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Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory Advance Access published March 1, 2005

Maybe It Is Time to Rediscover Bureaucracy

Johan P.Olsen

Center for European Studies,University of Oslo

ABSTRACT

This article questions the fashionable ideas that bureaucratic organization is an obsolescent,

undesirable,and non-viable form of administration and that there is an inevitable and

irreversible paradigmatic shift towards market-or network-organization.In contrast,the paper

argues that contemporary democracies are involved in another round in a perennial debate

and ideological struggle over what are desirable forms of administration and government:

that is,a struggle over institutional identities and institutional balances.The argument is not

that bureaucratic organization is a panacea and the answer to all challenges of public

administration.Rather,bureaucratic organization is part of a repertoire of overlapping,

supplementary,and competing forms coexisting in contemporary democracies,and so are

market-organization and network-organization.Rediscovering Weber’s analysis of bureau-

cratic organization,then,enriches our understanding of public administration.This is in

particular true when we(a)include bureaucracy as an institution,not only an instrument;(b)

look at the empirical studies in their time and context,not only at Weber’s ideal-types and

predictions;and(c)take into account the political and normative order bureaucracy is part of,

not only the internal characteristics of‘‘the bureau.’’

MAKING SENSE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Is‘‘bureaucracy’’an organizational dinosaur helplessly involved in its death struggle?Is it

an undesirable and nonviable form of administration developed in a legalistic and au-thoritarian society and now inevitably withering away because it is incompatible with complex,individualistic,and dynamic societies?Are,therefore,the term bureaucracy and

the theoretical ideas and empirical observations associated with it,irrelevant or deceptive when it comes to making sense of public administration and government in contemporary democracies?

Or are the mobilization of antibureaucratic sentiments and the claim that it is time to

say good-bye to bureaucracies and bureaucrats just another round in a perennial debate and ideological struggle over what desirable forms of administration and government are—that An earlier version of this article was presented as a keynote speech at the Ninth International Congress of

Centro Lationoamericano de Administracion Para el Desarrollo(CLAD)on State and Public Administration

Reform,Madrid,4November2004.The original version will be printed in Spanish in Revista del CLAD

Reforma y Democracia(Caracas).I thank H.George Frederickson,Robert E.Goodin,Morten Egeberg,James

G.March,Jon Pierre,Christopher Pollitt,R.A.W.Rhodes,Ulf I.Sverdrup,and Hellmut Wollmann for

constructive comments.Address correspondence to the author at j.p.olsen@arena.uio.no.

doi:10.1093/jopart/mui027

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

2Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

is,a contest for control of the size,agenda,organization,competences,moral foundations, staf?ng,resources,and outcomes of the public sector?If so,how helpful is the literature on ‘‘bureaucracy’’in analyzing current administrative challenges,compared to the diagnoses and prescriptions presented by reformers over the last twenty-?ve years?

The article acknowledges that there have been important changes in public admin-istration and,even more so,in the way administration is portrayed.Yet it questions the fashionable ideas that bureaucratic organization is obsolescent and that there has been

a paradigmatic shift from(Weberian)bureaucracy to market organization or network

organization.1In contrast to decades of bureaucracy bashing,the article argues that con-temporary democracies are involved in a struggle over institutional identities and in-stitutional balances.It also argues that for those interested in how contemporary public administration is organized,functions,and changes,it is worthwhile to reconsider and rediscover bureaucracy as an administrative form,an analytical concept, and a set of ideas and observations about public administration and formally organized institutions.

The argument is developed in the following way:First,some characteristics of bureaucratic organization are outlined.Second,claims about the undesirability of bureau-cracy are discussed in relation to competing criteria of success/failure and assumptions about the performance of bureaucratic organization.Third,aspects of administrative dynamics and the viability of bureaucratic organization are inquired,and fourth,some reasons for rediscovering bureaucracy are recapitulated.

BUREAUCRACY,BUREAUCRATS,BUREAUCRATIZATION

‘‘Bureaucracy’’is often used as a pejorative slogan,as well as a label for all public admin-istration or any large-scale formal organization.Max Weber,however,made bureaucracy an analytical concept,decoupled from the polemical context in which it had emerged (Albrow1970);and here the term signi?es,?rst,a distinct organizational setting,the bureau or of?ce:formalized,hierarchical,specialized with a clear functional division of labor and demarcation of jurisdiction,standardized,rule based,and impersonal.Second, bureaucracy refers to a professional,full-time administrative staff with lifelong employ-ment,organized careers,salaries,and pensions,appointed to of?ce and rewarded on the basis of formal education,merit,and tenure.Third,bureaucracy implies a larger organizational and normative structure where government is founded on authority,that is, the belief in a legitimate,rational-legal political order and the right of the state to de?ne 1I do not claim originality to this view.Lynn(2001)has criticized how the‘‘bureaucratic paradigm’’is portrayed

in the literature.Bureaucracy has been assumed to survive because it is essential to good administration and because representative democracy requires the use of hierarchy and needs the bureaucratic ethos(Aucoin1997;Dahl and

Lindblom1953,511;du Gay2000;Goodsell1983;Meier1997;Peters and Pierre2003b).It has also been argued that many reform proposals are‘‘repackaged versions of ideas that have been in public administration since its

beginnings’’(Hood1996,268)and that‘‘new’’approaches frequently rehash old ideas(Kettl1993,408).In

particular,the propagation of private business administration as an exemplary model for the public sector is hardly new(Waldo1948).Furthermore,Rhodes(1994;see also Davis and Rhodes2000)predicted a return to bureaucracy ten years ago,and Peters(1999,104–5)sees a possible return to Weber’s organizational archetypes as a tool for

comparative purposes.Based on comparative analysis,Suleiman(2003)provides a strong defense for bureaucracy, and Pollitt and Bouckaert share the spirit of this article when they write:‘‘The idea of a single,and now totally

obsolete,ancient re′gime is as implausible as the suggestion that there is now a global recipe which will reliably

‘reinvent’governments’’(2004,63).

Olsen Maybe It Is Time to Rediscover Bureaucracy3 and enforce the legal order.Binding authority is claimed through a fourfold rule-bound hierarchical relation:between citizens and elected representatives,between democratic legislation and administration,within administration,and between administration and citizens as subjects(as well as authors)of law.Bureaucratization,then,refers to the emergence and growth of bureaucratic forms and not to the perversions and illegitimate extension of the power of bureaucrats.2

Bureaucratic theory connotes a set of theoretical ideas and hypotheses concerning the relations between organizational characteristics and administrative mentality,behavior, performance,and change.3One key assumption is that rationality and control are attributes

of organizational structure and that it matters how public administration is organized. Another assumption is that organizational form can be deliberately developed.Yet the interpretation of these assumptions depends on whether bureaucracy is conceived as an instrument or institution and as an‘‘ideal-type’’or its empirical approximations.

Instrument and Institution

Bureaucracy can be seen as a rational tool for executing the commands of elected leaders.

In this perspective it is an organizational apparatus for getting things done,to be assessed

on the basis of its effectiveness and ef?ciency in achieving predetermined purposes. Bureaucratic structure determines what authority and resources can be legitimately used,

how,when,where,and by https://www.wendangku.net/doc/ad7103604.html,mands and rules are followed because they are

given by of?ceholders as trustees of an impersonal rational-legal order.Administrative legitimacy is based on the idea that the tasks are technical in nature—to identify a logically correct solution by interpreting rules and facts or applying expert causal knowledge. Administrative dynamics is subject to deliberate design and reform by legislation through procedurally correct methods.

