Initial Conditions and Incentives for Arab Economic Integration Can the European Community

Initial Conditions and Incentives for Arab Economic Integration: Can the European Community’s Success Be Emulated?*

Bernard Hoekman

World Bank and CEPR

Patrick Messerlin

Institut d’Etudes Politiques, Paris

Abstract: EC ‘trade fundamentals’ prevailing in the 1960s are compared with those applying in Arab countries today. The fundamentals differ significantly—Arab countries trade much less with each other than EC members did, and the importance of such trade in GDP varies greatly. This suggests that a viable Arab integration strategy must follow a path that differs from the preferential trade liberalization-led approach implemented by the EC. An alternative is to complement long-standing attempts to liberalize merchandise trade with an effort that revolves around service sector reforms and liberalization. This may prove to be an effective mechanism to support reforms as in principle there is a major constituency in each Arab country that has an interest in improving the performance of services—the natural resource-based and manufacturing sectors. A key condition for such an approach to be feasible is that Arab cooperation helps overcome political economy resistance to national, unilateral action, or, generates direct gains from cooperation in specific policy areas. The EC experience suggests that a services-based integration strategy will be complex and must be carefully designed and sequenced. Given the importance of services-related trade and logistics transactions costs, a first step might focus on bringing such costs down through a concerted joint effort.

Keywords: Middle East, trade agreements, economic integration, services liberalization JEL classification: F13, F15, O53

World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2921, October 2002

The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. Policy Research Working Papers are available online at https://www.wendangku.net/doc/ad16056063.html,.

* Versions of this paper were presented at the conference “Economic Integration Among Arab States,” Egyptian Center for Economic Studies, Cairo, October 21, 2001 and the 4th Mediterranean Development Forum, Amman, October 7-8, 2002. We thank Mustapha Nabli, Mounir Abdel Nour, Ahmed Galal, Heba Handoussa, Denise Konan, Maurice Schiff and participants in the meetings for helpful comments and Francis Ng for assistance with the data. This paper draws in part on a study for the Council on Foreign Relations that appeared as Hoekman and Messerlin (2002). Financial support by the Council on Foreign Relations is gratefully acknowledged by Messerlin.

Introduction

Regional integration is a central element of the trade strategies that are being pursued by many Arab countries All countries in the region have concluded numerous bilateral agreements to reduce trade barriers on a preferential basis. Many members of the Arab League are engaged in an effort to abolish tariffs on intra-Arab trade flows altogether. Most Arab countries around the Mediterranean have also signed free trade agreements with the European Community (EC). The latter aim at the elimination of tariffs on trade in goods with the EC (with the exception of agriculture) and also embody elements of

‘deeper’ integration—provisions calling for cooperation in trade-related regulatory areas and future negotiation to liberalize investment and services flows.

While preferential trade liberalization efforts between Arab countries have been limited in scope, this is beginning to change with the implementation of the 1998 Arab League Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), which obliges signatories to gradually eliminate tariffs by 2006 (Zarrouk, 2000). However, the GAFTA is a traditional agreement that is limited to merchandise trade. In contrast to the EC treaty, the GAFTA does not imply the creation of a common market for services, investment and other factor flows. Nor does it involve the establishment of common institutions to address regulatory issues.

This paper asks what can be learned from the European integration experience for efforts to pursue Arab integration. We do not address the issue whether there is (or will be) political support for greater economic integration—instead we investigate what the incentives are for Arab countries to pursue alternative forms of regional economic cooperation. The approach we take is to identify the initial conditions that prevailed in the EC and to describe how European member states dealt with major political obstacles to integration through the design of institutions. We then compare EC ‘trade fundamentals’ to those that apply in the current Arab context. We conclude that the fundamentals differ significantly, suggesting that Arab integration will have to follow a path that goes beyond a purely merchandise trade liberalization-based approach.

One alternative path that is identified is a service-sector driven integration strategy. Given the importance of improving service sector performance in many Arab countries and the potential gains from regional cooperation in the regulatory domain, this

may be a more effective route towards greater integration, not just regionally—where there is only limited potential and thus likely to be limited political support—but into the world economy more generally. The EC experience suggests a services-based integration strategy will be complex and should be carefully designed and sequenced. Intra-Arab cooperation in this area could start by focusing on addressing high logistics and trade-related transactions costs (trade facilitation), establishing focal points and benchmarks for pro-competitive regulation of key ‘backbone’ service sectors such as transport, distribution and communications, and a concerted effort to remove entry barriers and government restrictions on competition more generally.

1. Key Dimensions of the EC

The basic principle guiding the formation of modern Europe has been to use an economic process for a fundamentally political goal: “an ever closer union of the peoples of Europe” (Treaty of Rome, preamble, first paragraph). It is important to understand that this goal was based on a number of historical and economic factors.1 For one, the notion of integration had a long history. For example, in the nineteenth century, Europe had been integrated through force of arms by Napoleon, which led to a significant convergence in legislation and administrative procedures. Also relevant was how numerous German states had combined through the mechanism of the Zollverein into a federal Germany. However, more recent history played the primary role in the formation of the EC, in particular the Second World War. The desire to prevent war was an overriding objective of many of those who supported European integration in the 1950s. There was a strong perception that there was a positive correlation between trade and peace.2

Before the war European countries relied heavily on trade with each other. The collapse of trade in the 1930-40s provided a strong incentive to remove the barriers that had been built up. The challenge was to satisfy the political need to maintain critical national industries and the support of powerful interest groups while allowing for greater

1 What follows draws in part from Messerlin (2001). See Milward (1992) for a historical analysis of European economic integration.

2 Mansfield (1994) has concluded that, controlling for other factors, there is a robust negative relationship between the volume of trade between country pairs and the probability of a war between them.

gains from trade to be captured. As is well known, the inter-war years had been characterized by large-scale intervention in trade and beggar thy neighbor competitive devaluations. The objective of integrating Europe provided the foundation of a mechanism to reopen European markets.

An important feature of the EC is the success it has had in managing the trade-off between net economic costs and political benefits for members. Europeans eager to create some kind of federal Europe were ready to adopt a series of policies that are more interventionist and costly from an economic efficiency point of view than Europeans “merely” interested in peaceful coexistence between European states. The search for balance between economic and political aspects has played a major role in the Community’s history. Political objectives were critical in the development of the EC, in the sense that costly decisions from an economic perspective were possible because of associated political gains. A consequence of this is that perceptions that the political gains from European integration are decreasing require a reduction in the economic costs of European unification to maintain the balance. Political gains from integration are subject to diminishing returns. The political idea of a perpetual peace between France and Germany had a profound appeal to Europeans born before the 1960s. However, as of 2001, the idea of a Franco-German war is so remote that younger Europeans do not see the need to pay the economic costs that previous generations of Europeans were ready to pay. Such shifting balances have led to efforts by the EC to expand membership and deepen integration, and help explain why external protection has fallen over time.

Institutions

The basic constituent elements of the EC are well known. A major objective of the Treaty of Rome, which established the European Economic Community, was the realization of the four freedoms: free internal movement of goods, services, labor and capital, including the right of establishment. Thus, the EC aims to establish a common market with a common external commercial policy. The Community is unique in that it goes beyond inter-governmental cooperation. This is reflected, inter alia, in the fact that EC law has direct effect and that there are supra-national institutions—an executive (the European Commission), a political oversight body (the European Council); a judiciary—the

European Court of Justice (ECJ), and a (directly elected) European Parliament. Of these the Commission and the ECJ have been the most important in the pursuit of political and economic integration.

The supranational institutions of the EC have played a major role in the process of integration. The Commission has been the driver and guardian of the integration objective. It has the power to propose directives and regulations, which, if approved by the Council, and increasingly the Parliament, become EC law. As these laws have direct effect, they supersede national legislation in the area concerned. The Commission is a bureaucracy, staffed by nationals of the EC who are formally independent of their governments. The Council provides national level political oversight, comprising of the relevant Ministers of member states, or Heads of State, depending on the subject matter under consideration. The Council must approve all Commission proposals, working either on the basis of unanimity or weighted voting, again depending on the topic. Over time, an increasing number of issues have become subject to voting.

The Commission administers the common policies of the EC, including trade and agriculture—the two most important areas.3 It also enforces the various treaties that have been concluded or amended over time. Of great importance here is enforcement of rules on ‘fair’ competition—disciplines on state aids (subsidies) and restrictive business practices by firms that have the effect of impeding trade (and the realization of an integrated internal market). The Commission has an interest in both expan ding its ambit—through promulgation of new rules in the pursuit of integration—and in enforcing the negotiated rules of the game. The Commission, an independent European bureaucracy with its own financing—partly obtained from the revenues generated by the common external tariff—has been a defender of the European integration objective in times when member states have been less than enthusiastic (Winters, 1997). The Commission played a major role, for example, in forming a coalition with the private sector in the 1980s to re-vitalize integration through the proposal of the Single Market Program (‘EC-1992’). This proved to be a powerful instrument to move further towards

3 The Treaty of Rome grants the Community (not the Commission, but a complex mixture of the Council of Ministers and the Commission) the exclusive competence in trade policy. However, the way the Treaty defines the scope of this common and exclusive competence is rather clumsy. Article 133 (113 in the initial

achieve the objective of economic integration by introducing the principle of mutual recognition and ‘competition in rules’ and taking a series of concrete measures to enhance competition on services markets. This resulted in a boom in FDI inflows and cross-border mergers and acquisitions, and induced the accession of a number of countries that concluded that the costs of being outside the EC had become greater than the benefits.

