china economic journal

Disproportionate ownership structure and IPO long-run performance of non-SOEs in China ☆

Xiaoming WANG a ,Jerry CAO b ,Qigui LIU c ,Jinghua TANG c ,Gary Gang TIAN c,?

a Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,China

b Singapore Management University,Singapore c

University of Wollongong,Australia

a r t i c l e i n f o a

b s t r a

c t

Article history:

Received 19January 2014

Received in revised form 11November 2014Accepted 11November 2014

Available online 20November 2014This paper examines the relationship between ownership structures and IPO long-run perfor-mance of non-SOEs in China.Although non-SOEs underperform the market in general after IPO but the poor performance is mainly caused by the IPOs with ownership control wedge.Non-SOEs with one share one vote structure outperform those with control-ownership wedge by 30%for three years post-IPO performance in adjusted buy-and-hold returns.Non-SOEs with control-ownership wedge have higher frequency of undertaking value-destroying related party transactions.These ?ndings suggest that non-SOEs need to improve corporate governance such as disproportionate ownership structure to better safeguard the interest of long-run shareholders.

Crown Copyright ?2014Published by Elsevier Inc.All rights reserved.

JEL classi ?cation:G30G32

Keywords:IPO

Long-run performance

Disproportionate ownership Non-SOEs ?rms

1.Introduction

Initial Public Offering (IPO)’s performance has important implications for public investors.IPO literature has clearly documented the phenomenon of pervasive long-run IPO underperformance.The literature (Loughran &Ritter 1995;Ritter,1991)shows that IPO stocks on a 3–5-year horizon underperforms the market or matching ?rms.Jain and Kini (1994)and Mikkelson,Partch,and Shah (1997)?nd that IPO ?rms experience a decline in their post-issue operating performance.Pagano,Panetta,and Zingales (1998)attri-bute the post-IPO fall in pro ?tability to the window opportunity hypothesis when entrepreneurs want to take advantage of market timing.

In this paper,we examine whether the difference in ownership structure at ?rm level can explain IPO long-run (under)perfor-mance in China.Shleifer and Vishny (1997)point out that large owners gain major control of the corporation and extract private ben-e ?https://www.wendangku.net/doc/9d3968228.html,rge shareholders often prefer disproportionate ownership structure in which their control rights are much greater than cash ?ow rights in emerging markets.Such disproportionate ownership structure becomes a major channel to facilitate expropriation of minority shareholders (Bae,Baek,Kang,&Liu,2012;Claessens,Djankov,Fan,&Lang,2002;Laeven &Levine,2008;Lemmon &Lins,2003;Lins,2003;Liu &Tian,2012).These empirical studies document a negative association between ?rm value/performance and disproportionate ownership structure in non-IPO contexts.Yeh,Shu,and Guo (2008)study IPO ?rst-day return and

China Economic Review 32(2015)27–42

☆We received valuable comments from the participants at 24th Australasian Finance and Banking conference,Sydney,December 2011.Xiaoming Wang gratefully acknowledges support from Program for Innovative Research Team of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics.?Corresponding author.

E-mail address:gtian@https://www.wendangku.net/doc/9d3968228.html,.au (G.G.

Tian).

https://www.wendangku.net/doc/9d3968228.html,/10.1016/j.chieco.2014.11.004

1043-951X/Crown Copyright ?2014Published by Elsevier Inc.All rights

reserved.

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

China Economic Review

28X.Wang et al./China Economic Review32(2015)27–42

disproportionate ownership structure in Taiwan.Different from all these studies,we investigate IPO long-run performance in associ-ation with disproportionate ownership structure in China.

Post-IPO’s secondary market is important place for most small and public investors to trade IPO?rms.Many IPO underwriting pro-cess favors institutional investors so that small investor can only buy hot IPOs after they are traded.It is thus relevant to understand IPO long-run performance.On the other hand,IPO market offers an ideal place to investigate the causality between performance that is observed ex post and ownership structure ex ante.Most studies on ownership and performance are subject to endogeneity problem since they are jointly determined.We hypothesize that IPO?rms with disproportionate ownership structure in the IPO day1will underperform other IPO?rms in the long run due to the expropriation by controlling shareholders.We not only examine IPO’s long-run stock performance using cross-sectional approaches,but also report the change of operating performance post-IPO.Further-more,we try to understand the channels through which disproportionate ownership decrease long-run post-IPO performance.

We take advantage of Chinese IPO market for the following reasons.First,as other emerging markets,China’s corporate gover-nance system and investor protection are weak for small shareholders due to weak institutions.One implication is that the entrench-ment effects of a disproportionate ownership structure are likely to be pronounced in this market.Second,small retail investors actively investing in Chinese IPOs are na?ve ones,which means IPO long-run performance is critical.Third,equity market provides a critical source of external?nancing for non-government owned?rms,which comprise the majority of IPOs during the recent years.Most of?rms in China are characterized with a concentrated and disproportionate ownership structure.Our?ndings therefore have general implications of ownership structure and IPO?rm performance in countries with weak institutions.

We utilize a comprehensive sample of non-SOEs,and the sample includes636IPO companies listing between2002and2010.SOEs are excluded in this research primarily because(1)SOEs in China have different objectives and principal–agent framework,compared to the non-SOEs,so the main agency issue in SOEs is agency con?ict between the shareholders and managers rather than between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders(Liu&Tian,2012;Rousseau&Xiao,2007);(2)Although SOEs may also have a disproportionate ownership structure,it was created mainly for the purpose of decentralization rather than to create an internal cap-ital market(Fan,Wong,&Zhang,2007a),so disproportionate ownership structure in SOEs means that the controlling power of con-trolling shareholders has been largely decentralized to managers,which makes the agency con?icts between shareholders and managers stronger and controlling and minority shareholders less severe.We manually collect ownership information such as ulti-mate owners,controlling shareholders’cash?ow and control rights.Disproportionate ownership is quite pervasive:46%of our IPO companies are characterized by excess control rights.We?nd that IPOs with excess control rights signi?cantly underperform both the market and other comparable IPOs.With three-year market,industry and size adjusted buy-and-hold returns(BHR)and cumu-lative abnormal returns(CAR),IPOs with a control-ownership wedge underperform other IPOs by32%and16%,respectively.We also ?nd IPOs with excess control rights show signi?cant decline in operating performance post-IPO even after the pre-IPO earning man-agement is controlled.

We further provide analysis to understand the channels through which disproportionate ownership leads to lower long-run perfor-mance.First,we rule out IPO mispricing2as a driver of underperformance for?rms with excess control rights.We?nd that?rst day return is negatively associated with excess control rights.This suggests IPOs with disproportionate ownership have lower underpricing, partially excluding a possibility that overpricing leads to low long-run stock returns.We furthermore link?rm performance and own-ership structures to related party transactions.Recent studies suggest that when corporate wealth can be transferred from listed?rms to their controlling shareholders,tunneling activities lead to poor performance(Peng,Wei,&Yang,2010).We show that the frequency of value-destroying related party transactions is increasing in the presence and magnitude of excess control rights in IPO?rms.

By examining the impact of disproportionate ownership structure on IPO long-run performance in Chinese capital market,this paper complements previous literature such as Smart and Zutter(2003)and Smart,Thirumalai,and Zutter(2008)who examine the value implication of control-ownership wedge in the IPO market of the US by documenting a strong entrenchment effect of excess control rights in newly listed?rms in emerging markets.More importantly,it contributes to the literature on IPO long-term perfor-mance.We show that disproportionate ownership structure can explain IPO long-run underperformance.We show channels through which controlling shareholders expropriate minority ones by undertaking value-destroying related party transactions.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.Section2reviews the relevant literature and develops the hypotheses.Section3 introduces our data and sample.Section4analyzes the impact of the divergence between the ultimate owner’s cash?ow and control rights on long-run performance.Section5addresses the effect of the ultimately controlling shareholders’excess control rights on the underpricing of non-state controlled IPOs,and section6concludes the paper.

2.Literature review

The very?rst investigation into the divergence between cash?ow and control rights by La Porta,Lopez-de-Silanes,and Shleifer (1999),which covers companies from27countries,suggests that controlling shareholders can gain control rights in excess of their cash?ow claims through a pyramid structure and the common practice of ownership concentration.In emerging markets,particu-larly,where concentrated ownership structure is widespread and the legal protection of minority shareholders is weak,agency 1Using the disproportionate ownership structure of the?rst day of IPO helps to eliminate the endogeneity issue because shares held by large controlling shareholders

usually have a lock-up period of at least36months,which make the controlling shareholders are not able to change the disproportionate ownership structure during the long lock-up period.

2Loughran et al.(1994)document IPO underpricing is a common phenomenon.Loughran and Ritter(2002)attribute such underpricing to irrational behavior such as speculation bubbles and market fads.

costs are more like to originate from a con ?ict between controlling and minority shareholders.Claessens,Djankov,and Lang (2000),for example,identify a pyramid structure and cross shareholding as the major organizational strategy used by ?rms in nine East Asian economies to separate ownership and control.They also provide important evidence that entrenchment effects on corporate gover-nance stemming from the divergence between cash ?ow rights and control rights can signi ?cantly decrease ?rm value (Claessens et al.,2002),a claim supported by several later studies (Gompers,Ishii,&Metrick,2010;Laeven &Levine,2008;Lemmon &Lins,2003).

Fan,Wei,and Xu (2011)show that the cost of expropriation is ultimately born by a controlling owner who must then devote substantial resources to mitigate the cost,while other researchers identify several channels through which large shareholders tunnel bene ?ts.Cheung,Rau,and Stouraitis ’s (2006)analysis of related party transactions between Hong Kong listed companies and their controlling shareholders,for instance,associates these transactions with the wealth losses of minority shareholders.Likewise,Peng et al.(2010)provide evidence that in Chinese listed ?rms whose ?nancial condition is sound,controlling share-holders use related party transactions to extract private bene ?ts from minority shareholders.

In general,the literature on IPO performance documents two phenomena relevant for shareholders:pervasive short-run underpricing of IPOs across markets and time periods and long-run IPO underperformance of the market in the long term,usually over three-or ?ve-year periods (Ritter,1991).Jain and Kini (1994),for example,?nd that new IPOs experience declines in operating performance post issuance.For China,Chan,Wang,and Wei (2004)document both underpricing and long-run underperformance,while Sun and Tong (2003)show that post-issue performance is negatively related to state ownership but positively related to legal-entity ownership.Wang (2005)also documents a sharp decline in post-IPO operating performance but argues that neither state ownership nor ownership concentration is related to performance.A negative relation between a disproportionate ownership structure and the initial return of IPOs is identi ?ed by Yeh et al.(2008),but their study focuses on the Taiwanese market only.

All these studies,however,despite being focused on ownership ’s effect on IPO performance,fail to explore the implication of the ?rst-order agency problems that arise from ownership concentration;that is,the con ?icts between controlling and minority share-holders.In the context of a disproportionate ownership economy,controlling shareholders are likely to have perverse incentives be-cause of an excess of control rights.If the result is expropriation,it should be evident in IPOs.We therefore ?ll this research void by linking IPO performance to disproportionate ownership structure in newly listed ?rms.

The agency problem of disproportionate ownership structure results from con ?icts of interest.In particular,through a pyramid ownership structure and cross-shareholding,controlling shareholders can exert control in excess of their cash ?ow rights,an imbal-ance that also makes them less subject to board governance and market discipline.Such entrenched controlling shareholders are more likely to pursue private bene ?ts at the expense of minority shareholders or outside investors through such activities as related party transactions or connected party transactions in which corporate wealth can be expropriated through tunneling (Faccio,Lang,&Young,2001).Fan and Wong (2002)show that in East Asian corporations,the earnings-return relation decreases with the level of controlling shareholders ’excess control rights.

In the past three decades,China has undergone a profound institutional reform that has transformed its economic system from a central planning economy to a fairly decentralized market economy in which almost two-thirds of the nation ’s GDP is produced by the private sector (China Annuals of Statistics,2009).Since the opening of the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE)and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE)in December 1990and July 1991,respectively,China ’s stock market has developed rapidly.In the early years,the majority of Chinese listed companies were former state owned enterprises (SOEs);however,since then the number of IPOs with non-state ownership has increased gradually through share issue privatization.Between 2002and 2010,for example,the proportion of non-state controlled listed ?rms among all publicly listed companies in China increased from about 18%to more than 70%.3.Data and methodology 3.1.Sample

Our sample comprises all companies (excluding SOEs)that launched IPOs on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange between 2002and 2010.We restrict our observations to these years because the reporting of cash ?ow and control rights has only been mandated in China since 2002,and our long-term performance analysis requires at least three years of post-issue data,necessitating the inclusion of companies that went public prior to December 2010.We also exclude ?nancial ?rms because of their unique accounting standards,and ?rms with incomplete pre-or post-issue ?nancial information.Our ?nal sample consists of 636?rms that launched IPOs during the period from 2002to 2010(60?rms listed in main board of Shanghai Stock exchange,432?rms listed in SME board and 144?rms listed in GEM board of Shenzhen stock exchange).3All IPOs cases of non-SOEs have been in-cluded in our sample and no ?rm has been delisted during our sample period,so our research results are not in ?uenced by survivor-ship bias of our sample.We compile our dataset by merging IPO ?rm characteristics,market performance,?nancial information,and ownership data from the Chinese Stock Market Accounting Research (CSMAR)database with related party transactions information from the RESSET database.

3

There are two stock exchanges in China,the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange.Our sample covers IPOs listed in both exchanges.The main board here refers to IPOs listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange because there are no IPOs listed in main board of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange during our research period.The SME and GEM board were established in 2004and 2009separately by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange,which were mainly designed to allow small and medium size ?rms and young high-teach ?rms to go public.Thus pro ?le of ?rms listed in the main board and SME and GEM board differs.Thus our study includes dummy variables of listed boards in our regressions to control potential bias due to the different listed board and exchanges.

29

X.Wang et al./China Economic Review 32(2015)27–42

3.2.Variables

3.2.1.Long-term IPO performance

We evaluate the post-IPO performance of the non-SOEs in our sample using both market-and accounting-based measures.Our market-based performance measures are the 12-month,24-month,and 36-month post-IPO buy-and-hold stock returns (BHR)and the cumulative abnormal stock returns (CAR),both adjusted by the return of ?rms within the same market,industry,and size.4We calculate our results on the basis of monthly stock returns starting from the ?rst month after the IPO date.

We compute the buy-and-hold market-adjusted stock returns (BHR)as follows:

R it ?∏t

i ?11tr it eT?1

where R it is the buy-and-hold return of stock i from month 1to month t ,and r it is the monthly raw return of the stock,and

R bt ?∏t

i ?11tr bt eT?1

where R bt is the buy-and-hold return of the benchmark portfolio from month 1to month t ,and r bt is the monthly raw return of the benchmark portfolio.