Bureaucracy can,however,also be seen as an institution with a raison d’e?tre and organizational and normative principles of its own.Administration is based on the rule of

law,due process,codes of appropriate behavior,and a system of rationally debatable reasons.It is part of society’s long-term commitment to a Rechtsstaat and procedural rationality for coping with con?icts and power differentials.Bureaucracy,then,is an expression of cultural values and a form of governing with intrinsic value.Rationality and

justice are characteristics of the procedures followed to reach an outcome and not the outcome itself.Bureaucrats are supposed to obey,and be the guardians of,constitutional principles,the law,and professional standards.They are imagined to use their professional expertise and experience to illuminate all aspects of public policies and‘‘speak truth to power.’’They are also supposed to have autonomy in applying the law to individual cases without the involvement of elected politicians and organized interests.As a partly

2Weber1978;also Albrow1970;Bendix1962;Brunsson and Olsen1998;Eisenstadt1958,1959,1965;Gerth

and Wright Mills1970;Lepsius2003;Merton et al.1952;Stammer1972.The scope of the discussion is delimited

to public administration,even if Weber saw the large modern capitalist enterprises as‘‘unequalled models of strict bureaucratic organization’’(1978,974)and bureaucracy as an institutional pillar of both mass democracy and

a capitalist economy.Furthermore,focus is on the central governmental bureaucracy and not local bureaucracy.

3The term theory is here used in a relaxed way.The claim,made more than?fty years ago,that‘‘it would be

premature to refer to‘the theory of bureaucracy,’as though there existed a single,well-de?ned conceptual scheme

adequate for understanding this form of organization’’(Merton et al.1952,17)still holds true(Peters and Pierre2003b).

4Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

autonomous institution,bureaucracy has legitimate elements of nonadaptation to leaders’orders and environmental demands.4

Ideal-Type and Practice

As an ideal-type,bureaucracy has clear characteristics,preconditions,and effects.Practice at best approximates the ideal-type,and public administration is never a fully developed bureaucracy.There are?uid and overlapping organizational principles,and the func-tioning,emergence,growth,and consequences of bureaucracy depend on a variety of factors.5

Weber observed the possibility that beliefs in a legitimate order will govern organized action but also that human behavior can be guided by utility,af?nity,and traditions.

Domination based on authority and the validity of an order was de?ned as a question of degree and probabilities.Orders could be interpreted differently.There could be contradictory systems of order,and the key questions were,How often and under which conditions do bureaucrats actually comply with rules and commands,and how often are rules and commands enforced?Bureaucratization was stimulated by the quantitative and qualitative expansion of administrative tasks,but its direction and the reasons that occasioned it could vary widely(Weber1978,971).

Weber saw the bureaucrats’willingness and capacity to follow rules and orders as depending on a variety of mechanisms.Motivation was a result of material incentives inherent in lifelong careers,as well as socialization and habituation in educational and bureaucratic institutions.The bureaucracy’s capacity to follow formal rules or ethical codes depended on its own quali?cations and orientations but also on the leaders’ability to give direction and the continuous availability of resources.6Yet incentives and socialization mechanisms could not be expected to be perfect,and elected leaders could lack the knowledge and authority to direct and control administration.7They could promote contradictory or morally dubious objectives or be unable or unwilling to extract adequate resources.Citizens could express their concerns through other channels than the 4For Weber(1978,1380),‘‘institution’’referred to compulsory associations(Anstalten)in contrast to formal

organizations(Verband),and two key examples were the state and the church.An institutional perspective assumes that actors seek to ful?ll the obligations encapsulated in a role or an identity,embedded in membership in a political

community or group and the ethos and practices of its institutions.Rules are then followed because they are seen as natural,rightful,expected,and legitimate(March and Olsen1989),and legitimacy depends on how things are done,not solely on substantive performance(Merton1938).Because institutions are organizational arrangements infused with values beyond their instrumental utility,they develop a character that discourages arbitrary change and absorb criticism and protest through cooptation(Selznick1949,1957).New experiences may lead to change in institutions,but

institutionalists are not committed to a belief in historical ef?ciency,i.e.,rapid and costless adaptation to functional and normative environments or deliberate political reform attempts,and therefore to the functional or moral necessity of observed structures and rules(March and Olsen1989,1995,1998).

5Weber writes:‘‘One must keep one’s eye on the?uidity and the overlapping of all these organizational principles.

Their‘pure’types,after all,are to be considered merely border cases which are of special and indispensable analytical value,and bracket historical reality which almost always appears in mixed forms’’(1978,1002).

6Weber observed that‘‘bureaucracy as a permanent structure is knit to the one presupposition of the availability of continuous revenues to maintain it’’and that‘‘the bureaucratic structure goes hand in hand with the concentration of the material means of management in the hands of the master’’(1978,968,980).

7Weber notes:‘‘The question is always who controls the existing bureaucratic machinery.And such control is

possible only in a very limited degree to persons who are not technical specialists’’(1978,224).According to Weber (1978,991),there is an enduring struggle between political leadership and bureaucratization,and the political‘‘master’’always?nds himself,vis-a`-vis the trained of?cial,in the position of a dilettante facing the expert.

Olsen Maybe It Is Time to Rediscover Bureaucracy5 electoral one.Bureaucrats had interests and power of their own,and the distinction between politics and administration could be hard to uphold in practice.

As a result,there was a potential tension among elected of?cials,bureaucrats,and citizens,and the causal chain from a command to actual compliance could be long and uncertain.8Bureaucratic organization could produce multiple and contradictory outcomes,

and authority-based behavior could lead to disastrous consequences.In individual cases the consequences depended upon to what degree various spheres of life were bureaucratized,

the direction that those controlling the apparatus gave to it,and the distribution of economic and social power in society.

Given this complexity,which criteria are actually used to assess success and failure

when it is claimed that bureaucracy is an undesirable organizational form?And what are

the attributed implications of a de-bureaucratization of public administration?

THE DESIRABILITY OF BUREAUCRACY

Weber emphasized the technical superiority and the procedural rationality of bureaucracy,in contrast to the assertion that bureaucratic organization is undesirable and should be replaced by competitive markets or cooperative,power-sharing(interorganizational)networks.9Bureau-cracy,then,is assessed instrumentally,based on the expected contribution to realize predetermined goals,and deontologically,based on the validity of the behavioral codes and the principles of reason,morals,organization,and governing on which bureaucracy as an institution is founded(Olsen1997).A complication is that the functionally best solution is not always politically or culturally feasible and vice versa(Merton1938).

Criteria of Success and Failure

In an ideal-type bureaucracy,bureaucrats are responsible for following rules with regard to

their of?ce with dedication and integrity and for avoiding arbitrary action and action based on personal likes and dislikes.They are not responsible for adverse consequences stemming from

the execution of appropriate rules in proper ways.Nevertheless,bureaucracies are in practice assessed on the basis of a variety of criteria,depending on the social group complaining.For example,in1847,a professor in political science at Heidelberg,Robert von Mohl,observed

that‘‘the privileged classes complained of loss of privileges,the commercial classes of interference in commerce,artisans of paperwork,scientists of ignorance,statesmen of delay’’(Albrow1970,29).Weber also foresaw an insoluble con?ict between formal and substantive justice.Equality before the law,legal guarantees against arbitrariness,and recruitment based

on merit would reduce feudal privileges and have a leveling effect on social and economic differences.Nevertheless,the propertyless masses could be expected to prefer an equalization

of economic and social life chances rather than formal-legal equality.

