通信类英文文献及翻译
姓名：刘峻霖班级：通信143班学号：2014101108
附录
一、英文原文：
Detecting Anomaly Traf?c using Flow Data in the real
VoIP network
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, many SIP[3]/RTP[4]-based VoIP applications and services have appeared and their penetration ratio is gradually increasing due to the free or cheap call charge and the easy subscription method. Thus, some of the subscribers to the PSTN service tend to change their home telephone services to VoIP products. For example, companies in Korea such as LG Dacom, Samsung Net- works, and KT have begun to deploy SIP/RTP-based VoIP services. It is reported that more than ?ve million users have subscribed the commercial VoIP services and 50% of all the users are joined in 2009 in Korea [1]. According to IDC, it is expected that the number of VoIP users in US will increase to 27 millions in 2009 [2]. Hence, as the VoIP service becomes popular, it is not surprising that a lot of VoIP anomaly traf?c has been already known [5]. So, Most commercial service such as VoIP services should provide essential security functions regarding privacy, authentication, integrity and non-repudiation for preventing malicious traf?c. Particu- larly, most of current SIP/RTP-based VoIP services supply the minimal security function related with authentication. Though secure transport-layer protocols such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) [6] or Secure RTP (SRTP) [7] have been standardized, they have not been fully implemented and deployed in current VoIP applications because of the overheads of implementation and performance. Thus, un-encrypted VoIP packets could be easily sniffed and forged, especially in wireless LANs. In spite of authentication,the authentication keys such as MD5 in the SIP header could be maliciously exploited, because SIP is a text-based protocol and unencrypted SIP packets are easily decoded. Therefore, VoIP services are very vulnerable to attacks exploiting SIP and RTP. We aim at proposing a VoIP anomaly traf?c detection method using the ?ow-based traf?c measurement archi-tecture. We consider three representative VoIP anomalies called CANCEL, BYE Denial of Service (DoS) and RTP ?ooding attacks in this paper, because we found that malicious users in wireless LAN could easily perform these attacks in the real VoIP network. For monitoring VoIP packets, we employ the IETF IP Flow Information eXport (IPFIX) [9] standard that is based on NetFlow v9. This traf?c measurement method
provides a ?exible and extensible template structure for various protocols, which is useful for observing SIP/RTP ?ows [10]. In order to capture and export VoIP packets into IPFIX ?ows, we de?ne two additional IPFIX templates for SIP and RTP ?ows. Furthermore, we add four IPFIX ?elds to observe 802.11 packets which are necessary to detect VoIP source spoo?ng attacks in WLANs.
II. RELATED WORK
[8] proposed a ?ooding detection method by the Hellinger Distance (HD) concept. In [8], they have pre- sented INVITE, SYN and RTP ?ooding detection meth-ods. The HD is the difference value between a training data set and a testing data set. The training data set collected traf?c over n sampling period of duration Δ t.The testing data set collected traf?c next the training data set in the same period. If the HD is close to ‘1’, this testing data set is regarded as anomaly traf?c. For u sing this method, they assumed that initial training data set did not have any anomaly traf?c. Since this method was based on packet counts, it might not easily extended to detect other anomaly traf?c except ?ooding. On the other hand, [11] has proposed a VoIP anomaly traf?c detection method using Extended Finite State Machine (EFSM). [11] has suggested INVITE ?ooding, BYE DoS anomaly traf?c and media spamming detection methods. However, the state machine required more memory because it had to maintain each ?ow. [13] has presented NetFlow-based VoIP anomaly detection methods for INVITE, REGIS-TER, RTP ?ooding, and REGISTER/INVITE scan. How-ever, the VoIP DoS attacks considered in this paper were not considered. In [14], an IDS approach to detect SIP anomalies was developed, but only simulation results are presented. For monitoring VoIP traf?c, SIPFIX [10] has been proposed as an IPFIX extension. The key ideas of the SIPFIX are application-layer inspection and SDP analysis for carrying media session information. Yet, this paper presents only the possibility of applying SIPFIX to DoS anomaly traf?c detection and prevention. We described the preliminary idea of detecting VoIP anomaly traf?c in [15]. This paper elaborates BYE DoS anomaly traf?c and RTP ?ooding ano maly traf?c detec-tion method based on IPFIX. Based on [15], we have considered SIP and RTP anomaly traf?c generated in wireless LAN. In this case, it is possible to generate the similiar anomaly traf?c with normal VoIP traf?c, because attackers can easily extract normal user information from unencrypted VoIP packets. In this paper, we have extended the idea with additional SIP detection methods using information of wireless LAN packets. Furthermore, we have shown the real experiment results at the commercial VoIP network.