The buy-and-hold market-adjusted return (BHR)is thus

BHR t ?R it ?R bt

and the cumulative abnormal stock returns (CAR)is

AR it ?r it ?r bt

where AR it is the abnormal return of stock i at month t ,r it is the monthly raw return of the stock,and r bt is the monthly adjusted return of the benchmark portfolio.The cumulative abnormal market-adjusted return (CAR)from event month 1to month t is thus

CAR it ?

X t i ?1

AR it

We also evaluate ?rm performance using accounting-based measures,which,however,raises the issue of all Chinese pre-IPO ac-counting data being subject to accounting manipulation to ful ?ll listing requirements (Aharony,Lee,&Wong,2000).Such manipula-tion can create a downward bias in the accounting performance change measures,a bias that we take into account by weighting the

results based on stock return measures more heavily than those based on accounting return measures.For our analysis,we adopt three industry-adjusted 5accounting performance measures:sales growth,earnings growth,and the change in return on sales (ROS),calculated as the difference between the ?rm-speci ?c and industry-median value of performance measure.We use ROS,cal-culated as net income divided by sales,rather than ROA or ROE because Fan et al.(2007b)argue that measures based on equity or assets might create a downward bias on Chinese post-IPO ?rm performance.6Likewise,due to the fact that ?rms change signi ?cantly after IPO and the pre-IPO accounting performance and subject to manipulation,we use the average changes of the accounting perfor-mance measures (sales growth,earnings growth and ROS)in the 3-year post-IPO period rather than the accounting performance changes before and after the IPO as proxy of post-IPO accounting performance change.It should be noted,however,that we have omitted the accounting numbers in the IPO year because these data tend to be heavily manipulated (Fan et al.,2007b ),and that the pre-IPO earning management is controlled in our regressions by including the pre-IPO earning management as a control variable.3.2.2.Underpricing of IPO issues

We calculate the underpricing of an IPO issue as the return on the ?rst day of trading (relative to the offering price):

RET i 0?

P i 1?P i 0

i 0

4

Barber and Lyon (1997)argue that matching ?rms are the most appropriate benchmark to measure the long-term returns and to yield well-speci ?ed statistical tests,while Perry and Williams (1994)claim that ?rms classi ?ed under the same industry and with similar size are subject to similar economic and competitive factors and thus have comparable operating,investing,and ?nancing opportunity sets.Therefore we calculated the post-IPO market performance by using the return of ?rms within the same market,industry and size as benchmark returns.We appreciated the valuable comment made by an anonymous referee regarding this issue.5

We employ the six-industry classi ?cations borrowed from Firth,Fung,and Rui (2006):?nance,industrial,commercial,public utility,property,and conglomerate (all other industries).6

See Fan et al.(2007b)for more details.

30X.Wang et al./China Economic Review 32(2015)27–42

where Ret i 0is the initial return (underpricing)of stock i ,P i0is the closing price of stock i on the ?rst trading day,and P il is the offering price of stock i .

The market return on the ?rst trading day of the new stock is

RET i 0?

P im 1?P im 0

im 0

where Ret im is the market return on the ?rst trading day of the new stock i ,P i ,m0is the closing price of the appropriate Shanghai or Shenzhen composite index that corresponds to the offering day of the new stock i ,and P i ,ml is the closing price of the appropriate Shanghai or Shenzhen composite index on the ?rst trading day of the new stock i .

We adjust the return for the market effect as follows:

ADJRET i 0?RET i 0?RET im

where AdjRet i 0is the initial return (underpricing)of stock i .

3.2.3.Disproportionate ownership structure,cash ?ow rights,and control rights

To examine the effects of a disproportionate ownership structure,we ?rst identify the ultimate controlling shareholders by tracing the chain of ownership.Consistent with previous studies (Claessens et al.,2002;La Porta et al.,1999),we de ?ne control rights as the weakest link in the chain and cash ?ow rights as the product of ownership stakes along the chain.To illustrate,if an ultimately con-trolling shareholder owns 70%of the stock of publicly traded ?rm A,which in turn has 35%of the stock of ?rm B,then the ultimately controlling shareholder controls 35%of ?rm B,the weakest link in the control rights chain,and has cash ?ow rights of 24.5%,the prod-uct of the two ownership stakes along the chain.Because of a pyramid structure,cross-shareholding,and dual-class stocks,the largest shareholders ’control rights are always in excess of its cash ?ow rights (La Porta et al.,1999),and because controlling shareholders ’control rights exceed their cash ?ow rights,they always have the incentive and opportunity to expropriate the wealth of minority shareholders (La Porta et al.,1999).

3.2.

4.Other control variables

Following previous studies,several control variables are also included in our study,detailed de ?nition of all our variables used in this paper are reported in Appendix A .3.3.Sample distribution and description

Table 1provides the distribution and description of our sample.As Panel A clearly shows,the IPO ?rms are unevenly distributed across the sample period,which largely re ?ects the overall IPO market condition in China.From 2002to 2006,the Chinese stock mar-ket experienced a serious bear market in which the Shanghai Stock Index dropped from 2,200in mid-2001to 1,050in mid-2005,and only a few ?rms (e.g.,eight in 2005)went public.Panel A also reveals that an average 45.60%of the sample ?rms have a dispropor-tionate ownership structure,with the highest percentage occurring in 2005,when all the IPO ?rms had such a structure,and the low-est (39.80%)occurring in 2010.In the remaining years,the percentages ?uctuate from 40.91%to 63.27%.The presence of a disproportionate ownership structure also varies across industries:the highest percentage occurs in the property and real estate and commercial sectors (70.00%and 68.75%),followed by the industrial sector (45.68%),the public utilities sector (44.19%),and the conglomerate sector (38.27%).In terms of listed board,48.33%of IPO ?rms listed in main board have disproportionate ownership structure,while the number is 50%and 31.25%in SME and GEM board.

Panel B reports ?rm characteristics at the time of the IPO.With a mean initial return of 79.30%,the average levels of underpricing are lower than those reported in earlier research (Chan et al.,2004;Mok &Hui,1998;Su &Fleisher,1999).Nonetheless,the underpricing of IPOs in China is still much higher than that in developed markets (Loughran,Ritter,&Rydqvist,1994)7:the mean (me-dian)number of shares issued (in millions)is 66.46(51.10)and the mean (median)issue price of the IPOs is 22.15(18.80)RMB.Panel B also shows average cash ?ow rights of 36.64%as compared to excess control rights of 5.94%,which indicates a clear divergence be-tween the largest shareholders ’control rights and their cash ?ow rights in non-state controlled IPOs ?rms.

Panel C reports the mean and median values of the stock-based and accounting-based performance measures for the sample.It clearly shows that the average BHR and CAR of newly listed non-state controlled ?rms in China fall signi ?cantly in the three years sub-sequent to their IPOs in terms of both mean and median.As regards the accounting-based measures,the mean (median)change in the three-year average ROS of the sample is a negative ?13.02%(?7.61%),re ?ecting a decline in Chinese IPO ?rms ’accounting perfor-mance that is consistent with the data reported by Aharony et al.(2000)and Sun and Tong (2003).Although the average post-IPO sales growth is positive (20.88%),the earnings growth lags far behind the sales growth (?28.90%),suggesting that the accounting performance of Chinese ?rms decrease in the post-IPO period.

7

Please visit Jay Ritter ’s website at http://bear.cba.u ?.edu/ritter/interntl.htm for the most recently updated information.

31

X.Wang et al./China Economic Review 32(2015)27–42

32X.Wang et al./China Economic Review32(2015)27–42

Table1

Sample and variables summary statistics.

This table presents summary information on the sample of non-state controlled IPO?rms in China.Panel A reports the sample by year of IPO,industry sector and the listed board.Panel B lists the IPO?rm characteristics,including initial return,market-adjusted initial return,?rm age,issue size(i.e.,the value of shares issued in mil-lions),the number of days between the offering and listing dates,the listing date issue(ordering)price,the ultimately controlling shareholders’cash?ow rights,and the level of excess control rights(i.e.,the difference between the ultimately controlling shareholders’cash?ow rights and control rights).Panel C reports statistics for the two market-based performance measures of non-state controlled Chinese?rms that went public during2002–2010and for the accounting-based performance mea-sures of non-state controlled Chinese?rms that went public during2002–2010.The market-based performance measures are the buy-and-hold adjusted returns (BHRs)and the cumulative market-adjusted stock returns(CARs)accumulated for12,24,and36months starting from one month after the IPO month,both market based performances are adjusted by market,industry,and size.The accounting return measures are the average industry adjusted change in return on sales(ΔAROS), sales growth(ΔAGSALES),and earnings growth(ΔAGEARNS)in the three-year post-IPO period.

Panel A:Distribution of?rms by IPO year,industry and listed board

IPO Year Number of IPOs Firms with excess control in total sample by year(%) Firms with excess control Firm without excess control Total

2002661250.00

20039132240.91

200431184963.27

2005808100.00

200620143458.82

200739367552.00

200825335843.10

200933467941.77

201011918029939.80

Public utilities19244344.19

Real estate731070.00

Conglomerate31508138.27

Industrial22226448645.68

Commercial1151668.75

Main board29316048.33

SME21621643250.00

GEM459914431.25

Total29034663645.60

Panel B:Characteristics of IPO?rms

Mean Median Min Max Std.dev.

Initial return(%)79.3052.41?9.91538.120.82 Market-adjusted initial return(%)78.8451.67?11.22525.750.81 Firm Age 6.41 6.00 2.0021.00 3.86 Issue size(in millions)66.4651.1010.94593.4856.36 Days elapsed between offering and listing13.8113.007.0050.00 4.54 Issue price22.1518.80 2.60148.0015.54 Cash?ow rights36.6435.730.0085.3916.04 Excess control rights(%) 5.940.000.0053.428.76 Excess dummy0.460.000.00 1.000.50

Panel C:Market-based performance and accounting-based performance

Mean Median Min.Max.Std.dev.Obs.

BHR12(%)?14.97?12.52?239.53293.2049.64636 BHR24(%)?13.42?17.84?333.67434.5460.69636 BHR36(%)?25.42?30.63?723.072148.31146.22636 CAR12(%)?9.69?11.01?123.11131.9236.45636 CAR24(%)?11.04?13.36?220.50146.7546.88636 CAR36(%)?15.13?18.42?235.50212.9458.50636ΔAROS(%)?13.02?7.61?1973.55395.2498.35636ΔAGSALES(%)20.8816.81?58.58394.1729.07636ΔAGEARNS(%)?28.90?9.40?2482.8972544.564240.92636 Data sources:China Security Market and Accounting Research(CSMAR)and authors'own calculations.

4.Disproportionate ownership structure and long-term?rm performance

In this section,we investigate how the disproportionate ownership structure of non-state controlled IPO?rms affects their long-term market-based performance and accounting-based performance.

4.1.Univariate tests

Fig.1plots the mean BHRs and CARs,respectively,of non-state controlled IPOs?rms in China sorted by whether or not the con-trolling shareholders have excess control rights.In Panel A,the mean BHR of the group of IPOs?rms with excess control(in solid

lines)remain negative over the three years,while the mean BHR of the group of IPOs ?rms without excess control (in dotted lines)is much more than that of ?rms with excess control rights although it also exhibits negative.And the difference between the two groups of ?rms is larger as time passes.Likewise,very similar results are found in Panel B.

Table 2reports the mean and median values of the market-based and accounting-based performance measures for two sub-samples sorted by whether or not the ?rms are characterized by excess control rights.In each of the three post-IPO years,the mean and median BHRs and CARs of ?rms with excess shareholder control rights are statistically signi ?cantly lower than those for ?rms without.This ?nding indicates that the post-IPO market can indeed distinguish between the two groups of ?rms.Moreover,the magnitude of the difference in average BHRs and CARs between the two groups grows larger over time,suggesting that over the years,the market gradually perceives the negative effects of entrenchment.Our between-group comparison of accounting-based performance measures further shows that ?rms with excess control rights experience a more substantial drop in average ROS and slower sales and earnings growth than do their counterparts without excess control rights.

4.2.Regressions

4.2.1.Disproportionate ownership structure and post-IPO market performance

To examine the effects of disproportionate ownership structure on post-IPO performance,we perform regression analyses using generalized least squares to control for sample heterogeneity.Tables 3and 4summarize our regression results using the 12-,24-,and 36-month BHRs and CARs as dependent variables.As the BHRs may not be normally distributed,to alleviate the potential in ?u-ence of non-normal distribution of the long-term performance of IPOs,we transform the equal weighted matching ?rm-adjusted three-year BHR to the natural logarithm of 1000%plus each BHR.The regressions also include the ultimately controlling shareholders ’cash ?ow rights (CASHFLOW),the degree of excess control (EXCESS),and a dummy (EXDUMMY)equal to one if the wedge between the ultimately controlling shareholders ’control rights and cash ?ow rights is larger than zero.The control variables are the log of total assets (SIZE),debt-to-asset ratio (LEVERAGE),issuing P/E ratio (P/E)to control the in ?uence from issuing price,a dummy variable SELLING (a dummy equals to 1if there are block trading activities within a speci ?c year and 0otherwise)to control the potential

A) Post-IPO buy-and-hold stock returns(BHRs) of firms with and without excess control rights

B) Post-IPO cumulative abnormal stock returns (CARs) of firms with and without excess control rights

Fig.1.Mean post-IPO returns from one to thirty-six months after the initial trading month.This ?gure compares the average post-IPO performance (measured by BHRs and CARs)from one to thirty six months after the initial IPO month of ?rms with and without excess control rights.De ?nitions of BHRs and CARs are detailed in Appendix A .Panel A:Post-IPO buy-and-hold stock returns (BHRs)of ?rms with and without excess control rights.Panel B:Post-IPO cumulative abnormal stock returns (CARs)of ?rms with and without excess control rights.Data sources:China Security Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR)and authors'own calculations.

33

X.Wang et al./China Economic Review 32(2015)27–42

34X.Wang et al./China Economic Review32(2015)27–42

Table2

Mean and median statistics of post-IPO performance measures.

This table presents the mean and median values for market-based and accounting-based performance measures of non-state controlled Chinese?rms that went public during2002–2010.The?rms are sorted by whether or not the ultimately controlling shareholders have control rights in excess of their cash?ow rights.The market-based performance measures are the buy-and-hold returns(BHRs)and the cumulative abnormal stock returns(CARs)accumulated for12,24,and36months starting from one month after the IPO month,both performances are adjusted by market,industry,and size.We calculate the CARs measure based on monthly market-adjust stock returns,and compute the market returns as the weighted returns for all common stocks traded on the Shenzhen or Shanghai stock exchanges.The accounting return measures are the average industry adjusted change in return on sales(ΔAROS),sales growth(ΔAGSALES),and earnings growth(ΔAGEARNS)in the three-year post-IPO period.*,**,and***indicate signi?cance at the10%,5%,and1%levels,respectively.

