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Business Process Reengineering[1].

Business Process Reengineering[1].
Business Process Reengineering[1].

Business Process Reengineering.

This paper cites recent research into two public sector/local government organisations (LGOs), as they attempted to implement change through Business Process Reengineering (BPR). The unfortunate but not entirely unpredictable outcomes of the research were that these organisations were not 'ready' for change of such a 'radical' nature as BPR, that senior managers did not really understand the concept or i t s implications, and that cultural inertia, resistance to change and lack of effective leadership at senior levels were all contributory factors.

A key issue is the nature of the way people in leadership positions in these organisations actually 'think', and how this 'thinking' needs to fundamentally change before the organisat ions themselves are likely to benefit from radical improvements. Gershon's Review has been in the headlines this year (April, 2009) and the requirement for such change is as present as it was when his report was first issued five years ago.

Recent research into the potential implementation of Business Process Reengineering (BPR) in two local government organisations (LGOs) within the UK (Chamberlin, 2008), suggests that these organisations were not 'ready' (Hammer and Stanton, 1995) for change of such a 'radical' nature as BPR, or even the move towards becoming more process- (or system-) based organisations.

The study commenced by reviewing the literature surrounding reengineering --or BPR, as it had become more widely known -- including, as appropriate, other approaches to quality and change management. Focusing also on critical 'success' and 'failure' factors (CSF & CFF; Al-Mashari and Zairi, 1999), two key issues emerged that were relevant to BPR's potential for success in such organisations; the concepts of 'Organizational Readiness' (Hammer and Stanton, 1995), and that of 'degrees' of BPR, or 'Project Radicalness' (Kettinger et al, 1997).

A qualitative research approach was adopted using two case studies (Hartley, 1994), with 28,

semi-structured, in-depth interviews held with 29 participants from the two co-operating LGOs. 'Purposive sampling' (Saunders, et al, 2000) was employed with participants selected from those organisations' BPR training cohorts and those involved more directly at junior, middle and senior management levels. Access was also granted to meetings and organisational documentation. Impact analysis was undertaken with group and individual interviews.

The outcome of the study, and i t s reasons, were not entirely unexpected:

? Inadequate unde rstanding of the concept of BPR itself;

? Lack of effective leadership at senior level(s);

? Cultural inertia;

? Resistance to change.

Understanding

The research discovered no real evidence that anyone, at any level, amongst those espousing the virtues and intended application of BPR, in ei t her organisation, had made any real attempt to understand ie, fully understand -- what this might mean. It is contended that any organisation -- but more especially any large organisation so mired in cultural drag as had been acknowledged in those two LGOs -- that was beginning to consider embarking upon an approach to change that by its own definition was to be 'radical', should in the first instance seek to fully understand what that might mean.

Whilst the right language was used in documentation, presentations and other communications to staff, the resultant 'understanding' itself was at the very least inconsistent, and in reality was quite inadequate.

This was a senior management leadership responsibility, yet degrees of understanding and commitment at this level also were, at best, inconsistent.

My own experience, also of a UK corporate organisation that reduced from c250,000 employees to around half that, over the first half of the 1990s, at the same time making a serious shift towards becoming a process-based organisation (Harvey, 1995: 29/31), was that its middle and senior level managers had to change, in both the way they behaved, and the way they thought. Evidence at the time (Chamberlin, 1998) suggested that i t happened in that order - behavioural change brought about more rapid attitudinal change (thinking).

As a further consequence of the above study, the actual application of BPR was at least muted, if not in fact ineffective. For example, whilst in one LGO there had been a lengthy exercise of consul t ant-aided reengineering of processes to bring the customer-facing (or front-office) aspects of their Highways service into that LGO's new contact centre, the 'solution' had been decided beforehand, being largely driven by the e-Government agenda and the fashion for such call-centres. There was also reasonable evidence that this might not have been the best (or even the only) solution, and little evidence that alternatives had been considered.

This paper will suggest that the way managers 'think' is a key issue, and that if such o rganisations are to make a better fist of more radical change at (at least) process level -- if not corporate level - then it is their 'thinking' that will have to change, and change significantly.

