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Analysis of Speech Act Theory

Abstract: Speech Act Theory, with a long history and significant background effects in English study, is mot just a simple theory about speaking. I will analysis the theory based on the linguistic theory and pragmatics theory from the daily speech and speech act.

Keyword: Speech Act Theory; linguistic; pragmatics

Speech Act Theory is the first major theory of Pragmatics which is a comparatively young branch of linguistics. We can trace the theory back to 1950s when John Langshaw Austin gave his lecture: ―How to Do Things with Words‖ in Harvard University. From this interesting title, we can roughly see what the theory is about. Generally speaking, Speech Act Theory is just a theory about ―saying something is doing something‖. In this essay, I will try my best to give a complete analysis of this theory. Since I am just the beginner of linguistics learning, I will mainly describe others’ views of what the theory is; how it came into being and what the theory is for in the linguistic field. Meanwhile, I will add my own understandings and analyses to this theory. Specifically, I will divide this essay into three parts: Part I: the origin of Speech Act theory—the Perforamtives and Constatives, and how the separation between Performatives and Constatives becomes unclear and inapplicable. Part II: the birth of a theory of the Illocutionary Act and some interesting topics related to the theory.

Part I. Performatives and Constatives

To begin with, Austin claims that there are two types of sentences: Perfomatives and Constatives. In Asustin’s opinion, the sentences which are not descriptive and the uttering of these sentences is, or is a part of, the doing of an action are called PERFORMATIVES. In contrast, those sentences which are descriptive are called CONSTATIVES. From Austin’s definition, we can conclude that there are mainly three conditions for a sentence to be Performatives. i.e,

A) The sentence does not describe things.

B) The sentence cannot be said to be true or false.

C) The uttering of the sentence is fulfilling an act.

Now, we list some examples according to the three requirements above Ex. a) I declare the Spring Gala open.

b) I promise to finish my homework on time.

c) I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.

Austin once called sentences like ―I promise… I know… etc.‖ Ritual Phrases （程式用语）. Later, he used Performatives to replace Ritual Phrase in his lecture ―How to Do Things with Words‖. He said that if we use these sentential forms, we are fulfilling an act. However, these sentences must be uttered under Felicity Condition （合适条件）including proper process, people, situation and thoughts. If the Felicity Condition is violated, you are not fulfilling an act even you utter the sentence ―I declare the Spring Gala open‖. Suppose you are going to be a showman of the Spring Gala and you should make such declaration in the opening ceremony. However, if you are practicing this sentence at home, the sentence you are uttering is not effective, because you are not making the declaration in the right place at the right time.

However, Austin soon found that these Felicity Conditions were not applicable as he imagined. They are just applied to some Performatives. For example, when we use Performatives, we do not necessarily need to obey these conditions. We can use ―I give my word‖ to replace ―I promise‖, or even we can use Constatives to replace Performatives. For example: ―I’ll come at nine o’clock‖. On the other hand, Constatives also need Felicity Condition.

―The present King of France is bald‖ is not suitable for the present French political system.

Since these conditions cannot be the effective distinctions between Performatives and Constatives, Austin began to find another way to distinguish them. He focused his eyes on grammatical difference between Performatives and Constatives. He found that so many Performatives use First Person Singular, Present Tense, Active Voice, and Indicative Mood. Can these be the signs for a sentence to be Perfomative? Absolutely not. Austin found that Performatives also can use First Person Plural, Second Person, even Third Person, Past Tense, Passive Voice and Imperative Voice. Look at the following examples:

Ex. a) We promise to clean the room afterwards.

b) You are hereby authorized to pay for the purchase.

c) Passengers are warned to cross the track by bridge only.

d) Turn right

Although there are obvious difference between Performatives and Constatives, they also share many commonalities. Above all, they can be transformed into the other form by another expression without violating the rules. Such as (I promise to finish it on time = I will finish it on time). The original purpose to divide sentences into Performatives and Constatives is to intensify that some words are deeds. Or rather, sometimes to say something is to do something. However, Austin found that whenever we say something can be regarded as we do something. Therefore, it seems worthless to distinguish Perfomatives and Constatives and every problem should be reconsidered from ground up again. Then, a theory of the Illocutionary Act is crying out for attention.

Part II A Theory of the Illocutionary Act

Since the distinction between Performatives and Constatives cannot well satisfy the Speech Act Theory, Austin put forward another more effective

theory—the Theory of the Illocutionary Act. In the later part of How to Do Things with Words, Austin made a fresh start on the problem and considered it from the ground up again, i.e. in what sense to say something is to do something. As he put it, ―every sentence can be used to fulfill an act‖. Why can every sentence be used to fulfill an act? Austin claimed that when someone speaks, he actually completes three actions: Locutionary Act（说话

行为）; Illocutionary Act（行事行为）; Perlocutionary Act（取效行为）.Here, we just focus our analysis on the Illocutionary Act.