Obs.With Excess control Without excess control Different p-value of mean/median difference

BHR12(%)636Mean?19.86?10.88?8.98**0.02

Median?16.58?9.49?7.09***0.00

BHR24(%)636Mean?21.93?6.29?15.64***0.00

Median?21.89?14.10?7.79***0.00

BHR36(%)636Mean?42.65?10.97?31.68***0.00

Median?43.49?20.70?22.79***0.00

CAR12(%)636Mean?13.04?6.88?6.16**0.03

Median?14.68?7.27?7.41**0.01

CAR24(%)636Mean?17.03?6.03?11.00***0.00

Median?17.62?8.81?8.81**0.00

CAR36(%)636Mean?23.83?7.83?16.00***0.00

Median?26.15?10.15?16.00***0.00

ΔAROS(%)636Mean?22.52?5.05?17.47**0.03

Median?10.60?2.24?8.36**0.00

ΔAGSALES(%)636Mean18.2023.13?4.93**0.03

Median13.2118.47?5.26***0.00

ΔAGEARNS(%)636Mean?45.09?15.32?29.77?0.12

Median?37.148.99?46.13***0.00

Data sources:China Security Market and Accounting Research(CSMAR)and authors'own calculations.

in?uence from block holder’s selling activities on stock return.Finally,year and industry dummies to control for the effect of year and industry factors,dummies for listed board are included to control for the different pro?les of IPOs listed on different boards.

Consistent with the univariate results reported in Table2,the multivariate regression results show that?rms with a disproportion-ate ownership structure experience a more statistically signi?cant stock performance decline after the IPO(as shown in Table3,the regression coef?cients of excess control rights(EXCESS)are all statistically signi?cantly negative).The results indicate that?rms with

Table3

GLS regression results for the effects of disproportionate ownership structure on the post-IPO stock performance(BHRs).

In this table,the dependent variable is market-based performance,measured as BHRs for12,24,and36months,starting from one month after the IPO month.The BHR measures are calculated based on monthly market,industry,and size-adjusted stock returns.As the BHRs may not be normally distributed,to alleviate the potential in?uence of non-normal distribution of the long-term performance of IPOs,we transform the equal weighted matching?rm-adjusted three-year BHR to the natural logarithm of1000%plus each BHR.De?nitions of variables are detailed in Appendix A.p-values are in parentheses;*,**,and***indicate signi?cance at the10%,5%, and1%levels,respectively.

(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)

BHR12BHR24BHR36

EXCESS?0.30***?0.20*?0.53***

(0.01)(0.06)(0.00)

EXDUMMY?0.02?0.02*?0.03**

(0.22)(0.07)(0.03) CASHFLOW0.060.100.070.10*?0.030.06

(0.42)(0.11)(0.25)(0.09)(0.69)(0.37) SIZE0.020.010.000.00?0.00?0.01

(0.16)(0.23)(0.69)(0.69)(0.84)(0.59) LEVERAGE?0.06?0.06?0.04?0.04?0.04?0.03

(0.27)(0.31)(0.39)(0.41)(0.48)(0.59)

P/E0.00?0.000.010.01?0.01?0.01

(0.95)(0.95)(0.80)(0.87)(0.79)(0.62) SELLING?0.02?0.01?0.00?0.000.020.02

(0.26)(0.29)(0.77)(0.77)(0.25)(0.21) Const0.86***0.88*** 1.32*** 1.31*** 2.23*** 2.27***

(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00) Year Included Included Included Included Included Included Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included Board Included Included Included Included Included Included N636636636636636636

adj.R20.4660.4610.4340.4330.2740.255 Data sources:China Security Market and Accounting Research(CSMAR)and authors'own calculations.

a disproportionate ownership structure underperform those without in term of BHR,which is consistent with our univariate test re-sults.Likewise,as shown in Table 4,?rms with a disproportionate ownership structure signi ?cantly underperform those without in CARs in the post-IPO period of 12,24and 36months.

4.2.2.Disproportionate ownership structure and post-IPO accounting performance

Table 5reports the results of our regressions analyzing the effects of a disproportionate ownership structure on changes in post-IPO accounting performance,measure by the average change in ROS,sales growth,and earnings growth in the 3-years post-IPO pe-riod.Panel A and B reports the results using excess control rights and excess dummy as explanatory variables separately.Main control variables are the degree of excess control (EXCESS),and a dummy (EXDUMMY)equal to one if the wedge between the ultimately con-trolling shareholders ’control rights and cash ?ow rights is larger than zero.In addition to the control variables used in Tables 3and 4,we include one more variable (EM 8),which is the degree of earning management in the 3year pre-IPO period,the results are reported separately in columns (2),(4)and (6).This is because pre-IPO ?rms in China tend to manipulate their earnings in the pre-IPO period (Chen,Shi,&Xu,2013),which may also result in a decrease in post-IPO accounting performance.In other word,if we observe a worse post-IPO accounting performance in ?rms with excess control rights,it may be caused by those ?rms have more pre-IPO earnings management.By controlling the pre-IPO earning management in our regression models,we are able to achieve results that are free from potential effect from pre-IPO earnings management.

The regression results in Table 5indicate that ?rms with a disproportionate ownership structure experience deteriorating account-ing performance subsequent to their IPOs regardless of whether performance is measured by the change in ROS,sales growth,or earn-ings growth,even after the pre-IPO earnings management has been controlled.Consistent with the univariate test results,our results show that every one percentage increase in excess control rights results in a 2.66%(2.58%)decline for the change in ROS,a 0.45%(0.41%)slower sales growth,and 4.38%(5.67%)slower earnings growth.

According to Aharony et al.(2000),in managing their earnings,Chinese ?rms typically manipulate accruals and pro ?ts from non-core operations.Therefore,to check the robustness of our results and to bring our accounting-based measures more in line with those of previous studies,we also use operating earnings/assets,operating earnings growth,and net operating income growth as accounting-based performance measures to test the relation between a disproportionate ownership structure and performance changes.As Table 6indicates,even using these alternative post-IPO accounting performance changes,the level of excess control rights remains negatively correlated with ?rms ’accounting performance subsequent to the IPO.More speci ?cally,?rms whose ultimately controlling shareholders have more excess control rights experience a greater drop in operating earnings/assets and slower operating earnings growth and net income growth.

8

Earnings management is de ?ned by discretionary accruals (DAs)using the modi ?ed Jones models developed by Jones (1991).

Table 4

GLS regression results of the effects of a disproportionate ownership structure on the post-IPO stock performance (CARs).

In this table,the dependent variable is market-based performance,measured as CARs accumulated for 12,24,and 36months,starting from one month after the IPO month.The CAR measures are calculated based on monthly market,industry,and size-adjusted stock returns.As the CARs may not be normally distributed,to alleviate the potential in ?uence of non-normal distribution of the long-term performance of IPOs,we transform the equal weighted matching ?rm-adjusted three-year CAR to the natural logarithm of 1000%plus each CAR.De ?nitions of variables are detailed in Appendix A .P -values are in parentheses;*,**,and ***indicate signi ?cance at the 10%,5%,and 1%levels,respectively.

(1)(2)

(3)(4)

(5)(6)

CAR12

CAR24CAR36EXCESS ?0.22***?0.30***?0.63***(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.00)

EXDUMMY ?0.02*?0.02*?0.03*(0.06)(0.08)(0.05)CASHFLOW 0.050.08*0.070.12*?0.040.07(0.33)(0.08)(0.28)(0.06)(0.69)(0.44)SIZE 0.010.01?0.01?0.01?0.01?0.01(0.47)(0.54)(0.41)(0.34)(0.53)(0.35)LEVERAGE ?0.03?0.03?0.000.00?0.04?0.03(0.41)(0.45)(0.94)(0.99)(0.58)(0.68)P/E 0.010.010.010.010.010.01(0.65)(0.75)(0.61)(0.71)(0.71)(0.88)SELLING ?0.01?0.010.000.000.010.02(0.61)(0.63)(0.99)(0.96)(0.41)(0.36)Const 1.01*** 1.02*** 1.29*** 1.30*** 1.37*** 1.41***(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)Year Included Included Included Included Included Included Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included Board Included Included Included Included Included Included N

636636636636636636adj.R 2

0.2350.2310.2080.2020.170

0.152Data sources:China Security Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR)and authors'own calculations.

35

X.Wang et al./China Economic Review 32(2015)27–42

36X.Wang et al./China Economic Review32(2015)27–42

Table5

GLS regression results for the effects of a disproportionate ownership structure on the post-IPO accounting-based performance.

In this table,the dependent variable is,alternately,the average industry adjusted change in return on sales(ΔAROS),sales growth(ΔAGSALES),and earnings growth (ΔAGEARNS)in the three-year post-IPO period.ΔSIZE,ΔLEVERAGE,andΔP/E are the average industry adjusted change in?rm size,leverage ratio and P/E ratio in the three-year post-IPO period.Excess control rights and cash?ow rights are not change values because ownership structure are less likely to be changed during the3year lockup period.The number of observations in columns(2),(4)and(6)are smaller when we include pre-IPO earning management in our models because some?rms do not have enough pre-IPO information to calculate the pre-IPO earning management.Pre-IPO earning management(EM)is also not in change values because they are pre-IPO values.De?nitions of all other variables are detailed in Appendix A.P-values are in parentheses;*,**,and***indicate signi?cance at the10%,5%,and1%levels, respectively.

(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)

ΔAROSΔAGSALESΔAGEARNS

Panel A.Excess control rights as measure of disproportionate ownership structure

EXCESS?2.66***?2.58**?0.45***?0.41**?4.38**?5.67***

(0.00)(0.04)(0.01)(0.03)(0.01)(0.00) CASHFLOW?0.14?0.32**?0.020.030.82?1.00

(0.75)(0.04)(0.84)(0.74)(0.43)(0.34)

ΔSIZE0.47***0.090.73***0.62*** 1.75*** 1.16***

(0.01)(0.11)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)

ΔLEVERAGE?0.21**?0.05*0.07***0.08***?0.53**?0.51***

(0.03)(0.07)(0.00)(0.00)(0.02)(0.01)

ΔP/E?0.00?0.00?0.01**?0.01**?0.03?0.03

(0.94)(0.72)(0.03)(0.01)(0.24)(0.26)

EM?0.38?1.59?0.89

(0.83)(0.18)(0.94) Const49.44?6.3921.95***13.98?311.25***?174.75*

(0.14)(0.64)(0.00)(0.13)(0.00)(0.06)

Year Included Included Included Included Included Included Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included Board Included Included Included Included Included Included

N636533636533636533

adj.R20.0460.0190.4140.4380.0780.051

Panel B.Excess dummy as measure of disproportionate ownership structure

EXDUMMY?15.99**?6.20**?4.49**?2.90*?34.03*?38.76**

(0.05)(0.01)(0.02)(0.09)(0.08)(0.02) CASHFLOW0.28?0.25*0.040.10 1.48?0.12

(0.50)(0.09)(0.66)(0.33)(0.14)(0.90)

ΔSIZE0.49***0.09*0.74***0.62*** 1.78*** 1.21***

(0.00)(0.09)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)

ΔLEVERAGE?0.23**?0.06**0.07***0.08***?0.55**?0.53***

(0.02)(0.05)(0.00)(0.00)(0.02)(0.01)

ΔP/E?0.00?0.00?0.01**?0.01**?0.03?0.03

(0.97)(0.70)(0.03)(0.01)(0.25)(0.26)

EM?0.64?1.72?2.57

(0.72)(0.15)(0.83) Const20.52?14.0318.14**21.71**?354.38***?227.28**

(0.53)(0.29)(0.02)(0.02)(0.00)(0.01)

Year Included Included Included Included Included Included Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included Board Included Included Included Included Included Included

N636533636533636533

adj.R20.0460.0190.4140.4380.0780.051

Data sources:China Security Market and Accounting Research(CSMAR)and authors'own calculations.

Taken together,the regression results in Tables3,4,5,and6suggest that non-state controlled?rms in China that have issued IPOs generally show poorer stock returns and accounting performance when the ultimately controlling shareholders can exert control through a pyramidal structure or cross-shareholding using control rights that are in excess of cash?ow rights.

4.3.Disproportionate ownership structure and related party transactions

On the assumption that controlling shareholders can expropriate minority shareholders by tunneling the wealth of listed?rms,we now explore whether a?rm with disproportionate ownership structure is more likely to conduct tunneling https://www.wendangku.net/doc/9d3968228.html,ing related party transactions as proxies,we measure the effect of the wedges between control rights and cash?ow rights on the probability of a ?rm undertaking tunneling transactions using the likelihood of a?rm undertaking a value-destroying related party transaction as the dependent variable.Because there is no accurate measure of exactly how much bene?t is transferred through these transactions,as in prior studies(Cheung,Jing,Lu,Rau,&Stouraitis,2009,Cheung et al.,2006),we use the market reaction to related party transaction announcements as a proxy.A negative market reaction indicates tunneling,which reduces?rm value and goes against the interests of minority shareholders.We de?ne value-destroying related party transactions as any connected transaction associated with negative

cumulative abnormal market-adjusted stock returns (CARs)over trading day windows [0,+1],[?1,+1],[?2,+2],[?2,+5]relative to the announcement day (day 0).We report the estimates of our logistic models in Table 7.

As the table clearly shows,?rms with a disproportionate ownership structure are more likely to engage in value-destroying related party transactions,and the likelihood of a ?rm ’s engaging in such transactions increases with the divergence between control rights and cash ?ow rights.Moreover,consistent with Cheung et al.’s (2006)?ndings,the cash ?ow rights of controlling shareholders and ?rm size are negatively related to value-destroying related party transactions.Overall,the evidence in Table 7indicates a positive re-lation between disproportionate ownership and the likelihood of controlling shareholders expropriating minority shareholders.This relation is stronger for IPO ?rms with a wider wedge between controlling shareholders ’control rights and cash ?ow rights.This evidence further indicates that,in long-term,the underperformance of IPOs with excess control rights relative to IPOs without excess control rights is partly driven by their higher likelihood of undertaking value-destroying related party transactions.

Table 6

GLS regression results for the effects of disproportionate ownership structure on the post-IPO accounting-based performance.

