2014 年12 月12 日

目录 摘要 (1) 关键词 (1) Abstract (1) Key words (1) 引言（或绪论） (2) 一、中国智能电网的现状和发展趋势 (3) （一）中国智能电网产业研究的目的和背景 (3) 1．我国向智能电网发展的意义 (3) 2．我国开发智能电网的背景 (4) 中国智能电网技术的进展和趋势 (4) 二、国外智能电网的现状和发展趋 (4) （一）美国进行智能电网改造 (4) （二）欧盟智能电网的发展趋势 (5) （三）日本大力发展智能电网 (5) 致谢 (6) 参考文献 (7)

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智能电网特点浅析

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浅析智能电网的研究现状与发展趋势

浅析智能电网的研究现状与发展趋势 在我国不断发展的过程中，对于电力的需求在不断的加大，智能电网的建设和发展能在一定程度上满足社会的需求。同时，智能电网作为一项新兴的电力技术，将成为世界主流国家电力工业发展的趋势，也将为中国的经济建设提供更加稳定可靠的电力保障。 标签：智能电网；现状；发展趋势 智能电网这一概念最早是美国能源部的一个团队提出的。但随后美国能源部指出，目前的电网并不是“愚蠢的”，智能电网只是将电网中智能的部分扩大，从与消费者单纯的供需关系变为更加直接的与消费者进行交互，精确自动化的预测发电量并对电量进行分配。通过对不同动力来源的发电机组的发电量进行调配，提高新能源在电源结构中的比重，实现经济发展与环境保护齐头并进。 一、智能电网概述 智能电网是建立在集成的通信网络的基础上的主要通过利用传感器、测量技术以及自动控制技术实现电网的安全、可靠、高效运行。智能电网本身具有能耗少、安全性高、稳定性强、电力资源利用率高的优点。智能电网是电力技术进一步发展的产物，因而也称之为第二代电网。智能电网具有交互、协调、高效、安全、集成等特点，这几个特点中最为典型的就是集成性。集成性主要指的是智能电网融合了能量管理、配电管理、控制维护和远程监视等信息系统。智能电网实际上就是多种信息系统的集合。智能电网的高效性主要指的是它能够优化资产，实现资产的合理利用。智能电网通过引入先进的信息和监控技术，有效提高了资产利用效率，降低了维护成本，最终实现了资产的优化。智能电网的交互性主要指的是智能电网与用户设备之间可以实现有效沟通。在智能电网运行过程中通过与用户设备的有效交互，有助于电力用户发挥其积极作用，这对电力系统的正常运行也具有重要意义。 二、智能电网现状 （一）虚拟同步单机技术的发展 虚拟同步发电机技术是一种通过模拟同步发电机组的机电暂态特性，使采用变流器的电源具有同步发电机组的惯量、阻尼、一次调频、无功调压等并网运行外特性的技术。2017年12月27日，世界首个具备虚拟同步机功能的新能源电站在国家风光储输示范电站建成投运。这项技术自1997年提出以来，英国、美国、德国、荷兰等新能源领域先导都在努力攻关。最终，虚拟同步机大规模实际应用还是中国国家电网公司最先成功实现。虚拟同步机并不需要对电网进行大规模改造，不仅实用性很强，还经济实惠。通过虚拟同步电机技术的实用化，新能源发电并网的可控性得到了提高。