A distinction has to be made between the criticisms that public administration is not bureaucratic enough and that it is excessively bureaucratic.In the?rst case public

8Weber writes:‘‘The?nal result of political action often,no even regularly,stands in complete inadequate and often

even paradoxical relation to its original meaning’’(1970,117).

9According to Weber,‘‘The fully developed bureaucratic apparatus compares with other organizations exactly as

does the machine with non-mechanical modes of production.Precision,speed,knowledge of the?les,continuity, discretion,unity,strict subordination,reduction of friction and material and personal costs—these are raised to the

optimum point in the strictly bureaucratic administration,and especially in its monocratic form’’(1978,973).

6Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

administration does not meet the ideal model because a hierarchical,rule-based,and professionally staffed bureaucracy has not been set up.Or it may be that the formal organization is just a facade,and bureaucrats are not acting in accordance with the institution’s ethos and codes of conduct.The staff is corrupt and unreliable,incompetent, inef?cient,lazy,rigid and unresponsive,self-regarding,and uncontrollable.Administrators misuse their position and https://www.wendangku.net/doc/ad7103604.html,ws are not executed in a competent and fair manner;the commands of superiors are not followed;and bureaucrats are not responsive to,or account-able to,elected political leaders or the constitution.

The second type of criticism is that rules are followed too slavishly or that public administration should be organized and staffed according to nonbureaucratic principles, administrators should act according to a different ethos and code of conduct,or there should not be public intervention at https://www.wendangku.net/doc/ad7103604.html,plaints that a law is badly administered are then mixed with criticism of the content of the law and a principled opposition to the primacy of representative government.Such criticism is often part of a con?ict over organizational and normative principles,worldviews,symbols,and legitimacy,where the aim is to change the institutional identity and power of public administration(Bienefeld 2001;Brunsson and Olsen1993;Merton1968).

Recent criticism of public administration has elements of both types,but the latter has been predominant.What started as an attack on‘‘bureaucracy’’and its inef?cient,costly, and rigid internal organization and operations has since the late1970s developed into

a criticism of the role of public administration;the possibility and desirability of

government shaping society;the power balance between institutions and between actors;

and the relevance and functionality of jurisdictional boundaries,including those of the territorial state(Olsen2004a).Key arguments have been that the‘‘traditional’’way of governing society is ill-suited to cope with the tasks and circumstances faced.A para-digmatic shift from administering and governing through bureaucracies and hierarchies to competitive markets and cooperation in partly autonomous policy networks has been diagnosed or prescribed(Dunleavy and Hood1994).The special nature and success criteria of the public administration have been denied,and dichotomies such as state–society, public–private,politics–administration,and expert–layman have become obscure.

Reforms based on neoclassical economic ideology and private management ideology have prescribed privatization,deregulation,market competition,and commercialization.

Public administration is a supermarket delivering a wide variety of public services,dis-ciplined by market competition(Olsen1988).Management by contract and result replaces management by command.Citizens are a collection of customers with a commercial rather than a political relationship to government,and legitimacy is based on substantive performance and cost ef?ciency and not on compliance with formal rules and procedures.

Administrative change is portrayed as improvement,‘‘best practice,’’‘‘rightsizing,’’better value for money,and serving predetermined(usually economic)goals better.10The power 10For example,one Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development(OECD)report was titled Serving the Economy Better(1991),and another report summarized the key reform thrusts:‘‘A greater focus on results and

increased value for money,devolution of authority and enhanced?exibility,strengthened accountability and control,

a client-and service-orientation,strengthened capacity for developing strategy and policy,introducing competition and

other market elements,and changed relationships with other levels of government’’(1995,25).Within the New Public Management(NPM)perspective,change follows from ef?cient adaptation to environmental dictates or from

competitive selection.Superior organizational forms are believed to surface in a system characterized by diversity,

overlapping units,and competition.Interestingly enough,large parts of the NPM also assume that hierarchy is possible and that actors can be divided into principals and agents.

Olsen Maybe It Is Time to Rediscover Bureaucracy7 aspects and the ethical and moral dilemmas involved are rarely made explicit.Rather,

reform efforts are guided by a strong trust in competitive markets,a hope for‘‘the?nal demise of central planning’’(Camdessus1999),and the old quest for reduced state paternalism and a more‘‘adequate and realistic theory on the role and limits of government intervention’’(de Oliveira Campos1967,287).

The network criticism of bureaucracy has appealed to democratic ideology and has explicitly raised issues of authority and power.11It has prescribed cooperation and consensus seeking in‘‘?atter’’and more?exible types of organization,including inter-organizational power-sharing networks,and it has emphasized participation in,rather than freedom from,administrative decision making,implementation,and enforcement.Public administration is to be disciplined,but also enabled,by citizens’empowerment and social partnerships.Interdependent public and private actors need to cooperate,persuade, bargain,and build trust.They also need to pool legal authority,?nancial resources, expertise,and organization in order to improve results.

The criticism is usually principled and systemic.It is presented as a corrective to the conventional view of politics and government as centered on formal-constitutional institutions(Marinetto2003,598–99).It is argued that no single political center can legitimately claim to represent the public and the common good,issue commands,and expect compliance.Attempts to command are likely to generate withdrawal of cooper-ation,noncompliance,and a loss of trust,and a de?ning activity of administration is building support and mobilizing resources.Popular elections and majority government are

not the only source of legitimacy.Demands and support are not channeled solely via the institutions of representative democracy,and citizenship involves more than voting.A new institutionalized moral vision synthesizing private and public ethical principles and standards is needed because of‘‘the charade of democratic accountability given by the current electoral system’’(Brereton and Temple1999,466).

It has been argued that public administration was never designed to maximize

ef?cient service delivery,customer friendliness,and?exibility and that these criteria are an irrelevant yardstick(Peters and Pierre2003a,6).Still,von Mohl’s observation is relevant.

Public administration is likely to be assessed in terms of whatever are perceived as important problems by vocal groups in society.This is so whether the concern is fostering democracy,constitutionalism,and the rule of law;securing economic growth and competitiveness and?ghting in?ation,budget de?cits,and indebtedness;providing social equity,justice,and the reduction of poverty,inequality,illiteracy,and child mortality;or

a variety of other values,norms,interests,and goals.

Making sense of contemporary public administration,then,requires an understanding

of the complex ecology of institutions,actors,rules,values,principles,goals,interests, beliefs,powers,and cleavages in which it operates.Administration is rarely provided with

clear and stable criteria of success and failure.Politicians,judges,experts,organized groups,mass media,and individual citizens are likely to hold different and changing—not coherent and stable—concepts of‘‘good administration.’’They are likely to want the administration to serve a variety of changing and not necessarily consistent principles, goals,and interests.Each concern is a possible source of legitimacy as well as criticism.As

11Frederickson1999;Kickert,Klijn,and Koppenjan1999;Kickert and Stillman1999;Kickert and van Vught1995; Koppenjan and Klijn2004;O’Toole1997a,1997b;Peters and Pierre2000;Powell1990;Rhodes1997a,1997b.

Students of networks usually see tensions between markets and networks,for example,that competition tends to ruin

trust-based networks.For a recent review,see Rhodes forthcoming.

8Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

the mix of concerns changes,so do conceptions of good administration and good administrators(Jacobsen1960;Kaufman1956;Olsen2004a).

In democracies,however,citizens’con?dence in their institutions of government is

a core criterion,and a challenge is to develop institutions and actors that survive and

?ourish in the face of changing environmental pressures while maintaining commitment to the primacy of democratic values(March and Olsen1995,192).What implications,then, can be expected from a(de-)bureaucratization of public administration?

Impacts of Bureaucracy

An ideal bureaucratic structure is assumed to contribute to unity and coordination, precision and speed,predictability,obedience and loyalty,impartiality,reduction of friction and of material and personal costs,knowledge of?les and an institutionalized memory,and continuity across changes in government.Yet there is a conspicuous discrepancy between the enthusiasm for organizational design and reorganization and the lack of systematic knowledge about organizational impacts.In spite of decades of evaluation there is modest understanding of what consequences different forms are likely to have in different contexts(Wollmann2001).While it is documented that it matters how public administration is formally organized and that administrators are in?uenced by the rules and structural settings in which they act,state-of-the-art reviews have so far had little to say about the relationships between organizational structure and administrative behavior (Egeberg2003,120).

The nature of the relation is contested.Formal structure can be highly consequential but also a facade or empty shell,overwhelmed by informal structures and external resource distributions(Bendix1962,488).Organizational structure is not the only factor at play,and administrative organization can provide a framework rather than an‘‘iron cage,’’determining administrative mentality,behavior,and outcomes.Formal organization charts and procedural manuals have variable explanatory power,and manipulating formal organization can be a more or less precise instrument that gives different results in different contexts(Aucoin1997,305;Blau and Meyer1971).

Possibly,there has been little felt need to examine assumptions about the consequences of administrative reform because many reforms have been driven by strong ideological convictions or even a doctrinaire faith in what is the ideal organization and role of public administration in the economy and society.Yet it is also dif?cult to identify the exact effects of organizational structures,and a weak factual basis leaves room for strong ideological convictions.Since it is commonplace to focus on the negative effects of bureaucratic organization,and since the main complaints are well known,attention is here turned to some potentially positive implications of bureaucratic organization.

Consider,for example,the effect of rules.Subjecting human conduct to constitutive rules has been portrayed as part of processes of democratization and civilization(Berman 1983;Elias1982).Rules tend to increase action capabilities and ef?ciency(March and Olsen1989).They make it possible to coordinate many simultaneous activities in a way that makes them mutually consistent and reduces uncertainty,for instance,by creating predictable time rhythms through election and budget cycles(Sverdrup2000).Rules constrain bargaining within comprehensible terms.They enforce agreements and help avoid destructive con?icts.

Olsen Maybe It Is Time to Rediscover Bureaucracy9 Rules provide codes of meaning that facilitate the interpretation of ambiguous worlds.

They embody collective and individual roles,identities,rights,obligations,interests, values,worldviews,and memory and thus constrain the allocation of attention,standards

of evaluation,priorities,perceptions,and resources(March and Olsen forthcoming).Rules, furthermore,do not necessarily imply rigidity and in?exibility(March,Schultz,and Zhou 2000).Rules may prescribe change,and they allow behavioral?exibility.For example,in

the European Union,with its strong emphasis on legal integration and formal rules, changing patterns of attention,behavior,and resource allocation have taken place within

fairly stable structural frameworks(Olsen2003a).

Bureaucracy can also be positively related to important economic,social,and political criteria.For example,merit-based bureaucracy fosters economic growth in developing countries(Evans and Rauch1999)and contributes to poverty reduction(Henderson et al. 2003).12Bureaucracy is associated with low corruption,partly because a longer time horizon makes quick returns in terms of corruption less likely(Evans and Rauch1999,757; Kaufmann,Kraay,and Mastruzzi2004).General rules and welfare services,not tailor-

made solutions intended to serve a special group or interest,create trust in institutions of government and among citizens,when implemented in an impartial and uncorrupt way (Rothstein2003).

Bureaucratic rules,furthermore,contribute to democratic equality because they are (relatively)blind to the wealth and other resources of the citizens they serve.In comparison,market‘‘ef?ciency’’is ef?ciency in arranging trades that are mutually acceptable,given initial resources;and the democratic quality of networks depends on their accessibility for groups with different values,interests,resources,and capabilities.13The current emphasis on bureaucracy as the instrument of the legitimately elected government

of the day permits sympathy for a bureaucracy that sabotages the intentions of Frederick

the Great,the Russian tsar,or Hitler and derails their reforms(Brecht1937),but there is

less understanding for a bureaucracy that critically questions or opposes the reforms of democratically elected government.Nevertheless,bureaucratic autonomy is an organiza-

tional principle rooted in constitutional democracy and the principle of separation of powers.The ongoing deprofessionalization and politicization of public administration in

many countries,with more emphasis on political af?liation,loyalty,and commitment to

the current government,have costs in terms of an administration’s ability to serve future governments and society at large(Suleiman2003).

Still,the blessing of rules may be mixed.Rules may have positive effects up to a point

and then,as there are more of them,negative ones(Evans and Rauch1999).Detailed rules

and rigid rule following might under some conditions make policy making,implementa-

tion,and enforcement more effective,but a well-working system may also need rules that

allow discretion and?exibility.Consequently,the short-term and long-term consequences

of rules may differ,for example,standard operating procedures may increase short-term

ef?ciency and at the same time reduce long-term adaptability.Rules might make public debate obligatory,but rule following may also hamper reason giving and discourse(March

and Olsen forthcoming).Rules are in varying degrees precise,consistent,obligatory,and

12Evans and Rauch studied thirty-?ve developing countries in the period1970–90.Henderson et https://www.wendangku.net/doc/ad7103604.html,ed the

Evans–Rauch data set in a study of twenty-nine developing and middle-income countries for the same time period.

13Hierarchical authority,market competition,and cooperative networks provide different mechanisms of

accountability(Goodin2003).All three depend on rules,yet on different kinds of rules and in different ways.

10Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

legally binding,and they provide more or less clear prescriptions of appropriate behavior in different settings and situations.There are also more or less speci?ed exceptions from the rules and varying agreement about who the authoritative interpreter of a rule is.Bureau-cracies may be more or less‘‘autonomous’’or‘‘instrumental,’’with different degrees of freedom from political government and executive leadership(Knill1999).

Knowing what the rules demand and what is the common good,then,is problematic.

The fact that orders are not always obeyed,that rules are not always followed,and that the content of public policy is modi?ed on its way through the administrative apparatus (Merton et al.1952)may re?ect administrative complexity,not bureaucratic power.