In this table,the dependent variable is,alternately,the change in operating earnings/assets (ΔAOE/A),the operating earnings growth (ΔGAOE),and the net income growth (ΔGANOI)in the 3-year post-IPO period.ΔSIZE,ΔLEVERAGE,and ΔP/E are the average industry adjusted change in ?rm size,leverage ratio and P/E ratio in the three-year post-IPO period.Excess control rights and cash ?ow rights are not change values because ownership structure are less likely to be changed during the 3year lockup period.The number of observations in columns (2),(4)and (6)are smaller when we include pre-IPO earning management in our models because some ?rms do not have enough pre-IPO information to calculate the pre-IPO earning management.De ?nitions of all other variables are detailed in Appendix A .P-values are in parentheses;*,**,and ***indicate signi ?cance at the 10%,5%,and 1%levels,respectively.

(1)(2)

(3)(4)

(5)(6)

ΔAOE/A

ΔGAOE

ΔGANOI Panel A.Excess control rights as measure of disproportionate ownership structure EXCESS ?27.04***?6.08**?11.01**

?15.35***?10.31***?9.98***(0.00)(0.03)(0.01)

(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)CASHFLOW 1.05?0.690.79

?0.58 1.38?0.73(0.80)(0.67)(0.76)

(0.85)(0.44)(0.59)ΔSIZE 4.39***0.77 1.70

1.51

2.32*** 1.40***(0.01)(0.18)(0.10)

(0.15)(0.00)(0.00)ΔLEVERAGE ?2.42***?0.54*0.59

0.70?0.87**?0.61**(0.01)(0.07)(0.31)

(0.20)(0.03)(0.01)ΔP/E 0.00?0.03?0.05

?0.06?0.01?0.02(0.98)(0.38)(0.45)

(0.39)(0.79)

(0.43)EM ?4.64

18.52?3.16(0.80)

(0.58)(0.84)Const ?78.15?88.32?689.12***

?281.5995.87

?90.31(0.81)(0.54)(0.00)

(0.29)(0.48)(0.45)Year Included Included Included Included Included Included Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included Board Included Included Included Included Included Included N 636533636

533636533adj.R 2

0.0560.0040.0350.0180.033

0.049Panel B.Excess dummy as measure of disproportionate ownership structure

EXDUMMY ?139.31*?46.96*?86.70*

?101.26**?55.25*?47.91**(0.07)(0.07)(0.08)

(0.04)(0.09)(0.03)CASHFLOW 5.440.22 2.46

1.82 3.04*0.95(0.18)(0.89)(0.33)

(0.52)(0.07)(0.46)ΔSIZE 4.61***0.82 1.79*

1.63

2.40*** 1.47***(0.01)(0.15)(0.09)

(0.12)(0.00)(0.00)ΔLEVERAGE ?2.51***?0.58*0.53

0.63?0.90**?0.64**(0.01)(0.05)(0.36)

(0.25)(0.02)(0.01)ΔP/E 0.01?0.03?0.05

?0.06?0.01?0.02(0.94)(0.38)(0.46)

(0.38)(0.83)(0.43)SELLING ?28.53?14.95?13.34

?20.03?13.13?9.98(0.74)(0.58)(0.80)

(0.68)(0.71)

(0.66)EM ?6.66

14.13?5.30(0.72)

(0.68)(0.73)Const ?385.51?173.90?796.95***

?423.26*?20.02?229.02*(0.22)(0.21)(0.00)

(0.10)(0.88)(0.05)Year Included Included Included Included Included Included Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included Board Included Included Included Included Included Included N 636533636

533636533adj.R

2

0.0370.0010.0300.010

0.018

0.026

Data sources:China Security Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR)and authors'own calculations.

37

X.Wang et al./China Economic Review 32(2015)27–42

38X.Wang et al./China Economic Review32(2015)27–42

Table7

Logistical regressions on the likelihood of undertaking value-destroying related party transactions.

In this table,the dependent variable is a value-destroying connected transactions dummy that equals one if the?rm has undertaken a connected transaction associated with negative cumulative abnormal market-adjusted stock returns(CARs)over trading day window[0,+1],[?1,+1],[?2,+2],[?2,+5]relative to the announce-ment day(day0).The sample includes a total of9,847related party transactions over36months for636IPO?rms,starting from one month after the IPO month. We calculate the CARs based on daily market-adjusted stock returns and compute the market returns as the value weighted returns for all common stocks traded on the Shenzhen or Shanghai stock exchanges.De?nitions of variables are detailed in Appendix A.P-values are in parentheses;*,**,and***indicate signi?cance at the10%,5%,and1%levels,respectively.

(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)

=1if CAR[0,+1]b0=1if CAR[?1,+1]b0=1if CAR[?2,+2]b0=1if CAR[?2,+5]b0

EXCESS0.05***0.03***0.03***0.04***

(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)

EXDUMMY 1.04***0.95***0.67***0.83***

(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00) CASHFLOW?0.02***?0.03***?0.04***?0.04***?0.03***?0.04***?0.02***?0.03***

(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.000)(0.00) SIZE?0.68***?0.52***?0.47***?0.42***?1.08***?1.02***?0.97***?0.86***

(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00) LEVERAGE?0.00?0.00*?0.00***?0.00***0.00***0.00***0.000.00

(0.23)(0.08)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.35)(0.47) Const12.06***7.32***11.61***8.27***24.46***17.49***26.96***18.63*** Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Year Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Board Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included

N98479847984798479847984798479847 pseudo R20.1160.1320.1000.1150.1570.1610.1680.176

Data sources:China Security Market and Accounting Research(CSMAR)and authors'own calculations.

4.4.Robustness results

For robustness of our results,we also conduct the following tests:(1)we use the ratio of control rights and cash?ow rights as new measure of excess control rights,and we?nd the positive relationship still hold between new measure of excess control rights and post-IPO performance;(2)we conduct separate regressions using different subsample of?rms listed in main board,SME board and GEM board,and similar results are found indicating that the worse post-IPO performance in?rms with excess control rights is not driven by the different risk pro?le of?rms listed in different boards.The results of these robustness tests are not reported to save space.

5.Disproportionate ownership structure and initial IPO returns

This section examines how the disproportionate ownership structure of non-state controlled IPO?rms affects initial IPO returns (underpricing).Table8reports the mean and median market-adjusted initial stock returns for our sample,sorted by controlling shareholders’excess control rights and year.As the table shows,in most years,?rms with a disproportionate ownership structure show smaller initial returns than?rms without.The difference in mean of market-adjusted initial return of?rms with and without disproportionate ownership structure is9.16%(71.47%versus80.63%,which is signi?cant at the10%level.These results support our hypothesis that the largest controlling shareholders’excess control rights have a negative impact on the initial returns of non-state controlled IPO?rms.

To distinguish the effect of a disproportionate ownership structure on the initial returns of non-state controlled?rms,we also per-form a regression analysis that controls for additional?rm,industry,year,and institutional factors in China’s IPO markets.The depen-dent variable in this model is the IPO’s initial stock return,including both the unadjusted initial return(INITIAL RETURN)and the market-adjusted return(ADJ.INITIAL RETURN).Our key independent variables are the degree of the excess control rights(EXCESS) and a dummy(EXDUMMY)for the largest shareholders having excess control rights.The results are reported in panel A(initial return as dependent variable)and B(adjusted initial return as dependent variable)of Table9.As in panel A of Table9,when we include the key independents and only control for year and industry factors,the estimated coef?cients are signi?cantly negative at the5%level for the degree of excess control rights(Ex_wedge)and at the1%level for the presence of largest shareholders’excess control rights (Ex_dummy).

We then run further regressions that include additional control variables suggested by prior research on IPO underpricing. Chowdhry and Sherman(1996),for example,suggest that underpricing can be affected by the time gap between the offering and the listing.That is,because the information known by issuers,underwriters,and investors is asymmetrical(Baron,1982;Rock, 1986),the longer the time lags between the offering and the listing,the higher the risk to investors and thus the greater the probability of underpricing.In fact,both Chan et al.(2004)and Su(2004)provide empirical evidence that IPO underpricing in China is positively related to the offering-to-listing time lag.To capture the effects of this information asymmetry,we include the natural logarithm of the number of days between the offering and listing dates(DAYLAG),together with other variables commonly used in related studies of Chinese IPOs(Chan et al.,2004;Chen,Firth,&Kim,2004;Su&Fleisher,1999),including the ultimately controlling shareholders’cash

?ow rights (CASHFLOW);the age of the ?rms(LNAGE),represented by the natural logarithm of one plus the age in years of the com-pany from the date on which it was ?rst listed (with any part of a year treated as a whole year);the issue size (PROCEEDS),represent-ed by the natural logarithm of the gross proceeds;the issuing P/E ratio and year,industry and listed dummies.

The results of these multiple regressions,shown in Table 9,indicate that the time lag between the IPO date and the ?rst trading date is insigni ?cant in explaining IPO underpricing.Although this result contrasts with those of earlier studies (Chen et al.,2004;Mok &Hui,1998;Su &Fleisher,1999),it is consistent with more recent ?ndings that the time lag in the Chinese IPO market has been dramatically shortened,thereby removing previously unknown factors caused by the long time lag (Yu &Tse,2006).The coef-?cients for the degree of excess control rights (EXCESS)reported in panel A and the dummy variable (EXDUMMY)reported in panel B remains negative and they are statistically signi ?cant.The marginally lower initial return,or smaller underpricing,associated with a disproportionate ownership structure is consistent with our second hypothesis that,in non-state controlled IPO ?rms,the excess con-trol rights enjoyed by ultimately controlling shareholders become entrenched in a disproportionate ownership structure,thereby giv-ing largest controlling shareholders less incentive to underprice new issues.These results,which support our second hypothesis,are also consistent with Yeh et al.’s (2008)?ndings for Taiwan.6.Conclusions

Public investors invest in IPOs at capital markets because they believe in the issuing ?rms ’future prospects,?nancial performance,and corporate governance.In China,the world ’s largest emerging economy,although the IPO market is actively attracting critical ?-nancing from retail investors,the long-run IPO performance is proving dismal.Many newly listed ?rms are essentially controlled by private owners through a complex pyramid ownership structure,which gives their controlling shareholders greater control rights in excess of their cash ?ow rights.Under this disproportionate ownership structure,controlling shareholders are incentivized to expro-priate minority shareholders.IPOs with the disproportional ownership structure should be deemed as bad investment in the long run for public investors.

Utilizing a hand-collected data on ownership for publicly listed non-SOEs,we show that IPO ?rms characterized by excess control rights signi ?cantly underperform other IPOs in the long-run stock and operating performance.Our ?ndings thus suggest that the con-?ict between large controlling shareholders and minority shareholders remains the primary agency problem because of the signi ?-cant entrenchment effect generated by disproportional ownership structures.Furthermore we show that IPO ?rms with excess control show signi ?cantly lower ?rst day return but are associated with higher frequency of value-destroying related party transac-tions,suggesting that the latter reason can explain IPO-run poor performance.

This research has important implications for both investors and regulators.First,small public investors interested in IPOs must un-derstand the ownership structure of the newly listed ?rm and rationally discount the price of such ?rms commensurate with the ad-verse incentives of controlling shareholders.Disproportionate ownership structures have to be considered as an important corporate governance issue.Regulators,for their part,must recognize that the current investor protection systems need to address the challenge of protecting minority investors in corporations characterized by a complex and disproportionate ownership structure.

Table 8

Mean and median statistics of initial returns.

This table reports mean and median statistics of the initial (?rst day)stock returns of non-state controlled IPOs grouped by whether or not the Chinese IPO ?rm is sub-ject to excess shareholder control during 2002–2010.The initial return of an IPO is measured as the difference between the closing stock price on the ?rst trading day and the offering price,and then divided by the offering price adjusted by market return.Excess control N 0and Excess control =0refer to ?rms with and without excess control rights.Note there is no IPO ?rm without excess control rights in the year 2005.*,**,and ***indicate signi ?cance at the 10%,5%,1%levels,respectively.

Obs.

Market-adjusted initial returns (%)Excess control N 0

Excess control=0Difference p -value of mean/median difference 200212Mean 113.85139.28?25.44

0.32Median 98.6989.908.79 1.00200322Mean 65.6054.9210.680.22Median 54.4545.968.490.33200449Mean 70.0075.34?5.340.39Median 60.2452.00

8.24

0.84

20058Mean 30.49Median 27.35200634Mean 91.8897.06?5.180.40Median 82.9787.14?4.170.33200775Mean 178.07235.59?57.52***0.01Median 166.70198.88?32.19*0.06200858Mean 122.39126.08?3.690.44Median 28.3833.43?5.050.93200979Mean 56.5578.86?22.31**0.01Median 64.1167.98?3.87**0.042010299Mean 27.9840.92?12.94***?0.01Median 18.3833.64?15.26***

0.00Total

636

Mean 71.4780.639.16*0.08Median

50.26

50.480.28*0.09

Data sources:China Security Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR)and authors'own calculations.

39

X.Wang et al./China Economic Review 32(2015)27–42

40X.Wang et al./China Economic Review32(2015)27–42

Table9

GLS Regression results for the effects of a disproportionate ownership structure on the initial return.

In this regression model,the dependent variables are the unadjusted initial return(Initial Return)and the market-adjusted initial return(Market-adjusted Initial Re-turn).AGE is the natural logarithm of one plus the age in years of the company from the date on which it was?rst listed(with any part of a year treated as a whole year). PROCEED is the natural logarithm of the value of gross proceeds in the IPO.DAYLAG is the natural logarithm of the number of days between the offering and listing dates. De?nitions of all other variables are detailed in Appendix A.P-values are in parentheses;*,**,and***indicate signi?cance at the10%,5%,and1%levels,respectively.

Panel A Unadjusted initial return as dependent variable

(1)(2)(3)(4)

Initial return

EXCESS?0.79***?0.52*

(0.01)(0.07)

EXDUMMY?0.15***?0.11**

(0.00)(0.02) CASHFLOW0.110.11

(0.52)(0.53) PROCEED?0.41***?0.41***

(0.00)(0.00) AGE?0.02?0.03

(0.50)(0.44) DAYLAG0.060.06

(0.52)(0.53)

P/E0.19*0.19*

(0.06)(0.06) Const 1.41*** 2.95*** 1.40*** 2.96***

(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00) Industry Included Included Included Included Year Included Included Included Included Board Included Included Included Included

N636636636636

adj.R20.4500.5060.4520.508 Panel B Adjusted initial return as dependent variable

(1)(2)(3)(4)

Market-adjusted Initial Return

EXCESS?0.82***?0.56**

(0.00)(0.05)

EXDUMMY?0.16***?0.12**

(0.00)(0.01) CASHFLOW0.080.07

(0.66)(0.67) PROCEEDS?0.40***?0.40***

(0.00)(0.00) AGE?0.02?0.03

(0.50)(0.44) DAYLAG0.010.01

(0.89)(0.91)

P/E0.21**0.21**

(0.04)(0.04) Const 1.43*** 2.99*** 1.42*** 2.99***

(0.00)(0.00)(0.00)(0.00) Industry Included Included Included Included Year Included Included Included Included Board Included Included Included Included

N636636636636

adj.R20.4500.5060.4520.508

Data sources:China Security Market and Accounting Research(CSMAR)and authors'own calculations.