III. THE VOIP ANOMALY TRAFFIC DETECTION METHOD
A. CANCEL DoS Anomaly Traf?c Detection
As the SIP INVITE message is not usually encrypted, attackers could extract ?elds necessary to reproduce the forged SIP CANCEL message by snif?ng SIP IN VITE packets, especially in wireless LANs. Thus, we cannot tell the difference between the normal SIP CANCEL message and the replicated one, because the faked CANCEL packet includes the normal ?elds inferred from the SIP INVITE message. The attacker will p erform the SIP CANCEL DoS attack at the same wireless LAN, because the purpose of the SIP CANCEL
attack is to prevent the normal call estab-lishment when a victim is waiting for calls. Therefore, as soon as the attacker catches a call invitation message for a victim, it will send a SIP CANCEL message, which makes the call establishment failed. We have generated faked SIP CANCEL message using sniffed a SIP INVITE message.Fields in SIP header of this CANCEL message is the same as normal SIP CANCEL message, because the attacker can obtain the SIP header ?eld from unencrypted normal SIP message in wireless LAN environment. Therefore it is impossible to detect the CANCEL DoS anomaly traf?c using SIP headers, we use the different values of the wireless LAN frame. That is, the sequence number in the 802.11 frame will tell the difference between a victim host and an attacker. We look into source MAC address and sequence number in the 802.11 MAC frame including a SIP CANCEL message as shown in Algorithm 1. We compare the source MAC address of SIP CANCEL packets with that of the previously saved SIP INVITE ?ow. If the source MAC address of a SIP CANCEL ?ow is changed, it will be highly probable that the CANCEL packet is generated by a unknown user. However, the source MAC address could be spoofed. Regarding 802.11 source spoo?ng detection, we employ the method in [12] that uses sequence numbers of 802.11 frames. We calculate the gap between n-th and (n-1)-th 802.11 frames. As the sequence number ?eld in a 802.11 MAC head er uses 12 bits, it varies from 0 to 4095. When we ?nd that the sequence number gap between a single SIP ?ow is greater than the threshold value of N that will be set from the experiments, we determine that the SIP host address as been spoofed for the anom aly traf?c.
B. BYE DoS Anomaly Traf?c Detection
In commercial VoIP applications, SIP BYE messages use the same authentication ?eld is included in the SIP IN-VITE message for security and accounting purposes. How-ever, attackers can reproduce BYE DoS packet s through snif?ng normal SIP INVITE packets in wireless LANs.The faked SIP BYE message is same with the normal SIP BYE. Therefore, it is dif?cult to detect the BYE DoS anomaly traf?c using only SIP header information.After snif?ng SIP INVITE message, the a ttacker at the same or different subnets could terminate the normal in- progress call, because it could succeed in generating a BYE message to the SIP proxy server. In the SIP BYE attack, it is dif?cult to distinguish from the normal call termination proce dure. That is, we apply the timestamp of RTP traf?c for detecting the SIP BYE attack. Generally, after normal call termination, the bi-directional RTP ?ow is terminated in a bref space of time. However, if the call termination procedure is anomaly, we can observe that a directional RTP media ?ow is still ongoing, whereas an attacked directional RTP ?ow is broken. Therefore, in order to detect the SIP BYE attack, we decide that we watch a directional RTP ?ow for a long time threshold of N sec after SIP BYE m essage. The threshold of N is also set from the experiments.Algorithm 2 explains the procedure to detect BYE DoS anomal traf?c using captured timestamp of the RTP packet. We maintain SIP session information between clients with INVITE and OK messages including the same Call-ID and 4-tuple (source/destination IP Address and port number) of the BYE packet. We set a time threshold value by adding Nsec to the timestamp value of the BYE message. The reason why we use the captured timestamp is that a few RTP packets are observed under 0.5 second. If RTP traf?c is observed after the time threshold, this will be considered as a BYE DoS attack, because the VoIP session will be terminated with normal BYE messages. C. RTP Anomaly Traf?c Detection Algorithm 3 describes an RTP ?ooding detection method that uses