Austin emphasized that fulfilling a Locutinary act is fulfilling an Illocutionary act. For example, when we are fulfilling a locutionary act, we also finish these actions: put forward or answer a question, provide information and promise, declare a verdict or purpose and various similar actions. Now we can give a definition to the Illocutionary act: An act which is to show the speak er’s intension. i.e. to show why the speaker say like that, or rather, to show what the speaker means by saying that. In other words, when we speak, we not only produce some units of language with certain meaning, but also make clear our purpose in producing them, the way we intend them to be understood, or they also have certain forces as Austin prefers to say. Although Austin acknowledged that ―force‖ can be regarded as part of

―meaning‖, he claimed that it is better to distinguish ―force‖ from ―meaning‖ just as distinguish ―sense‖ from ―reference‖.

However, Jonathan Cohen violently opposed the Theory of the Illocutionary Act. He said that the it is meaningless to distinguish ―force‖ from ―meaning‖, or rather, it is rather difficult to recognize which is ―force‖ and which is ―meaning‖ in one sentence. For example, in the following two sentences, it is hard to separate ―force‖ from ―meaning‖. In other words,

―force‖ and ―meaning‖ are the same in the two sentences:

Ex. a) Is it raining?

b) I ask whether it is raining.

Both of these two sentences are asking whether it is raining or not, so the ―force‖ equals to ―meaning‖ in the two sentences. However, we should acknowledge that Austin’s distinguishing ―force‖ from ―meaning‖ is reasonable. For example, someone may say to you: ―You are a fool‖, and then you may ask: ―What do you mean?‖ You ask like this, not because you don’t understand the sense of the word ―fool‖ and the reference of the word ―You‖. What you do not really understand is the purpose of the speaker. On the other hand, you probably know the intension of the speaker, but ―What do you mean?‖ shows your disagreement to other’s comments. The example perfectly shows that ―force‖ and ―meaning‖ can be distinguished. Even in Cohen’s example: ―Is it raining?‖ , ―I ask whether it is raining.‖, the two sentence have different forces. We can use ―Is it raining?‖ to inquire whether we can go out, whether we should take an umbrella. However, when we say ―I ask whether it is raining‖, we may not be satisfied with other’s answer to

―Is it raining?‖ Therefore, two sentences with the same meaning have different forces.

John Searle, the student of Austin, also acknowledged that it is difficult to distinguish Locutionary Act and Illocutionary Act, but he has his own solution to this problem, that is, use other technical words to replace Locutionary Act. Austin once divided Locutionary Act into three small acts: Phonetic Act（发音行为）, Phatic Act（措辞行为）, Rhetic Act（表意行为）.

Ex. a) He said: ―Get out!‖------Phatic Act

b) He told me to get out.--------Rhetic Act

c) She said: ―Are they at home or school?‖--------Phatic Act

d) She asked whether they were at home or school.-------Rhetic Act

From these examples, we can conclude that the verbs ―tell‖ and ―ask‖ we use are just Illocutionary Verbs. Therefore, we can safely say that Phatic Act overlaps the Illocutionary Act to some extend. How to solve this problem? Searle suggested that we use ―Propositional Act‖ to replace ―Phatic Act‖, and

remain the other three acts. In Searle’s opinion, Propositional Act sequals to Reference（指称）and Statement（陈述）.Thus, the distinction between Locutionary Act and Illocutionary Act became the distinction among the four acts: Phonetic Act, Phatic Act, Propositional Act and Illocutionary Act.

Here, I should point another interesting point that how to translate the Illocutionary Act into Chinese. In the early days, some scholars just translated it into ―言外行为‖for the sake of convenience. What is more, “言外行为”can well fit up with Chinese term ―言外之意‖. However, we cannot agree with this translation, because the prefix –il does not mean ―not‖, it means ―in‖, ―within‖. Austin once emphasized: ―There is yet a further sense in which to perform a locutionary act, and therein an Illocutionary act, may also be to perform an act of another kind.‖ Therefore, we can clearly see that Illocutionary Act means that there is another act within the Locutionary Act. Actually, as a Chinese, we must be familiar with the extra meaning(言外之意), because our language is full of colorful meanings. We Chinese people love deeply digging out words’ meaning. Chinese Poetry is a good example which has packed so many meanings into one single word or phrase, waiting to be felt and realized. However, in my opinion, “言外之意”is still not the perfect translation to Illocutionary Act, because we ignored the word ―Act‖. ―言外之意‖ refers to the meaning below the surface –the extra meaning, but the illocutionary act can be one act from two different perspectives. Definitely, Locutionary Act and Illocutionary Act are the same acts within one sentence. When we fulfill one act, the other is just completed at the same time. Therefore, we also cannot translate Illocutionary act into ―言外之意‖. As to how to correctly and beautifully translate Illocutionary Act, scholars tried their best, but the outcome still not satisfactory. At present, ―行事行为‖ is a widely accepted translation. Professor Jiang Wangqi once tried to translate Illocutionary act

into ―话中行为‖, Loctionary Act as ―发话行为‖, Perlocutionary Act as ―话后行为‖. We still expect the better translating version to come into being.

Work Cited: 姜望琪《当代语用学》

Austin How to Do Things with Words

语料

Ex. a) I declare the Spring Gala open.