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Corperate Governance & cross-border M&A(2008)

Spillover of corporate governance standards in cross-border mergers and acquisitions

Marina Martynova a ,?,Luc Renneboog b ,1

a The University of Shef ?eld Management School,UK

Tilburg University and European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI),PO Box 90153,5000LE Tilburg,The Netherlands

a r t i c l e i n f o a

b s t r a

c t

Available online 8April 2008In cross-border acquisitions,the differences between the bidder and target corporate governance (measured by newly constructed indices capturing shareholder,minority shareholder,and creditor protection)have an important impact on the takeover returns.Our country-level corporate governance indices capture the changes in the quality of the national corporate governance regulations over the past 15years.When the bidder is from a country with a strong shareholder orientation (relative to the target),part of the total synergy value of the takeover may result from the improvement in the governance of the target assets.In full takeovers,the corporate governance regulation of the bidder is imposed on the target (the positive spillover by law hypothesis).In partial takeovers,the improvement in the target corporate governance may occur on voluntary basis (the spillover by control hypothesis).Our empirical analysis corroborates both spillover effects.In contrast,when the bidder is from a country with poorer shareholder protection,the negative spillover by law hypothesis states that the anticipated takeover gains will be lower as the poorer corporate governance regime of the bidder will be imposed on the target.The alternative bootstrapping hypothesis argues that poor-governance bidders voluntarily bootstrap to the better-governance regime of the target.We do ?nd support for the bootstrapping effect.

JEL classi ?cation:G30G34G38G18G14G15

Keywords:Takeovers

Mergers and acquisitions Cross-border

Takeover synergies

Corporate governance regulation Contractual convergence Shareholder protection Creditor protection

Minority shareholder protection Takeover regulation

1.Introduction

Cross-border merger and acquisition (M&A)activity has increased signi ?cantly over the last 15years (Moeller and Schlingemann,2005).Expansion through cross-border acquisitions enables companies to exploit differences in tax systems and to capture rents resulting from market inef ?ciencies,such as national controls over labour and resources markets (Scholes and Wolfson,1990;Servaes and Zenner,1994).An additional source of takeover synergy in cross-border M&As may be induced by improvements in the governance of the bidding and target ?rms as a result of spillovers of corporate governance standards between the two ?rms.

Wang and Xie (in press)show that both bidder and target ?rms bene ?t from corporate governance improvements in domestic US mergers and acquisitions.They use the ?rm-level shareholder rights indices of Gompers et al.(2003)and show that takeover synergies increase with the differences in the index between the bidder and the target.We hypothesize that the scope for potential improvements in corporate governance is even greater in cross-border M&As as the difference between the bidder and target quality of corporate governance is ampli ?ed by the signi ?cant variation in national corporate governance standards.Therefore,our

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?Corresponding author.The University of Shef ?eld Management School,9Mappin Street,S14DT Shef ?eld,UK.Tel.:+441142223344;fax:+441142223348.E-mail addresses:M.Martynova@shef ?https://www.wendangku.net/doc/ba10265685.html, (M.Martynova),Luc.Renneboog@uvt.nl (L.Renneboog).1

n.2008.03.004

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main question is:Do differences in the quality of corporate governance standards between the bidder and target countries explain part of the expected value creation in cross-border takeovers?In other words,is there a valuation effect of cross-border spillover of corporate governance standards (and more speci ?cally of investor protection)?

Why would we expect such a spillover valuation effect for corporate governance?In international law,a full takeover leads to a change in the nationality of the target ?rm such that the acquirer's corporate governance regulation will apply to the combined company,in effect replacing the target corporate governance (Bris and Cabolis,2008).When the bidder is subject to better corporate governance regulation than the target,the acquisition may result in an improvement in corporate governance (e.g.enhanced shareholder orientation)at the target.As improved governance is expected to generate additional value,the abnormal share price returns of both the bidder and target should re ?ect such value creation.We call this hypothesis the positive spillover by law hypothesis.‘Positive ’refers to the corporate governance improvement for the target as a result of the full takeover by the bidder.In other words,the better the bidder's corporate governance,the higher are the returns to the bidder and target ?rms from the takeover.Likewise,we de ?ne the negative spillover by law hypothesis:when the bidder governance standards are below those of the target,the abnormal returns will be lower as the governance standards of the target will now be less strict.

A negative spillover by law effect is expected between a bidder in a country with low investor protection and a target in a country with stricter corporate governance regulation,as the induced poor investor protection by the bidder may lessen the quality of corporate governance of the target.This could reduce the value of the target assets in the hands of the bidder.However,there is an alternative hypothesis:bidders can abide by the stricter regulation that the target is subject to.We call this the bootstrapping hypothesis:bidders voluntarily bootstrap their corporate governance regulation to a higher level.2As such,?rms can contract privately on the optimal level of investor protection.3If the bidder intends to pursue such bootstrapping to a higher level of corporate governance,its value may actually increase which will be re ?ected in the bidder share price at the takeover announcement.Bootstrapping may occur in both full and partial acquisitions,but the valuation effect may be stronger in partial takeovers whereby a stake of less than 100%of the voting rights is acquired and the target still remains listed on its national stock exchange.4The bootstrapping valuation effect may also be stronger in takeovers with all-equity offers or mixed bids as (some of)the target shareholders will then remain involved with the merged company and may actively resist managerial actions re ?ecting a reduced shareholder orientation (Starks and Wei,2005).

International law prescribes that the positive spillover by law effect is to take place in a full takeover,which leads to a change in the target ?rm's nationality.Nonetheless,partial takeovers may also lead to a similar spillover effect,which we call the spillover by control hypothesis.Although the target ?rm is not fully absorbed by the bidder in a partial acquisition,the bidder may still impose its own corporate governance standards on the target,provided that the bidder standards are stricter than the target's.In contrast,if the bidder standards are less strict than the target's,the bidder has to comply (locally)with the target corporate governance law and the listing regulations (in case the target remains listed on a national stock exchange).