The Commission plays a major role in administering various mechanisms that redistribute income and resources across groups in the EC. Any trade liberalization will give rise to losers, who depending on their political power, may need to be compensated. Indeed, if powerful, such compensation is a precondition for liberalization to occur, unless there are other groups in society whose gains are sufficient to induce them to mobilize against those who benefit from status quo trade restrictions. The compensation required to make trade reform politically feasible can take the form of an exception to trade liberalization, long transition periods, transfers from the budget (subsi dies), or issue linkage. All of these mechanisms were used in the EC. The common policies on trade and agriculture were designed carefully to maintain relatively higher rates of protection for

‘sensitive’ industries, complemented by transfers (subsidies) to disadvantaged regions and soft lending by the European Investment Bank for infrastructure and related types of projects.

The second major player in the integration venture has been the ECJ, which over time developed a huge case law interpreting the validity (legality) of national policies. As the ultimate arbiter, the ECJ’s decisions are final and binding on the member states. The ECJ played a key role in the design of the Single Market Program by identifying the significant scope that existed for the principle of mutual recognition to overcome national non-trade policies that impeded cross-border competition (see below). More generally, it has ensured objective and consistent application and interpretation of EC law.

Treaty of Rome) only provides a non-exhaustive list of trade policy instruments. As a result, determining what is and what is not covered required decades of rulings by the ECJ.

Trade and Trade Policy

The first milestone in the realization of the common market was the creation of a customs union, that is, the adoption of a common external tariff (CET) and the implementation of internal trade liberalization. To a very large extent trade and trade policy constituted th e glue that held the EC together.

Trade: In the mid-1950s, each of the six founding EC Member states exported more than 25% of their total exports to the rest of the Community and all of them together represented more than 18% of intra-EC trade (except Italy with only 11%). Thus, all the founding members had both a substantial stake in intra-European liberalization of trade, and enough ‘power’ to play a role (have a voice) in the process of the creation of the EC. Germany, the largest member country, exported almost 30% of its total exports to the rest of the EC, accounting for one third of total intra-EC trade. This ‘initial condition’ is of great importance in understanding the success of the EC—members not only had great political interest in cementing a binding peace, but also had great economic interest in revitalizing and further expanding intra-European trade. Note that the trade involved merchandise. Trade in services, labor and capital was quite limited, in contrast to other parts of the world.

Trade policy: Agreeing to a CET is a major source difficulty for many customs unions. The more unbalanced are initial tariffs across prospective members, the harder the task, unless high protection countries are seeking to use the customs union as an instrument to liberalize trade. Agreeing on a CET and applying it has been among the most difficult aspects of implementing customs unions—as illustrated by the GCC, as well as many other attempts to form a customs union (World Bank, 2001). Sustaining the CET can be equally if not more difficult. Any common tariff will imply adjustment pressure as industries relocate. Industry interests will diverge across countries. Thus, in the nineteenth century the American South objected strenuously to the high protective tariffs sought by US ‘infant’ industries, which were mostly located in the North. The tariffs raised production costs in the South and implied a transfer of resources to the North, exacerbating the tensions that led to the US civil war. Similar tensions associated with industrial agglomeration and implicit transfers helped cause the demise of the East African Common Market (World Bank, 2001).

The initial conditions confronting EC members regarding the formation of the CET were relatively favorable. The EC created its common tariff from four initial tariff schedules (as Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg were already a single customs territory, the Benelux, with a common tariff schedule). Two territories (Germany and Benelux) had rather low tariffs, and two (France and Italy) relatively high tariffs—an ideal circumstance for using the simplest possible harmonization rule: the unweighted average of the four tariff schedules. This greatly facilitated agreement on the level of the external tariff, limiting disputes between EC member states to those tariff lines where duty rates were different enough to make everybody unsatisfied by the outcome of the unweighted average method. There were a non-negligible number of such cases—about 20 percent of all tariff lines (Messerlin, 2001). The GATT helped resolve many of these conflicts by lowering tariffs across the board through multilateral negotiating rounds—making the results of the averaging method more palatable to the more open Member states, while offering compensation to more protectionist members through better access to global export markets.

As discussed below, liberalization of internal trade was accompanied by managed trade in key sectors such as coal, steel and agriculture, as well as the implementation of a common external trade policy. The latter played a major role in the EC, and to some extent became a substitute for foreign policy. The absence of other means for the EC to take international action—there being no common foreign policy—induced it to carve out zones of political influence through the intensive use of discriminatory trade agreements. These agreements have had almost no economic impact on the EC. Rather, their role has been to strengthen the hegemony of certain EC member states or to establish this. The primary example of this over the past 40 years, is the role EC trade policy played in supporting the ‘territorial expansion’ of the EC, which grew from the 6 founding members in 1957 to 9 (1973), 10 (1981), 12 (1986), and 15 (1995) member states (leaving aside the direct enlargement to eastern Germany in 1990, which had been prepared for since the Community’s birth, and was confirmed by special trade arrangements between the former German Democratic Republic and the EC starting in the 1960s).

Common Sectoral Policies

European integration has been driven in part by two sectoral ‘engines’: agriculture and coal/steel. In both areas the EC has common policies. In both cases, the focus of the common policy is on managing production and trade. In the case of coal and steel, the 1951 Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the precursor of the EC, reflected a strong tradition of collusion between steel firms backed by national governments.4 In the early 1950s intra-EC free trade in steel was impossible given German comparative advantages—substituting prevailing private barriers for public management and control thus made a lot of political sense. But the price paid was to inhibit and distort competition in this industry for the next five decades. Perhaps equally, if not more important, it also provided a demonstration effect for other sectors, which were given an incentive to push for and support industrial policies that benefited them.

Although the coal and steel indu stries were of fundamental importance in the design and launch of the European integration effort—not least because they were seen as a major potential source of conflict between France and Germany—agriculture was equally important. In all 6 founding members, farmers in the early 1950s constituted a significant share of the labor force and GDP. Managed trade in this sector was seen as a necessary condition to pursue integration more broadly. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) aimed to: (1) increase farm productivity, (2) ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, (3) stabilize markets, and (4) assure the availability of supplies at reasonable prices. Until the early 1990s, the CAP was essentially based on using one instrument (price supports) to reach all these objectives, causing steadily increasing distortions and costs. The political rationale for the CAP—as in the case of coal and steel—was that free trade, even in principle, was neither feasible nor desirable. As far as the two major players were concerned, Germany wanted access to the large

4 The ECSC provisions were influenced by the “Entente Internationale de l’Acier” (International Steel Cartel), set up in 1926 by steel makers from Belgium, France, Germany, Saarland, and Luxembourg. The "Entente" reflected the prevailing view that cartels were a good mechanism to ensure market stability in the context of intra-European trade liberalization. The ECSC pricing rules (broadly similar to the US Pittsburgh basing point system abandoned in 1924 following an antitrust order) were a major element of ‘managed trade’ in this sector.

French market, which was highly protected—as were almost all EC markets— but could be bought off by the promise of higher prices for agricultural produce (Winters, 1997).

Over time, virtually all agricultural goods became subject to common market organizations (CMOs). Until the 1992 CAP reform, the CMOs relied essentially on a set of multiple guaranteed prices determined on an annual (or half-yearly) basis by the Council of Ministers. Because these guaranteed prices were unrelated to world prices, the CAP required import barriers to insulate the product markets concerned from the world market. These barriers took the form of variable import levies. Adjusted on a daily basis, these raised import prices to the level prevailing in the EC. In the 1970s, export subsidies began to be necessary to dump surpluses into world markets. In an effort to limit excess supply caused by high guaranteed prices. As of the 1980s the CAP imposed such a budgetary burden on the Community that quantitative limits on production were imposed, voluntary set-aside programs were adopted, and subsidies were granted to low-income consumers to increase demand.

The CAP was a great success in terms of expanding output and increasing self-sufficiency in food. Indeed, it was too successful—imposing serious budgetary strains and, more importantly for the rest of the world, imposing major costs on non-European food producers and generating decades of multilateral tension. Although the raison d’etre for the CAP has largely disappeared, agricultural reform remains highly contentious in the EC. Support for agricultural and related rural policies to support farmers remains strong, although increasing driven by environmental and public heal th concerns—which ironically are due in part to the production-increasing incentives of the CAP.

Domestic regulation

It has been argued that Europe could not make much progress toward trade liberalization until “it was discovered ... that further progress depended on ... some policy of ‘positive’ integration ... because the removal of discriminatory policies threatened to undermine just as many entrenched interests as [policy integration] would have done.” (Milward 1984, p. 421). The rhetoric of EC policy makers and their advisors suggested that ‘deeper’ integration—extending to domestic regulatory regimes and economic policies—was necessary to attain intra-EC free trade. Policy makers such as Jelle Zijlstra, the Dutch

Minister of Economic Affairs, were not alone in arguing in the early 1950s that credible tariff removal required “common policies on taxes, wages, prices and employment policy” (Milward, 1992, pp. 188ff). Many felt that policy harmonization was required to equalize costs, and that without it a customs union would not be feasible, because countries would impose new forms of protectionist policies. Thus, the Belgian coal mining industry argued in the late 1940s that a common market could only be accepted if German wage and social security costs were raised to Belgian levels.5 French officials persistently demanded policy harmonization in the social area—equal pay for both sexes, a uniform length of the working week—as a precondition for trade liberalization, given that French standards were higher than in other countries.