References

Aharony,J.,Lee,C.W.J.,&Wong,T.J.(2000).Financial packaging of IPO firms in China.Journal of Accounting Research,38,103–126.

Bae,K.H.,Baek,J.S.,Kang,J.K.,&Liu,W.L.(2012).Do controlling shareholders’expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value?

Theory and evidence.Journal of Financial Economics,105,412–435.

Barber,B.M.,&Lyon,J.D.(1997).Detecting long-run abnormal stock returns:The empirical power and specification of test statistics.Journal of Financial Economics,43, 341–372.

Baron,D.P.(1982).A model of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for new issues.Journal of Finance,37,955–976.

Chan,K.,Wang,J.,&Wei,K.(2004).Underpricing and long-term performance of IPOs in China.Journal of Corporate Finance,10,409–430.

Chen,G.,Firth,M.,&Kim,J.B.(2004).IPO underpricing in China’s new stock markets.Journal of Multinational Financial Management,14,283–302.

Chen,C.,Shi,H.,&Xu,H.(2013).Underwriter reputation,issuer ownership,and pre-IPO earnings management:Evidence from China.Financial Management,42(3), 647–677.

Cheung,Y.L.,Jing,L.,Lu,T.,Rau,P.R.,&Stouraitis,A.(2009).Tunnelling and propping up:An analysis of related party transactions by Chinese listed companies.Pacific-Basin Finance Journal ,17,372–393.

Cheung,Y.L.,Rau,P.R.,&Stouraitis,A.(2006).Tunneling,propping and expropriation:Evidence from connected party transactions in Hong Kong.Journal of Financial

Economics ,82,343–386.

China Annual of Statistics (2009).Published by National Bureau of Statistics of China.

Chowdhry,B.,&Sherman,A.(1996).International differences in oversubscription and underpricing of IPOs.Journal of Corporate Finance ,2,359–381.

Claessens,S.,Djankov,S.,Fan,J.P.H.,&Lang,L.H.P.(2002).Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings.Journal of Finance ,57,

2741–2771.

Claessens,S.,Djankov,S.,&Lang,L.H.P.(2000).The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations.Journal of Financial Economics ,58,81–112.Faccio,M.,Lang,L.H.P.,&Young,L.(2001).Dividends and expropriation.American Economic Review ,91,54–78.

Fan,J.P.H.,Wei,K.,&Xu,X.(2011).Corporate finance and governance in emerging markets:A selective review and an agenda for future research.Journal of Corporate

Finance ,17,207–214.

Fan,J.P.H.,&Wong,T.J.(2002).Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings in East Asia.Journal of Accounting and Economics ,33,

401–425.

Fan,J.P.H.,Wong,T.J.,&Zhang,T.Y.(2007a).The emergence of corporate pyramids in China.SSRN working paper .

Fan,J.P.H.,Wong,T.J.,&Zhang,T.Y.(2007b).Politically connected CEOs,corporate governance,and post-IPO performance of China ’s newly partially privatized firms.

Journal of Financial Economics ,84,330–357.

Firth,M.,Fung,P.M.Y.,&Rui,O.M.(2006).Corporate performance and CEO compensation in China.Journal of Corporate Finance ,12(4),693–714.

Gompers,P.A.,Ishii,J.,&Metrick,A.(2010).Extreme governance:An analysis of dual-class firms in the United States.Review of Financial Studies ,23,1051–1088.Jain,B.,&Kini,O.(1994).The post-issue operating performance of IPO firms.Journal of Finance ,49,1699–1726.

Jones,J.J.(1991).Earnings management during import relief investigations.Journal of Accounting Research ,29(2),193–https://www.wendangku.net/doc/9d3968228.html, Porta,R.,Lopez-de-Silanes,F.,&Shleifer,A.(1999).Corporate ownership around the world.Journal of Finance ,54,471–https://www.wendangku.net/doc/9d3968228.html,even,L.,&Levine,R.(2008).Complex ownership structures and corporate valuations.Review of Financial Studies ,21,579–604.

Lemmon,M.L.,&Lins,K.V.(2003).Ownership structure,corporate governance,and firm value:Evidence from the East Asian financial crisis.Journal of Finance ,58,

1445–1468.

Lins,K.V.(2003).Equity ownership and firm value in emerging markets.Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis ,38(1),159–184.

Liu,Q.,&Tian,G.(2012).Controlling shareholder,expropriations and firm ’s leverage decision:Evidence from Chinese non-tradable share reform.Journal of Corporate

Finance ,18,782–803.

Loughran,T.,Ritter,J.R.,&Rydqvist,K.(1994).Initial public offerings:International insights.Pacific-Basin Finance Journal ,2,165–199.Loughran,T.,&Ritter,J.(1995).The new issues puzzle.Journal of Finance ,50(1),23–51.

Loughran,T.,&Ritter,J.(2002).Why has IPO underpricing changed over time?Financial Management ,33(3),5–37.

Mikkelson,W.H.,Partch,M.M.,&Shah,K.(1997).Ownership and operating performance of companies that go public.Journal of Financial Economics ,44,281–307.Mok,H.M.K.,&Hui,Y.(1998).Underpricing and aftermarket performance of IPOs in Shanghai,China.Pacific-Basin Finance Journal ,6,453–474.Pagano,M.,Panetta,F.,&Zingales,L.(1998).Why do companies go public?An empirical analysis.Journal of Finance ,53(1),27–64.

Peng,W.Q.,Wei,K.,&Yang,Z.(2010).Tunneling or propping:Evidence from connected transactions in China.Journal of Corporate Finance ,17,306–325.Perry,S.E.,&Williams,T.H.(1994).Earnings management preceding management buyout offers.Journal of Accounting and Economics ,18(2),157–179.Ritter,J.R.(1991).The long-run performance of initial public offerings.Journal of Finance ,46,3–27.Rock,K.(1986).Why new issues are underpriced.Journal of Financial Economics ,15,187–212.

Rousseau,P.L.,&Xiao,S.(2007).Change of control and the success of China's share issue privatization.SSRN working paper .Shleifer,A.,&Vishny,R.W.(1997).A survey of corporate governance.Journal of Finance ,52,737–783.

Smart,S.,Thirumalai,R.,&Zutter,C.(2008).What's in a vote?The short-and long-run impact of dual-class equity on IPO firm values.Journal of Accounting and

Economics ,45(1),94–115.

Smart,S.,&Zutter,C.(2003).Control as a motivation for underpricing:A comparison of dual-and single-class IPOs.Journal of Financial Economics ,69(1),85–110.

Variable names Variable de ?nitions

Post-IPO performance BHR 12Twelve months post-IPO performance measured by BHR.

BHR 24Twenty four months post-IPO performance measured by BHR.BHR 36Thirty six months post-IPO performance measured by BHR CAR 12Twelve months post-IPO performance measured by CAR.

CAR 24Twenty four months post-IPO performance measured by CAR.CAR 36Thirty six months post-IPO performance measured by CAR.ΔAROS Average change of ROS in the three-year post-IPO period

ΔAGSALES Average growth rate of sales in the three-year post-IPO period.ΔAGEARNS Average growth rate of earnings in the three-year post-IPO period.

ΔAOE/A Average growth in operating earnings/assets in the three-year post-IPO period.ΔGAOE Average growth in operating earnings in the three-year post-IPO period.ΔGANOI

Average growth in net income in the three-year post-IPO period.

Disproportionate ownership structure EXCESS Ultimate controlling shareholder's control rights minus cash ?ow rights at the time of IPO

EXDUMMY Dummy equals to 1if the ultimate controlling shareholder has excess control rights at the time of IPO CASHFLOW Ultimate controlling shareholder's cash ?ow rights at the time of IPO

Control variables SIZE

Natural logarithm of total assets at the time of IPO.LEVERAGE Total debt to total assets at the time of IPO.P/E

Issuing P/E ratio.

SELLING Dummy equals to 1if the block holders sell their shares during the period of 12,24or 36months.

EM

Average pre-IPO Earnings management measured by average discretionary accruals of the 3years pre-IPO period as calculated by the modi ?ed Jones Models developed by Jones (1991)

Notes:Calculation of BHRs and CARs is discussed in Section 3.2.1.

Appendix A Variable de ?nitions

41

X.Wang et al./China Economic Review 32(2015)27–42

42X.Wang et al./China Economic Review32(2015)27–42

Su,D.(2004).Adverse-selection versus signaling:Evidence from the pricing of Chinese IPOs.Journal of Economics and Business,56,1–19. Su,D.,&Fleisher,B.M.(1999).An empirical investigation of underpricing in Chinese IPOs.Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,7,173–202.

Sun,Q.,&Tong,W.(2003).China share issue privatization:The extent of its success.Journal of Financial Economics,70,183–222.

Wang,C.(2005).Ownership and operating performance of Chinese IPOs.Journal of Banking&Finance,29,1835–1856.

Yeh,Y.H.,Shu,P.G.,&Guo,R.J.(2008).Ownership structure and IPO valuation:Evidence from Taiwan.Financial Management,37,141–161. Yu,T.,&Tse,Y.K.(2006).An empirical examination of IPO underpricing in the Chinese A-share market.China Economic Review,17,363–382.

(完整版)人教版小学英语六年级下册课文

六年级下册 Unit One How tall are you ? I’m 21 metres tall. I’m tallest! I’m 1.6 metres tall. I’m taller than dinosaur. It’s so tall! Some dinosaurs are bigger than houses. Some are smaller than our schoolbags. How heavy is it? It’s five tons. What size are your shoes? My shoes are size 35. Look! That’s the tallest dinosaur in this hall. Yes, it is. How tall is it? Maybe 4 metres. Wow! It’s taller than both of us together. Look！There are more dinosaurs over there! They’re all so big and tall. Hey, this dinosaur isn’t tall! I’m taller than this one. Oh, yes. How tall are you? I’m 1.65 metres.

How tall are you? I’m 1.61 metres. Oh! I’m taller. You’re older than me, too. How old are you? I’m 12 years old. How tall are you? I’m 1.64 metres. Wu Yifan is taller than John, but Zhang Peng is taller than Wu Yifan. Those shoes in the window are nice! Let’s have a look. What size are your shoes, Mike? Size 7. Size 7? That’s so small. In China I wear size 40 shoes. Oh! Your feet are bigger than mine. My shoes are size 37. Really? You look taller than me. But I think you are heavier. How heavy are you? I’m 48 kilograms. Yes, you’re heavier. I’m 46 kilograms.

人教版小学六年级下册语文课文

人教版小学六年级下册语文课文（要求背诵的有全文更好） 第一课：《文言文两则》 1、《学奕》 弈秋，通国之善弈者也。使弈秋诲二人弈，其一人专心致志，惟弈秋之为听；一人虽听之，一心以为有鸿鹄将至， 思援弓缴（zhuó）而射之。虽与之俱学，弗若之矣。 为是其智弗若与？曰：非然也。 2、《两小儿辨日》 孔子东游，见两小儿辩斗问其故。 一儿曰：“我以日始出时去人近，而日中时远也。” 一儿以日初出远，而日中时近也。 一儿曰：“日初出大如车盖，及日中盘盂（yú）， 此不为远者小而近者大乎？” 一儿曰：“日初出沧（cāng）沧凉凉，及其日中如探汤， 此不为近者热而远者凉乎？” 孔子不能决也。 两小儿笑曰：“孰（shú）为汝(rǔ）多知（zhì）乎？” 第二课：《匆匆》 燕子去了，有再来的时候；杨柳枯了， 有再青的时候；桃花谢了，有再开的时候。但是，聪明的， 你告诉我，我们的日子为什么一去不复返呢？——是有人偷了他们罢：那是谁？又藏在何处呢？是他们自己逃走了罢：现在又到了哪里呢？ 我不知道他们给了我多少日子；但我的手确乎是渐渐空虚了。 在默默里算着，八千多日子已经从我手中溜去；像针尖上一滴水滴在大海里，我的日子滴在时间的流里，没有声音，也没有影子。 我不禁头涔涔而泪潸潸了。 去的尽管去了，来的尽管来着；去来的中间，又怎样地匆匆呢？早上我起来的时候，小屋里射进两三方斜斜的太阳。太阳他有脚啊，轻轻悄悄地挪移了；我也茫茫然跟着旋转。于是——洗手的时候， 日子从水盆里过去 ；吃饭的时候，日子从饭碗里过去；默默时，便从凝然的双眼前过去。 我 觉察他去的匆匆了，伸出手遮挽时，他又从遮挽着的手边过去，天黑时，我躺在床上，他便伶伶俐俐地从我身上跨过，从我脚边飞去了。等我睁开眼和太阳再见，这算又溜走了一日。我掩着面叹息。但是新来的日 子的 影儿又开始在叹息里闪过了。 在逃去如飞的日子里，在千门万户的世界里的我能做些什么呢？只

中国各城市的古称谓及得名由来

中国各城市的古称谓及得名由来 华北和东北： 天津——意为“天子的津渡”，明代永乐帝朱棣在这里率领大军渡过海河南下推翻建文帝 邯郸——城市名押an韵，邯郸意为“邯山至此而尽”，郸同单，“单”意思是山脉的尽头，邯郸是中国沿用最古老的地名之一 秦皇岛——秦始皇求仙入海之岛，秦皇岛是中国唯一用古代帝王称号来命名的城市 太原——取“广大的平原”之意 大同——取自“天下大同之地”，“大同”是古代政治上的最高理想 长治——长治古称上党，明代在此地设置长治县，取“长治久安”之意 赤峰——得名于城东北的褐色孤峰 包头——包头由蒙古语“包克图”演化而来，意思是“有鹿的地方”，包头由此别称为鹿城乌海——乌达与海勃湾的合称 大连——大连旧称青泥洼，青泥洼大部分都是山东移民，在山东有一种很流行的事物叫做褡裢，大连就是由褡裢演变而来，另一说大连来自俄语“达里尼” 阜新——取“物阜民丰，焕然一新”之意 盘锦——盘山和锦州各取一字而成，也取“盘根错节，锦上添花”之意 本溪——本溪得名于境内的本溪湖，本溪湖古称杯犀湖，杯犀湖因“湖底上阔下窄，状如犀牛之角”而得名，清代雍正年间因杯犀湖名称过雅又难写难辨，故取其谐音改称为本溪湖 长春——意为“长年春色的城市”，东北的春天是非常寒冷的，以长春命名城市说明了该城的气候特点是寒冷占据主导