The main conclusion from our empirical analysis is that the positive spillover by law hypothesis is supported whereas the negative spillover by law hypothesis is not.The bidder and target takeover announcement returns are positive when the former's governance standards are stricter than the latter's.This implies that the stricter governance imposed on the target is expected to lead to value creation,possibly to an increased focus on shareholder value and the reduction in managerial private bene ?ts of control.In contrast,when the bidder corporate governance standards are less strict than the target's,neither the bidder nor the target returns are lower.While this evidence goes against the negative spillover by law hypothesis,it does not contradict our bootstrapping hypothesis :it seems that poor-governance bidders bootstrap to the better-governance regime of the target,experiencing a share price increase.Importantly,the effect is only valid for partial acquisitions or,in other words,in deals which still involve some of the target shareholders (who did not sell out)and in which the target ?rm remains listed on the stock exchange in the country of the target.

The spillover by control hypothesis holds when the differences between the bidder and target governance regulation have a positive effect on anticipated gains of partial takeovers.The spillover effect from a bidder from a country with stronger shareholder protection to the target explains part of the value creation expected at the announcement of the partial takeover.The potential bene ?ts from the improvement of the target corporate governance are shared by both the bidding and target ?rms'shareholders:both the bidder and target returns increase.Our results are robust with respect to several model speci ?cations that control for potential endogeneity problems.

Our results also support the view that national corporate governance regulation has a signi ?cant impact on the ?ow of cross-border takeovers.In particular,we ?nd that ?rms from countries with weak corporate governance regulation are more likely to

One could somehow compare this to the bonding hypothesis:some ?rms seek a cross-listing on an exchange with stricter investor protection/listing requirements.Cross-listing allows ?rms to commit credibly to protect the shareholders ’interests (see e.g.Coffee,1999;Doidge et al.,2006).Such bonding is credible to the market as it involves high costs (complying to different accounting standards,listing regulation,governance standards)and comprises a legal obligation.3

A counterexample whereby a ?rm moves towards less shareholder-orientation is given by Bris and Cabolis (2007):they show that Aventis,the ?rm arising from the merger of German Hoechst and French Rhone-Poulenc,borrowed from the corporate governance regimes of both ?rms,resulting in a more protected company than with the French default legal system of investor protection.4

In the case of cross-border mergers,a bidder is entitled to subject a foreign-owned subsidiary to its local corporate law,irrespective of the domicile of the subsidiary (Bris and Cabolis,2008,citing Muchlinski,1997).When less than 100%of the shares of the target are acquired by the foreign ?rm,the target ?rm remains operating under the law of its home country.Furthermore,the extraterritoriality principle in international law states that a state can assert jurisdiction over its nationals abroad.However,the extraterritoriality principle does not apply when a foreign ?rm acquires 100%of the company ’s shares.

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invest abroad rather than domestically,con?rming earlier results by Doidge et al.(2007)and Benos and Weisbach(2004).We also ?nd that bidders are more likely to acquire?rms abroad if minority shareholder protection in their home country is strong.This result is in line with the argument by Goergen et al.(2005)that strong protection of minority shareholders makes corporate takeovers costly and hence forces companies to look for potential M&A targets abroad,in countries with weaker(minority) shareholder protection.Strong creditor protection in the home country also has a positive effect on the international takeover activity.This may result from the relation between creditor protection and a?rm's access to debt?nancing(La Porta et al.,1998). Martynova and Renneboog(2007a)show that debt?nancing is indeed frequently used in cross-border M&As.Therefore,cross-border M&As are more likely to be made by bidders that have access to less expensive debt capital which prevails in countries with strong protection of creditor rights.

Finally,most of our other results on the effect of the relative transaction size,free cash?ow,hostility,means of payment, diversi?cation strategies,stock-price run-up,differences in economic development,geographical closeness and language relatedness of the bidder and target,the level of corruption,and other characteristics are in line with the?ndings in the earlier literature.

This paper contributes to the literature in two ways.

First,we answer the question how or through which channels cross-border mergers and acquisitions generate value.Not just purely economic characteristics(of the bid,the target,and the bidder)but also the spillover of corporate governance standards between the bidder and the target explain part of the takeover premiums or the anticipated value(abnormal announcement returns).The impact of national corporate governance standards on the shareholder wealth effect in cross-border M&As has been previously studied in Bris and Cabolis(2008)and Bris et al.2008-this issue,Starks and Wei(2005),Kuipers et al.(2003),and Rossi and Volpin(2004).These?ve studies investigate the valuation effects of corporate governance on M&As from different perspectives and arrive at different results.Our paper is closest to the study by Bris and Cabolis(2008)and Bris et al.2008-this issue.The authors show that takeover premiums in cross-border deals increase with the difference in shareholder protection and the quality of accounting standards between the bidder and the target.They report that this effect is signi?cant only in M&As when the target changes its nationality(full acquisitions).In contrast,our results reveal that the improvement in the target shareholder protection has a positive effect on takeover synergy irrespective of the type of takeover.Our results thus reveal that governance-related takeover synergies may not only arise from a spillover by law effect but also from spillover by control and bootstrapping effects.

The second contribution is that our analysis is based on new corporate governance indices.Our country-level indices are more elaborate than the indices developed by La Porta,Lopez-de-Silanes,Shleifer and Vishny(henceforth LLSV)and employed in the studies mentioned above.With the help of150corporate lawyers from32European countries,we have created a corporate governance database that comprises the main changes in corporate governance regulation in all European countries over the last 15years.For each country,we quantify corporate law,stock exchange regulation and corporate practices5,and measure their effectiveness in mitigating the con?icts of interest between the various corporate constituencies:management,majority and minority shareholders,and creditors.Our indices reveal that corporate governance regulation has been substantially reformed in virtually every European country since the early1990s.Therefore,it is important to note that,in contrast to previous studies,all legal indices employed in this paper are time-varying and re?ect changes in the legal environment.