Kaufman,for example,observes:

A simple command or a single new statute sometimes has little effect because there is such

a large body of existing law and practice,and such a strongly established set of rights and

privileges and obligations,that it is not possible for government of?cers and employees to

respond to the latest instruction without violating others and without infringing on the legitimate

interests of a good many people.Bureaucrats may respond sluggishly to new directives not

because they are willfully disobedient or obstructive,but because they cannot ignore the

accumulation of prior directives about which the authors of the new ones know nothing.A

bureaucracy that scrupulously discharges its responsibilities may for that very good reason

appear arbitrary and high-handed to some observers.Conscientious attention to the entire body

of relevant law thus makes public servants look like villains to some people.(1981,7)

The degree to which rules and a logic of appropriateness guide administrative behavior depends on the competition from other behavioral logics,such as the logic of consequentiality and utility maximization.While the problems of rules are often exposed, it is also dif?cult to specify precise,consistent,and stable goals,and both goals and rules can pervert behavior.In goal-driven systems there is,for example,a tendency to concentrate on measures of performance rather than on performance(March and Olsen 1995,159).Neither are single-purpose agencies likely to be a panacea.Even when there are ef?ciency gains with regard to a single objective,actors are likely to externalize their costs at the detriment of the general public.The‘‘hidden hand’’of the market mechanism cannot be expected to reliably compensate such externalities,and there may be a loss of political accountability and control(Christensen and L?greid2004;Wollmann forthcom-ing).Strong vertical linkages between social groups and single-purpose agencies also make effective coordination and horizontal linkages within government dif?cult(Peters1998, 302).Administrators,then,regularly face situations where the clarity and consistency of rules,(self-)interests,and preferences vary and give more or less clear behavioral guidance (Egeberg1995,2003).One hypothesis is that the comparative prescriptive clarity of

a behavioral logic will determine which one will dominate other logics.14

The effects of rules also depend on whether rules are internalized or represent external incentives and constraints.While some see good administration solely as a question of right organizational incentives,others argue that properties of administrators as well as structures,rules,and resources make a difference.In public administration there have been cycles of trust in control of behavior through the manipulation of incentive structures and individual cost-bene?t calculations and trust in an ethos of internal-normative responsibility 14For other possibilities,see March and Olsen(1998,forthcoming).

Olsen Maybe It Is Time to Rediscover Bureaucracy11 and willingness to act in accordance with rules of appropriateness.Historically,the two have interacted,and their relative importance has changed over time and varied across insti-tutional settings(deLeon2003).

Weber,on the one hand,deplored the bureaucrats whom the routine of bureaucracy

was seen to select and form(Gerth and Wright Mills1970,50),and usually the bureaucratic method and the moral atmosphere it spreads are assumed to hamper initiative (Merton1952)and exert a depressive in?uence on creative minds(Schumpeter1996,207).

Yet Weber also underlined how important it is that administrators are socialized into an

ethos of rule following.That is,that they are governed by internalized codes of exemplary behavior,right and wrong,true and false,legal and illegal,organized into the bureaucracy

as an institution(March and Olsen1989,forthcoming).Hence,the effects of rules are

linked to how well bureaucracies solve the‘‘perennial problem of preserving character and judgment,’’that is,the ability to maintain ethical re?ection,give good reasons,distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate demands,and‘‘ensure responsible action even when

no one is watching’’(Jos and Thompkins2004,256,276).

The Disentanglement Problem

While it is relatively easy to monitor whether rules and procedures are followed,it is more

dif?cult to attribute causal effects to speci?c organizational properties or actors,in particular in multilevel and multicentered systems.A disentanglement problem appears

when‘‘good administration’’is de?ned by several competing criteria and performance depends upon the organization of public administration as well as the qualities,orien-tations,and capabilities of the personnel.The problem is extended because administrative success also depends on the performance of several actors and institutions organized on different principles and with different cultures,resources,histories,and dynamics,as

well as on the degree to which of?cials and citizens are able and willing to mobilize resources that match tasks and goals and give administrations autonomy to apply their expertise.

The challenge of specifying the implications of bureaucratization and de-bureaucratization,therefore,is formidable,and the value of the ideal-type of bureaucracy

for this task is questionable.Its structural characteristics do not necessarily occur together

in practice(Hall1963),and it has been suggested that each dimension could be regarded as

a variable(Friedrich1952).Usually,however,analysts make no attempt to include all relevant features of a bureaucratic structure.15Neither is it obvious how the organization of postbureaucratic administration can best be characterized and typologized and what the

likely effects of de-bureaucratization are.Market organization and network organization

come in many guises and hybrid forms(Thompson2003;Thompson et al.1991).There are quasimarkets and quasinetworks,as well as quasihierarchies(Exworthy,Powell,and Mohan1999),and‘‘it is the mix that matters’’(Davis and Rhodes2000;Rhodes1997a).

From a democratic point of view there are good reasons to reconsider the possible positive in?uences of bureaucratic organization,as a supplement to the well-known story

15For example,Evans and Rauch(1999)created a‘‘Weberianness Scale’’based on the degree to which

administrative agencies employed meritocratic recruitment and offered predictable,long-term careers.They observed

that others stress other features and that a comprehensive appraisal of all features of the bureaucratic‘‘ideal-form’’was

beyond their capacities and available data.

12Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

of its perversions.The claim that there is too little bureaucracy is as relevant as the criticism of excessive bureaucracy,and assessments of public administration need to make explicit the normative criteria used and not reduce administrative(re)organization solely to

a technical question involving the ef?cient implementation of predetermined goals.Then,

if bureaucracy is to some degree,and under some conditions,desirable,is it also viable?Or is it,like the dinosaur,doomed to disappear?

THE VIABILITY OF BUREAUCRACY

In contrast to recent reformers who have diagnosed or predicted the necessary demise of a centrally organized and rule-bound public administration,Weber argued that bureaucracy would be the dominant organizational form in the modern world.16Several lines of thought are involved,however.Weber saw the growth of bureaucratic organization as the inevitable product of a long historical development toward the rationalization of human organization and cooperation,but he denied that history follows a general law of development and can be constructed in terms of‘‘unilinear’’evolution or‘‘cycles’’(Gerth and Wright Mills1970,51).Weber viewed bureaucratic structure as malleable—

a rationally designed tool,deliberately structured and restructured in order to improve the

ability to realize externally determined goals.Yet,when fully developed,the bureaucracy was indispensable,powerful,and dif?cult to control or destroy even in the face of radical changes in society.17Nevertheless,there would be changes in the control of bureaucracy, and beliefs in its legitimacy would be modi?ed through human deliberation,reason giving, and political struggles.In sum,the dynamics of bureaucratization resulted from many forces,and Weber(1978,1002)wondered how far the development of bureaucratic organization was subject to political,economic,and other external determinants or to an ‘‘autonomous’’logic inherent in its technical structure.

Reformers tend to treat change as a master value,but the challenge is twofold:?rst,to clarify how malleable administrative organization and practices,mentalities,cultures,and codes of conduct are and what the conditions are under which administrative forms can be deliberately designed and reformed;and second,to balance stability and?exibility.

Democracies value order,continuity,and predictability as well as?exibility and change, and usually there are attempts to balance the desire to keep the basic rules of government stable and the desire to adapt rules to new experience.Democratic institutions create some degree of order and thereby elements of rigidity and in?exibility.Yet they are arranged to both speed up and slow down learning from experience and adaptation to changing circumstances.

Here,a distinction is made between administrative reforms aimed at improving practical problem solving within fairly stable institutional and normative frameworks and reforms aimed at changing such frameworks.Focus is on the latter,where an institution’s external relations—its pact with society—are at stake.Transformation from one 16Weber writes:‘‘The development of modern forms of organization in all?elds is nothing less than identical with the development and continual spread of bureaucratic administration.This is true of church and state,of armies,

political parties,economic enterprises,interest groups,endowments,clubs,and many others....The choice is only that between bureaucracy and dilettantism in the?eld of administration’’(1978,223).

17Weber also notes:‘‘Once fully developed,bureaucracy is among those social structures which are the hardest to destroy.’’...‘‘Where administration has been completely bureaucratized,the resulting system of domination is

practically indestructible(1978,987).