吉林——吉林全称吉林乌拉，满语意思是“沿江的城市”，吉林市是中国唯一省市同名的城市 佳木斯——佳木斯清代又称“嘉木寺”，在满语是“驿丞”的意思，因为佳木斯在古代地处松花江通往黑龙江江口的驿道 华东： 烟台——意为“狼烟升起的炮台” 青岛——因岛上“山岩耸秀，林木蓊郁”而得名，且与“琴岛”谐音 威海——明代在此地设威海卫，取“威震东海”之意 日照——取“日出初光先照”之意 淄博——淄川与博山的合称 莱芜——莱是植物名，俗称灰菜，芜指田野荒芜，古时这里是一片荒凉的地方，故名莱芜菏泽——城市名押e韵，菏山与雷泽的合称，菏泽也是中国沿用最古老的地名之一 合肥——因东淝河与南淝河在此汇合而得名 蚌埠——意为“盛产蚌珠的港埠”，蚌埠由此别称为珠城 宿迁——春秋时为钟吾子国，后宿国迁都于此，宿迁由此得名 连云港——意为“在连岛与云台山之间的港湾”，云台山是江苏省的最高峰 镇江——唐代为镇海军节度使的驻地，到了宋代因地理环境的变化，此地距大海较远，故而更名为镇江，取“镇守长江”之意 无锡——先秦锡山产锡，至汉朝锡尽，故名无锡 上海——得名于松江（即苏州河）的一条支流上海浦，上海意为“通向大海的地方” 金华——意为“金星与婺女争华之地” 宁波——宁波古称明州，宁波得名于“海定则波宁”

古今名人名字的由来含义

古今名人名字的由来含义 姓名是中华文化的脉承之一，它是人们以血脉传承为根基的社会人文标识。历史上名字起得好的名人，人也惊艳，名也惊艳。下面让我们一起品味中国的名字艺术。 1、子，神国公嘉的后代，公嘉字文。我国古人有的以祖先的“字”为姓，如公子牙字叔，他的子就叫叔得臣。子也是近这种式为姓的。故姓。 为什么人们叫子为“老二”呢?原来，子的父亲叔梁纥，是国的一个将军，他原有九个女儿和一个儿子。这仅有的一个儿子是个瘸子。在当时男尊女卑的情况下，叔梁纥当然很不满意。于是，他就和妻子一起到曲阜东南的尼丘山求天神另赐一子。后来，果然又生下了子，叙梁纥以为这是在尼丘山上求来的，就给他取名为丘，字仲尼。“仲”字是排行，表示“第二”的意思，因为子是叔梁纥的第二个儿子，所以人们又叫子为“老二”。 2、白，相传白到七岁时还没有正式的名字。原因是他在“抓”时，抓了《诗经》这本书，这不但喜坏了他父亲，而且也难坏了他父亲。他想：如果儿子长大成了诗人，若没有一个叫得响的好名字岂不遗憾?于是，越往诗人的名声面想，越发对儿子取名之事慎之又慎了，故此一拖多年没有定名。这年春天，白一家在家院中游玩，他父亲想作一首春日的七绝诗，有意考考儿子的本事。他咏了两句：“春风送暖百花开，迎春绽金它先来”后就说：“后面的诗句我想不出来了，由你们母子二人续上吧。”白的母亲想了一会道：“火烧杏林红霞

落”，她的话音刚落，白就用手指树，脱白说道：“花怒放一树白。”他父亲听后，连声叫好，忽然心里一动：这句诗的头一个字不正是自家的姓吗？这最后一个“白”字不正说出了花圣洁高雅吗？于是，他当即决定儿子的名字就叫白。 3、，1896年9月，日本青年宫崎滔天、平山，经过多曲折，在日本横滨中国革命志士少白的寓所，见到了文。文谈及革命时，其慷慨激昂之情，犹如深山虎啸。他俩被文的革命热情、见识和抱负深深感动，决心帮助文，并为他的生命安全担忧，劝他暂时留驻日本。 文同意后，宫崎和平山就陪同文找旅馆。他们绕过日比谷公园，路过候爵府邸，来到“对鹤馆”旅馆，并由平山替文代笔登记。当时，文处于流亡之中，不便公开姓名身份。填写什么好呢？平山执笔踌躇一番，忽然想起刚才走过候爵府时看见的那块牌匾，于是就在旅馆簿上写下了“”两字。但按日本习俗，只是个姓，还得有一个适当的名字才好，平山又踌躇起来了。正在这时，文接过登记簿，在“”两字下面添上了一个“樵”字，笑着对平山说：“我是中国的山樵。”这就是名字的由来。 4、迅，著名史学家候外庐同志在一篇文章中，对迅之所以取名迅，作了如下解释：一般人把迅字解释为“快迅”，是不确切的。迅字《尔雅?释兽》云：“牝狼，其子激，绝有力，迅。”注云：“狼子绝有力者，曰迅。”“缴”即激，从犬言兽性，从水言水性。都是激烈的意思。迅的，取自迅的母亲的姓。迅，古义的狼子。迅的字义可理解为牝狼一个有勇力的儿子。迅为什么要以狼子自居？他曾说过自己甘做封建制

中国省会和简称汇总

记忆各省简称 京津沪渝直辖市蒙宁新藏桂自治 一国两制台港澳东北三省黑吉辽 冀鲁晋归华北苏浙皖赣在华东 湘鄂豫归华中华南还有粤闽琼 川滇黔归西南西北还有陕甘青 记忆我国的行政区域省份名称 两湖两广两河山五江云贵福吉安 四西二宁青甘陕海内台北上重天 香港澳门和台湾爱我祖国好河山 第1句：湖南,湖北,广东,广西,河南,河北,山东,山西 第2句：新疆,黑龙江,江西,浙江,江苏,云南,贵州,福建,吉林,安徽第3句：四川,西藏,宁夏,辽宁,青海,甘肃,陕西 第4句：海南,内蒙古,台湾,北京,上海,重庆,天津

23个省份

中国各省简称的由来 一、四个直辖市 1、北京（京）北京有据可查的第一个名称为“蓟”，是春秋战国时燕国的都城。辽金是将北京作为陪都，称为燕京。金灭辽后，迁都于此，称中都。元代改称大都。明成祖朱棣从南京迁都于此，改称“北京”。名称一直沿用至今。1949年设为直辖市。取全称中的“京”字作为简称。 2、天津（津）唐宋以前，天津称为直沽。金代形成集市称“直沽寨”。元代设津海镇，这是天津建城的开始。明永乐2年（1404年）筑城设卫，始称天津卫，取“天子经过的渡口”之意。1949年设为直辖市。取全称中的“津”字作为简称。 3、上海（沪）上海之称始于宋代，当时上海已成为我国的一个新兴贸易港口，那时的上海地区有十八大浦，其中一条叫上海浦，它的西岸设有上海镇。1292年，上海改镇为县。这是上海这一名称的由来。1949年，上海设为直辖市。古时，上海地区的渔民发明了一种竹编的捕鱼工具“扈”，当时还没有上海这一地名，因此，这一带被称为“沪渎”，故上海简称“沪”。春秋战国时上海是楚春申君黄歇封邑的一部分，故上海别称“申”。 4、重庆（渝）重庆古称“巴”。秦时称江州。隋称渝州。北宋称恭州。重庆之名始于1190年，因南宋光宗赵敦先封恭王，后登帝位，遂将恭州升为

人教版六年级语文下册课文

人教版六年级语文下册课文 1、文言文两则《学弈》《两小儿辩日》电子课文 学弈（yì）[1] 弈秋[2]，通国[3]之善弈者也。使弈秋诲[4]二人弈，其一人专心致志，惟（w?i）弈秋之为听[5]；一人虽听之[6]，一心以为有鸿鹄（hú）[7]将至，思援[8]弓缴（zhu ?）[9]而射之。虽与之[10]俱[11]学，弗（fú）[12]若之矣（yǐ）[13]。为[14]是其[15]智弗若与（yú）？曰：非然也。 两小儿辩日[16] 孔子东游，见两小儿辩斗[17]，问其故。 一儿曰：“我以[18]日始出时去[19]人近，而日中[20]时远也。” 一儿以日初出远，而日中时近也。 一儿曰：“日初出大如车盖，及[21]日中则如盘盂（yú）[22]，此不为远者小而近者大乎？” 一儿曰：“日初出沧（cāng）沧凉凉[23]，及其日中如探汤[24]，此不为近者热而远者凉乎？” 孔子不能决[25]也。 两小儿笑曰：“孰（shú）为汝（rǔ）[26]多知[27]乎？” 1、本文选自《孟子?告子》。孟子是我国古代的思想家、教育家。《孟子》记录了孟子的思想和言行。弈：下棋。 2、秋：人名，因他善于下棋，所以称为弈秋。 3、通国：全国。 4、诲：教导。 5、惟弈秋之为听：只听弈秋（的教导）。 6、之：指弈秋的教导。 7、鸿鹄：天鹅。 8、援：引，拉。 9、缴：古时指带有丝绳的箭。 10、之：他，指前一个人。 11、俱：一起。 12、弗：不。 13、矣：了。 14、为：因为。 15、其：他的，指后一个人。 16、本文选自《列子?汤问》。 17、辩斗：辩论，争论。 18、以：认为。 19、去：离。 20、日中：正午。 21、及：到。 22、盘盂：盛物的器皿。圆者为盘，方者为盂。

中国各省名称的由来

中国各省名称的由来 我国幅员辽阔，人口众多，具有悠久的历史文化。各个省（直辖市）名称和别称的由来源远流长，各具特色，读来使人对祖国的秀丽山川倍感亲切。 一、四个直辖市 1、北京（京） 北京有据可查的第一个名称为“蓟”，是春秋战国时燕国的都城。辽金是将北京作为陪都，称为燕京。金灭辽后，迁都于此，称中都。元代改称大都。明成祖朱棣登基后，从南京迁都于此，改称当时的“北平”为“北京”，意与南京相对之意，名称一直沿用至今。 取全称中的“京”字作为简称。 2、天津（津） 唐宋以前，天津称为直沽。金代形成集市称“直沽寨”。元代设津海镇，这是天津建城的开始。明永乐2年（1404年）筑城设卫，始称天津卫，取“天子经过的渡口”之意。1949年设为直辖市。 取全称中的“津”字作为简称。 3、上海（沪）

上海之称始于宋代，当时上海已成为我国的一个新兴贸易港口，那时的上海地区有十八大浦，其中一条叫上海浦，它的西岸设有上海镇。1292年，上海改镇为县。这是上海这一名称的由来。1949年，上海设为直辖市。 古时，上海地区的渔民发明了一种竹编的捕鱼工具“扈”，当时还没有上海这一地名，因此，这一带被称为“沪渎”，故上海简称“沪”。春秋战国时上海是楚春申君黄歇封邑的一部分，故上海别称“申”。 4、重庆（渝） 重庆古称“巴”。秦时称江州。隋称渝州。北宋称恭州。重庆之名始于1190年，因南宋光宗赵敦先封恭王，后登帝位，遂将恭州升为重庆府，取“双重喜庆”之意。1997年，重庆设为直辖市。 隋时，嘉陵江称渝水，重庆因位于嘉陵江畔而置渝州，故重庆简称“渝”。 二、五个自治区 1、内蒙古自治区（内蒙古） 蒙古原为部落名，始见于唐代记载。1206年，成吉思汗统一蒙古各部，建立蒙古国。元灭后，蒙古族退居塞北。明清形成内、外蒙古之称。晚清以后，泛指大漠以南、长城以北、东起哲里木盟、西至套西厄鲁特所以盟旗为内蒙古。 取全称中“内蒙古”三字作为简称。 2、维吾尔自治区（新） 辖区古称西域。西汉设西域都护府。东汉魏晋改都护为长史。唐代设伊、西、庭三州和安西、北庭两个都护府。17世纪中叶以后，清朝平定了准噶尔部叛乱，在天山南北设伊犁将军。清光绪10年（1884年），改为新疆省，意为“故土新归”。1955年，设新疆维吾尔自治区。 取全称中的“新”字作为简称。 3、西藏自治区（藏）

我国各个城市的简称

一、四个直辖市 1、北京（京） 北京有据可查的第一个名称为“蓟”，是春秋战国时燕国的都城。辽金是将北京作为陪都，称为燕京。金灭辽后，迁都于此，称中都。元代改称大都。明成祖朱棣从南京迁都于此，改称“北京”。名称一直沿用至今。1949年设为直辖市。 取全称中的“京”字作为简称。 2、天津（津） 唐宋以前，天津称为直沽。金代形成集市称“直沽寨”。元代设津海镇，这是天津建城的开始。明永乐2年（1404年）筑城设卫，始称天津卫，取“天子经过的渡口”之意。1949年设为直辖市。 取全称中的“津”字作为简称。 3、上海（沪） 上海之称始于宋代，当时上海已成为我国的一个新兴贸易港口，那时的上海地区有十八大浦，其中一条叫上海浦，它的西岸设有上海镇。1292年，上海改镇为县。这是上海这一名称的由来。1949年，上海设为直辖市。 古时，上海地区的渔民发明了一种竹编的捕鱼工具“扈”，当时还没有上海这一地名，因此，这一带被称为“沪渎”，故上海简称“沪”。春秋战国时上海是楚春申君黄歇封邑的一部分，故上海别称“申”。 4、重庆（渝） 重庆古称“巴”。秦时称江州。隋称渝州。北宋称恭州。重庆之名始于1190年，因南宋光宗赵敦先封恭王，后登帝位，遂将恭州升为重庆府，取“双重喜庆”之意。1997年，重庆设为直辖市。 隋时，嘉陵江称渝水，重庆因位于嘉陵江畔而置渝州，故重庆简称“渝”。 二、五个自治区

1、内蒙古自治区（内蒙古） 蒙古原为部落名，始见于唐代记载。1206年，成吉思汗统一蒙古各部，建立蒙古国。元灭后，蒙古族退居塞北。明清形成内、外蒙古之称。晚清以后，泛指大漠以南、长城以北、东起哲里木盟、西至套西厄鲁特所以盟旗为内蒙古。 取全称中“内蒙古”三字作为简称。 2、维吾尔自治区（新） 辖区古称西域。西汉设西域都护府。东汉魏晋改都护为长史。唐代设伊、西、庭三州和安西、北庭两个都护府。17世纪中叶以后，清朝平定了准噶尔部叛乱，在天山南北设伊犁将军。清光绪10年（1884年），改为新疆省，意为“故土新归”。1955年，设新疆维吾尔自治区。 取全称中的“新”字作为简称。 3、西藏自治区（藏） 元时称西藏地区为“乌思藏”。“乌思”是藏语“中央”的意思，“藏”是“圣洁”的意思。明代设立两个都指挥使司。清代称西藏东部为“康”（喀木），中部为“卫”，西部日喀则一带为“藏”（包括阿里），因其在中国西部，故称西藏。1965年设立西藏自治区。 取全称中的“藏”字作为简称。另一说认为简称源于故称“乌思藏”。 4、宁夏回族自治区（宁） 公元5世纪处，匈奴贵族赫连勃勃自以为是夏后氏后裔，故将建立的割据政权定国号为“夏”。宋代，党项族拓拔氏首领李元昊称帝，定都兴庆府（今银川），立国号“夏”，创立文字，建西夏王朝。13世纪，元灭西夏，取“平定西夏永远安宁”之意，在这里设宁夏行省，始有宁夏之名。1958年设宁夏回族自治区。 取全称中的“宁”字作为简称。 5、广西壮族自治区（桂） 宋设广南西路，简称广西路，“广西”一名产生。元设广西两江道。明设广西省。1958年设广西僮族自治区，1965年改为广西壮族自治区。