There are several reasons why we focus on country regulation(rather than?rm-level regulation).First,it is virtually impossible to code the content of corporate charters,to collect the amendments and to gather all major shareholder decisions of AGMs for such a large group of?rms.These?rms are situated in a heterogeneous group of countries with varying degrees of transparency and disclosure problems.Second,empirical evidence reveals a high correlation between corporate governance at the?rm-level and at the country-level.Doidge et al.(2007)analyse the variation in a cross-section of?rm-level corporate governance indices and conclude that most of the variation can be explained by country characteristics.They argue that countries matter so much because they in?uence the costs that?rms incur to bond themselves to good governance and the bene?ts they receive from doing so.The authors also state that?rms with concentrated ownership(de facto the vast majority of listed?rms in Continental Europe)invest less in?rm-level governance mechanisms,as the major shareholders monitor their?rm’s managers more effectively.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.Section2describes the data sources and sample composition.Section3 presents the empirical results while Section4concludes.

2.Sample description

We select our initial sample of European acquisitions undertaken during the?fth takeover wave(1993–2001)from the Mergers and Acquisitions Database of the Securities Data Company(SDC).6The SDC data is?ltered down to intra-European cross-border takeovers,whereby both the acquirer and the target are from countries within Continental Europe and the UK.Our sample also includes deals involving?rms from Central and Eastern Europe(including Russia).For reasons of comparison,we also collect

5We also capture generally accepted corporate practices in as far as they are stricter than the regulation.For instance,non-voting shares are legal in the UK,but are not used by any?rm listed on the London Stock Exchange.Therefore,we consider the UK as a country where the one-share-one-vote is upheld.

6The quality of the SDC data is veri?ed by comparing its information on the announcement date,the company’s country of origin,the transaction value, payment structure,share of control acquired,bid completion status,and the target’s attitude towards the bid with information from the news announcements stored in LexisNexis,the Financial Times,and Factiva.We uncovered inconsistencies in one or more records in36%of the observations of the SDC database,which we subsequently corrected.

information on domestic mergers and acquisitions in Continental Europe and the UK.We retain only those cross-border and domestic M&As that satisfy the following requirements:(i)The transaction involves a change in control 7;

(ii)The shares of the bidder or the target ?rm (or of both)are traded on a Continental European or UK stock exchange;(iii)Both parties participating in the M&A transaction are independent corporations;8

(iv)Neither the bidder nor the target is a ?nancial institution (bank,unit trust,mutual fund or pension fund);(v)The period between two consecutive bids by the same acquirer is at least 300trading days;9

(vi)

Financial and accounting data for at least one of the participants of the transaction are available in DataStream or in the Amadeus,Fame or Reach databases.

Our ?nal sample of domestic and cross-border M&A announcements consists of 2419deals involving ?rms from 29European countries.Cross-border M&As represent one-third of the sample (737deals).Table 1reports the sample distribution by country of the bidding and target ?rms.The most active cross-border acquirers are British,German,and French ?rms,which cumulatively account for 49%of all cross-border M&As.Firms from the UK,Germany and France are also most frequently the targets in cross-border acquisitions (37%of all cross-border M&As).Not to be underestimated is the cross-border M&A activity involving Scandinavian ?rms,which represents 23%and 17%of all cross-border acquirers and targets,respectively.

The domestic M&A activity by UK,German,French,and Scandinavian ?rms substantially exceeds their involvement in cross-border takeovers.In contrast,companies from the Benelux countries,Austria,and Ireland are more frequently involved in cross-border rather than in domestic M&As.Relative to the other major economies in Continental Europe,Southern Europe (Greece,Italy,Portugal,and Spain)has a remarkably low domestic and cross-border takeover activity.In cross-border M&As,Southern European ?rms are more frequently targets (of German,British and French bidders)than bidders.Another interesting observation relates to Eastern and Central European countries that have joined the European Union since 2004.Many ?rms from these new member states are acquired by West-European bidders,predominantly from neighbouring countries (Scandinavia,Austria,and Germany).In contrast,the participation of Central European ?rms as bidders in cross-border acquisitions is small,as is the domestic takeover market in that region.3.Empirical results 3.1.Variable construction

The next subsections discuss the measurement of four categories of variables:(i)the bidder and target announcement returns (the dependent variables),(ii)corporate governance indices,(iii)measures of corporate governance spillover effects (our key explanatory variables),and (iv)the bidder-,target-,and deal-speci ?c characteristics (our control variables).The de ?nitions of variables and data sources are summarized in Appendix A.

3.1.1.The bidder and target announcement returns

We measure the short-term wealth effects at the takeover announcement using the event study methodology.For each bidding and target ?rm,we compute the daily abnormal returns realized over the period starting 1day prior and ending 1day subsequent to the day of the public takeover announcement.10The takeover announcement wealth effect is the sum of these daily abnormal returns.We also consider longer event windows,such as [?5,+5]and [?60,+60].Daily abnormal returns are the difference between realized and market model benchmark returns.Our market model is based on the MSCI-Europe index and its parameters are estimated over 240days,starting 300days prior to the acquisition announcement.11To test the signi ?cance of the estimated abnormal returns,we use both parametric and non-parametric tests as discussed by Brown and Warner (1985)and Corrado (1989),respectively.

As panel A of Table 2shows,the 3days cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR)is 0.83%and 0.47%for the subsamples of domestic and cross-border bidders respectively.Both ?gures are signi ?cantly different from zero at the 5%level and the difference in the CAARs between the two subsamples is also statistically signi ?cant.12This result con ?rms ?ndings of recent empirical studies that cross-border bidders somewhat underperform their domestic peers (see e.g.Moeller and Schlingemann,2005;Dennis et al.,2002).In contrast,targets in cross-border takeovers experience signi ?cantly higher returns than targets in domestic bids.For the 3days window centred on the bid announcement,cross-border target ?rms accumulate abnormal returns of 12.55%compared to 11.52%for domestic targets.Goergen and Renneboog (2004)document similar differences for large intra-European M&As.