Olsen Maybe It Is Time to Rediscover Bureaucracy13 institutional archetype to another requires deinstitutionalization and a subsequent reinstitutionalization(Eisenstadt1959;Peters1999).The legitimacy of an institution’s mission,organization,functioning,moral foundation,ways of thought,and resources is thrown into doubt,and a possible outcome is the fall and rise of institutional structures and

their associated systems of normative and causal beliefs.The key issues are of

a constitutional character:What kind of public administration and government for what

kind of society?What are to be core institutions and auxiliary institutions?How is the preferred solution to be achieved?

Historical Necessities?

New Public Management reformers have claimed that the era of hierarchical and rule-

bound administration is https://www.wendangku.net/doc/ad7103604.html,ually,the language is apolitical,and administrative development is fate more than choice.There is an‘‘inevitable shift’’toward a more advanced administration and a convergence in administrative forms globally or at least among OECD countries(Osborne and Gaebler1992).18

Market enthusiasts are inspired by neoclassical economic theory.Public administra-

tion has to adapt to a globalized economy,and a paradigmatic shift to markets and management has been presented as a generic medicine(World Bank1991,38).While network enthusiasts,emphasizing horizontal links and power sharing between government

and society,call attention to attempts to change existing power balances through political processes(Kettl1996,16),elements of environmental‘‘necessities’’are also present. Network organization is,for example,interpreted as a logical consequence of the functional differentiation of modernity(Mayntz1997),a re?ection of changing power relations in society(Kettl1996),and the‘‘reconquest of political authority by societal actors’’(Andersen and Burns1996,228).The increasing number and importance of multicentered networks bring about a loss of central authority and political steering,and elected of?cials and administrative leaders have limited capacity to deliberately design and

reform public administration.19

The holistic visions of market organization,network organization,and bureaucracy

share a well-known conception of change:existing institutions and organizations survive because they work well and provide better solutions than their alternatives(Goodin1996; Stinchcombe2001).Each vision assumes that a single,context-free set of principles for organizing public administration is functionally and normatively superior.Over time the superior form replaces the others.It spreads independent of characteristics distinctive and

speci?c to a region or country,resulting in convergence on a single organizational model.

The inevitability and convergence hypothesis is not supported by empirical observations.While globalization is exerting pressures on administrative systems around

the world,they have not created convergence and a common pattern(Welch and Wong 2001).Neither have the internal market,common legislation,and intense interaction

18There are variations among Anglo-Saxon versions of NMP,and continental European versions and Rod Rhodes

have reminded me about the antipodean exceptionalism among the former(see also Christensen and L?greid2001;

Olsen and Peters1996;Pollitt2003).

19See note11.However,comparisons over time cannot assume as a baseline that once in the past all authority and

power were concentrated in one center(Pollitt2003).The role of the political center has been precarious,and the

authority and power following from winning democratic elections(Rokkan1966)and occupying administrative

positions have varied.

14Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

among administrators in the European Union produced structural convergence(Olsen 2003a).Member states continue to organize their administrations differently both at home and in Brussels(Kassim,Peters,and Wright2000;Kassim et al.2001).

The European Union also illustrates that market building and network building do not exclude bureaucratic organization.The EU is to a large extent based on legal integration and rules,and strengthening markets and networks have produced more,not fewer,rules.

The EU’s search for a constitutional order,the writing of a Constitutional Treaty,and the emphasis on human rights have further strengthened the tendency.A trend toward rules and institutions is also observed in world politics(Goldstein et al.2000).Generally,there has been a rule explosion(Ahrne and Brunsson2004),a rights revolution(Sunstein1990), and a global expansion of judicial power(Tate and Vallinder1995),and the conviction that professions such as medical doctors and teachers have been ineffectively subjected to public accountability has created an audit explosion and new rules(Power1994).Scandals in both the private and the public sector,from Enron in the United States to the demise of the Santer Commission in the EU,have also triggered demands for legal and ethical rules and an ethos of responsibility.

Arguably,increasing diversity might be conducive to the quest for rules.In heterogeneous polities,governing can rarely assume a community of shared objectives.

Such polities can at best develop and maintain a community of shared institutions, principles,rules,and procedures that makes it possible to rule a divided society without undue violence(March and Olsen1995).In the absence of agreed-upon,clear,and stable goals and with uncertain ends–means relations,administrative organization becomes

a problematic policy instrument and deontological concerns are likely to become more

important.Citizens may not accept centralized discretion and power,but they may want common rules.They may develop not only institutions that make it possible to participate in administrative processes but also institutions that make it unnecessary to participate because they treat citizens as political equals and work with integrity in predictable ways (Olsen2003b).

Therefore,what recent reformers present as universal diagnoses and prescriptions for public administration are in fact partial,time-and space-bound interpretations.Each perspective highlights speci?c components of the system of public administration found in democratic polities,re?ects a development in a speci?c time period,or is associated with

a particular reform ideology.The institutional centerpiece in one order,period,or reform

ideology is an auxiliary institution in other orders,periods,and ideologies(Olsen2004a).

Rather than a paradigmatic shift and global convergence,there is an open-ended reexamination and contention over institutional identities and institutional balance.

Democratic Learning?

Criticism of public administration and government is part of democratic dynamics.The democratic vision is that when immediate experience with bureaucratic institutions cannot be reconciled with democratic values,bureaucracy becomes a political issue and the bureaucratic system loses legitimacy(March and Olsen1995,192).Up to a point,recent reforms illustrate such a pattern.Reform programs have been part of a reexamination of democratic-constitutive ideals.They have involved attempts to modify interinstitutional relations and rebalance the role of the state,market,and civil society,as well as the role of different professions,organized interests,and citizens.

Olsen Maybe It Is Time to Rediscover Bureaucracy15 The bureaucracy bashing of the New Right and the neoliberal administrative reforms

in the1980s branded the public sector a problem and not a solution(Savoie1994).The

‘‘reinventing government’’movement was a reaction,presenting a partly alternative vision

of the role of government and a third way between bureaucracy and market.It proposed

‘‘better government’’rather than‘‘less government,’’with a state supporting civil society

and markets,rather than‘‘steering’’society(Centro Lationoamericano de Administracion

Para el Desarrollo Scienti?c Council1999;Rhodes forthcoming).Political and organizational factors were critical in the process.The‘‘reinventing government’’movement,for example,gained ascendancy in political circles in Washington,D.C.,and spread through a network of globalized,U.S.-dominated management consulting?rms (Saint-Martin2001).

Understanding administrative change,then,requires an examination of how reforms

are borrowed or imposed from outside the national political framework.International organizations such as the OECD,the International Monetary Fund,and the World Bank

have been important for diffusing administrative reform ideas.As observed by Nef(2003), administrative reforms externally induced or assisted are nothing new for newly independent and developing states.Transplanted administrative forms from Europe and

North America,with their visions of rationality,ef?cacy,and impersonality,have been the measuring rod of‘‘modernity by imitation,’’and the supremacy of the bureaucratic model

has been followed by reforms inspired by neoliberal ideology(Nef2003).