SSRC and sequence numbers of the RTP header. During a single RTP session, typically, the same SSRC value is maintained. If SSRC is changed, it is highly probable that anomaly has occurred. In addition, if there is a big sequence number gap between RTP packets, we determine that anomaly RTP traf?c has happened. As inspecting every sequence number for a packet is dif?cult, we calculate the sequence number gap using the ?rst, last, maximum and minimum sequence numbers. In the RTP header, the sequence number ?eld uses 16 bits from 0 to 65535. When we observe a wide sequence number gap in our algorithm, we consider it as an RTP ?ooding attack.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Experiment Environment
In order to detect VoIP an omaly traf?c, we established an experimental environment as ?gure 1. In this envi-ronment, we employed two VoIP phones with wireless LANs, one attacker, a wireless access router and an IPFIX ?ow collector. For the realistic performance evaluation, we directly used one of the working VoIP networks deployed in Korea where an 11-digit telephone number (070-XXXX-XXXX) has been assigned to a SIP phone.With wireless SIP phones supporting 802.11, we could make calls to/from the PSTN or cellular phones. In the wireless access router, we used two wireless LAN cards- one is to support the AP service, and the other is to monitor 802.11 packets. Moreover, in order to observe VoIP packets in the wireless access router, we modi?ed nProbe [16], that is an open IPFIX ?ow ge nerator, to create and export IPFIX ?ows related with SIP, RTP, and 802.11 information. As the IPFIX collector, we have modi?ed libip?x so that it could provide the IPFIX ?ow decoding function for SIP, RTP, and 802.11 templates. We used MySQL for the ?ow D B.
B. Experimental Results
In order to evaluate our proposed algorithms, we gen-erated 1,946 VoIP calls with two commercial SIP phones and a VoIP anomaly traf?c generator. Table I shows our experimental results with precision, recall, and F-score that is the harmonic mean of precision and recall. In CANCEL DoS anomaly traf?c detection, our algorithm represented a few false negative cases, which was related with the gap threshold of the sequence number in 802.11 MAC header. The average of the F-score value for detecting the SIP CANCEL anomaly is 97.69%.For BYE anomaly tests, we generated 755 BYE mes-sages including 118 BYE DoS anomalies in the exper-iment. The proposed BYE DoS anomaly traf?c detec-tion algorithm found 112 anomalies with the F-score of 96.13%. If an RTP ?ow is terminated before the threshold, we regard the anomaly ?ow as a normal one. In this algorithm, we extract RTP session information from INVITE and OK or session description messages using the same Call-ID of BYE message. It is possible not to capture those packet, resulting in a few false-negative cases. The RTP ?ooding anomaly traf?c detection experiment for 810 RTP sessions resulted in the F score of 98%.The reason of false-positive cases was related with the sequence number in RTP header. If the sequence number of anomaly traf?c is overlapped with the range of the normal traf?c, our algorithm will consider it as normal traf?c.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a ?ow-based anomaly traf?c detec-tion method against SIP and RTP-based anomaly t raf?c in this paper. We presented VoIP anomaly traf?c detection methods with ?ow data on the wireless access router. We used the IETF IPFIX standard to monitor SIP/RTP ?ows passing through wireless access routers, because its template architecture is easil y extensible to several protocols. For this purpose, we de?ned two new IPFIX templates for SIP and RTP traf?c and four new IPFIX ?elds for 802.11 traf?c. Using these IPFIX ?ow templates,we proposed CANCEL/BYE DoS and RTP ?ooding traf?c detection algorithms. From experimental results on the working VoIP network in Korea, we showed that our method is able to detect three representative VoIP attacks on SIP phones. In CANCEL/BYE DoS anomaly traf?c
detection method, we employed threshold values about time and sequence number gap for class?cation of normal and abnormal VoIP packets. This paper has not been mentioned the test result about suitable threshold values. For the future work, we will show the experimental result about evaluation of the threshold values for our detection method.