We require either that the transaction leads to a combination of the ?rms or that the acquirer who held less than 50%of the target ’s stock prior to the transaction acquires majority control.8

The absorption of subsidiaries is not included,nor are divestitures and management buyouts.9

The reason for this restriction is that we want to avoid contamination of the windows used to estimate the systematic risk.10

The event day is either the day of the announcement or the ?rst trading day following the announcement in case the announcement is made on a non-trading day.11

Our estimates of the abnormal returns are robust with respect to the geographical scope of the market index (local,European-wide,and worldwide index)and the estimation model of the benchmark returns (the estimated beta adjusted for mean-reversion Blume,1979,and non-synchronous trading Dimson,1979).Changing the market index or the estimation model does not materially change any of the results in the remainder of the paper.12

We (conservatively)only report the non-parametric tests.The signi ?cance levels of the parametric tests corroborate the non-parametric ones but the former lead to higher levels of signi ?cance.

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To investigate the in ?uence of the legal environment on the takeover wealth effect,we compare the CAARs for sub-samples of bidders (targets)across countries of different legal origins.Countries from the former communist block are classi ?ed according to their (staged)accession to the European Union.Panel B of Table 2reveals the systematic differences in the bidder and target CAARs by legal origin.Whereas bidders of German or Scandinavian legal origin earn signi ?cant positive returns in cross-border M&As,their counterparts of English or French legal origin earn more modest or even insigni ?cant returns,and bidders from recent EU Accession countries incur negative returns.For the target ?rms,we observe that companies of English or Scandinavian legal origin yield the highest announcement returns,which are almost 2.5times higher than the returns of target companies of French or German legal origin.Remarkably,the CAARs to the target ?rms from the former communist block countries are not signi ?cantly different from zero.

3.1.2.Corporate governance standards indices

To measure the quality of corporate governance standards in the bidder and target ?rms'countries we construct a number of indices.13With the help of 150corporate lawyers from 32European countries (as reported in Appendix B),we create a corporate governance database comprising the main aspects of and changes in corporate governance regulation in all European countries (including Central and Eastern Europe)since 1990.For each country,we quantify the regulation mitigating the con ?icts of interests between the main corporate constituencies:management versus shareholders,majority versus minority shareholders,and creditors versus shareholders.We construct the following three indices (see also Martynova and Renneboog,2007b ).All these indices are rescaled to take values within the [0,10]interval.

(i)The shareholder rights index is based on shareholders'ability to curb managerial opportunistic behaviour.The index measures

the degree of shareholder orientation of a national regulation.The index increases with the number and quality of legal provisions that provide shareholders with effective power to appoint and dismiss the board of directors and to control most of the important corporate decisions on,for instance,equity issues or anti-takeover measures.We also take into account the regulatory provisions that ensure that the board of directors acts as an independent body operating on behalf of all shareholders and monitors top management.Provisions that address the quality of information on the management and the frequency of disclosure of accounting information are also considered.A higher index score represents a higher likelihood that management acts in the interest of shareholders and hence re ?ects better corporate governance standards with respect to shareholder protection.(ii)The minority shareholder protection index hinges on the regulatory provisions that increase the relative power of the

minority shareholders in the presence of strong majority shareholders.In a ?rm with concentrated control,it is possible that the dominant shareholder extracts private bene ?ts of control by in ?uencing managerial decisions for his own bene ?t (see e.g.Durnev and Kim,2005).This may lead to the expropriation of minority shareholders'rights.We quantify the regulatory provisions related to minority shareholder protection (e.g.board representation,minority claims,extraordinary general meetings,blocking minorities),the one-share-one-vote principle (dual class shares,voting caps,break-through rule,equal treatment principle),ownership transparency,and the relative decision power in case of a takeover threat.A higher index score signi ?es that minority shareholders'interests are better protected.

The shareholder rights and minority shareholder protection indices are positively correlated because they both re ?ect to some degree the underlying quality of shareholder protection in a country.However,they are based on different institutional characteristics.

(iii)The creditors rights index hinges on the regulatory provisions that allow creditors to force repayment more easily,to take

possession of the collateral,or even to gain control over the ?rm in case of ?nancial distress.In creating this creditor rights index,we closely follow the approach of LLSV and investigate the regulation related to the violation of debt covenants (deviations from the debtor priority ranking in case of bankruptcy),the possibility for debtors to impose restrictions on borrowers (e.g.limitations on ?ling for reorganization/liquidation),and the creditors rights in ?nancially distressed ?rms (e.g.,automatic stay on assets).The index also captures the difference between creditor-oriented and debtor-oriented bankruptcy codes:we augment the creditor rights index for a country with a pure liquidation code by one,while leaving the index unchanged for a country with a debtor-oriented code.14The reason is that a bankruptcy code that facilitates reorganization focuses on corporate survival,usually at the expense of the (more senior)creditors.A higher index score re ?ects stronger creditor rights,i.e.higher corporate governance standards with respect to creditor protection.The constituents of each index and their coding are given in Appendix C.

It is important to note that a system with strong legal enforcement may substitute for weaker regulation as well-functioning courts can effectively resolve disputes between corporate constituencies (LLSV,1998).Conversely,a law designed to uphold the rights of e.g.minority shareholders may be eroded in case the judiciary does not function effectively.To address these problems,we multiply the above indices by an index capturing the quality of law enforcement.We use the rule of law index developed by the World Bank,which we rescale to take values within the [0,1]interval.The rule of law index measures the extent to which agents

These indices overcome some of the limitations of the LLSV indices.First,our indices are based on a broader de ?nition of corporate governance regulation than that used by LLSV.Second,our indices are dynamic:they capture the many regulatory reforms on a yearly basis since 1990.Furthermore,we use functional approach to construct the indices,which differs from the comparative approach employed by LLSV (1998).For a detailed discussion of the limitations and advantages of our indices see Martynova and Renneboog (2007b).14

Chapter 11in the US and administration in the UK are the prototype of a debtor-oriented code.In the 1990s,many bankruptcy codes have been reorganized and now frequently include two tracks:a debtor-oriented part and a pure liquidation code.We classify such bankruptcy codes as debtor-oriented.