Reforms imposed on developing countries have often been justi?ed by crises,but the standard prescription is also used when such problems do not exist.For example,in

a recent report,OECD(2003)observes that Norway’s economy and society,measured against those of its OECD peers,are very strong.Nevertheless,the arguments for radical

public sector reform are seen as compelling,and greater reliance on markets and greater competition are‘‘urgently needed.’’State ownership must be reduced,and the wage settlement system,made more?exible.Reforms have been too cautious.Needed is a break

with the Norwegian reform style of consensus-based incrementalism,even when that tradition of decision making is likely to come under strain.Social peace is put at risk without any explicit analysis of the normative aspects involved or the system’s historical

ability to adapt to shifting national and international circumstances.

The Norwegian example gives support to those who question to what degree inter-national organizations are able to learn from past successes and failures.20Nevertheless,

the enthusiasm for a universal(NPM)cure,and the institutionalized pressure for global administrative convergence,has weakened since the early1990s.It has been discovered

that complaints about public administration have not disappeared after decades of reform.

A good public administration is no longer a minimalist one,and states can play a role beyond protecting property rights and enforcing contracts.The need for in-depth understanding of the speci?c situation in individual countries is emphasized.There are few answers that are right under all circumstances,and no one-size-?ts-all recipe will do. Administrative reform must be matched carefully with the needs,traditions,and resources

of each political system(World Bank1997,2000;also OECD1997,2002).

After some enthusiasm for NPM principles,the relevance of administrative context

has been rediscovered also in former communist states in Europe.Now,it is concluded that

20For example,‘‘the IMF is fairly dogmatic and ideological.It never praises—or learns from—countries—no matter

how economically successful—if they diverge from its doctrines’’(Vaknin2003,8).

16Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

each country has to recognize its own potential and?nd its own way and not copy business methods and the NPM reforms from the West.Adopting Anglo-Saxon prescriptions and cultures is likely to have‘‘detrimental’’and‘‘disastrous’’consequences,in particular when reforms are made within tight budgetary constraints and a short time frame.Part of the advice is to go‘‘back to basics,’’that is,Weberian bureaucracies(Fournier1998,129,135;

Hesse1998,176;Metcalfe1998,61).Furthermore,the possibility of maintaining

a modernized neo-Weberian state in Europe has been suggested,as a continental European

and a Scandinavian alternative to the largely Anglo-Saxon New Public Management (Bouckaert2004;Pollitt and Bouckaert2004).

Within a Weberian perspective the viability issue extends beyond changes in rules and structures.It requires insight into the processes through which a sense of administrative identity and role is learnt,lost,and rede?ned and the conditions under which administrators are likely to develop and internalize democratic,constitutional,and professional norms.21 For democratic governments it is more legitimate to change formal administrative structures than to change moral structures and mentalities that in?uence whether people voluntary accept binding authority and comply with rules of conduct.The ethical question is,What kind,or kinds,of administrators are wanted(Dahl and Lindblom1953,523)—rule followers,competitive actors,or cooperative personalities—and with what kinds of skills?

Among the empirical questions are,To what degree are administrators malleable and administration a site of learning where civic-minded,public-spirited identities might be developed?How,and through what processes and institutions,are individuals transformed into of?ceholders and rule followers with an ethos of self-discipline,impartiality,and integrity;self-interested,utility-maximizing actors;or cooperating administrators oriented toward the policy networks they participate in?Today,there are no?rm answers to these questions.

Beyond a Single Principle

Bureaucratic,market,and network organization are usually portrayed as alternatives,based respectively on hierarchical authority,competition,and cooperation.From an analytical point of view,these are different mechanisms for achieving rationality,accountability,and control;mobilizing resources and compliance;and organizing feedback from society.In modern,pluralistic societies with a variety of criteria of success and different causal understandings,it is,however,unlikely that public administration can be organized on the basis of one principle alone.An administration that simultaneously has to cope with contradictory demands and standards,balance system coordination,and legitimate diversity organizationally(Olsen2004b)and technologically(Peristeras,Tsekos,and Tarabanis 2003)is likely to require more complexity than a single principle can provide.

One possibility is to see polity and society as consisting of dependent but partly autonomous institutional spheres of thought and action.Within a common set of values and morals in society,modernity involved an extensive differentiation among spheres with different organizational patterns,norms and values,roles,vocabularies,resources,and 21Not all approaches to public administration accept that institutions provide a framework for fashioning actors by developing and transmitting speci?c cognitive and normative beliefs and developing a common identity and sense of belonging.Many rational choice approaches take human nature as constant and universal.All individuals are utility maximizers,whatever institutional context they act within.

Olsen Maybe It Is Time to Rediscover Bureaucracy17 dynamics,and the institutionalization of bureaucracy was part of this large-scale ins-titutional differentiation(Eisenstadt1959;Weber1978,489).The political-administrative systems then can be resolved into partly supplementary and partly competing admin-istrative forms and mechanisms of governing—including hierarchies,voting systems,price systems and competitive markets,and cooperative networks(Dahl and Lindblom1953).

In periods the different institutions are in balance.Nevertheless,there is strain between institutions,and Weber suggested that historical dynamics could be understood in terms of

a tension between bureaucratic routinization and charismatic political leadership.In different time periods the economy,politics,organized religion,science,and so on can all

lead or be lead,and one cannot be completely reduced to another.At transformative points in history institutions can also come in direct competition(Gerth and Wright Mills1970,335).

Contemporary political-administrative orders routinely face institutional imbalances

and collisions.There are shifting interrelations between institutions,and strain between

their foundational norms is an important source of change(Orren and Skowronek1994).

There are intrusions and attempts to achieve ideological hegemony and control over other institutional spheres,and institutional imperialism may threaten to destroy what is distinct

about other institutional spheres.However,there is also institutional defense against the invasion of alien norms.Typically,an institution under serious attack reexamines its pact

with society;its rationale,identity,and foundations;and its ethos,codes of behavior,and primary allegiances and loyalties(Merton1973).Likewise,there may be public debates

about what different institutions are supposed to accomplish for society,how each is to be

justi?ed and made accountable,and what kind of relationship government is supposed to

have to different types of institutions.

Such a reexamination has been going on in public administration lately,and there has

been a rebalancing of the core institutions of modern society.Available observations do not, however,support the prediction that administrations converge on a single form and that bureaucratic organization is nonviable,that it is disappearing because it is outcompeted by market and network forms of administrative organization.Rather,bureaucratic organization

may become more important in increasingly heterogeneous societies,as part of a public administration organized on the basis of several competing principles.

The reform agenda activates Weber’s question:how the viability of administrative

forms depends on large-scale societal transformation and environmental determinism, government’s capabilities to govern through institutional design and reform,and internal bureaucratic autonomy and routine ability to adapt to changing circumstances.Rather than

a linear trend,there may be contradictory developments,cycles,reversals,breakdowns,and transformations.If so,students of public administration are given an opportunity to explore

the shifting legitimacy and importance of different forms,their changing relations and interactions,and the conditions under which each is likely to decline or rise in importance.A general lesson seems to be that the Enlightenment-inspired democratic belief in admin-istrative design,learning,and reform in the name of progress is tempered by a limited human capacity for rational understanding and control,making reformers institutional gardeners

rather than institutional engineers(March and Olsen1983;Olsen2000).

REASONS FOR REDISCOVERING BUREAUCRACY

So why bother with bureaucracy,bureaucrats,bureaucratization,and bureaucratic theory?