Underlying these concerns was generally a fear by interest groups of an erosion of rents, or a worry that domestic policies may be used to re-impose protection. Abstracting from the common policies for coal/steel and agriculture—where managed trade and production was seen as desirable and necessary—in a number of policy areas the EC established disciplines on the ability of governments to use domestic policy instruments as a substitute for trade policy. Disciplines on enterprise behavior that impedes the realization of the common market and on government assistance—subsidies—were enforced by the Commission with varying degrees of intensity, but had an important effect on ensuring that the ‘conditions of competition’ became more equitable over time.

A noteworthy feature of the EC has been actions towards ‘deeper’ integration through harmonization of national policies dealing with regulatory objectives. This focused on efforts to limit the market segmenting effects of national regulations pertaining to health and safety. Progress toward harmonization was very slow, in part because adoption of a Community-wide norm required unanimity. It took 14 years for agreement to be reached on the composition of fruit jams; 11 for a directive on mineral water (Vogel, 1995). Over 1962-79 only nine directives on foodstuffs were adopted.

In 1979, the ECJ threw out a German ban on the sale of a French product (Cassis de Dijon) used to prepare an aperitif (kir) because it could not be justified on the basis of

5 In the discussion of proposals for a European customs union in the early 1950s, virtually every question that came to be addressed in the Maastricht treaty was discussed: a common European currency, monetary policy, whether there should be freedom of labor, mutual recognition of professional qualifications, a

public safety or health. This established the principle that goods legally introduced into circulation in one member state could not be barred from entering and being sold in another. This principle was later incorporated into the 1987 Single European Act and the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Union. The “new” approach differentiates between standards that have health and safety (public interest) dimensions from those that did not. For the latter it made harmonization redundant by requiring governments to accept foreign regulations as equivalent to their own. For the former a process of determining common minimum standards (“essential requirements”) was agreed to. Progress towards development of these standards was made easier by a decision to accept qualified majority voting on issues affecting the functioning and completion of the single market, and defining standardization as a Single Market Programme issue.

In sum, integration in the EC was driven very much by the engine of trade in goods—all members had strong incentives to see intra-EC trade liberalized. Trade in services and factors of production—labor, capital—played only a minor role. The EC’s success was based in part on an almost perfect balance of economic power. It was

‘financed’ by three large countries (France, Germany and Italy) of almost equal size in terms of population and income, and two smaller countries—but large and skilled enough to play the key role of mediators (Belgium and the Netherlands). These countries had almost perfectly symmetrical and large stakes in the EC endeavor. The EC founding countries traded more than 30 percent of their total external trade with the other members. This mutual trade dependence and relative symmetry allowed the EC to use trade liberalizati on as a vehicle for integration—there was no need to rely significantly on integration of services or labor markets to achieve the members’ goals.

This balance was maintained in the enlargement process—the initial balances were never seriously put into question. Britain was as powerful as France or Germany, and Spain was comparable to Italy. Other new members were similar in size to the smaller founding countries. A retrospective sense of the ‘luck’ that accompanied the birth and development of the EC during its first fifty years is best provided by the sudden, but short-lived, hesitations in Europe that accompanied German reunification. Britain and

common company law, a free capital market, or common workplace and products safety standards (Milward, 1992, p. 191).

France immediately showed old instinctive reactions of fear, while other member states also demonstrated concerns. These reactions suggest that the EC would probably not have been founded if there had been a unified Germany.

Integration also had an overriding political objective that was strongly supported by all members—preventing another war in Europe. The EC is the child of three terrible wars (1870, 1914 and 1939) that were responsible for millions of deaths in the six EC founding countries. It was born in a world divided into two political and economic regimes (market-driven democracies vs. central-planned dictatorships). During its first 30 years, it grew under the constant pressure of the Cold War.

What follows asks to what extent the economic factors that prevailed in the EC apply to the Arab context, focusing in particular on the initial trade ‘dependence’ conditions. As the motor of European integration was to a very large extent the liberalization of intra-regional trade in non-agricultural merchandise (agriculture being the subject of managed trade and EC-wide policies), an obvious question is whether such trade could also be the basis of Arab economic integration.

2. Merchandise Trade Fundamentals in Arab Countries

Countries in the region can be divided fairly naturally into three groups: relatively natural resource-poor countries (less than one third of exports comprise natural resources), oil exporters (more than two thirds of exports consist of natural resources—mostly fuels); and an intermediate group where exports of fuels and ores constitute between one and two-thirds of total exports). For completeness and purposes of comparison we report data for other ‘regional’ countries—Cyprus, Israel, Turkey and Iran—as well as for Arab states.

Small product markets -- nationally and regionally

The economic size of the Arab region is limited. Arab countries th at are members of the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA)—noted with an asterisk in Table 1—represent a little less than Spain’s GDP. Only one Arab country (Egypt) has more than 60 million inhabitants. One implication of the ‘smallness’ of many of the countries in the region is that the costs to trade and investment due to differences in national laws or regulations

are higher than for the EC. (Four EC Member states have a population of more than 60 million, and only two Member states out of fifteen have a population of less than 5 million.) The limited market size of the Arab countries is a crucial factor why all efforts to achieve regional economic integration since the 1950s have failed—even if one leaves aside the fact that they were conceived behind high protection with respect to the rest of the world.

There is another powerful economic force working against integration: Arab countries are relatively similar to each other and compete more with each other for the same export markets. Most Arab countries in the sample are either oil-rich or rely heavily on oil exports. As the fundamental motive for trade is to take advantage of differences in endowments (comparative advantage) between trading partners, this situation suggests limited prospects for large benefits from regional economic integration. Offsetting this is the fact that Arab countries exhibit a wide range of GDP per capita, from less than

US$500 (Yemen) to US$17,000 (UAE and Qatar). Such large income differences generate incentives to trade by inducing product differentiation in order to respond to different incomes and related tastes. But these differences appear too wide for the small markets involved to be a powerful force for significantly greater intra-regional trade. That leaves the possibility of production sharing or processing-type of trade, where labor, energy or water-intensive parts of the production process is undertaken in countries where such factors are in relative abundance. This type of trade has become important in Central Europe, North America, and East Asia. However, a pre-condition for this to materialize is a substantial increase in the efficiency of services (reduction in transaction costs)—discussed further below.

In sum, the data suggest that: (i) the region is fragmented into relatively small economies, and, taken together is relatively small in economic size; (ii) many have similar production structures, which limits their incentives to trade; and (iii) the wide income differences in the region are unlikely to overcome the resulting trade resistance.

Product concentration and differentiation

As natural resources dominate exports of a majority of countries, we have focused so far on “inter-industry” trade. This is based on specialization in production, with countries

producing different products using different factor intensities. Such trade may be associated with a concentrated export structure if the country’s comparative advantage in a limited range of products is very strong. Inter-industry trade is complemented by “intra-industry” trade, involving the exchange of different varieties of similar “products,” or the exchange of goods that form part of a production chain (importing components and exporting the processed goods). In most high-income and newly industrializing countries, intra-industry trade accounts for a large and growing share of total trade.

The scope for intra-industry trade is more limited for fuels than for consumer electronics, but exists even within the oil sector broadly defined. There are many varieties of fuels, and numerous possibilities to produce differentiated oil-based industrial products, such as chemicals. The potential for specialization and intra-industry trade is augmented by the fact that oil and chemical markets are oligopolistic enough to induce the few large firms operating in such markets to follow a policy of profit maximization through market segmentation and product differentiation. More generally, intra-industry trade is driven by economies of scale that make it profitable for enterprises to specialize in similar but differentiated goods, and for countries to exchange these.

Various measures of the structure and composition of trade are reported in Table 2. Two indicators of product concentration in trade are reported: the number of distinct product categories exported, measured at the 3-digit level of the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC),6/ and the “Herfindhal-Hirschmann index” (HHI).7/ As expected, oil-rich countries have concentration indices that are much higher th an those of natural resource poor countries—reflecting the concentration in oil (ores) and oil-derived exports imposed by their very strong comparative advantages in fuels (ores). However, this generalization requires some qualification. The UAE and Saudi Arabia have relatively diverse exports, reflecting entrep?t activity as well as processing and light manufacturing activities in the UAE, and the chemical sector in Saudi Arabia. Note also

6/ The SITC is a UN statistical classification for international trade. There are 239 different SITC items at the 3-digit level. The SITC measure of concentration is defined as the ratio between the number of 3-digit items for which exports exceed US$100,000 and the total number of 3-digit items (there are 239 such items). For small countries an additional criterion of at least a 0.3 percent share in total exports is used.

7/ The HHI is defined as the sum of the squares of the market share of each export item in total exports. The lower the HHI are, the less concentrated exports are. The HHIs are calculated at the 3-digit SITC level.

that the number of product categories exported increased substantia lly in some oil exporters, e.g., in Qatar. The shares of intermediate or resource poor Arab countries are below those of Asian comparator economies, suggesting a narrower industrial base.

In a number of countries, especially Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia there has been a significant diversification of the export base as measured by the SITC indicator. Indeed, on average, the last two decades have seen trade in the region become less concentrated. The HHI index suggests that this trend is more general than the SITC measure—concentration appears to have been falling pretty much across the board. In the case of oil-rich countries this reflects the oil price decline that occurred during this period, which made the production of fuels less profitable compared to th e production of oil-derivatives or other goods. But for a number of countries, especially resource poor or less endowed with oil, it reflects the pursuit of domestic reforms. Egypt registered a particularly large increase in diversification, rising from 33 to 68 percent on the SITC diversification measure, while the HHI fell from 0.58 to 0.28. Similarly large reductions in the HHI occurred in Morocco and Tunisia.