智能电网与传统电网的区别

1智能电网与传统电网的差异 传统电网是一个刚性系统,电源的接入与退出、电能量的传输等都缺乏弹性,致使电网没有动态柔性及可组性;垂直的多级控制机制反应迟缓,无法构建实时、可配置、可重组的系统;系统自愈、自恢复能力完全依赖于实体冗余;对客户的服务简单、信息单向;系统内部存在多个信息孤岛,缺乏信息共享。虽然局部的自动化程度在不断提高,但由于信息的不 完善和共享能力的薄弱,使得系统中多个自动化系统是割裂的、局部的、孤立的,不能构成一个实时的有机统一整体,所以整个电网的智能化程度较低[9210]。 与传统电网相比,人们设想中的智能电网将进一步拓展对电网全景信息(指完整的、正确的、具有精确时间断面的、标准化的电力流信息和业务流信息等)的获取能力,以坚强、可靠、通畅的实体电网架构和信息交互平台为基础,以服务生产全过程为需求,整合系统各种实时生产和运营信息,通过加强对电网业务流实时动态的分析、诊断和优化,为电网运 行和管理人员提供更为全面、完整和精细的电网运营状态图,并给出相应的辅助决策支持,以及控制实施方案和应对预案,最大程度地实现更为精细、准确、及时、绩优的电网运行和管理[9210]。 与传统电网相比,智能电网将进一步优化各级电网控制,构建结构扁平化、功能模块化、系统组态化的柔性体系架构,通过集中与分散相结合,灵活变换网络结构、智能重组系统架构、最佳配置系统效能、优化电网服务质量,实现与传统电网截然不同的电网构成理念和体系。 由于智能电网可及时获取完整的电网信息,因此可极大地优化电网全寿命周期管理的技术体系,承载电网企业社会责任,确保电网实现最优技术经济比、最佳可持续发展、最大经济效益、最优环境保护,从而优化社会能源配置,提高能源综合投资及利用效益。 2国内外智能电网建设背景不同 电力行业作为社会基础产业,是国家发展的命脉产业之一。电网建设与国家能源资源结构、产业布局、经济发展规划和相关政策密切相关,同时也与本国的能源资源条件、能源资源输入可能性以及国家能源战略安全等密切相关。 随着中国经济社会高速发展,电力需求日益增长,中国电力工业建设进入快速发展时期。一方面,电网建设规模日趋扩大,电网负荷变动剧烈,区域负荷不平衡;另一方面,电网架构依然薄弱,亟待坚固补强。中国能源资源分布、经济发展不均衡,必须提高电网输送能力,发展远距离、大跨距、大容量输电,加强统一协调和规划建设,形成统一调度运行的统 一或联合电网。 而国外发达国家的电力工业已步入成熟期,输电网架构变化很小,电网发展趋于平稳,电力需求趋于饱和,电力供应及冗余储备趋向平衡。出于体制和利益需求,他们最为关注的是停电时间最小化和市场效益最大化。因此,从国外对智能电网的研究现状来看,其侧重于建立一个高效、安全、环保、灵活应变的智能电力系统,更多地从市场、安全、电能质量、环境等方面出发,从用户端的角度来看待和研究智能电网,更多地强调信息与电网的结合及基于信息的业务重整。另外,国外尤其是欧、美国家所倡导的智能电网,更关注于分布式电源及客户端的接入、信息的获

智能电网发展及展望

智能电网发展及展望 摘要：智能电网就是电网的智能化（智电电力），也被称为“电网 2.0”，它是建立在集成的、高速双向通信网络的基础上，通过先进的传感和测量技术、先进的设备技术、先进的控制方法以及先进的决策支持系统技术的应用，实现电网的可靠、安全、经济、高效、环境友好和使用安全的目标，其主要特征包括自愈、激励和包括用户、抵御攻击、提供满足21世纪用户需求的电能质量、容许各种不同发电形式的接入、启动电力市场以及资产的优化高效运行。 近20年来，虽然信息、通信技术发生了翻天覆地的变化，但日渐老化的传统电网结构并没有跟上技术变革的步伐，用户对电力供应提出了越来越高的要求，国家安全、环保等各方面政策都对电网的建设和管理提出了更高的标准。建设智能电网已经箭在弦上。 关键词:智能电网发展概况智能电网计划未来展望 前言 2005年，一位名叫马克?坎贝尔的加拿大人发明了一种无线控制器，这种控制器与大楼的各个电器相连，让大楼里的电器互相协调，减少了大楼在用电高峰期的用电量。欧美各国对智能电网的研究开展较早，且已经形成强大的研究群体，由于各国的具体情况不同，其智能电网的建设动因和关注点也存在差异。 我国电力行业紧密跟踪欧美发达国家电网智能化的发展趋势，着力技术创新，研究与实践并举，在智能电网发展模式、理念和基础理论、技术体系以及智能设备等方面开展了大量卓有成效的研究和探索。2009年5月，在北京召开的“2009特高压输电技术国际会议”上，国家电网公司正式发布了“坚强智能电网”发展战略。2009年8月，国家电网公司启动了智能化规划编制、标准体系研究与制定、研究检测中心建设、重大专项研究和试点工程等一系列工作。在2010年3月召开的全国“两会”上，温家宝总理在《政府工作报告》中强调：“大力发展低碳经济，推广高效节能技术，积极发展新能源和可再生能源，加强智能电网建设”。这标志着智能电网建设已成为国家的基本发展战略。