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Table2

Cumulative average abnormal returns(CAARs)to bidding and target?rms in cross-border and domestic M&As

Cross-border M&As Domestic M&As Diff.Cross-border—

Domestic

Panel A.Takeover announcement effect Mean value t-stat[Nobs]Mean value t-stat[Nobs]Mean value t-stat

The bidder CAARs

[?1;+1]0.47b 2.25[653]0.83a 3.95[1456]?0.36b?2.17 [?5,+5]0.85c 1.92[653]0.76a 2.56[1456]0.09 1.15 [?60;+60]?3.63c?1.80[653]?2.49c?1.80[1456]?1.14a?3.40

The target CAARs

[?1;+1]12.55a 5.24[296]11.52a7.42[764] 1.02a?2.65 [?5,+5]15.61a16.15[296]12.17a 2.60[764] 3.44a?3.54 [?60;+60]26.84a12.04[296]24.99a10.22[764] 1.85a?3.53 Panel B.Takeover announcement effect by legal origin

The bidder CAARs[?1,+1]by legal origin of the bidder country

English legal origin0.36 1.63[173]0.50a 2.69[744]?0.14?1.30 French legal origin0.39c 1.88[181]0.91b 2.32[279]?0.52b?2.18 German legal origin0.66b 2.08[137]0.59b 2.44[184]0.070.61 Scandinavian legal origin0.67b 2.15[149] 2.29a 3.17[206]?1.62a?3.44 EU2004Accession countries?1.25b?2.03[6]0.120.56[35]?1.37a?2.86 EU2007Accession countries,Croatia,and Russia?1.60?0.23[4]?0.51?0.15[8]?1.09?0.55 The target CAARs[?1,+1]by legal origin of the target country

English legal origin19.42a7.52[57]17.64a14.00[306] 1.78b 2.44 French legal origin7.12a 3.80[52] 2.82a 3.18[118] 4.30a 3.19 German legal origin7.06a 3.46[33] 4.42a 3.17[48] 2.64a 2.53 Scandinavian legal origin17.32a7.95[38]14.77a7.12[76] 2.55a 2.72 EU2004Accession countries 1.52 1.53[15] 3.67a 2.74[11]?2.15?1.62 EU2007Accession countries,Croatia,and Russia?0.18?0.12[8]?6.36?0.78[5] 6.18a 3.11

Panel A reports the average values of the CARs for bidding and target?rms in cross-border and domestic acquisitions conducted in Continental Europe and the UK. The CAARs are reported in percentages.Panel B reports the CAARs for bidding and target?rms in cross-border and domestic acquisitions classi?ed by the legal origin of the bidder and target countries.Abnormal returns are computed as the difference between the realized and market model benchmark returns.For each ?rm,we calculate daily benchmark returns using MSCI-Europe index returns and the market model parameters are estimated over240days starting300days prior to the acquisition announcement.The t-statistics from the non-parametric test(Corrado,1989)is reported to assess the signi?cance of the CAARs.a,b,and c stand for statistical signi?cance at the1%,5%,and10%level,respectively.Nobs stands for the number of observations.

have con?dence in and abide by the rules of society,which include the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary and the enforceability of contracts.A higher score of the index signi?es that a national judicial system is more effective.

Panel A of Table3reports the mean values of the corporate governance indices multiplied by the rule of law index.(Henceforth,when we refer to the corporate governance indices,we refer to the original indices multiplied by the rule of law index).The indices are reported by legal origin and for every?fth year over the period1990–2005.The panel shows that in1995—the reference year of the LLSV indices—our shareholder rights protection index ranks countries in a similar order as it does the LLSV anti-director index.That is,countries of English legal origin have the highest corporate governance standards with respect to shareholder protection.They are followed by the countries of Scandinavian legal origin,and then by the countries of French and German legal origin.The panel also shows that there have been substantial changes in corporate governance standards in virtually every country in Europe over the past15years.The changes relate to all three dimensions of corporate governance standards addressed in this paper.However,in2005,the countries of English legal origin still provide the highest quality of shareholder protection.Over time,shareholder rights and minority shareholder protection have increased throughout Continental Europe and the UK,whereas creditor protection has been reduced in Western Europe.By2005,many Continental European countries had improved their legal system and moved closer to the standards set by the English legal system.

Panel B of Table3shows the mean values of the corporate governance indices for the countries of bidding and target companies measured in the year of the acquisition.It shows that,in contrast to the targets in cross-border acquisitions,bidding?rms are from countries with better legal protection of(minority)shareholders.This pattern is consistent with the evidence by Rossi and Volpin (2004):targets in cross-border acquisitions are typically from countries with poorer standards of shareholder protection than bidders. The difference in creditor rights between the bidder and target countries seems to have no impact on the?ow of cross-border M&As.

The correlation matrix in Table4shows that the value for the target shareholder rights index is positively correlated with the bidder and target takeover returns.The value of the target minority shareholder protection index is also positively correlated with the target returns but is negatively correlated with the bidder returns.The table also reports the correlations between the indices and the main variables that are used in the regression models below.

3.1.3.Corporate governance spillover effects

We measure the potential corporate governance spillover effect in cross-border mergers and acquisitions in two ways.First,we take the difference between the indices of the bidder and target countries(the differences-approach).This variable captures the scope of the potential improvement(or deterioration)in corporate governance if the target?rm were to adopt the standards of the

bidder.The quality of corporate governance standards is measured by means of the three indices discussed above;i.e.we measure it with respect to the protection of shareholders,minority shareholders,and creditors (while taking into account the quality of the judiciary).Table 4shows that the shareholder-rights difference is positively correlated with the target takeover returns.