Table 2 also presents data on the magnitude of intra-industry trade.8 The higher the intra-industry trade (IIT) index, the more the trade of a country involves the exchange of different varieties of a similar type of product. IIT of Arab countries is far below the ratios registered by Asian comparators, which have IIT indices in the 0.60 range. Among Arab countries, Tunisia has the highest intensity of IIT (30 percent), followed by Morocco and the UAE. The magnitude of IIT has been growing rapidly in a number of other countries, however, especially Egypt and Jordan. Oil-rich countries exhibit very low IIT indices, due to their comparative advantage in a limited number of products. The UAE is an exception, reflecting the entrep?t trading activity of this economy.

Finally, Table 2 presents data on the share of parts and components in total manufactured exports and imports. This indicator provides information on the relative importance of ‘assembly’ activity in total trade. A high share of components in imports combined with a low share of components in exports is observed in all Arab countries, except Oman. This compares with much higher ratios and more balanced trade for

dynamic exporters in East Asia (Table 2). For countries with relatively high GDP per capita (interpreted as a proxy for relatively high wages), a combination of high import share of components and low export shares suggests a high level of assembly activities for domestic or neighboring markets, and hence a relatively high degree of effective protection against imports of final (assembled) products. Such situations are often the source of large rents for firms (wholesalers or retailers) that are able to import for local assembly. This may also prevail in countries with lower GDP per capita levels, but a low share of components in exports could also mean that these countries are used as assembly centers for re-exports of assembled goods. However, data on outward processing trade collected by the EC suggests this is not the case.

To summarize: (i) most Arab countries tend to have relatively concentrated exports, although this has been changing rapidly for some nations (Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia); (ii) there are low levels of intra-industry trade; and (iii) a high ratio of imports to exports of components. This suggests important assembly activities directed at domestic markets that are likely to require high protection against imports.

Political economy implications of intra-Arab trade patterns

The geographical pattern of exports of Arab countries mirrors what has been said about export structure by product—to a large extent, it is the “corollary” in the geographical context of the economic forces at work in the production, demand, and trade patterns. The share of exports going to other Arab countries ranges from 0.9 (Kuwait) to 13.1 percent (Oman) for oil-rich countries, mirroring the production concentration of these countries (reflecting their comparative advantages in the world markets), and the fact that oil is consumed everywhere in the world (Table 3). For the largest oil producer/exporter (Saudi Arabia), the share is only 7.6 percent. The “hard-core” set of countries that tend to trade substantially with other Arab countries (around 20 percent or more of total exports) is limited to Jordan, Lebanon and Syria (some 34, 45 and 18 percent of total exports,

8 The index is defined as IIT = 1 - [∑∑∑ |X

ijk - M ijk|? (X ijk + M ijk)], where X ijk represents the exports of

products from industry i from country j to country k and M ijk represents the imports of products from industry i by country j from country k. In this study industries are defined at the three digit level of the SITC.

respectively). With the exception of Oman, for all other Arab countries, regional exports

account for less than 10 percent of total exports.9

An important policy question concerning Arab economic integration is whether

these levels of intra-regional trade are ‘too low’ because of barriers to trade. An often

used index of the intensity of regional trade is helpful in determining whether the value of

trade between two countries is above or below what would be expected on the basis of their

importance in world trade. Identification of bilateral combinations where trade is below

expected levels can also help to identify the existence of major barriers to trade. Table 4

reports data on the intensity of trade.10 Values below (above) unity indicate that trade

between two countries is lower (higher) than expected. The data suggest that intra-Arab

trade flows are not consistently lower than what should be expected. The only countries

that trade less with other Arab countries than ‘expected’ are Algeria and Kuwait. The share

of Egypt’s exports to the region is about three times larger than what would be expected.

Trade intensity indices for Jordan and Lebanon are the highest, followed by Syria. Overall,

the intensity index for all regional intra-trade is more than double the ‘expected’ level.

A criticism of the intensity indices is that they do not control for factors such as

GDP and trade costs as determinants of trade flows. A commonly used technique to

incorporate such variables is the gravity model.11 Gravity model regressions on non-oil

trade for th e period 1970-98 suggest that in the 1970s, being located in the Middle East

and North Africa region had no effect on bilateral trade volumes (Chang, 2000). In 1980,

Arab countries’ trade is actually less than predicted by the model. In 1990 and 1998 this

pattern reversed, with intra Arab exports and imports becoming larger than predicted by

the model. Research by Al -Atrash and Yousef (2000) concludes that while intra-regional 9 There is some uncertainty on the direction of trade given weak reporting by several countries.

10

The "trade intensity" index is defined as the share of one country's exports going to a partner divided by

the share of world exports going to the partner. That is, TI ij = [x ij /X it ] ÷ [x wj /X wt ] where x ij and x wt are the

value of i's exports and world exports to j, X it is i's total exports and X wt are total world exports. An index of

more (less) than unity indicates a bilateral trade flow that is larger (smaller) than would be expected given the

partner country's importance in world trade. 11 The gravity model explains bilateral trade between country (i) and country (j). Normally, the amount of

trade is directly proportional to size (income, population, land area, etc.) and inversely proportional to the

distance between trading partners i and j. It is expressed by the following equation: δγγββij j j i i ij D P Y P AY T 2121= where T is the amount of trade between two trading countries, Y is the GDP

of the country, P is the population, and D is the distance between the trading partners. Often additional

variables such as existence of a common border or language are also included as explanatory variables.

trade in the Maghreb and among the Gulf Cooperation Council states is less than predicted, this is not true for the Mashreq countries. Thus, the available evidence is somewhat ambiguous on the question whether intra-regional trade flows are lower than what would be expected given levels of GDP, population and geography. Simple shares and trade intensity indices suggest intra-regional trade is not that low and has been expanding; the gravity regressions suggest that trade is less than what would be expected. However, there has been a noticeable change in the last 10 years, with trade now being larger than what the standard gravity model would predict. (See the Appendix for a brief discussion of trends in bilateral trade over the last 30 years).

Two questions that are particularly relevant for the prospects of trade-led Arab economic integration initiatives deserve attention. First, to what extent do Arab countries that export a lot to the rest of the region (relative to their total exports) also account for a major share of intra-Arab exports? Second, how important are exports to other Arab nations in GDP terms for individual Arab countries? The first question captures the balance between the incentives of each country to go to a hypothetical regional Arab economic integration conference, and its capacity to influence the outcome of such a conference. The second question provides a very rough sense of the importance of intra-Arab trade for the national economy of each prospective member. It can be seen as a crude indicator of the strength of domestic political support for a regional Arab trade option. Despite appearances, trade policy is fundamentally a domestic policy—that is, a set of domestic bargains between conflicting domestic interests. This perspective suggests it is important to ask if there is a sufficiently large domestic coalition in favor of regional trade within key Arab countries. The importance of this question is amplified when it is recognized that a country has alternatives to regional trade. Many Arab countries are already pursuing discriminatory agreements with one (or more) large industrial country(ies). A significant number of countries have signed Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Agreements with the EC. And, of course, many are members of the WTO and have the option of pursuing multilateral liberalization.

The Arab countri es that have substantial exports to other Arab nations (more than $1 billion)—Oman, Saudi Arabia and the UAE—are all oil exporters. These three countries account for almost 60 percent of total intra-Arab trade. As already mentioned,

with the exception of Oman, in none of these cases do intra-regional exports account for more than 10 percent of the country’s total exports (Table 5). In the case of Oman and UAE, these exports are equivalent to 7-8 percent of GDP and go beyond oil and oil derivatives, suggesting there may be significant political support for Arab economic integration in these countries. However, it should be recognized that these are not large countries in the regional context and therefore will have only have a limited capacity to push such an initiative forward. Countries with a high share of their total exports going to the Arab region—such as Jordan, Lebanon and Syria—represent only a small share of total intra-Arab trade (3, 2, and 5 percent, respectively), implying that their potential influence in a regional trade process is also likely to be small.

If we look at the ratio between exports to Arab countries and GDP, in addition to Oman and the UAE, there are three countries where the share is above 5 percent: Bahrain, Jordan, and Syria. This is not insignificant and suggests that these countries have an interest in the pursuit of Arab economic integration. In the case of Saudi Arabia the figure is 3.3 percent; for Tunisia 2.7 percent and for the other countries, Arab trade is less than 2 percent of GDP.

These numbers suggest that the situation is significantly different from that prevailing at the creation of the EC. In the mid-1950s, all prospective EC Member states exported more than 25 percent of their total exports to the rest of the Community. Intra-Arab trade shares are much lower for almost all Arab countries. Moreover, EC trade amounted to more than 3 percent in the domestic GDP of all the future EC Member states (5 percent for Germany), with Italy being the only exception at 2.8 percent. While the Arab trade/GDP ratios for many countries are similar, an important difference is that the variance is much higher—for a number of countries, including Egypt—which would have to be an important member of any integration initiative—the ratio is quite low. Thus, the balance between alternative trade agreements is tilted away from Arab integration.