智能电网对智慧城市的支撑作用研究 黄晓嘉

智能电网对智慧城市的支撑作用研究黄晓嘉 发表时间：2018-08-13T17:17:45.847Z 来源：《电力设备》2018年第12期作者：黄晓嘉 [导读] 摘要：智能电网对智慧城市建设具有强大的支撑潜力。阐述了智慧城市的内涵与特征，及其对智能电网的关键需求。 （惠州电力勘察设计院有限公司 516023） 摘要：智能电网对智慧城市建设具有强大的支撑潜力。阐述了智慧城市的内涵与特征，及其对智能电网的关键需求。通过梳理二者的关系认为智能电网是智慧城市的重要组成部分，以智能电网为基础构建智慧城市是智慧城市发展的重要途径。在智能电网建设中，需要深化应用信息通信类技术、分布式能源发电并网技术、绿色输变电工程技术、先进储能技术、主动配电网和微网技术、需求响应技术、电动汽车与电网互动技术、智能用电及用户用能行为分析技术、智能电网业务互动技术城市能源互联网等关键技术，使智能电网为智慧城市的发展提供强大的支撑。 关键词：智能电网；智慧城市；信息通信技术；分布式能源 智慧城市的建设是时代发展的必然需求，它的发展会使信息呈现出智能化的发展趋势，提升经济的发展水平，加快智能信息系统的建设与应用，有利于构建环境优美、管理高效、社会和谐的生活环境。智能电网是智慧城市的发展基础，因此，越来越多的专家学者，致力于研究智能电网对智慧城市的支撑作用，以此来促进二者的协调发展。 1.智慧城市的内涵和特征 目前全球还没有城市实现完整意义上的智慧城市，也并没有形成完全统一的智慧城市的概念和理论模型，各研究机构、组织和企业也从不同的视角出发，依据不同的技术背景、所处的经济发展阶段，提出了不同的智慧城市概念。国际电工委员会（IEC）在其智慧城市的白皮书中给出的智慧城市是：信息通信技术（ICT）与城市传统基础设施结合，使众多系统集成为一个新系统，用以实现解决环境污染问题、方便城市管理者更高效管理城市以及向市民提供高质的生活、交通及其他系统，满足市民进行经济、文化、社会性等一系列活动需求的目标。英国标准协会（BritishStandardInstitution，BSI）提出智慧城市是在城市层面通过捕捉整个城市的信息，并进行数据分析，达到对整个城市资源的实时监控。欧洲智慧城市理念以人为本，突出环境的可持续发展，实现经济的可持续增长，具有用户创新、开放创新、大众创新、协同创新的鲜明特点。智能电网最明显的特点，体现在以下几个方面：（1）网架结构稳定，具备强大的电力输送能力，可为城市的发展，提供安全稳定的电力资源。（2）它可以在减少运营成本的同时，使电网输送的效率以及运行的效率得到整体发展，有利于提高电网运行的经济效益与社会效益。（3）智能电网使用清洁的能源，加大对可再生资源的利用，能够有效降低城市的环境污染问题，提高资金的使用效率，保持生态平衡。（4）智能电网的应用，使客户与电网信息完全透明，有利于实现资源的共享。（5）智能电网的建成，改变了传统的电网运行方式，使其呈现出操作灵活的特点，实现双向互动服务的发展目标，提高电网运行的服务质量。 2.能源技术上的支撑 2.1为智慧城市保证电力供应 智能电网是一种利用先进技术，将传统变电站的应用管理系统转变为带有智能化色彩的管理模式。在智能电网的应用中，利用了控制技术、无线通讯技术和智能传感技术等一系列先进技术，实现对变电站输电设备运行情况的实时监控与检测，在自动化配电方面得到了广泛的推广以及实际应用。