Second,we construct indicator variables capturing the direction of corporate governance spillover effects:from the bidder to the target and vice versa (the indicator-variable approach).The indicator variable for the spillover of better governance standards from the bidder to the target equals one if the bidder index is above the median and the target index is below the median (the positive spillover by law/spillover by control effect ),and is zero otherwise.The indicator variable for the spillover of better governance standards from the target to the bidder (the bootstrapping effect )equals one if the bidder index is below the median and the target index is above the median,and is zero otherwise.Alternatively,this variable may indicate the spillover of the bidder low governance standards to the target ?rm (the negative spillover by law effect ),if its parameter estimate has the inverse sign.Overall,the indicator variables denote whether a bidding company is likely to improve or worsen its own governance and the governance in a target ?rm.It should be noted that the median value of each index is measured across all countries in a particular year and both the bidder and target indices are compared to the same median.

Table 5partitions all M&As by the quality of corporate governance standards.It shows that the majority of cross-border bidders are from countries with superior standards of investor protection.More than 76%of all cross-border bidders are from countries with a shareholder rights index above the median (Panel A).This percentage is even higher (about 93%)when we consider minority shareholder protection (Panel B).Panel C shows that the sample is evenly split between bidders from countries with below-and above-median creditor rights.A similar picture arises for target companies:they tend to be from countries with above-median investor

Table 3

Corporate governance regulation indices

Panel A.Corporate governance indices by legal origin and by year

English legal origin

French legal origin

German legal origin

Scandinavian legal origin

EU 2004Accession

EU 2007Accession countries,Croatia,and Russia

N =2

N =8N =3N =4N =9N =4Shareholder rights index 1990 4.79 3.33 2.93 3.34 1.72 1.621995 5.21 3.39 3.21 3.55 2.23 1.722000 5.91 3.87 4.28 3.97 2.65 2.042005

6.13

4.57

4.66

4.18

3.34

2.86

Minority shareholder protection index 1990 4.25 2.69 3.14 3.21 1.510.681995 4.58 2.89 3.57 3.38 2.13 1.182000 5.20 3.37 4.52 3.60 2.78 1.962005

5.05 3.42 4.64 3.63 3.54 2.15

Creditor rights index 1990 3.40 4.42 5.92 6.67 1.18 1.221995 3.40 4.43 5.92 5.33 3.51 2.272000 3.51 3.89 4.29 4.07 3.82 2.332005

3.41 3.48

4.11 4.03 4.10 2.61

Panel B.Corporate governance indices by the bidder/target country in cross-border and domestic M&As

Cross-border M&As Domestic M&As

Diff.cross-border —Domestic

Mean value

t -stat

Mean value

t -stat

Mean value t -stat Shareholder rights index

Bidder Country 4.37 5.11?0.74a ?3.22Target country 3.74 5.11?1.37a

?2.84Diff.bidder —target

0.63a

3.16–

–

Minority shareholder protection index Bidder country 4.06 4.41?0.35a ?2.65Target country 3.74 4.41?0.67a

?3.11Diff.bidder —target 0.32b

2.31

–

––

Creditor rights index Bidder country 3.71 3.430.28 1.62Target country 3.72 3.430.29 1.61Diff.bidder —target ?0.01?0.04

––

Num.of obs

737

1681

Panel A reports the mean values of the corporate governance indices by legal origin and for every ?fth year over the period 1990–2005.All indices are adjusted for the degree of law enforcement by country.N is the number of countries of a speci ?c legal origin.Panel B reports the mean values of the indices for bidder and target countries by domestic and cross-border M&As.a,b and c stand for statistical signi ?cance at the 1%,5%and 10%level,respectively.

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protection.These patterns stand in sharp contrast to those documented by Bris and Cabolis (2008)who ?nd that the majority of bidders and targets are from countries with below-median investor protection.This difference may be due to the sample composition.In contrast to Bris and Cabolis (2008),our sample excludes M&As that involve ?rms from outside Continental Europe and the UK.Another rationale for the observed differences is that our classi ?cation is based on our dynamic corporate governance indices whereas Bris and Cabolis (2008)use the static LLSV indices.

Table 5shows that bidders from legal systems with below-median investor protection mainly acquire target ?rms from systems with above-median legal protection (63.46%).Similarly,target ?rms from legal systems with below average investor protection tend to sell their shares to foreign acquirers coming from systems with superior legal protection (80.71%).

3.1.

4.Other determinants of the bidder and target returns

We consider three categories of additional factors that may in ?uence the bidder and target returns:the characteristics of the bidder and target ?rms,the features of the takeover deal,and the characteristics of the bidder and target countries.

3.1.

4.1.Bidder and target characteristics.The bidder characteristics that we control for are ?rm size,Q-ratio,leverage,cash ?ow,and pre-announcement stock price run-up.The size of the bidder is included as a proxy for managerial hubris (Roll,1986),as larger acquirers tend to overpay in takeovers (Moeller et al.,2004).Therefore,the bidder returns are expected to decrease with ?rm size.The bidder Q-ratio is a proxy for the ?rm's growth potential and quality of internal corporate https://www.wendangku.net/doc/ba10265685.html,ng et al.(1989)and Servaes (1991)document higher returns for bidders with higher Q-ratios.In contrast,Moeller et al.(2004)?nd a negative relationship between bidder returns and Q-ratio for their sample of M&As from the 1990s.Therefore,the expected effect of the bidder Q-ratio on returns is ambiguous.We also include cash ?ow and leverage to control for acquisitions driven by free cash ?ow motives (Jensen,1986).Bidders with high cash ?ow and low leverage are more likely to make value-destroying acquisitions.Finally,we include the bidder pre-announcement stock price run-up to control for the bidder's prior stock performance.