To summarize: the available data suggest that: (i) intra-Arab trade is not less than what would be expected given fundamentals, especially for non-Maghreb countries; (ii) economies that sell a large share of their exports to the region (the potential ‘hard-core’ supporters of Arab economic integration) account for small shares of total intra-Arab trade; (iii) conversely, for countries accounting for a large share in total intra-Arab trade,

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儿少分章节重点考试资料缩印版

名词解释 儿童少年卫生学：是保护和促进儿童少年身心健康的科学,是预防医学的重要组成部分。 生长（growth）：指细胞繁殖、增大和细胞间质增加，表现为组织、器官、身体各部分乃至全身的大小、长短、重量的增加和身体成分的变化，为量变。 发育（development）：指细胞、组织的分化和功能的不断完善，心理智力的发展和运动技能的获得，为质变。 成熟：指生长和发育达到一个相对完备的阶段，，标志着个体形态、生理功能、心理素质等方面都已达到成人水平，具备独立生活和生养下一代的能力。 成熟度：专指某一特定生长发育指标当时达到的水平占成人水平的百分比。 生长发育可塑性：指人体结构、功能为适应环境变化和生活经历而发生改变的能力。 生长发育指标体系：体格发育指标，体能发育指标，心理行为发育指标 儿少卫生学的研究对象是从出生后的婴儿到发育成熟的青年，年龄范围为0~25岁。重点对象是中小学生群体，在此基础上向学龄前儿童和大学生群体延伸。三个鲜明的发展特征：1.高度重视主要服务对象——中小学生的三大特点：正在旺盛生长发育；生长的同时在接受教育；集体生活在学校这一特殊环境里。2.制定工作目标和提出干预措施时，不仅关注生长发育及其影响因素，学生常见病和伤害防治，而且充分考虑其心理-情绪-行为发展特征和实际需求。3.核心任务是针对青春期少年的身心发展过渡性特点和特殊问题，提供良好的教育、保健和医疗服务。 主要研究内容：生长发育、疾病防治、心理卫生、教育过程卫生、学校健康教育、学校卫生监督和学校建筑设备卫生。 生长发育的一般规律：1.遗传与环境的交互作用。2.生长发育的阶段性和连续性的统一：阶段性：婴儿0-1，幼儿前期1-3，幼儿期3-6，童年期5-12，青春期10-20 女孩比男孩早1~2年，青年期18-25。3.生长发育速度的不均衡性：整个生长期内个体的生长速度有时快，有时慢，是不平衡的。第一突增期：胎儿4个月开始至出生后一年，身长（胎儿中期4-6个月）体重（胎儿后期7-9个月）；第二突增期;青春期（女9-11至13-15 男11-13至15-17）； （1）突增期意义：1补充适当的营养2保证充足的睡眠3保证足够的锻炼。4各系统生长模式的时间顺序性与统一协调性：生长发育过程中，各组织、器官的生长模式在时间进程上是不同的。（2）程序性：1头尾发展律（胎儿期和婴幼儿期，由上至下、由近而远） 2近侧发展律（瘦的精细动作，近-远，粗-细，简单-复杂）3向心律（童年期和青春期，下肢先于上肢，四肢早于躯干）。（3）Scammon生长模式：1一般型：肌肉、骨骼脏器等，两次突增；2神经系统型：发育最早，一次突增，先快后稳；3淋巴系统型：发育最旺盛，一次突增，有升有降；4生殖系统型：发育开始最晚，一次突增，先慢后快。5.子宫型：子宫，肾上腺发育在出生时较大，其后迅速变小，青春期开始前才恢复到出生时的大小；其后迅速增大。（4）生长轨迹现象和生长关键期：1生长轨迹现象：在外环境五特殊变化的条件下，个体儿童的发育过程比较稳定，呈现一种轨迹现象，其中遗传基因起关键作用；2赶上生长：因某种因素生长发育受阻的儿童，在阻碍生长的因素被克服后表现出的加速生长，并恢复到正常轨迹的现象；3生长关键期：生长关键期是器官和组织的快速生长期，此时受到干扰，常导致永久性的缺陷和功能性障碍。 体能：是指人体具备的能胜任日常工作和学习而不感到疲劳，同时有余力能充分享受休闲娱乐生活，又可应付突发紧急状况的能力。（体能发育过程的不均衡性、阶段性、不平衡性和性别特征） 体成分（身体成分）：指人体总重量中不同身体成分的构成比例，属化学生长的范畴。（体成分的两成分模型由体脂重和去脂体重） 青春期（adolescence）：是个体从童年向成年的逐渐过渡的时期，是生长发育过程中的一个极其重要的阶段。青春期的年龄区间为10~20岁，WHO把青春期定义为这样一个时期：1.是个体从出现第二性征到性成熟的生理发展过程；2.是个体从儿童认知方式发展到成人认知方式的心理过程；3.是个体从社会经济的依赖性到相对独立状态的过渡。女性青春期的时间跨度一般为10~18岁，男孩为12~20岁。 青春期的发育特点：1.体格生长加速，以身高为代表的形态指标出现第二次生长突增；2.各内脏器官体积增大、重量增加，功能日趋成熟；3.内分泌功能活跃，与生长发育有关的激素分泌明显增加；4.生殖系统功能发育骤然加快，迅速成熟，到青春晚期已具有繁殖后代的能力；5.男女外生殖器和第二性征迅速发育，使两性的外部形态特征差异更明显；6.青春期心理发展骤然加快，产生相应的心理-行为变化，可能出现一些青春期特有的心理-行为问题。 青春期发育类型：早熟型（盆宽窄肩的矮胖体型，突增维持1年左右）、晚熟型（瘦高，维持2年以上）、一般型（介于二者之间，维持两年左右） 矮身材：身高低于其性别--年龄组正常值的第三百分位P3。垂体性侏儒症、甲状腺功能低下症、遗传代谢性疾病、生长迟缓、家族性矮身材、体质性生长迟缓。高身材指个体的身高高于其性别年龄相应标准的第97百分位数以上。按原因分：家族性高身材、体质性生长发育加速、巨人症。 性早熟（sexual preiocity）：是一种以性成熟提前为特征的性发育异常，一般指男9岁以前出现睾丸增大，女8岁前出现乳房增大活10岁前出现月经初潮。一般分真性性早熟，由下丘脑-垂体-性腺轴过早启动引起；假性性早熟，多因性腺或肾上腺皮质肿瘤等导致性激素分泌过多，环境污染物种的激素成分，外源性性激素药物，含性激素制剂的不当应用也可引起；部分性早熟，患儿仅有某一方面的单独提前发育现象、不伴随其他异常表现；体质性性早熟，女孩8~8.5岁前出现第二特征指标一项以上发育或10岁前来初潮男孩9~9.5岁前出现睾丸增大或阴毛生长，本质上属健康人群。 青春期性发育障碍(delay puberty)：一般指男童14岁未出现睾丸增大，女童13岁未出现乳房发育为判断标准。 影响生长发育的因素有：遗传和环境因素，其中前者决定了生长发育的可能性，即决定了生长发育的潜力。后者决定了生长发育的现实性。即在不同程度上影响该潜力的正常发挥，决定发育的速度以及最终可达到的程度。①遗传因素：遗传的家族.种族影响：如家族聚集性和种族差异，是遗传影响的具体表现，身高、 性成熟早晚、生长突增模式、月经初潮年龄，都与家 庭遗传有关，种族影响对个体的体型、躯干、和四肢 的长度的比例等作用很大；双生子研究。②环境因素： 1）营养2）体育锻炼3）疾病4）生活作息制度5） 气候和季节6）环境污染7）社会家庭因素。 双生子研究：MZ同卵，DZ异卵 遗传度：是衡量遗传、环境因素各自对表型性状总变 异相对作用大小。越接近1，遗传作用越大。 生长发育调查方法含义以及特点：1）横断面调查； 在某一较短时间和一定地区范围内，选择有代表性的 对象对某几种指标的一次性大标本调查。特点：通过 其，可在短期内获得大量的资料。在一个较大地区范 围内通过调查得出某项指标的正常值，建立该地区儿 童少年生长发育的标准；也可将本地区本人群的调查 结果与其他地区人群结果作比较，以了解本地区儿童 少年的生长发育水平，并作为评价本地区儿童少年保 健工作效果依据；对同地区同人群的连续多次调查， 可比较不同时期的动态变化，分析生长长期趋势。调 查规模达时间短，需较多测试人员，调查前应该有详 细的计划严格的人员分工和测试程序，调查项目不宜 过多，根据调查目的确定调查对象具有代表性，对所 处的内外环境属性有明确规定2）追踪性调查；是一 种动态观察，通过选择一定数量的对象，在较长一段 时间内进行的定期，连续多次的调查，观察儿童少年 的生长发育动态。