二、英文翻译：
交通流数据检测异常在真实的世界中使用的VoIP网络一.介绍
最近,许多SIP[3],[4]基于服务器的V oIP应用和服务出现了,并逐渐增加他们的穿透比及由于自由和廉价的通话费且极易订阅的方法。因此,一些用户服务倾向于改变他们PSTN家里电话服务V oIP产品。例如,公司在韩国LG、三星等Dacom网-作品、KT已经开始部署SIP / RTP-based V oIP服务。据报道,超过5百万的用户已订阅《商业V oIP服务和50%的所有的用户都参加了2009年在韩国[1]。据IDC,预期该用户的数量将增加在我们的V oIP 2009年到27百万[2]。因此,随着V oIP服务变得很受欢迎,这是一点也不意外,很多人对V oIP异常交通已经知道[5]。所以,大多数商业服务如V oIP服务应该提供必要的安全功能对于隐私、认证、完整性和不可否认对于防止恶意的交通。Particu - larly,大多数的电流SIP / RTP-based V oIP服务提供最小安全功能相关的认证。虽然安全transport-layer一类协议传输层安全(TLS)[6]或安全服务器(SRTP)[7]已经被修正,它们并没有被完全实施和部署在当前的V oIP应用的实施,因为过顶球和性能。因此,un-encrypted V oIP包可以轻易地嗅和伪造的,特别是在无线局域网。尽管的认证, 认证键,如MD5在SIP头可以狠的剥削,因为SIP是基于文本的协议和未加密的SIP包都很容易地被解码。因此,V oIP服务很容易被攻击开发SIP和服务器。我们的目标是在提出一个V oIP异常交通检测方法archi-tecture使用流转交通测量。我们认为有代表性的V oIP异常称为取消,再见拒绝服务(DoS)和快速的洪水袭击在本文中,因为我们发现恶意的用户在无线局域网可以很容易地履行这些袭击的真正的V oIP 网络。V oIP包监测,利用IETF出口(IPFIX IP流信息)[9]标准的基础上,对NetFlow 9节。这一交通测量方法的研究提供了一个灵活的、可扩展的模板结构为各种各样的协议,有利于对观察SIP /服务器流[10]。摘要为获取和出口V oIP包成IPFIX 流中,我们定义两个额外的IPFIX模板为SIP和快速流动。此外,我们加上四个IPFIX领域观察802.11包所必需的欺骗攻击的检测在WLANs V oIP来源。
二.相关工作
[8]提出了一种检测方法Hellinger洪水的距离(简称HD)的概念。文献[8]中,他们有售前介绍邀请,洪水:SYN和快速检测种方法。高清是之间的差异值的训练数据集和测试的数据集。收集的训练数据集的交通量持续时间Δn采样周期t。收集的测试数据集的训练数据集下的流量可以在同一时间内。如果高清接近' 1 ',
该测试数据集被视为异常交通。为使用这个方法,他们假定初始训练数据集上没有任何异常交通。因为这种方法是基于分组数,它可能不会很容易地扩展来侦测其他异常交通除了洪水泛滥。另一方面,[11]提出了一项V oIP异常交通检测方法,利用扩展有限状态机(EFSM)。[11]建议邀请洪水,再见DoS异常交通和媒体垃圾邮件检测的方法。然而,状态机的需要更多的内存空间,因为它已经保持每个流程。
[13]已经呈现出NetFlow-based V oIP异常检测方法,REGIS-TER邀请,琳琅驱,而注册/邀请扫描。How-ever V oIP DoS攻击,本文认为不被考虑。在[14],一个入侵检测系统(IDS)的方法来检测,研制了SIP的异常,但是只有仿真的结果。V oIP交通、SIPFIX监测[10]作为IPFIX提出了延长。SIPFIX的主要思路的分析是应用层检验和SDP装载媒体会话的信息。然而,本文提出只有中应用的可能性,SIPFIX DoS 异常交通检测器和预防。我们描述了初步的构思的交通状况检测V oIP异常[15]。阐述了交通,再见DoS异常交通detec-tion洪水异常快速IPFIX方法的基础上。基于[15],我们一直认为SIP和服务器异常交通产生在无线局域网。在这种情况下,就有可能产生类似的异常交通与正常V oIP交通,因为攻击者就很容易从普通用户信息提取未加密的V oIP的数据包。在本文中,我们已经将这个想法与额外的SIP 检测方法的使用信息的无线局域网的数据包。此外,我们已经表现出真正的实验结果在商业V oIP网络。
三.交通检测器的VOIP异常方法
a.取消DoS异常交通检测器