智能电网的成功建立，在一定程度上意味着城市电网将以平稳健康的姿态运行，智能电网可以对城市电网的各个环节设备的运行状况进行监控检测，在检测过程中及时的将检测数据生成信息代码传递给终端管理系统，相关工作人员可以根据这些信息进行分析整理，实时对城市电网在运行过程中潜在风险进行评估预测，并且有针对性的制定风险处理方案。智能电网的投入使用保证了城市电网的运行情况，对突发性电网状况加以控制，全面提高了城市电网的事故预警能力，为智慧型城市保证了稳定的电力供应。例如：北京市的智能电网建设，在市区内配电自动化服务范围上得到了进一步的扩展。城市电网的配电系统与配电设施上的完善，有效的缩短了整个城市电网供电所需的时间，与未完成智能电网建设时期相比，整个北京市的停电时间被缩短到了将近18分钟，为智慧城市的发展提供了可靠的电力供应。 2.2使用清洁能源，减少环境污染 智能电网在投入使用后，利用清洁的能源代替传统的电力资源，使城市能源消费体系中清洁能源的比重得到提高，促进城市的可持续发展。为了更好地利用清洁能源、降低环境污染，智能电网先后建成了预测光伏发电功率、风电发电功率以及特高压发电功率等项目，扩大清洁能源在城市电网中的应用效果，利用城市电网，将与城市距离较远的清洁能源传递到城市中。除此之外，有关部门还选择在配电网项目中加入分布式能源，确保能源的平衡发展，在日常生活中推广使用清洁能源。近年来，我国投入使用了大量的电动汽车，用电能为汽车提供动力，以此来替代传统的燃油方式，有效抑制了汽车尾气对大气环境的污染。 2.3为智慧城市提高能源利用率 智能电网的投入使用，对城市电网通信平台的进一步发展起到了推动效果。在整个智慧型城市的资源分布、整合方面，提高了能源的有效利用率。城市智能电网通信平台的建立，不仅仅只对城市电网提供优质服务，还为城市的其他行业提供了相应服务设施。例如：在人们的日常生活中，智能电网通信平台中的电力光纤可以为用户将互联网信号、电信网络信号和电视网络信号进行汇聚以及融合，避免了由三网信号造成的不必要的资源浪费，实现了三方的资源共享，促进了三者的协调发展。在城市电力行业中，智能电网的通信平台还可以将电能生产与电力传输过程中产生的信息数据资源进行汇总，实现了对电能的进一步转换与对用户消费过程中产生的数据信息的全面分析。 3.智能电网支撑智慧城市的关键技术 3.1信息通信技术 信息通信支撑技术是实现智能电网与智慧城市业务互动的底层基础设施，不仅包括目前已在智慧城市中越来越引起重视的4G通信、物联网、移动互联网、“互联网+”等社会公共信息通信技术，也包括电力大数据、电力光纤通信等电力行业特有的电力信息和通信技术。 3.2分布式能源发电并网技术 未来智慧城市对生态环境越来越重视，随着国家分布式能源政策的引导，分布式能源在城市中的渗透率将会逐步提高，是实现智慧城市绿色发展的关键。在建立统一、规范的相关技术标准和体系前提下，完善分布式能源并网技术，大力提高电力电子技术应用水平。在分布式能源渗透率逐步提高的情况下，不断提高相关的负荷预测、运行控制技术水平。根据各种电源的性质以及当地具体情况，科学选择集中接入中压配电网或者分散接入低压配电网等方式，做到因地制宜、灵活接入。开发适应分布式能源渗透率逐步提高的新型调度技术，克