制定生长速度正常值，揭示生长发 育规律性，系统深入的观察分析某些内外因素对生长 发育的长期影响。调查对象自始至终是同一组人群， 故反应的生长发育规律较横断面调查更加准确，更能 确切的反映人群或个体的生长速度。费时长，调查中 人员和对象都容易流失，从调查开始即应采取措施保 证其稳定性，最大限度减少样本流失。尽量使用同一 型号的测试器材，技术标准保持一致，使前后结果有 可比性。3）半纵向调查；将横断面和追踪调查两种 方法混合，克服追踪调查所需年限太长，研究样本易 流失的缺点。节约时间和工作量。只具有部分的追踪 性质，获得生长发育速度是近似的，将会出现两组不 同对象的重叠，产生差异，需利用适当的统计方法修 匀。 生长发育的评价的实际意义：1.了解个体、群体的生 长发育现状，处于什么等级、发展趋势如何；2.为评 价遗传--环境影响因素，考察学校卫生工作实效、开 展保健干预提供依据；3.筛查、诊断生长发育障碍。 生长发育评价既针对个体也针对群体，由生长发育水 平、生长速度、发育匀称度（指标间相互关系）和体 质综合评价报告等四类内容组成。 生长发育评价方法：一：等级评价法和离差曲线图法 （正态分布的计量资料）；二：指数法：利用数学公 式，根据身体各部分比例关系，将两项或多项指标相 连，转化成指数进行评价。身高坐高指数：根据人体 躯干与下肢的比例关系，从纵截面角度反映体型，分 为长躯型、中躯型、短躯型（坐高cm/身高cm*100%）； 反映生理功能指数：身高肺活量指数和体重肺活量指 数=肺活量/身高或体重；BMI营养状况指数。三：Z 分法：Z标准差法，是一种特殊类型离差法。它不以 均数加减标准差表示，而是以中位数为中心，将资料 从偏态分布大体转换为正态分布，再取＋－1Z、＋－ 2Z、＋－3Z为界值点，建立正常值。通过正态转换过 程，实测值即被转换成Z分，由此确定发育等级。四， LMS法：三大优势：1.对百分位数法、Z分法既沿袭 又修正。2.只要使用的样本量达到要求，所制成的正 常值或标准课精确到个位。3.各相邻百分位数值间不 会出现交叉、颠倒或重叠，从而使所定正常值或标准 的精确性显著提高。五：发育年龄评价法：是指用某 些身体形态、生理功能指标和第二性征的发育水平及 其正常变异，制成标准年龄，评价个体发育状况。（四 种：形态年龄，第二性征年龄，齿龄，骨龄） 心理卫生（精神卫生）：是研究如何维护和促进人类 心理健康的科学。包括一切旨在改善心理健康的措施， 使人能按自己的身心潜能进行活动。（对儿童来说， 就是促进心理健康发展、培养健全性格、提高儿童对 环境的适应能力、预防精神方面的各种问题） 儿童少年心理健康的标准：心1.智力发展2.情绪反应 适度 3.心理行为特点与年龄相符。4.行为协调，反 应能力适度5。人际关系的心理适应。6，个性的稳 定和健全 心理障碍:儿童在心理健康方面存在的偏倚称心理卫 生问题，若其严重程度、持续时间超过相应年龄的允 许范围，称心理障碍。（20%） 儿童期心理行为问题的表现主要有： 1、学业相关问题学习困难、注意力障碍、自控力 差等，多发生在小学阶段，特别是初入学儿童。注意 有些属于学龄前期向学龄期过渡时出现的暂时性适 应不良。 （ADHD注意缺陷多动障碍：俗称儿童多动症，是以 注意力不集中、情绪冲动、过度活动、学习困难为特 征的综合征。通常起病于7岁之前， LD学习障碍：是指学龄儿童在阅读、书写、拼写、表 达、推理、计算能力等学习过程中存在一种或一种以 上的特殊性障碍，包括阅读障碍、数学障碍、书写障 碍、非特定性学习障碍等。） 2、情绪问题紧张焦虑、孤僻、强迫行为、恐怖。（焦 虑指突如其来出现的、无明显躯体原因的恐惧感，若 经常反复出现，已形成儿童焦虑障碍，是儿童期最常 见的情绪障碍之一。强迫行为：指儿童以强迫观念和 强迫动作为主，伴焦虑情绪和适应困难的一类症候群。 恐惧：当参与某项活动或面临某种情景式产生过分强 烈、持续的紧张、恐惧和回避情绪。心境障碍：又称 情感性障碍，是一组以显著而持久的心经高涨或低落 为主要症状的精神障碍，伴有相应的思维和行为改 变。） 3、品行问题如偷窃、经常撒谎、攻击性行为。 4、 不良习惯如习惯性抽动、吮指、咬指甲、口吃、遗 尿。5、广泛性发育障碍：孤独症谱系障碍ASD：也 称自闭症，是由脑发育不良引起的，以社会功能、语 言沟通缺陷为主，伴异常狭窄的兴趣和行为特征的儿 童期发育行为障碍。表现：交流障碍、言语发育障碍、 行为刻板重复、智力落后、感觉异常。 青春期心理咨询：专指处于青春发育阶段的少年（尤 其是那些存在心理问题者），运用心理商谈的技术、 程序和方法，帮助其对自己与环境形成正确的认识， 矫正其心理上的不平衡，以改变其态度与行为，并对 社会生活产生良好的适应。原则：保密、限时、自愿、 情感自限、延期决定、伦理规范。 生长发育指标：发育水平、营养状况、智力。 生命指标：婴儿死亡率：IMR是指在所给定的年份内 每1000名活产儿在0~1岁期间的死亡人数，反映活 产儿一年内的死亡概率。它是国际公认的衡量一个国 家/地区社会经济文化、居民健康状况、卫生保健事业 发展的重要标志。 疾病指标：因病缺课率：以月为单位计算因病缺课的 人时数或人日数占授课总时数的比例。反映学生健康 状况的重要指标。 生命质量指标：包括日常功能指标、心理社会功能评 定、专门性生活质量评定量表、综合性生活质量评定 量表。 六、视力不良：视力低下，是在采用远视力表站在5m 远处检查时，裸眼视力低于 5.0 。（近视不能仅凭上 述检查而必须通过眼科的散瞳验光才能确诊）。 近视：是指眼睛辨认远方（5米以上）目标的视力低 于正常，但视近正常，它是由于屈光不正所致。严 格定义是在不使用调节功能状态下，远处来的平行光 在视网膜感光层前方聚焦。 预防近视的措施：1.限制近距离用眼时间：预防近视 眼的基本措施是限制过多的长时间近距离视近活动， 每日可3~4次向5m以外的远处眺望，远望时宜选择 固定目标，每次5~10分钟，避免刺眼的强光刺激； 2.重视读写卫生：阅读、书写时坐姿要端正，眼书距 离保持在30~35cm左右，避免在光线过强或过弱的地 方读写；3.开展体育锻炼，增加室外活动，认真做好 眼保健操：活动有助使眼压下降；4.合理饮食，注意 营养：合理营养是预防近视眼的综合措施之一；5.改 善学习环境6.定期检查视力：学校应每年两次进行视 力检查；7.健康教育：开展用眼卫生的健康宣教。8. 加强围生期保健，减少早产儿。低体重儿的发生。 七、龋齿：龋齿是牙齿在身体内外因素作用下，硬组 织脱矿，有机质溶解，牙组织进行性破坏，导致牙齿 缺损的儿童少年常见病。患牙不能自愈。患龋后不仅 引起疼痛，而且影响食欲、咀嚼和消化功能，对生长 发育造成不利影响。 流行病学特点：1.龋患率：幼儿园儿童高于小学生， 小学生高于中学生；城市高于农村，大城市高于中小 城市。2.龋均（总龋牙数/受检总人数）和患者龋均（总 龋数/患龋总人数）都是反映龋齿患病程度的重要指标， 防龋工作重点在幼儿园儿童和小学生人群上。3.5岁 乳牙无龋率，12岁恒压龋均。4.好发牙和好发部位： 乳龋的好发牙是第1、2乳磨牙（第4、5乳牙），尤 其第2乳磨牙；恒龋的好发牙是第1、2恒磨牙（第6、 7恒牙）尤其第1恒磨牙（俗称“六龄齿”）；恒龋的 好发部位相同都以咬合面为主。 四联致病因素论：1、细菌和菌斑，是根本原因。主 要的致龋菌是变形链球菌，可合成葡糖基转移酶，使 蔗糖转化为高分子细胞外多糖，使牙齿内的酸度增加， 有利于菌斑的形成。2、食物因素，是物质基础，碳 水化合物（尤其蔗糖）是致龋的主要食物，不仅可以 酵解产酸，降低菌斑的PH值，而且参与菌斑形成和 作用，流行病学调查显示，蔗糖消耗量和龋齿发病率 间存在高度正相关。3、宿主，是重要条件。指牙齿 对龋病的抵抗力或敏感性。。4、时间因素是发生过程。 儿童系统防龋法：1.定期检查、早期诊断。2.控制牙 菌斑。3.讲究饮食卫生，增强宿主抗龋力。4.健全学 校口腔疾病防治网。 八、缺铁性贫血：是由不同程度缺铁引起的以小细胞、 血红蛋白低下为特征一类贫血总述。防治要点：一般 治疗（饮食），病因治疗，铁剂治疗，针对性防治综 合措施，预防铁中毒。 九、肥胖：肥胖是在遗传、环境的交互作用下，因能 量摄入超过能量消耗，导致体内脂肪积聚过多，从而 危害健康的一类慢性代谢性疾病。 肥胖的两种类型：一种是单纯性肥胖，主要因摄食量 过多、“以静代动”的生活方式、缺乏运动等原因引 起；另一种是继发性肥胖，因神经-内分泌功能失调或 代谢性疾病引起。 