为SIP邀请信息通常是不加密的,攻击者可以提取领域繁殖伪造的必要信息通过嗅闻啜啜取消邀请包,特别是在无线局域网。因此,我们不能辨别其正常SIP 取消短信与复制的一个,因为管理领域包括正常取消包推断出SIP邀请的讯息。攻击者将会执行的园区取消DoS攻击,因为相同的无线局域网的目的是为了防止SIP取消攻击时的正常叫estab-lishment受害者正等待着电话。因此,尽快打电话邀请袭击者渔获的信息,为一个受害者,就会发送一个SIP取消消息,这使得叫建立失败了。我们产生了伪造的SIP取消消息使用嗅一口邀请的讯息。苏州工业园区头球的领域都是一样的,取消信息正常SIP取消留言,因为攻击者无法获得SIP标题域SIP消息未加密的正常从无线局域网的环境。因此无法检测交通使用DoS 异常取消标题,我们使用了SIP的值不同的无线局域网帧。也就是说,序号在画框会在802.11分辨一个受害者的主人和一个攻击者。我们看着源MAC地址和序列号的MAC框架包括一小口802.11取消信息显示在算法1。我们比较了源MAC 地址的SIP取消包与先前储存的SIP邀请流动。如果源MAC地址的一小口取消流量发生变化时,它会有很高的可能取消包所产生的未知的用户。然而,源MAC 地址可以欺骗时。关于802.11源掺假检测,利用法在[12],使用序列号802.11的帧。
我们之间的差距,最后对计算-th(n-1 802.11的帧。)作为序号在现场的使用12位802.11 MAC头球,它不同于从0到4095。当我们发现序号在一个单一的SIP流量差距大于阈值,将定氮的实验结果,我们确定SIP主机地址被欺骗时为异常交通。
b.再见DoS异常交通检测器
V oIP应用在商业,SIP再见消息使用相同的认证领域包括在SIP IN-VITE的信息,为安全、会计的目的。How-ever,攻击者可以复制再见DoS信息包通过嗅正常SIP邀请包的无线局域网。信息管理SIP再见也用正常的SIP再见。因此,很难侦测再见DoS异常交通只利用SIP的标题信息。信息后,闻了闻SIP邀请攻击者在相同或不同的子网,可以终止在正常范围之内,因为它可以进步电话中获得成功,生成了再见消息给SIP代理服务器。在SIP再见攻击,难以区分,从普通的电话终止程序。也就是说,我们申请时间戳的快速交通侦测SIP再见的攻击。一般来说,普通电话后,由双向快速流终止结束时仍很快就空间的时间。然而,如果这个调用终止程序是异常时,我们能观察到的媒体流方向快速仍在进行,但是攻击流量定向琳琅坏了。因此,为了检测SIP再见的进攻,我们决定,我们观看了一场方向快速流在很长一段时间后的最低门槛,N秒SIP再见消息。入口处的N也将从实验。算法的程序来检测2解释说再见DoS anomal交通用被俘的时间戳的快速包。我们保持SIP会话之间信息的客户提供包括邀请和好的信息和4-tuple相同的Call-ID(源/目的IP地址和端口)再见包。我们约个时间通过增加Nsec阈值的时间戳的价值信息。再见我们为什么使用捕获的时间戳是那几个服务器包下观察0.5秒。如果服务器后交通观测时间阈值,这将被视为一种再见DoS攻击,因为V oIP 会议将终止与正常再见消息。服务器异常交通检测算法之3描述了一种快速检测方法,使用SSRC洪水和顺序编号的服务器的标题。会议期间,通常一个单一的服务器,同样的SSRC价值得以维持。如果SSRC也发生了变化,极有可能就是异常发生时。另外,如果有一个很大的序列号差距包,我们确定服务器异常交通发生。服务器检查每一个序列号码作为一个包是困难的,我们计算序列号的差距,最后使用第一,最大和最小顺序编号。在服务器页眉、序号在现场使用16位从0到65535之间。当我们看到一个宽的序列号差距在我们的方法,我们觉得这是一种快速的洪水袭击。
四. 绩效评估
a. 试验环境
为了检测V oIP异常交通,我们建立了一个实验环境为图1。在这个环境,我们聘用了两V oIP电话与无线局域网,一个袭击者,无线接入路由器和IPFIX流收藏家。对现实的绩效评估,我们直接采用V oIP网络的工作之一11-digit部署在韩国当在一个电话号码(070-XXXX-XXXX)已被分配到一个SIP电话。SIP电话支持
802.11无线,我们可以打电话到/从PSTN或手机。在无线接入路由器,我们使用了两种无线局域网卡-一个是为了支持美联社服务,另一个是监听802.11的数据包。此外,为了观察V oIP包的无线接入路由器,我们修改nProbe[16],那是一个开放的IPFIX流发生器、创造和出口IPFIX流动相关的喝了一口,琳琅,802.11的信息。随着IPFIX收藏家,我们更改了,它会libipfix流动提供了IPFIX解码功能为喝了一口,琳琅,802.11模板。我们使用MySQL的流量分贝。
b.实验结果
为了评估我们提出的演算法,我们gen-erated 1,946 V oIP电话和两个商业SIP 电话和V oIP异常交通的发电机。实验结果显示我们的桌子上我和精确,召回,这是F-score谐波均值的精度和召回率的两倍。在DoS异常交通检测器取消,我们的算法代表了一些假负面的案例,这是关系到阈值的差距序列号在802.11 MAC的标题。F-score值的平均值为检测97.69%.For SIP取消异常是产生异常的测试中,我们再见再见再见mes-sages包括118靶向exper-iment DoS异常之处。提出的交通detec-tion再见DoS异常算法与F-score 112异常发现的96.13%。如果一个快速流是前终止阈值,我们把异常流量作为一个正常的人。该算法提取信息从服务器会话的邀请和好的或者会议简介讯息使用相同的Call-ID再见消息。它是可能的,不是来捕捉那些包,导致一些最后的病例。洪水异常交通检测器的服务器会话810对试验结果的分析导致了服务器的F值可达到98%以上。假阳性病例的原因与服务器的序列号在页眉。如果序列数目的异常交通搭接的正常范围,我们的演算法将考虑交通是正常的交通。