Table 5

Sample composition cross-border acquisitions by quality of the bidder and target corporate governance systems for cross-border acquisitions Frequency Target ?rms

Percent Row pct Col pct

Below median Above median Total Panel A.Shareholder rights index Bidding ?rms

Below median

491271766.65%17.23%23.88%27.84%72.16%17619.29%26.29%Above median

20535656127.82%48.30%76.12%

36.54%63.46%80.71%73.71%Total

25448373734.46%

65.54%

100.0%

Panel B.Minority shareholder protection index Bidding ?rms Below median

33492.17% 4.48% 6.65%

32.65%67.35%11.85% 5.48%Above median

11956968816.15%77.20%93.35%

17.30%82.70%88.15%94.52%Total

135********.32%81.68%

100.0%

Panel C.Creditor rights index Bidding ?rms

Below median

15419334720.90%26.19%47.08%

44.38%55.62%44.90%48.98%Above median

189

20139025.64%27.27%52.92%

48.46%51.54%55.10%52.02%Total

34339473746.54%53.46%

100.0%

Frequency denotes the total number of observations falling into a particular category.Percent denotes the percentage of a particular category ’s observations within the total sample.Row pct stands for the percentage of a particular category ’s observations in the total number of observations within the same row.Col pct stands for the percentage of a particular category ’s observations in the total number of observations within the same column.

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210M.Martynova,L.Renneboog/Journal of Corporate Finance14(2008)200–223

The target characteristics that we include as control variables are leverage and cash?ow,as a bidder is likely to pay higher premiums for targets with lower leverage and higher cash?ows.For the analysis of(public)target CARs,we also include the target Q-ratio and pre-announcement stock price run-up to control for its growth opportunities and prior stock performance respectively.

3.1.

4.2.Deal characteristics.Both the theoretical and empirical M&A literature have shown that the following transaction attributes affect the bidder and target takeover returns:the form of and the attitude towards the bid(opposed bids,unopposed tender offers, friendly M&As),the legal status of the target?rm(listed versus privately-held),the industry relatedness of the bidding and target ?rms(a focus versus diversi?cation strategy of the bidder),the type of acquisition(full versus partial acquisition),the means of payment(all-cash,all-equity,mixed offer),and the relative deal size.15It is argued that the market interprets all these pieces of information as a signal of the quality of the bidding and target?rms and of the potential value creation in the takeover,which triggers share price adjustments.Therefore,to capture the effect of this signal we also control for the above deal characteristics in our models.

3.2.Controlling for the selection bias

We recognize that a decision to participate in a cross-border acquisition is an endogenous choice made by the bidding and target?rms and these endogeneity issues may affect the conclusions of our analysis.In particular,Rossi and Volpin(2004)?nd that bidders and targets from countries with high shareholder protection are more likely to be involved in domestic rather than cross-border M&As.Therefore,we expect that a cross-border acquisition involving a bidder or a target from a country with high shareholder protection will occur only if the takeover synergies are suf?ciently high to overcome all additional costs arising from integrating with a foreign?rm.16This implies a positive relationship between the bidder and target shareholder protection indices and the announcement stock returns.

Therefore,to control for the sample-selection bias,we employ Heckman's(1976,1979)procedure.By applying a Probit analysis to the sample of all European bidding?rms involved in domestic and cross-border acquisitions,we estimate the probability that a ?rm will undertake a cross-border rather than a domestic acquisition.The resulting parameters are used to compute Heckman'sλ(inverse Mill's ratio)for each bidding?rm in our sample.We subsequently include Heckman'sλas an additional regressor into the regressions on the bidder returns.Similarly,we estimate the probability that a target?rm is involved in a cross-border rather than domestic acquisition by computing Heckman'sλand including it into the target returns'regressions.Although the bidder and target selection equations seem very similar,they refer to different?ows of foreign direct investments.The bidder equations estimate the determinants of the investment out?ow from the country,whereas the target equations estimate the determinants of the investment in?ow to the country.

The explanatory variables of the two selection equations(presented in Table6)are based on previous studies on the determinants of foreign direct investments and international?nancial integration(see e.g.Pagano et al.,2002;Sarkissian and Schill,2004;Claessens and Schmukler,2007).First,we include the characteristics of the bidding/target?rms(size,leverage,cash ?ow,and Q-ratio)and the non-negotiated features of the intended takeover(public/private target,industry focus/diversi?cation, the period within the takeover wave).Second,we also include macro variables such as GDP growth,income per capita,and the level of corruption in the bidder/target country.We expect bidding?rms to initiate M&As abroad(rather than domestically)when their home countries offer a poor investment environment,which is proxied by low economic growth and high levels of corruption.An underdeveloped M&A market resulting from various obstacles such as takeover-unfriendly regulation may be another reason that motivates?rms to acquire foreign targets.Therefore,we also include a proxy variable for the scope of domestic M&A activity in the country.Finally,the impact of the regulatory environment on the decision to acquire abroad is captured by our corporate governance indices.

The estimates of the selection equations of the bidding and target?rms reveal interesting results with respect to the impact of the regulatory environment on the?ow of cross-border M&A activity(Table6).In particular,a bidding?rm is more likely to make a cross-border acquisition if it is from a country with low standards of shareholder rights.The result supports the view that?rms from countries with weak corporate governance regulation are more likely to invest abroad rather than domestically(Doidge et al., 2007;Benos and Weisbach,2004).We also?nd that bidders are more likely to acquire?rms abroad if minority shareholder protection in their home country is strong.This result is in line with Goergen et al.(2005)who argue that strong protection of minority shareholders makes corporate takeovers very costly and hence forces companies to look for potential M&A targets in countries with weaker minority shareholder protection.Strong creditor protection in the home country also has a positive effect on the international acquisition activity.This may follow from the positive relationship between creditor protection and a?rm's access to debt?nancing(LaPorta et al.,1998).Martynova and Renneboog(2007a)show that debt?nancing is frequently used in cross-border M&As.Therefore,cross-border M&As are more likely to be made by bidders who have access to inexpensive debt capital which prevails in countries with strong creditor rights.

Unsurprisingly,the selection equation for the target?rms shows that a target is more likely to sell its shares to a foreign bidder if the standards of shareholder protection in the target country are low and the standards of creditor protection are high.

15For an overview of the evidence on the wealth effect of M&As and its determinants,see Jensen and Ruback(1983),Jarrell et al.(1988),Agrawal and Jaffe (2000),Bruner(2004),and Martynova and Renneboog(in press).

16For the discussion of additional costs associated with cross-border takeovers see e.g.Dennis et al.,(2002)and Moeller and Schlingemann(2005).