Seddon (2007) called this problem 'a thinking thing', and again, in his most recent book, emphasises this with: 'Ohno knew that what matters is how we conceptualise problems; thinking is the key.' (Seddon, 2008a: 68)

Without this change of 'thinking', managers are unlikely to change what they do in their organisations. According to Seddon, the problem these managers have is that what they are being asked to do is just as it was for Taiichi Ohno* -- the ideas they are being asked to embrace are 'counter-intuitive' (ibid: 71).

(*NB see also Womack, J P, Jones, D T, and Roos, D, (1990), The Machine that Changed the World: The Story of Lean Production, New York, Rawson Associates)

He says that unless they 'do it', they won't 'get i t', and illustrates this point with a number of case studies (Seddon, 2005) where evidence is given from clients who all confirm that they had to 'do it', before they 'got it'. Once they do -- ie, 'get it' - they (in this case) become espoused to the systems thinking principles that Seddon's company, Vanguard Consulting, are assisting them tow ards, and are unlikely to revert to previous 'command and control.' types of thinking.

Interacting

Paper et al (2001) say that top management has to: 'live the new paradigm by being active participants in the change process. Top management endorsement is not enough. They have to interact with teams and management to let their people know that change is a priority and that they understand what is being done at the process level to make change happen.'

This 'interacting with teams', in other words', means they have to do it, to understand it. They continue: 'The biggest obstacle to execution was wi t hin the middle management ranks. Members of middle management were too used to being experts in a specific area.' …'Behavioral change is the most difficult type of change. I t takes time and patience. Execution of a major change program therefore requires a lot of time to reap desired benefits.' … 'If managerial attitude remains that of "command and control" and/or their behavior does not change, transformation will most likely fail.'

This aligns with what Argyris (2002: 212) found: 'that beliefs or espoused theories vary widely', whereas, 'theories-in-use do not.' When Paper et al (ibid) say that: 'Top management has to live the new paradigm by being active participants in the change process,' they similarly imply that top management has to 'do i t', in order to 'get i t', and this requires what Argyris called 'double-loop learning'; a break away from reasoning that 'maintains the status quo [and] inhibits genuine learning.'

Being 'experts in a specific area' requires maintenance of those 'theories-in-use', giving rise to what Argyris calls 'defensive reasoning': 'Individuals keep their premises and inferences taci t, lest they lose control' (ibid). He called this his 'Model I Theory-in-Use', as shown in Figure 1, above

In a study of the public sector in the US, Gulledge and Sommer (2002) stress the problem this point creates with: 'process management does not work very well when overlaid on a hierarchical command and control management structure,' and they ci t e Champy (1996) in that: 'the shift to process

management requires a restructuring (ie, a reengineering) of management,' all of which continues to emphasise the need for attitudinal and behavioural changes within the senior echelons of the public sector -- those 'established hierarchies'.'

Intervention

This raises the question whether 'attitudinal' or 'behavioural' change is possible without some other intervention? Blanchard (1989) posits that 'attitude' is simply 'emotionally-charged knowledge', and suggests that when people are given new 'knowledge' regarding, for example, a proposed organisatio nal change, they will take an emotional stance, for or against that knowledge; they will be ei t her for it (positive attitude), or against it (negative attitude). If they are for the change, then a

'knowledge-attitude-behaviour' (KAB) approach to that change could well be successful; eg, following explanation of what Hammer and Champy (2001: 154) called their 'case for action' and 'vision statement', staff can see the need for the change and understand the future position, so their behaviour moves towards the new pattern of requirements.

However, if the emotional stance is against the proposed change, the KAB model is less likely to be successful -- as a negative attitude is likely to produce resistance- and an alternative 'KBA' (knowledge-behaviour-atti t ude) will be required: despite adequate and reasonable (from management's perspective) explanation, staff deny the need for and/or resist the proposed change. In this case, management make clear that the change of 'behaviour' is required, confident that staff will more readily see the need once the new situation has been experienced.

Both of these are illustrated (Figure 2), wi t h the 'blended' version shown also:

This could imply some sort of coercive (Dunphy and Stace, 1993) approach to the management of the change, but it is not about forcing people to do things, more about saying '1 require you to do this,' so the reasoning becomes clear. It can mean being assertive, but as Seddon (2008a) points out: 'Some of the best systems thinkers I know are bossy; they are bossy about the right things.' This does not mean any ill-treatment of employees, merely that you might need to insist they taste the pudding, before deciding they don't like it. The prize, of course, according to Blanchard, is that once the 'behaviour' has changed, the 'atti t ude' is then likely to change also. Anecdotal support for this abounds, as the UK seat-bel t s, drink-driving and, more recently, smoking in closed public places (eg, pubs) laws attest -- notwi t hstanding, of course, the equally recent but less successful attempt to prohibit mobile phone use whilst driving.