五.结论
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哲学Philosophy 马克思主义哲学Philosophy of Marxism 中国哲学Chinese Philosophy 外国哲学Foreign Philosophies 逻辑学Logic 伦理学Ethics 美学Aesthetics 宗教学Science of Religion 科学技术哲学Philosophy of Science and Technology 经济学Economics 理论经济学Theoretical Economics 政治经济学Political Economy 经济思想史History of Economic Thought 经济史History of Economic 西方经济学Western Economics 世界经济World Economics 人口、资源与环境经济学Population, Resources and Environmental Economics 应用经济学Applied Economics 国民经济学National Economics 区域经济学Regional Economics 财政学（含税收学）Public Finance (including Taxation) 金融学（含保险学）Finance (including Insurance) 产业经济学Industrial Economics 国际贸易学International Trade 劳动经济学Labor Economics 统计学Statistics 数量经济学Quantitative Economics 中文学科、专业名称英文学科、专业名称 国防经济学National Defense Economics 法学Law 法学Science of Law 法学理论Jurisprudence 法律史Legal History 宪法学与行政法学Constitutional Law and Administrative Law 刑法学Criminal Jurisprudence 民商法学(含劳动法学、社会保障法学) Civil Law and Commercial Law (including Science of Labour Law and Science of Social Security Law ) 诉讼法学Science of Procedure Laws
论文《人工智能》---文献检索结课作业
人工智能 【摘要】：人工智能是一门极富挑战性的科学，但也是一门边沿学科。它属于自然科学和社会科学的交叉。涉及的学科主要有哲学、认知科学、数学、神经生理学、心理学、计算机科学、信息论、控制论、不定性论、仿生学等。人工智能(Artificial Intelligence)，英文缩写为AI。它是研究、开发用于模拟、延伸和扩展人的智能的理论、方法、技术及应用系统的一门新的技术科学。人工智能是计算机科学的一个分支，它企图了解智能的实质，并生产出一种新的能以人类智能相似的方式做出反应的智能机器，该领域的研究包括机器人、语言识别、图像识别、自然语言处理和专家系统等1。 【关键词】：人工智能；应用领域；发展方向；人工检索。 1．人工智能描述 人工智能(Artificial Intelligence) ，英文缩写为AI。它是研究、开发用于模拟、延伸和扩展人的智能的理论、方法、技术及应用系统的一门新的技术科学2。人工智能是计 算机科学的一个分支，它企图了解智 能的实质，并生产出一种新的能以人 类智能相似的方式作出反应的智能 机器，该领域的研究包括机器人、语 言识别、图像识别、自然语言处理和 专家系统等。“人工智能”一词最初 是在1956 年Dartmouth学会上提出 的。从那以后,研究者们发展了众多 理论和原理,人工智能的概念也随之扩展。人工智能是一门极富挑战性的科学，从事这项工作的人必须懂得计算机知识，心理学和哲学。人工智能是包括十分广泛的科学，它由不同的领域组成，如机器学习，计算机视觉等等，总的说来，人工智能研究的一个主要目标是使机器能够胜任一些通常需要人类智能才能完成的复杂工作。但不同的时代、不同的人对这种“复杂工作”的理解是不同的。例如繁重的科学和工程计算本来是要人脑来承担的，现在计算机不但能完成这种计算, 而且能够比人脑做得更快、更准确，因之当代人已不再把这种计算看作是“需要人类智能才能完成的复 1.蔡自兴，徐光祐.人工智能及其应用.北京：清华大学出版社，2010 2元慧·议当人工智能的应用领域与发展状态〖Ｊ〗．2008
机械专业中英文对照翻译大全.