最新部编人教版六年级语文下册课文word版

第一单元 1、北京的春节 老舍 照北京的老规矩，春节差不多在腊月的初旬就开始了。“腊七腊八，冻死寒鸦”，这是一年里最冷的时候。在腊八这天，家家都熬腊八粥。粥是用各种米，各种豆.身各种干果熬成的。这不是粥，而是小型的农业展览会？ 除此之外，这一天还要泡腊八蒜。把蒜瓣放进醋里，封起来,为过年吃饺子用。到年底，蒜泡得色如翡翠，醋也有了些辣味,色味双美，使人忍不住要多吃几个饺子。在北京，过年时，家家吃饺子。 孩子们准备过年，第一件大事就是买杂拌儿。这是用花生、胶枣、榛子、栗子等干果与蜜饯掺和成的。孩子们喜欢吃这些零七八碎儿。第二件大事是买爆竹，特别是男孩子们。恐怕第三件事才是买各种玩意儿——风筝、空竹、口琴等。 孩子们欢喜，大人们也忙乱。他们必须预备过年吃的、喝的、穿的、用的，好在新年时显出万象更新的气象。 腊月二十三过小年，差不多就是过春节的“彩排”。天一擦黑，鞭炮响起来，便有了过年的味道这一天，是要吃糖的，街上早有好多卖麦芽糖与江米糖的,糖形或为长方块或为瓜形，又甜乂黏，小孩子们最喜欢。 过了二十三，大家更忙。春节眨眼就要到了啊。除夕前

必须大扫除一次，名曰扫房。还要把肉、鸡、鱼、青菜、年糕什么的都预备充足，至少足够吃用一个星期的——按老习惯，店铺多数关五天门，到正月初六才开张。 除夕真热闹家家赶做年菜，到处是酒肉的香味。男女老少都穿起新衣，门外贴上了红红的对联，屋里贴好了各色的年画。除夕夜家家灯火通宵，不许间断，鞭炮声日夜不绝。在外边做事的人,除非万不得已，必定赶回家来吃团圆饭。这一夜，除了很小的孩子，没有什么人睡觉，都要守岁。 元旦的光景与除夕截然不同：除夕，街上挤满了人；元旦，铺户都上着板子，门前堆着昨夜燃放的爆竹纸皮，全城都在休息。男人们午前到亲戚家、朋友家拜年。女人们在家中接待客人。城内城外许多寺院举办庙会，小贩们在庙外摆摊，卖茶、食品和各种玩具。小孩子们特别爱逛庙会，为的是有机会到城外看看野景,可以骑毛驴，还能买到那些新年特有的玩具。庙会上有赛轿车赛马的，在老年间，据说还有赛骆驼的。这些比赛并不为争谁第一谁第二，而是在观众面前表演骡马与骑者的美好姿态和娴熟技能。 多数铺户在初六开张，又放鞭炮，从天亮到清早，全城炮声不绝。除了卖吃食与其他重要日用品的铺子，大家并不很忙，铺中的伙计们还可以轮流着去逛庙会、逛天桥和听戏。 元宵上市，春节的又一个高潮到了。正月十五，处处张灯结彩，整条大街像是办喜事，红火而美丽。有名的老铺都

中国各省份地区划分(整理)

北京（京）天津（津）上海（沪）重庆（渝）内蒙古自治区（内蒙古）维吾尔自治区（新）西藏自治区（藏）宁夏回族自治区（宁）广西壮族自治区（桂）香港特别行政区（港）澳门特别行政区（澳）黑龙江省（黑）吉林省（吉）辽宁省（辽）河北省（冀）山西省（晋）青海省（青）山东省（鲁）河南省（豫）江苏省（苏）安徽省（皖）浙江省（浙）福建省（闽）江西省（赣）湖南省（湘）湖北省（鄂）广东省（粤）台湾省（台）海南省（琼）甘肃省（甘或陇）陕西省（陕或秦）四川省（川或蜀）贵州省（贵或黔）云南省（云或滇）dian 华东：山东、江苏、江西、安徽、浙江、上海 华南：湖南、广东、广西、福建 华北：北京、天津、河北、内蒙、山西 西南：云南、贵州、四川、重庆、西藏 西北：陕西、甘肃、宁夏、新疆、青海 中国各省份简称的由来 四个直辖市 1、北京（京）北京有据可查的第一个名称为“蓟”（ji），是春秋战国时燕国的都城。辽金是将北京作为陪都，称为燕京。金灭辽后，迁都于此，

称中都。元代改称大都。明成祖朱棣从南京迁都于此，改称“北京”。名称一直沿用至今。1949 年设为直辖市。取全称中的“京”字作为简称。 2、天津（津）唐宋以前，天津称为直沽。金代形成集市称“直沽寨”。元代设津海镇，这是天津建城的开始。明永乐 2 年（1404 年）筑城设卫，始称天津卫，取“天子经过的渡口”之意。1949 年设为直辖市。取全称中的“津”字作为简称。 3、上海（沪）上海之称始于宋代，当时上海已成为我国的一个新兴贸易港口，那时的上海地区有十八大浦，其中一条叫上海浦，它的西岸设有上海镇。1292 年，上海改镇为县。这是上海这一名称的由来。1949 年，上海设为直辖市。古时，上海地区的渔民发明了一种竹编的捕鱼工具“扈”，当时还没有上海这一地名，因此，这一带被称为“沪渎”，故上海简称“沪”。春秋战国时上海是楚春申君黄歇封邑的一部分，故上海别称“申”。 4、重庆（渝）重庆古称“巴”。秦时称江州。隋称渝州。北宋称恭州。重庆之名始于1190 年，因南宋光宗赵敦先封恭王，后登帝位，遂将恭州升为重庆府，取“双重喜庆”之意。1997 年，重庆设为直辖市。隋时，嘉陵江称渝水，重庆因位于嘉陵江畔而置渝州，故重庆简称“渝”。 五个自治区 1、内蒙古自治区（内蒙古）(呼和浩特市) 蒙古原为部落名，始见于唐代记载。1206 年，成吉思汗统一蒙古各部，建立蒙古国。元灭后，蒙古族退居塞北。明清形成内、外蒙古之称。晚清以后，泛指大漠以南、长城以北、东起哲里木盟、西至套西厄鲁特所以盟旗为内蒙古。取全称中“内蒙古”三字作为简称。

名字的由来(作文16篇)(精美篇)

《名字的由来》 名字的由来作文（一）： 名字的由来350字 中国的孩子习惯跟父同姓，我父亲姓滕，所以我也姓滕。我的名字是我在妈妈肚子里5个月的时候就取好了，是爸爸给我取的。远航是在2000年冬天那时正下着茫茫的大雪，我父母在温暖的小屋里看电视，他们看见广阔的大海上有一艘轮船，轮船上正飘着鲜红的中国五星红旗，站着威武的中国海军。这时爸爸突然就有了一个想法，说不管我们的孩子是男孩还是女孩，都叫远航。妈妈也觉得这个名字既好听又有好处，从此我就叫了滕远航。 我的爸爸妈妈期望我驾驶大轮船向大海前进。我期望我是一名海上特站队的队长，能够保卫国家，我不会辜负父母对我的期望。不论怎样我必须会努力去大海完成父母的心愿。 你此刻明白我的名字有什么秘密了吧，你们也说说你们的名字有什么秘密吧。 名字的由来作文（二）： 名字的由来300字 我叫郑逸豪。郑是姓爸爸的姓，逸是飘逸的逸，英俊潇洒的意思。豪是英雄豪杰的豪，又勇敢又机智的意思。 我的名字还有其他三个。一是小马虎，因为我做事、写字、考试等都很马虎，十分容易犯大大小小的错误，所以爸爸常常严厉地批评我是个小马虎。 二是小憨憨，因为我的脸蛋胖乎乎的，说话的样貌憨憨的，做事情也懒洋洋的，所以妈妈常常摸着我的脸蛋，亲昵地叫我小憨憨。 三是旺崽小毛头，这是我姐姐给我起的名字，因为我小时候头上的头发可稀少啦，姐姐就把我的头发比喻成几根毛，所以我就有了这个小毛头这个绰号。 我的秘密已经告诉你们了，你们可千万别拿我的三个名字来开我的玩笑哦。 名字的由来作文（三）： 名字的来历350字 小名字大好处 每个人都有自我的名字，每个名字都代表不一样的好处，都有一个动人的故

全国各省份的简称及由来

中国分4个直辖市，5个自治区，2个特别行政区，24个省，简称如下：直辖市： 北京[京] 天津[津] 上海[沪] 重庆[渝] 自治区： 宁夏[宁] 西藏[藏] 广西[桂] 新疆[新] 内蒙古 特别行政区： 香港[港] 澳门[澳] 省份： 黑龙江[黑] 云南[滇|云] 吉林[吉] 安徽[皖] 山东[鲁] 山西[晋] 广东[粤] 广西[桂] 江苏[苏] 江西[赣] 河北[冀] 河南[豫] 浙江[浙] 海南[琼] 湖北[鄂] 湖南[湘] 甘肃[甘|陇] 福建[闽] 四川[川|蜀]

贵州[黔|贵] 辽宁[辽] 陕西[陕|秦] 青海[青] 台湾[台] 各省省名的来由： 江西：以江南的西部得名。唐属江南西道，后设江西观察使，为江西得名的开始；宋置江南西路，简称江西路；元设江西行省及江西湖东道；明置江西省，后改江西布政使司；清改江西省，省名至今未变。 山东：以在太行山之东而得名。唐大部分属河南道；宋设京东路，后分京东东、西路；金更名山东东、西路，为山东得名的开始；元设山东东西道；明置山东省，后改山东布政使司；清改山东省，省名至今未变。 山西：以在太行山之西而行名。唐大部分属河东道；宋设河东路；金分河东北、南路；元设山西河东道，为山西得名的开始；明置山西省，后改山西布政使司；清改山西省，省名至今未变。 河南：以在黄河之南而得名。西汉即有河南郡，为河南得名的开始。唐大部分属都畿道和河南道；宋设京畿路和京西北路；金改南京路；元设河南江北省和河南江北道；明置河南省，后改河南布政使司；清改河南省，省名至今未变。 河北：以在黄河之北而得名。唐大部分属河北道，为河北得名的开始。宋设河北路，后分河北东、西路；金分河北东路设大名府路；元设燕南赵北道；明设北平省，后废省，所有府和直隶州直属中央，称北直隶；清改直隶省；1929年民国改河北省，省名至今未变。 湖南：以在洞庭湖之南而得名。唐属江南西道和黔中道，后设湖南观察使，为湖南得名的开始；宋称湖南路；元设岭北湖南道；明属湖广省，后改省为湖广布政使司；清分湖广省置湖南省，省名至今未变。 湖北：以在洞庭湖之北而得名。唐属江南东道、淮南道和山南东道；宋荆湖北路，简称湖北路，为湖北得名的开始；元设江南湖北道；明属湖广省，后改为省为湖广布政使司；清分湖广省置湖北省，省名至今未变。 广东：以广南东路简称得名。唐属岭南道；宋以旧广州辖地置广南东路，简称广东路，为广得名的开始；元设海北广东道；明置广东省，后改广东布政使司；清改广东省，省名至今未变。

人教版小学六年级下册语文课文

人教版小学六年级下册语文课文(要求背诵的有全文更好) 第一课:《文言文两则》 1、《学奕》 弈秋,通国之善弈者也。使弈秋诲二人弈,其一人专心致志, 惟弈秋之为听;一人虽听之,一心以为有鸿鹄将至, 思援弓缴(zhuó)而射之。虽与之俱学,弗若之矣。 为就是其智弗若与？曰:非然也。 2、《两小儿辨日》 孔子东游,见两小儿辩斗问其故。 一儿曰:“我以日始出时去人近,而日中时远也。” 一儿以日初出远,而日中时近也。 一儿曰:“日初出大如车盖,及日中盘盂(yú), 此不为远者小而近者大乎？” 一儿曰:“日初出沧(cāng)沧凉凉,及其日中如探汤, 此不为近者热而远者凉乎？” 孔子不能决也。 两小儿笑曰:“孰(shú)为汝(rǔ)多知(zhì)乎？” 第二课:《匆匆》 燕子去了,有再来的时候;杨柳枯了, 有再青的时候;桃花谢了,有再开的时候。但就是,聪明的, 您告诉我,我们的日子为什么一去不复返呢？——就是有人偷了她们 罢: 那就是谁？又藏在何处呢？就是她们自己逃走了罢:现在又到了哪里 呢？ 我不知道她们给了我多少日子;但我的手确乎就是渐渐空虚了。 在默默里算着,八千多日子已经从我手中溜去;像针尖上一滴水滴 在大海里,我的日子滴在时间的流里,没有声音,也没有影子。 我不禁头涔涔而泪潸潸了。 去的尽管去了,来的尽管来着;去来的中间,又怎样地匆匆 呢？早上我起来的时候,小屋里射进两三方斜斜的太阳。太阳她有脚啊, 轻轻悄悄地挪移了;我也茫茫然跟着旋转。于就是——洗手的时候, 日子从水盆里过去 ;吃饭的时候,日子从饭碗里过去;默默时,便从凝然的双眼前过去。 我 觉察她去的匆匆了,伸出手遮挽时,她又从遮挽着的手边过去,天黑时,我躺在床上,她便伶伶俐俐地从我身上跨过,从我脚边飞去了。等我 睁开眼与太阳再见,这算又溜走了一日。我掩着面叹息。但就是新来的 日子的