男女18岁时都分别取BMI值24和28为超重和肥胖 界指点。体脂率男超过20%，女14岁以下超过25% 或14岁以上超过30%为肥胖。肥胖的防治：养成良 好的饮食习惯，纠正偏爱高糖、高脂、高热量饮食的 不良习惯。限制过量进食，对体重定期检测，加强体 育锻炼与户外活动。 体育锻炼的卫生要求？1适合年龄、性别和健康情况 2培养体育锻炼的兴趣和习惯3体育教学必须遵循的 基本原则：①循序渐进②全面锻炼③准备和整理运动 ④运动与休息交替 体育课的结构：开始部分2-3min，准备部分6-12min， 基本部分25-30min，结束部分3-5min 体育课的运动负荷决定于课程强度，密度，时间三大 因素 靶心率：达到最大运动强度60%—70%的心率，是判 断体育课运动负荷的常用指标，是运动时需要达到的 目标心率，是判断有氧运动的主要指标。健康人 130-180。=安静心率+（最大心率-安静心率）×60% 评价体育课的运动负荷指标还有脉搏（心率）曲线图、 平均脉搏、脉搏指数（=平均脉搏/安静脉搏）（中学生 1.6~1.8） 学生一天应有至少1小时的体育锻炼时间。注意饭前 饭后一个小时不宜剧烈运动。运动时大量排汗，必须 少量多次饮水，适量补充水分和盐分。在补充水分和 电解质的同时，还应注意适当补充钙等无机盐。 预防运动性创伤方案？1安全防范法2保护帮助法3 量力适应法4准备活动法 体育锻炼的自我监督：1主观感觉，包括运动时的排 汗量，运动后的心情，睡眠食欲等方面的自我感觉， 其他身体疲劳感觉、睡眠、食欲、运动情绪等2客观 评价：内容包括测试脉搏，监测体重，分析运动成绩 的变化、进行体能和其他形态、功能的测量等。 健康监测体系（三部分）：健康体检、检测结果报告、 建立健康档案。 健康教育基本内容：健康行为与生活方式，疾病预防， 心理健康，生长发育青春期保健，安全应急与避险。 大脑皮层功能活动特性及卫生意义：1始动调节：大 脑皮层的工作能力在刚开始时，因脑细胞和其他相关 器官、系统的功能尚处于较低水平，需要一定的起动 时间。伴随工作时的能量消耗，工作能力将逐渐提高， 该现象称~。据此，在学日、学周、学期开始时规定 的学习难度、学习强度都不宜太大，应逐渐增强。2 优势法则：各种脑、体力活动内容，在大脑皮质上各 有其代表区域。皮质能从机体受到的大量刺激中，选 择最符合自身目的和兴趣的一些刺激，在脑皮质引起 强烈的兴奋区域，即优势兴奋性。其兴奋性高于其他 区域，而且能将皮质其他部位的兴奋性吸引过来，加 强自身的兴奋性，又使那些部位处于抑制状态。因此， 优势兴奋性的形成可明显提高学习效率。所以，组织 教学内容时，一定要注意该内容的持续时间应适应受 教育者的年龄特点。3动力定型：如果儿童体内外的 条件刺激按一定顺序多次重复后，在大脑上的兴奋、 抑制过程及与此相关的神经环路将相对固定下来，形 成动力定型。因此，有规律的生活作息、良好的学习 态度、健康的行为方式应从小培养。4镶嵌式活动： 伴随学习性质的变化，脑皮层的功能在定位上（兴奋 区与抑制区，工作区与休息区）相互轮换，称为~。 因此，教学安排中应注意课程性质的轮换，脑力与体 力活动交替，以确保脑皮层在较长时间内保持旺盛的 工作能力。5保护性抑制：一旦大脑皮层的活动超过 其功能限度，皮层反馈性的进入抑制状态，称为保护 性抑制。~是一种生理状态，也是早期疲劳的表现， 对保护脑皮层免受功能衰竭发挥重要作用。因此，教 育过程中如果能注意到学生的早期疲劳表现，适当组 织休息或安排其他活动，脑皮层功能活性将很快恢复； 如果任其发展，不采取劳逸结合措施，学生的疲劳状 态就会持续下去并逐步加重，甚至发展成病理性的 “过劳”状态。 影响脑力工作能力的因素？年龄；性别；健康状况； 遗传；学习动机和兴趣；学习生活条件；养育和生活 方式。 疲劳：在过强、过猛的刺激或刺激强度虽不大但持续 长时间的作用下，使大脑皮层细胞的功能消耗超过限 度，所产生的保护性抑制。是一种生理现象，出现早 期疲劳是学习生理负荷达到临界限度的指标。 试述学生学习疲劳的表现和评价学习疲劳的意义。第 一阶段又称早期疲劳。机制是优势兴奋性降低，不能 实行对周围区域的抑制（内抑制障碍）。表现为上课 时坐立不安，小动作多；注意力转移。条件反射实验 出现错误反应增加。有些人的早期疲劳内抑制表现不 明显，主要反应是兴奋过程出现障碍。早期疲劳的重 要特点是：兴奋过程或内抑制过程中的一个方面有障 碍性表现。第二阶段又称显著疲劳。机制是大脑皮层 的保护性抑制加深、扩散，特点是兴奋过程和内抑制 都减弱或发生障碍。具体表现：上课打呵欠和瞌睡； 对条件刺激的错误反应增多，反应量减少，反应时延 长，有时甚至出现后抑制现象。 学校的作息制度符合哪些原则？1、符合皮层的功能 的特点和脑力工作能力的变化规律，使学习活动与休 息的交替安排合理化2、对不同年龄阶段，不同健康 水平的儿童少年应区别对待，分别制度3、既能满足 学习任务，又要保证学生德智体美全面发展4、学校 与家庭作息制度相互协调统一5、制度一经确定，不 要轻易改变 一日生活制度：1课业学习：小学1、2年级不超过 4h，3、4年级5h，5、6年级6h，初中7h，高中8h； 2、每节课持续时间:小学40分钟；中学45分钟；大 学50分钟3、课外活动：小学生不少于3-3.5h，中学 生2-2.5h，其中至少有1h体育锻炼时间。中学生每周 参加课外体育活动不宜少于3次，每次45min。4、睡 眠：小学生10h，中学生9h，大学生8h。5、休息： 每节课休息10min，第2、3节课间休息20min。炎热 夏季保证短时间午睡。6、自由活动：每天看电视或 课余上网时间不宜超过1h。7、进餐 青少年健康危险行为：凡是给青少年健康、完好状态 乃至成年期健康和生活质量造成直接或间接损害的 行为。特征：1.明显偏离个人、家庭、学校乃至社会 的期望。2.对健康的危害程度各异。3.有个体聚集性 和群体聚集性。4.有鲜明的后天习得性。5.青少年行 为有良好的可塑性。导致的危害：危及健康和生命， 产生潜在危险，引发性传播疾病。分类：易导致非故 意伤害的行为、致故意伤害行为、物质滥用行为、精 神成瘾行为、危险性行为、不良饮食和体重控制行为、 缺乏体力活动行为。 伤害：是由各种物理性、化学性、生物性事件和心理 行为因素等导致个体发生暂时性或永久性损伤、残疾 或死亡的一类疾病的总称。分为非故意伤害和故意伤 害。 儿童青少年意外伤害的危险因素有：宿主因素（年龄 性别种族心理行为特征生理缺陷与特征），家庭因素， 社会因素，物理因素（地区因素），其中伤害事故出 现的两个高峰在婴儿期和青春期 儿童青少年意外伤害的预防控制干预包括教育干预， 技术干预，工程干预，经济干预，称为“四E策略”。 暴力是指蓄意滥用权力或躯体力量，对自身、他人、 群体或社会进行威胁或伤害，导致身心损伤、死亡、 发育障碍或权利剥夺的一类行为 校园暴力：发生在校园内、上下学途中、其他与学校 活动相关的所有暴力行为。分为躯体暴力、言语/情感 暴力、性暴力三种形式。 教学楼的卫生原则：1.保证教学顺利进行。2.光线好、 通风好。3.方便师生课间休息和户外活动。4.保证师 生安全。 教室内部设计的卫生要求？1 足够的室内面积 2 良 好的采光照明和室内微小气候 3防止噪音干扰 4 便 于学生就座和通行，便于清扫和养成良好的卫生习惯。 采光系数：或称自然照度系数，为综合评价教室的采 光状况，指室内某一工作面的天然光照度与同时室外 开阔天空散射光的水平照度的比。一般最低采光系数 不低于2.0% 教室课桌面的平均照度不应低于300lx，黑板面平均 垂直照度不应低于500lx，照度均匀度不低于0.7 教室人工照明的卫生要求：保证课桌面和黑板面上有 足够照度，照度充分均匀；不产生或少产生阴影，没 有或者尽量减少眩光作用；不因人工照明导致室内温 度过高而影响空气的质量和安全性。 桌椅高差：为桌近缘高与椅高之差。1/3坐高+1~2cm 课桌椅尺寸有11个型号，不同身高不同型号，桌椅 配套，同号搭配。 教室自然采光的卫生要求：满足采光标准，课桌面和 黑板上有足够光照；照度分布均匀；单侧采光的光线 应自学生作为左侧射入，双侧采光也应将主要采光窗 设在左侧；避免产生较强的眩光作用，创造愉快、舒 适的学习环境。 玻地面积比不低于1：5 黑板反射系数<20% 投射角不小于20~22°，最小开角不小于5°。 室深系数不小于1:2。 采光方向：南北向双侧，左侧 学校卫生监督：是指卫生行政部门依据国家相关法律、 政策和学校卫生标准，对学校建筑设备、学校生活环 境、学生用品、学校卫生服务工作等进行监督检查的 系列性执法活动。