机械专业英语词汇中英文对照翻译一览表 陶瓷ceramics 合成纤维synthetic fibre 电化学腐蚀electrochemical corrosion 车架automotive chassis 悬架suspension 转向器redirector 变速器speed changer 板料冲压sheet metal parts 孔加工spot facing machining 车间workshop 工程技术人员engineer 气动夹紧pneuma lock 数学模型mathematical model 画法几何descriptive geometry 机械制图Mechanical drawing 投影projection 视图view 剖视图profile chart 标准件standard component 零件图part drawing 装配图assembly drawing
尺寸标注size marking 技术要求technical requirements 刚度rigidity 内力internal force 位移displacement 截面section 疲劳极限fatigue limit 断裂fracture 塑性变形plastic distortion 脆性材料brittleness material 刚度准则rigidity criterion 垫圈washer 垫片spacer 直齿圆柱齿轮straight toothed spur gear 斜齿圆柱齿轮helical-spur gear 直齿锥齿轮straight bevel gear 运动简图kinematic sketch 齿轮齿条pinion and rack 蜗杆蜗轮worm and worm gear 虚约束passive constraint 曲柄crank 摇杆racker
机械类英文文献+翻译)
机械工业出版社2004年3月第1版 20.9 MACHINABILITY The machinability of a material usually defined in terms of four factors: 1、Surface finish and integrity of the machined part; 2、Tool life obtained; 3、Force and power requirements; 4、Chip control. Thus, good machinability good surface finish and integrity, long tool life, and low force And power requirements. As for chip control, long and thin (stringy) cured chips, if not broken up, can severely interfere with the cutting operation by becoming entangled in the cutting zone. Because of the complex nature of cutting operations, it is difficult to establish relationships that quantitatively define the machinability of a material. In manufacturing plants, tool life and surface roughness are generally considered to be the most important factors in machinability. Although not used much any more, approximate machinability ratings are available in the example below. 20.9.1 Machinability Of Steels Because steels are among the most important engineering materials (as noted in Chapter 5), their machinability has been studied extensively. The machinability of steels has been mainly improved by adding lead and sulfur to obtain so-called free-machining steels. Resulfurized and Rephosphorized steels. Sulfur in steels forms manganese sulfide inclusions (second-phase particles), which act as stress raisers in the primary shear zone. As a result, the chips produced break up easily and are small; this improves machinability. The size, shape, distribution, and concentration of these inclusions significantly influence machinability. Elements such as tellurium and selenium, which are both chemically similar to sulfur, act as inclusion modifiers in resulfurized steels. Phosphorus in steels has two major effects. It strengthens the ferrite, causing
电气工程及其自动化专业_外文文献_英文文献_外文翻译_plc方面