One reason is that the dinosaur scenario,emphasizing the undesirability and nonviability of

18Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

bureaucracy and an inevitable and irreversible paradigmatic shift toward market or network organization,is wrong or insuf?cient.Bureaucratic organization and the success criteria in which it is embedded are still with us.Bureaucracy has a role as the institutional custodian of democratic-constitutive principles and procedural rationality,even if in competition with other institutions embedding competing criteria of success.Bureaucracy also has a role as a tool for legislators and representative democracy and is positively related to substantive outcomes that are valued in contemporary democracies,by some more than others.The juridi?cation of many spheres of society,human rights develop-ments,increased diversity,lack of common overriding goals,and renewed demands for public accountability may furthermore contribute to a rising interest in the legal-bureau-cratic aspects of administration and governing.

What,then,does it mean to‘‘rediscover’’bureaucracy?The argument is not that bu-reaucratic organization is a panacea and the answer to all challenges of public admin-istration.Public administrations face different challenges,command different resources, and are embedded in different political and administrative traditions.Bureaucracy, therefore,is not the way to organize public administration,for all kinds of tasks and under all circumstances.Bureaucratic organization is part of a repertoire of overlapping,sup-plementary,and competing forms coexisting in contemporary democracies,and so are market organization and network organization.

While simple diagnoses and prescriptions often‘‘win’’political-rhetorical battles over administrative organization,Weber denies simple answers.A theory of public administration has to acknowledge the complexity of administrative organization,actors, and change.One should make efforts to detect empirical regularities and develop gener-alizations,as well as explaining particular cases,and yet recognize the limits of gen-eralization.Because administrative theory and practice are closely linked to the history and culture of speci?c states and regions,and as long as de?nitions of‘‘good administration’’and‘‘good government’’hinge on speci?c de?nitions of ends,purposes,and values,there can be no truly universal generalizations about public administration without a profound knowledge about the varying political,social,cultural,and economic characteristics that impinge on the administration.22

Administrative theory has to take into account that contemporary practitioners are involved in law application,expert advice,service provision,support building,and resource mobilization.Administrators are rule-driven bureaucrats and also managers calculating expected utility.They are problem-solving servants as well as powerful masters.Admin-istrative arrangements are sometimes facades and at other times ef?cient organizational tools for implementing the policies of elected leaders or institutions with an ethos and procedural rationality that temper the self-interested pursuit of power.Public administration is organized on the basis of authority as well as competition and cooperation.Several organizational forms coexist,but the mix changes over time.Different organizational patterns perform well,facing similar tasks and contexts.Administrations deal with the population as subjects,civic-minded citizens,clients,and self-interested customers, expecting different things in different contexts from government and differently able and willing to provide administration with resources.Administrative development involves change and continuity,convergence and divergence,and a variety of not necessarily 22Arellano and Castillo2004;Dahl1947;March1997;Olsen2001,2003a,2004a;Olsen and Peters1996;

Wollmann forthcoming.

Olsen Maybe It Is Time to Rediscover Bureaucracy19 coordinated processes.The politics of administrative design and reorganization includes deliberations and struggles over organizational forms but also over symbols,legitimacy,and

the ethos and identity of public administration.

For students of public administration inclined to follow up Weber’s research program,

one theoretical challenge is to reconcile logics of action and?t them into a single frame-

work that provides an improved understanding of the conditions under which admin-istrators will be motivated and able to obey political orders,follow constitutive or professional codes of behavior,or act in a self-interested manner or as spokespersons for

speci?c causes or groups.Another challenge is to generate improved insight into the processes that translate organizational structures into behavior and consequences,the factors that strengthen or weaken the relation between organizational structure and administrative mentality,behavior,and performance;and to identify the conditions under

which different organizational forms work well according to democratic standards. Likewise,there is a need to inquire how a variety of processes translates human action into change in institutional structures and their moral foundations,as well as in administrators.

Rediscovering Weber’s analysis of bureaucratic organization enriches our un-derstanding of such questions and of public administration in general.The argument is not

that Weber always provides authoritative answers.Much has to be learned about the mechanisms by which public administration approaches the ideal-type bureaucracy;what causes the emergence,growth,and decline of bureaucratic organization;and the implications of such changes.Nevertheless,Weber calls attention to important issues

and dilemmas and offers stimulating lines of thought.This is in particular true when we(a) include bureaucracy as an institution and not only an instrument,(b)look at the empirical studies in their time and context and not only at Weber’s ideal-types and predictions,and

(c)take into account the political and normative order bureaucracy is part of—and not only

the internal characteristics of‘‘the bureau.’’

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个人年终工作总结报告以及反思范文【5篇】

个人年终工作总结报告以及反思范文【5篇】总结对于每个人来说有利于自身更好的提高，善于总结的人在工作中获得的成果也会非常好，那么很快一年就要过去了，你们的年终工作总结打算怎么写呢?下面是为大家带来的有关个人年终工作总结报告以及反思范文，希望大家喜欢。个人年终工作总结报告时间如白驹过隙，20__年第一学期即将划上一个完满的句号。回顾半年来的班级管理工作，真可谓忙碌而紧张。本学期我担任九年级一班班主任，一个学期的工作实践，让我深刻体会到，要当好一个毕业班的班主任非常操心费力。毕竟学生在此年段，思想都十分活跃，个性也更替较快，伴随着紧张繁忙学习的学习生活，相跟而来的是情绪复杂而散乱。因此，我对本学期的班主任工作主要是在上学年度的基础上进行了较为细致的调整，结果证明收效一定是较好的。现本人将本学期班主任工作作如下小结：一、本学期的基本工作思路。在本学期的班务工作中，我始终坚持以理想信念教育和思想品德教育为核心。把加强学生思想、品德、纪律、法制、安全、行为等教育作为重点，把“自尊、自爱、自信、自强、自律”作为基本内容来开展班主任工作，让学生作到一切以德为先，让德促学，全面发展。二、在思想上高度重视，严格抓学生的日常行为规范，努力培养学生良好的学习习惯。

班主任工作琐碎而繁杂的，这都需要班主任工作细微周到，但我总是不厌其烦、耐心做学生思想工作，每当学生取得一点学习的进步和思想上获得一点提高，我都会认真地进行全面总结与肯定。给学生以更大的激励。在半年工作中，我始终抓住班级的常规管理、让班规管理不放松。开学初，我利用班会活动对学生进行了班规宣读，要求学生对班规熟记于心。对学生在校间的着装、发型、纪律和劳动卫生等行为都提出具体要求，且督导落实。同时本人也力作模范，照章检查，发现问题随时校正。经过自己不断努力，我班学生时间观念，劳动意识，卫生意识和竞争意识，行为习惯已基本养成。在学校眼里我所在的班是一个让领导放得心，让学生、家长满意的班级。三、注重落实学校各项任务。从某某年秋学生进入这所学校，我就十分重视班集体的培养，教育他们，班级是学校一一个组成部分，一个好的班级才会让学生学得安心，学得踏实，才会感到温暖快乐，我们要为拥有一个好的班级而自豪。因此，对学校所规定的任务或开展的各项活动我都要求学生积极认真地完成，学生也极力照办。学生对每次活动都努力完成，荣誉感在班上得到了具体体现。在半学期中我班分别在“忠、孝、雅、诚”演讲活动中和冬季运动会中均取得令人满意的成绩。其他各项指标也在学校名列前茅。良好的班风也真正得到展示，学校对此也十分满意。四、重视班干部队伍的建设和管理，培养其综合能力，发挥其先锋模范作用，以此影响和带动全玫各项工作的开展。班干部是班主任的得力肋手，是班级管理的骨干力量。为了让他