古诗词翻译

银烛 原文 明天顺①间，丰庆为②河南布政使，按部③行④县，县令某墨⑤吏也，闻庆至，恐，饰白银为烛以献。庆初未之觉也。既而执烛者以告，庆佯曰：“试爇之。”曰：“爇⑥而不能燃也。”庆笑曰：“不能燃乌用烛为？”贮以故筐，明日尽还之。顾谓令曰：“汝烛不燃，易可燃者。自今慎勿复尔。”令出，益大恐，辄解印而去。庆亦终不以银烛事语人。 注释 ①明天顺：明朝天顺年间②为：担任③部：规定，程序。④行：巡视，考察。⑤墨：贪财。⑥爇：点燃，焚烧 译文 明朝天顺年间，丰庆担任河南布政使一职，按照程序巡察各县。有一个地方的县令是个大贪官，听说丰庆要来了，十分害怕，就把银子熔铸成蜡烛的样子送给丰庆。丰庆先前没有察觉，后来侍者告诉他。丰庆故意说：“点燃蜡烛。”侍者说：“点了，可是不能燃烧。”丰庆笑着说：“不能燃怎么能当蜡烛呢？”（于是）仍旧把它装在先前的筐子中。第二天，全部还给县令，并对县令说：“你送的蜡烛不燃，换成能燃的吧，从今后千万别再这样了。”县令出来后，更加害怕了，就辞官走了。丰庆也没有把这事告诉别人。 知人 原文 赵洞门为御史大夫，车马辐辏①，望尘②者接踵于道。及罢归，出国门③，送者才三数人。寻召还，前去者复来如初。时吴菌次独落落然，不以欣戚④改观，赵每目送⑤之，顾谓子友沂曰：“他日吾百年后，终当赖此人力。”未几，友沂早逝，赵亦以痛子殁于客邸，两孙孤立，菌次哀振⑥之。抚其幼者如子，字⑦以爱女。一时咸叹赵为知人 注释 ①辐辏：归聚、会集。②望尘：拜尘，谄媚权贵。③国门：指京师。 ④欣戚：比喻赵开心的宦途浮沉。⑤目送——随其人之去而以目注视，在此表看重之意。⑥振——同赈，接济。⑦字：嫁女儿。 译文 赵洞门出任御史大夫时，门前车马归聚，谄媚贵权的人几乎在路上排起队来。等到他被免职，离开了京城，来送的只有三五个人。不久，他被朝廷召回起用，以前离开的那批人又像当初那样来拜访了。当时独有吴园次一个人，不因富贵失势改变对赵洞门的态度。赵洞门常常目送他出门，回头跟儿子友沂说：“将来我去世后，最终要依赖这个人来办事。”没多久，友沂过早去世，赵洞门也因悲痛失去儿子，死于外地客寓。他的两个孙子无依无靠，吴园次一边哀悼，帮助办理后事；一边扶助他们，

建筑名词解释

『台基』建筑名词解释 台基 就是建筑物的底座。四面以砖石砌成，内多填土，地 面铺以砖石。 须弥座xūmízu?原为佛象底座。由印度传入中国後，被用作尊贵建筑的底座。它的组成为圭角、下枋、下枭、束腰、上枭、上枋等。 如故宫三大殿的台基就是简约式的须弥座。 踏跺 tàdu? 就是用来登上台基的阶级。 龙尾道 在坡道较长的情况下，会用平、坡相间形式建造的阶 榜。 慢道较为平缓的阶梯或斜道。 礓碴 jiāngchá是将砖石打侧，以其梭角所砌成的斜道，给人和马车登上台基。形状就像洗衣板。 辇道 niǎndào 有斜度的路，方便马车通行。於唐宋时期，设置於踏跺之间。後来，辇道被加上水、云、龙等雕刻，渐渐演变成今天的「御路」。 陛石bìshí用作铺设御路的石块。 如故宫保和殿北面御路的大石雕。 角石 用于宋式台基的角位，常雕刻有龙、凤、狮子等装饰。 清代台基是不用角石设计。 螭首螭是传说中有角的龙。突出的螭首雕刻设置在台基外

chīshǒu部。除美观外，它用作为排走雨水的出水口。 如天坛祈年殿的龙、凤、云三种形式的螭首。『柱』建筑名词解释 柱zhù就是建筑物的底座。四面以砖石砌成，内多填土，地面则铺以砖石。 柱础是垫著木柱的石墩。 鼓镜是指柱础凸出于地面的部份。 覆盆唐宋时期，常用的鼓镜设计，像倒转的碗。 鼓蹬 因南方天气潮湿，所以柱础都设计成较高身的鼓状石 墩，称之为鼓蹬。 檐柱yánzhù建筑物最外的一列柱子，用来支撑屋檐的重量。通常建筑物有前後两列檐柱。 中柱 位处建筑物中轴线上的柱子，用作支撑屋脊的。但中 柱不包括在山墙之内的柱子。 山柱设在山墙内，顶著屋脊的柱子。 角柱位处山墙两端，建筑物转角的柱子。 金柱除檐柱、中柱、山柱外，其他柱子都称作金柱。 外金柱距离檐柱较近的柱子为外金柱。 里金柱 「里」和「外」是相对的，距离檐柱较远的柱子便称 作里金柱。

脐带血造血干细胞库管理办法(试行)

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员会），负责对脐带血造血干细胞库设置的申请、验收和考评提出论证意见。专家委员会负责制订脐带血 造血干细胞库建设、操作、运行等技术标准。 第八条脐带血造血干细胞库设置的申请者除符合国家规划和布局要求，具备设置一般血站基本条件之外， 还需具备下列条件： （一）具有基本的血液学研究基础和造血干细胞研究能力； （二）具有符合储存不低于1 万份脐带血的高清洁度的空间和冷冻设备的设计规划； （三）具有血细胞生物学、HLA 配型、相关病原体检测、遗传学和冷冻生物学、专供脐带血处理等符合GMP、 GLP 标准的实验室、资料保存室； （四）具有流式细胞仪、程控冷冻仪、PCR 仪和细胞冷冻及相关检测及计算机网络管理等仪器设备； （五）具有独立开展实验血液学、免疫学、造血细胞培养、检测、HLA 配型、病原体检测、冷冻生物学、 管理、质量控制和监测、仪器操作、资料保管和共享等方面的技术、管理和服务人员； （六）具有安全可靠的脐带血来源保证； （七）具备多渠道筹集建设资金运转经费的能力。 第九条设置脐带血造血干细胞库应向所在地省级卫生行政部门提交设置可行性研究报告，内容包括：

儿少卫生学练习题名解+问答

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古诗文名句解释

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建设工程名词解释

建设工程名词解释 饶志辉 1 结构转换层：建筑物某层的上部与下部因平面使用功能不同，该楼层上部与下部采用不同结构类型，并通过该楼层进行结构转换，则该楼层称为结构转换层。 2 冷剂压套筒接头： 3 沥青橡胶应力吸收薄膜： 4 冷桥现象：房屋外墙转角、内外墙交角、楼屋面与外墙搭接角的区域范围，在室内温度高于室外温度时候，产生水雾吸附于墙面的现象称为"冷桥"现象，大多出现在冬季。 5 银粉、金粉：含金属涂料的油漆。 6 （越岭线）垭口：山口。 7 路灯、草坪灯、庭园灯、地灯：路灯：装在道路上照明用的灯。草坪灯：草坪灯的设计主要以外型和柔和的灯光为城市绿地景观增添安全与美丽，并且普遍具有安装方便、装饰性强等特点，可用于公园、花园别墅、广场绿化、等场所的绿化带的装饰性照明。地灯：安装在地面上或接近地面位置上的灯。 8 两带：灞河滨水生活蓝带和浐河城市生态绿带。 9 绿肺：比喻能吸收二氧化碳并释放出氧气的绿地、森林等。 10 电气元器件气候防护：潮湿、盐雾、霉菌以及气压、污染气体对电子设备影响很大，其中潮湿的影响是最主要的。通常采用浸渍、灌封、密封等措施。

11 牛腿、肩梁： 12 声发射定位信号： 13 错层结构：是指在建筑中同层楼板不在同一高度，并且高差大于梁高（或大于500毫米）的结构类型。 14 红外轴温探测系统： 15 虚拟仓库：如果建筑材料市场离得不远的话，可通过信息系统对部分材料建立一个虚拟仓库，从而实现零库存。 16 高压射流技术、真空泵技术、以及射流泵的出现、液压技术的进步、超声波检测技术： 17 WSS无收缩深孔注浆技术： 18 三轴搅拌桩：是长螺旋桩机的一种，同时有三个螺旋钻孔，施工时三条螺旋钻孔同时向下施工，是软基处理的一种有效形式，利用搅拌桩机将水泥喷入土体并充分搅拌，使水泥与土发生一系列物理化学反应，使软土硬结而提高地基强度。 19 工程地质与基坑开挖深度及地连墙墙趾关系图： 20 透水砖：也叫渗水砖、荷兰砖。 21 水幕降尘器：是一种比较传统且常用的降尘方法。 22 水泡泥技术：一种隧道爆破时降低粉尘的技术。水泡泥就是用装水的塑料袋填于炮眼内来代替一部分泡泥，装完药后将其填于炮眼内，尽量不要搞破，然后用黄泥封堵。实践表明，此法降尘效率非常高。 23 单向阀：单向阀是流体只能沿进水口流动，出水口介质却无法回流，俗称单向阀。单向阀又称止回阀或逆止阀。用于液压系统中防止