1、 外文原文 A: Fundamentals of Single-chip Microcomputer Th e si ng le -c hi p m ic ro co mp ut er i s t he c ul mi na ti on of both t h e de ve lo pm en t o f t he d ig it al co m pu te r an d th e i n te gr at ed c i rc ui t a rg ua bl y t h e to w m os t s ig ni f ic an t i nv en ti on s o f t he 20th c e nt ur y [1]. Th es e t ow ty pe s of ar ch it ec tu re a re fo un d i n s in g le -ch i p m i cr oc om pu te r. So m e em pl oy t he spl i t pr og ra m/da ta m e mo ry o f th e H a rv ar d ar ch it ect u re , sh ow n in Fi g.3-5A -1, o th ers fo ll ow t he p h il os op hy , wi del y a da pt ed f or ge n er al -p ur po se co m pu te rs a nd m i cr op ro ce ss o r s, o f ma ki ng n o log i ca l di st in ct ion be tw ee n p r og ra m an d d at a m e mo ry a s i n t he P r in ce to n ar ch ite c tu re , sh ow n i n F ig.3-5A-2. In g en er al te r ms a s in gl e -chi p m ic ro co mp ut er i s c h ar ac te ri ze d b y t h e i nc or po ra ti on o f a ll t he un it s of a co mp uter i n to a s in gl e d ev i ce , as s ho wn in Fi g3-5A -3. Fig.3-5A-1 A Harvard type Program memory Data memory CPU Input& Output unit memory CPU Input& Output unit
常见的有机化学基团名称翻译
有机化学基团名称翻译 A 伸乙烷合萘基;伸二氢苊基acenaphtheneylene 亚乙烷合萘基;亚二氢苊基acenaphthenylidene 醋酰胺基;乙酰胺基acetamido; acetamino 乙炔基acetenyl;ethynyl 乙酰乙酰基acetoacetyl 丙酮基acetonyl 亚丙酮基acetonylidene 乙酰氧基acetoxy 乙酰基acetyl 乙酰亚胺基acetylimino 酸硝基aci-nitro 吖啶基acridinyl 丙烯酰基acrylyl; acryloyl 己二酰基adipoyl; adipyl 脲[基]羰基;脲甲酰基allophanyl; allophanoyl 烯丙基allyl 甲脒基amidino; guanyl 酰胺基amido 酰胺草酰基;草酰胺酰基amidoxalyl; oxamoyl 胺基amino 戊基amyl; pentyl 伸戊基amylene 亚戊基amylidene 亚戊基amylidene; pentylidene 苯胺基anilino 大茴香亚甲基;对甲氧苯亚甲基;对甲氧亚苄 基anisal; anisylidene 甲氧苯胺基anisidino 大茴香酰基;对甲氧苯甲酰基;对甲氧苄酰基anisoyl 大茴香亚甲基;对甲氧亚苄基;对甲氧苯亚甲 基anisylidene; p-methoxybenzylidene; anisal 邻胺苯甲酰基;邻胺苄酰基anthraniloyl; anthranoyl 蒽基anthranyl; anthryl 蒽醌基anthraquinonyl 伸蒽基;次蒽基anthrylene 精胺酰基arginyl 亚胂酸基arsinico 胂基arsino 胂酸基arsono 亚胂基arsylene 细辛基;2,4,5-三甲氧苯基asaryl; 2,4,5-trimethoxyphenyl 天[门]冬酰胺酰基asparaginyl; asparagyl 天[门]冬胺酰基aspartyl 阿托酰基;颠茄酰基;2-苯丙烯酰基atropoyl 壬二酰基azelaxyl 迭氮基;三氮基azido; triazo 偶氮亚胺基azimino; azimido 次偶氮基azino 偶氮基azo 氧偶氮基azoxy B 苯亚甲基;亚苄基benzal 苯甲酰胺基;苄酰胺基benzamido 苯亚磺酰基benzene sulfinyl; phenylsulfinyl 苯磺酰胺基benzenesulfonamido 苯磺酰基benzenesulfonyl 次苄基benzenyl; benzylidyne 二苯甲基benzhydryl; diphenylmethyl 二苯亚甲基benzhydrylidene; diphenylmethylene 联苯胺基benzidino 亚苄基;苯亚甲基benzilidene 二苯羟乙酰基benziloyl 苯并咪唑基benzimidazolyl 苯甲酰亚胺基benzimido; benzoylimino 亚胺苄基benzimidoyl; benzimidoyle 苯并呋喃基;熏草基benzofuryl 苯并哌喃基benzopyranyl 苯并【口+咢】【口+井】基benzoxazinyl 苯并【口+咢】唑基benzoxazolyl 苯甲酰氧基;苄酰氧基benzoxy; benzoyloxy 苯甲酰基;苄酰基benzoyl 伸苯甲酰基benzoylene 苯甲酰亚胺基benzoylimino; benzimido 苯甲酰氧基benzoyloxy; benzoxy 苄基;苯甲基benzyl 亚苄基;苯亚甲基benzylidene; benzylene; benzal 次苄基;苯次甲基benzylidyne; benzenyl 联苯基biphenylyl 【草(之上)+伯】基;龙脑基;冰片基;莰基bornyl; camphenyl 丁二烯基butadienyl 次丁烯基butenylidyne 丁氧基butoxy 丁基butyl 伸丁基butylene 亚丁基butylidene