Where this is leading, though, is that for managers to be encouraged to change the way they 'think', first they may have to be 'encouraged' to change the way they behave. This would require a fundamental shift in that thinking, or a 'new paradigm' from 'top-down' management to a form of leadership that offers a more supporting style, in line with another Blanchard concept that has been around for many years -- that of 'pyramidal inversion' (or paradigmal) inversion. Following his organisational behaviour work with Paul

Hersey and Dewey Johnson (see also Hersey et al, 2001), Blanchard went on to co-author a series of books based on the initial publication, The :01ne Minute Manager (Blanchard and Johnson, 1983), and this pyramidal inversion became a popular- albeit perhaps intuitive -- concept. But, as Argyris (ibid) has pointed out, it is not enough simply to 'espouse' a theory, one has to 'use' it: 'To the extent that individuals use Model II instead of merely espousing it, they will begin to interrupt organizational defensive routines and create organizational learning processes and systems that encourage double-loop learning in ways that persist.' (p 214).

Argyris called this, 'Model II Theory-in-Use', and it is shown in Figure 3, above:

Whilst not identical, the term 'governing variables' has a certain kinship wi t h what reengineering people called 'business rules', and what Seddon (2003: 119/120; 2008: 71, 79 & 81) calls 'system condit ions'; those actions that 'govern' stages in work processes, regardless of whether or not they aid or inhibit the process. He says that system conditions 'exist because of the way managers think about the design and management of work,' and that the 'ideas' that give rise to this are 'flawed' (ibid).

According to Seddon (2002: 22) this requires an 'entirely different way of thinking': 'For banks, as well as many other organisations, it is the whole system that needs to change if real advances in service and quality are to be made. For this to happen, people need to change the way in which they think. The change is unlikely to occur while thinking is influenced by notions of hierarchy.'

Mind-sets

In Blanchard's (1989) view, these 'notions of hierarchy' are not 'thrown away', they are just 'looked at differently.' In his model (Figure 4), the left-hand 'Responsive-Up' mind-set exhibits Dyess' view that;

'Historically, managers hoarded information, controlling its release to bolster their power' (*Kirby Dyess, vice president and director, Human Resources, Intel; cited in Champy, 1996: 146).

In Blanchard's alternative form -- the 'Customer' mindset - 'information' is made available to (if not held by) all employees, in order that they can make appropriate decisions that affect good customer service. Intuitive or not, further examples of this concept- both espousal and 'use' -- are shown in Figure 5, overleaf.

In Nordstrom's case (Peters, 1988: 370), this was billed as their 'Organization Chart' and called the

'helping hand facing upwards', a principle echoed by Patricia Vaz (2002; then BT Retail's managing director of customer service), with: 'They work their socks off and often all they need is a helping hand.' ('How Patricia sees the future', BT Today, July, p. 4)

Blanchard's view was that managers had to decide who they 'worked for, your boss or your people?', and saw this as a fundamental shift of mind-set, one that is echoed by Fellers (1999: 89) with: 'Managers who

have strong needs for control and power, or who want others to revere them for their position, are going to be frustrated in the future. People are no longer willing to tolerate them -- whether they are right or wrong. Empowerment is being cast upon us by those on the frontline like the sea upon the shore. In several organizations that have taken the lead in empowerment, the supervisors tell me they now feel as if they work for the subordinates, compared to the old situation where the employees answered to them.

I think this is what Dr Deming had in mind.'

Seddon (2002: 27) held similar views: 'If you really want to know what's going on, you have to talk to the people who do the work. …Hierarchical thinking encourages everybody to 'look up' all the time rather than out to the customer.…the attention of the people who need to be engaged with the problem is diverted upwards'. This point is reinforced in his latest Vanguard Newsletter, (April, 2009: 1) following a contribution from a Mid-Staffs NHS 'reader': '…the problems would have been easy to see if leaders were looking in the right place, but leaders of our hospitals look up, for they are in fear of the regime.'