中国省份名称、简称、省会及其简称的由来

中国省份名称、简称、省会及其简称的由来 一、四个直辖市： 1、北京（京）——北京 北京据可查的第一个名称为“蓟”，是春秋战国时燕国的都城。辽金将北京作为陪都，称为燕京。金灭辽后，迁都于此，称中都。元代改称大都。明成祖朱棣从南京迁都于此，改称“北京”。名称一直沿用至今。1949年设为直辖市。取全称中的“京”字作为简称。 2、天津（津）——天津 唐宋以前，天津称为直沽。金代形成集市称“直沽寨”。元代设津海镇，这是天津建城的开始。明永乐2年（1404年）筑城设卫，始称天津卫，取“天子经过的渡口”之意。1949年设为直辖市。取全称中的“津”字作为简称。 3、上海（沪）——上海 上海之称始于宋代，当时上海已成为我国的一个新兴贸易港口，那时的上海地区有十八大浦，其中一条叫上海浦，它的西岸设有上海镇。1292年，上海改镇为县。这是上海这一名称的由来。1949年，上海设为直辖市。古时，上海地区的渔民发明了一种竹编的捕鱼工具“扈”，当时还没有上海这一

地名，因此，这一带被称为“沪渎”，故上海简称“沪”。春秋战国时上海是楚春申君黄歇封邑的一部分，故上海别称“申”。 4、重庆（渝）——重庆 重庆古称“巴”。秦时称江州。隋称渝州。北宋称恭州。重庆之名始于1190年，因南宋光宗赵敦先封恭王，后登帝位，遂将恭州升为重庆府，取“双重喜庆”之意。1997年，重庆设为直辖市。隋时，嘉陵江称渝水，重庆因位于嘉陵江畔而置渝州，故重庆简称“渝”。 二、五个自治区 1、内蒙古自治区（内蒙古或蒙）——呼和浩特 蒙古原为部落名，始见于唐代记载。1206年，成吉思汗统一蒙古各部，建立蒙古国。元灭后，蒙古族退居塞北。明清形成内、外蒙古之称。晚清以后，泛指大漠以南、长城以北、东起哲里木盟、西至套西厄鲁特所以盟旗为内蒙古。取全称中“内蒙古”三字作为简称。 2、新疆维吾尔自治区（新）——乌鲁木齐

部编版小学语文六年级下册课文原文

部编版小学语文六年级下册课文原文

目录 1.北京的春节 (1) 2.腊八粥 (2) 3.古诗三首 (4) 寒食 (4) 迢迢牵牛星 (4) 十五夜望月 (5) 4.藏戏 (5) 5.鲁滨逊漂流记(节选) (6) 6.骑鹅旅行记（节选） (9) 7.汤姆.索亚历险记（节选） (13) 8.匆匆 (15) 9.那个星期天 (16) 10.古诗三首 (17) 马诗 (17) 石灰吟 (18) 竹石 (18) 11.十六年前的回忆 (18) 12.为人民服务 (21) 13.金色的鱼钩 (22) 14.文言文二则 (25) 学弈 (25) 两小儿辩日 (25) 15.表里的生物 (26) 16.真理诞生于一百个问号之后 (27) 17.他们那时候多有趣啊 (29)

回忆往事阅读材料 (31) 1.老师领进门 (31) 2.作文上的红双圈 (32) 依依惜别阅读材料 (33) 1.给老师的一封信 (33) 2.把握自己，把握美好未来 (34) 3.我为少男少女们歌唱 (34) 4.毕业赠言 (35) 古诗词诵读 (36) 1.采薇（节选） (36) 2.春夜喜雨 (36) 3.闻官军收河南河北 (37) 4.早春呈水部张十八员外 (37) 5.江上渔者 (38) 6.泊船瓜洲 (38) 7.游园不值 (38) 8.卜算子.送鲍浩然之浙东 (39) 9.浣溪沙 (39) 10.清平乐 (40)

1.北京的春节 照北京的老规矩，春节差不多在腊月的初旬就开始了。“腊七腊八，冻死寒鸦”，这是一年里最冷的时候。在腊八这天，家家都熬腊八粥。粥是用各种米，各种豆，与各种干果熬成的。这不是粥，而是小型的农业展览会。 除此之外，这一天还要泡腊八蒜。把蒜瓣放进醋里，封起来，为过年吃饺子用。到年底，蒜泡得色如翡翠，醋也有了些辣味，色味双美，使人忍不住要多吃几个饺子。在北京，过年时，家家吃饺子。 孩子们准备过年，第一件大事就是买杂拌儿。这是用花生、胶枣、榛子、栗子等干果与蜜饯掺和成的。孩子们喜欢吃这些零七八碎儿。第二件大事是买爆竹，特别是男孩子们。恐怕第三件事才是买各种玩意儿——风筝、空竹、口琴等。 孩子们忙乱，大人们也紧张。他们必须预备过年吃的、喝的、穿的、用的，好在新年时显出万象更新的气象。 腊月二十三过小年，差不多就是过春节的“彩排”。天一擦黑，鞭炮响起来，便有了过年的味道。这一天，是要吃糖的，街上早有好多卖麦芽糖与江米糖的，糖形或为长方块或为瓜形，又甜又黏，小孩子们最喜欢。 过了二十三，大家更忙，春节眨眼就要到了啊。除夕前必须大扫除一次，名曰扫房。还要把肉、鸡、鱼、青菜、年糕什么的都预备充足，至少足够吃用一个星期的——按老习惯，店铺多数关五天门，到正月初六才开张。 除夕真热闹。家家赶做年菜，到处是酒肉的香味。男女老少都穿起新衣，门外贴上了红红的对联，屋里贴好了各色的年画。除夕夜家家灯火通宵，不许间断，鞭炮声日夜不绝。在外边做事的人，除非万不得已，必定赶回家来吃团圆饭。这一夜，除了很小的孩子，没有什么人睡觉，都要守岁。 元旦的光景与除夕截然不同:除夕，街上挤满了人；元旦，铺户都上着板子，门前堆着昨夜燃放的爆竹纸皮，全城都在休息。 男人们午前到亲戚家、朋友家拜年。女人们在家中接待客人。城内城外许多寺院举办庙会，小贩们在庙外摆摊，卖茶、食品和各种玩具。小孩子们特别爱逛庙会，为的是有机会到城外看看野景，可以骑毛驴，还能买到那些新年特有的玩具。庙会上有赛轿车赛马的，在老年间，据说还有赛骆驼的。这些比赛并不为争谁第一谁第二，而是在观众面前表演骡马与骑者的美好姿态和娴熟技能。 多数铺户在初六开张，又放鞭炮，从天亮到清早，全城炮声不绝。除了卖

中国各个省份城市知识讲解

一、中国共有省级行政区34个，具体为： 2个特别行政区：香港、澳门。 4个直辖市：北京、上海、天津、重庆。 23个省：河北、山西、陕西、山东、河南、辽宁、吉林、黑龙江、江苏、浙江、安徽、江西、福建、湖北、湖南、四川、贵州、云南、广 东、海南、甘肃、青海、台湾。 5个自治区：内蒙古、新疆、西藏、广西、宁夏。 二、各市省会目录 1.北京市北京 2.天津市天津 3.上海市上海 4.重庆市重庆 5.河北省石家庄 6.山西省太原 7.陕西省西安 8.山东省济南 9.河南省郑州 10.辽宁省沈阳 11.吉林省长春 12.黑龙江省哈尔滨 13.江苏省南京 14.浙江省杭州 15.安徽省合肥 16.江西省南昌 17.福建省福州 18.湖北省武汉 19.湖南省长沙 20.四川省成都 21.贵州省贵阳 22.云南省昆明 23.广东省广州 24.海南省海口 25.甘肃省兰州 26.青海省西宁 27.台湾省台北 28.内蒙古自治区呼和浩特 29.新疆维吾尔自治区乌鲁木齐 30.西藏自治区拉萨 31.广西壮族自治区南宁 32.宁夏回族自治区银川 33.香港特别行政区香港 34.澳门特别行政区澳门

三、5 - 32省会的地级市与县级市 5.河北省（11个地级市、22个县级市）： 11个地级市：石家庄市、唐山市、秦皇岛市、邯郸市、邢台市、保定市、张家口市、承德市、沧州市、廊坊市、衡水市。 22个县级市：辛集市、藁城市、晋州市、新乐市、鹿泉市、遵化市、迁安市、武安市、南宫市、沙河市、涿州市、定州市、安国市、高碑店市、泊头市、任丘市、黄骅市、河间市、霸州市、三河市、冀州市、深州市。 6、山西省城市（11个地级市、11个县级市） 11个地级市：太原、大同、朔州、阳泉、长治、晋城、忻州、晋中、临汾、运城、吕梁 11个县级市：古交、潞城、高平、原平、介休、侯马、霍州、永济、河津、孝义、汾阳 7.陕西省（10个地级市、3个县级市）： 10个地级市：西安市、铜川市、宝鸡市、咸阳市、渭南市、延安市、汉中市、榆林市、安康市、商洛市。 3个县级市：兴平市、韩城市、华阴市。 8.山东省（17个地级市、31个县级市）： 17个地级市：济南市、青岛市、淄博市、枣庄市、东营市、烟台市、潍坊市、济宁市、泰安市、威海市、日照市、莱芜市、临沂市、德州市、聊城市、滨州市、菏泽市。 31个县级市：章丘市、胶南市、胶州市、平度市、莱西市、即墨市、滕州市、龙口市、莱阳市、莱州市、招远市、蓬莱市、栖霞市、海阳市、青州市、诸城市、寿光市、安丘市、高密市、昌邑市、曲阜市、兖州市、邹城市、新泰市、肥城市、乳山市、文登市、荣成市、乐陵市、禹城市、临清市。 9.河南省（17个地级市、21个县级市）： 17个地级市：郑州市、开封市、洛阳市、平顶山市、安阳市、鹤壁市、新乡市、焦作市、濮阳市、许昌市、漯河市、三门峡市、南阳市、商丘市、信阳市、周口市、驻马店市。 21个县级市：巩义市、新郑市、新密市、登封市、荥阳市、中牟县、偃师市、汝州市、舞钢市、林州市、卫辉市、辉县市、沁阳市、孟州市、禹州市、长葛市、义马市、灵宝市、邓州市、永城市、项城市、济源市。 10.辽宁省（14个地级市、17个县级市）： 14个地级市：沈阳市、大连市、鞍山市、抚顺市、本溪市、丹东市、锦州市、营口市、阜新市、辽阳市、盘锦市、铁岭市、朝阳市、葫芦岛市。 17个县级市：新民市、瓦房店市、普兰店市、庄河市、海城市、东港市、凤城市、凌海市、北镇市、大石桥市、盖州市、灯塔市、调兵山市、开原市、凌源市、北票市、兴城市 11.吉林省（8个地级市、1个州、20个县级市）： 8个地级市：长春市、吉林市、四平市、辽源市、通化市、白山市、松原市、白城市。 1个州：延边朝鲜族自治州。 20个县级市：九台市、榆树市、德惠市、舒兰市、桦甸市、蛟河市、磐石市、公主岭市、双辽市、梅河口市、集安市、临江市、大安市、洮南市、延吉市、图们市、敦化市、龙井市、

中国历史各朝代名称来历

中国历史各朝代名称来历 我国历史悠久，朝代更零星纷繁。每朝的创建者要首手办的第一件事就是确立国号（朝代名称）。国号就是一个国家的称号。《史记·五帝本纪》：“自黄帝至舜禹，皆同姓而异其国号，以章明德。” 朝代的名称是由什么决定呢？大致有五个来由：由部族、部落联盟的名称而来，来自创建者原有卦号、爵位；源于创建者原始所或政权统治的区域；源于宗族关系；寓意吉祥。具体说： w.w.w.k.s.5.u.c.o.m 夏：据传禹曾受卦于夏伯，因用以称其政权为“夏”。另据历史学家范文澜先生说，禹的儿子启西迁大夏（山西南部汾浍一带）后，才称“夏”。 商：相传商（今河南商丘南）的始祖契曾帮助禹治水有功而受卦于商，以后就以“商”来称其部落（或部族）。汤灭夏后，就以“商”作为国名。后盘庚迁殷（今河南安阳西北）后，又以"殷"或"殷商"并称。 周：周部落到古公檀父时，迁居于周原（今陕西岐山）。武王灭殷以后，就以“周”为朝代名。周前期建都于镐（今陕西西安西南），后来平王东迁洛邑（今河南洛阳），因在镐的东方，就有“西周”和“东周”的称号。 秦：据《史记》记载，本为古部落，其首领非子为周孝王羊马有成绩，被周孝王赐姓为“嬴”，并赐给了一小块土地（今甘肃天水县，另说是陇西谷名）。后来襄又救周有功被封为诸侯，秦始皇统一六国，始建秦国。 汉：项羽封刘邦为汉王，以后刘邦击败项羽，统一中国，国号称“汉”。汉朝前期都长安，后期都洛阳，故从都城上有“西汉”和“东汉”，从时间上有“前汉”和“后汉”之分。 魏：汉献帝曾封曹操为“魏公”、“魏王”爵位，曹丕代汉后便称“魏”以皇室姓曹，历史上又称“曹魏”。 蜀：刘备以四川为活动地区，蜀指四川，其政权称“蜀”。历史上也称“蜀汉”。汉指东汉的继续。 吴：孙权活动于长江下游一带，历史上曾建吴国，曹魏曾封孙权为“吴王”，故史称“孙吴”；又以地位在东，也称“东吴”。 晋：司马昭逼魏帝封他为“晋公”，灭蜀后进爵为晋王。后来他的儿子司炎继承他的爵位，逼令魏帝退位，自立为皇帝，国号“晋”。 隋：隋文帝杨坚之父杨忠，曾被北周封为“随国公”。隋文帝后袭用此卦爵，称为“随朝”。他认为随有走的意思，恐不祥改为“隋”。 唐：唐高祖李渊的祖父李虎，佐周有功，被追卦为“唐国公”，爵位传至李渊。太原起兵后，李渊称“唐王”，后废杨广建唐朝。 辽：辽原称“契丹”，改“辽”是因居于辽河上游之故。 宋：后周恭帝继位后，命赵匡胤为归德节度史，归德军驻宋州（今河南商丘），赵匡胤为宋州节度使。故陈桥兵变后，发迹在宋州，国号曰“宋”。 西夏：拓拔思恭占据夏州（今山西横山县），建国时以夏州得名，称“大夏”。因其在西方，宋人称“西夏”。 金：金都城上京会宁（今黑龙江阿城南），位于按出虎水（今阿什河），相传其水产金，女真语“金”为“按出虎”。 元：据《元史》记载：“元”的命名，是元世祖忽必烈定的。是取《易经》上“大哉乾元”句中的“元”，有大、首等意思。但也有人认为与蒙古人的风俗与图腾有关，有的认为与佛教有关。 明：朱元璋是元末起义军之一，是继承郭子兴而发展起来的，郭子兴属于白莲教组织。白莲