Ownership

Whilst empowerment has been rightly criticised when it is seen as little more than the 'emperor's new clothes' (Argyris, 1998), Osborne and Gaebler (1993: 51) argue that i t is an 'American tradition' that is as 'old as the frontier,' citing as examples self-help organisations, day-care centres, babysitting cooperatives, Little Leagues, Girl and Boy Scout groups, recycling programmes and 'volunteer organisations of all kinds.' The mistake, they say, is that 'when we organize our public business, we forget these lessons,' citing George Latimer, former Mayor of St Paul, Minnesota: 'The older I bet, the more convinced I am that to really work, programs have to be owned by the people they're serving. That isn't just rhetoric, i t's real. There's got to be ownership' (ibid: 49).

In the middle of the previous decade, Tom Peters, evangelising on a very similar theme, cited Bob Swiggett, CEO of the Stamford (CT) Kollmorgen company:

'The leader's role is to create a vision… not to kick somebody in the backside.

The role of the leader is the servant's role.

It's supporting his people, running interference for them, coming out wi t h an atmosphere of trust, and Understanding, and love.

You want your people to feel they have complete control over their destiny at every level.

Tyranny is not tolerated here. People who want to manage in the traditional sense are cast off by their peers like dandruff… We preach trust and the golden rule.'

(Source: Swiggett, R, (Bob), in Peters, T J, (1985), A Passion 'for Excellence, CBS/Fox Video; and cited in Peters, T J, and Austin, N, (1985)A Passion for 'Excellence: The Leadership Difference, Glasgow, Fontana/ Collins, p 206; originally quoted in Inc., (April 1984)

As Argyris (1998: 99) said, all you get if 'workers have little control over their destinie s' is 'contractual compliance', whereas if 'management wants employees to take more responsibility for their own destiny, it must encourage the development of internal commitment' (ibid: 100). This need for a complete reversal of perspective was also emphasised by Tom Peters (1985), who said: 'What we require in my opinion is nothing less than a 180° shift.'

Seddon (2002: 31) reinforced this '180° shift' further (albeit wi t h a health warning), wi t h: 'On 'customer service' seminars, managers are encouraged to think of their organisation as an upside-down triangle. Instead of being a hierarchy (like a pyramid), it is shown to be supporting all those people who spend their time wi t h customers. They see the logic of this and say that it's a good idea, but too few realise just what action must be taken and which practices must be abolished. At the very least it means that managers must not demand that their staff are always doing things for them, after all, the staff are there to serve the customer.'

Seddon claims that these notions of hierarchy and service are 'incompatible', and that the 're-education of management begins with the destruction of hierarchical thinking' (ibid). This "re-education' is what Champy (1996) referred to as the 'reengineering [of] management', and agreeing, said that the 'real challenge to changing dramatically how companies operate is with managers, both in how they work and how they think' (p xii).

Part two and a full list of references will appear in the next issue of the journal

DIAGRAM: Figure 1: Model I Theory-in-Use.

DIAGRAM: Figure 2: Attitudinal vs Behavioral Change.

DIAGRAM: Figure 3: Model II Theory-in-Use.

DIAGRAM: Figure 4: Turning The Pyramid Upside Down.

DIAGRAM: Figure 5: 'Pyramid' examples

~~~~~~~~

By John Chamberlin

Dr John Chamberlin (63) is a Senior Lecturer and Pracademic at the Derbyshire Business School (DBS), within the Facul t y of Business, Computing & Law (BC&L) at the University of Derby (UoD). After 34 years in the telecommunications industry (BT), the last decade of which saw him as a Senior Manager with a large external workforce over the East Midlands, and commensurate budget, John took early retirement in 1996, but wi t hin a year of this he had signed on for a fulltime MBA at UoD. Coming out with one of only two Distinctions, and the only 'Masters' Level Prize for Outstanding Performance' that year, John then became a part-time lecturer within DBS. Early in 2005 he reverted to being a full-time student, to embark upon a PhD studying the implementation of Business Process Reengineering (BPR) within two local authorities, completing this in December 2008. The confidential nature of, and ramifications from, this study, have meant that its outputs are being published in various stages, via conferences and journals. John is a founder member of the 'Systems Thinking & Organisational Change Research Group' (STOCRG) within DBS, and his primary academic interests are in management, leadership, change, the public sector, BPR, and systems thinking.

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