3.3.Regression results 3.3.1.The bidder returns

3.3.1.1.The impact of corporate governance regulation on the bidder returns.We start our analysis with the bidder returns regressions that include the bidder and target corporate governance indices in levels,while controlling for the fact that making a cross-border acquisition is an endogenous decision (selection bias problem).Model 1of Table 7shows that the effect of the bidder and target national governance standards on the bidder returns is insigni ?cant.The coef ?cients remain insigni ?cant in Model 2after controlling for growth potential,leverage,share price run-up,means of payment and many other characteristics of the deal,the target,the bidder and the countries of the bidder and target.We also fail to ?nd any signi ?cant coef ?cients when we re-estimate this model including one of the corporate governance indices at the time (see Models 4–6).Overall,the evidence suggests that,apart from its impact on the decision to acquire a ?rm abroad (see Section 3.2),corporate governance regulation has no signi ?cant effect on the takeover returns to the bidding ?rm's shareholders.

Most of our results with respect to the control variables are consistent with previous empirical ?ndings (see e.g.Moeller et al.,2004;Bris and Cabolis,2008;Starks and Wei,2005).Speci ?cally,we observe that (i)the bidder size has a signi ?cantly negative effect on the bidder returns suggesting that large bidders are more likely to make poor takeover decisions;(ii)the bidder Q-ratio has no signi ?cant effect on the bidder returns;(iii)the proxies for free cash ?ow —the bidder cash ?ow and leverage —have the expected (but insigni ?cant)impact on the bidder returns (respectively,a negative and positive effect)which indicates that there is little evidence that cross-border acquisitions occur as a result of empire building;(iv)the bidder returns are signi ?cantly lower for hostile takeovers suggesting that the bidder shareholder fear overbidding in case of opposition by the target ?rm;(v)the returns are also lower for acquisitions involving equity payments (signalling overvaluation of the bidder shares),for public targets,for diversifying mergers (leading to a diversi ?cation discount),and for full takeovers;(vi)the bidder pre-announcement stock-price run-up has a signi ?cantly positive effect on the bidder announcement returns;(vii)the bidder returns are also higher when the bidder and target countries are neighbours or belong to the same language group,as both may enhance transparency or induce trust;17(viii)the differences in economic development between the bidder and target countries is not correlated to the bidder returns;and (ix)the level of corruption in the target country has an insigni ?cant effect on the bidder returns.

Table 6

Heckman sample selection equations for bidding and target ?rms in cross-border M&As

Probability of a BIDDING company acquiring a foreign ?rm (vs.domestic ?rm)Probability of a TARGET company being acquired by a foreign ?rm (vs.a domestic ?rm)Coeff.

Pr N ChiSq Coeff.Pr N ChiSq Corporate governance regulation in the ?rm country Shareholder rights index

?0.3123a .000?0.2149c .092Minority shareholder protection index 0.3945a .009?0.1311.596Creditor rights index 0.2804a

.000

0.2962a

.000

Firm characteristics Q-ratio 0.0229b .0220.0398.174Leverage ?0.2117.590?0.4936.346Size (log TA)0.2159a .0000.1949a .000Cash ?ow/TA 0.5508

.3620.2502.770

Deal characteristics Public target ?0.4561b .032–Same industry 0.0438.720?0.0274.8751997–19990.2326.1140.5145b .0192000–2001

0.2987b

.0490.5936b

.011

Characteristics of the ?rm's country Anti-corruption index ?0.1045.4180.3511a .007Log GNP per capita ?0.3639.5220.2862.284GDP growth

?0.1593c .0780.2707b .012#Domestic acquisitions/#listed ?rms 1year prior ?0.0267.218?0.0400.560Intercept

?2.9004a .000

?2.1785a

.003

Number of obs.2271760Pseudo ?R 2

21.15%

27.08%

This table shows the selection equations of sample selection models for the bidding and target ?rms.The selection equations model the probability that a bidder (target)?rm participates in a cross-border (rather than domestic)acquisition.The depended variable equals one if the bidder (target)?rm participates in a cross-border takeover,and zero if in a domestic takeover.The de ?nitions of the included variables are given in Appendix A.a,b and c stand for statistical signi ?cance at the 1%,5%and 10%level,respectively.

This result is interesting as it suggests that acquisitions of companies belonging to similar cultures lead to a higher value creation.The evidence is in spirit of Guiso et al.(2006,2007)who show that international transactions are more common between ?rms from countries that display a higher level of cultural similarities.

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All estimated models reveal that Heckman's λis signi ?cant con ?rming that ignoring the selection bias may induce estimation problems.To rule out any further possibility that our results are driven by the endogeneity of the control variables,we also re-estimate Model 7excluding the corporate governance indices.Our results are upheld.

3.3.1.2.The impact of corporate governance spillover effects on the bidder returns.Whereas Table 7concentrates on the impact of corporate governance regulation on the bidder returns in cross-border acquisitions,we now switch to the question whether potential corporate governance spillover is re ?ected in the bidder returns.We do not report the parameter estimates of the control variables in Table 8,as they are similar to those reported in Table 7.As in previous sections,we correct the models of Table 8for sample-selection biases.We now primarily focus on the potential improvement (or deterioration)of bidder and target ?rms corporate governance standards as a result of the takeover and its effect on the bidder returns.

In Panel A of Table 8,we measure the scope for potential corporate governance spillover by the differences between the bidder and target corporate governance indices.In line with Bris and Cabolis (2008),the parameter coef ?cient shows that the shareholder-rights difference has a positive,albeit insigni ?cant,effect on the bidder CARs.A signi ?cantly positive coef ?cient would be consistent with the spillover by law hypothesis which states that the improvement in the corporate governance of the target ?rm via the transfer of the bidder governance standards is a source of synergistic gains in corporate takeovers.

The insigni ?cance of the coef ?cients may be due to the fact that not only bidding companies from countries with superior corporate governance standards may bene ?t from cross-border M&As but also bidders from countries with low investor protection.These may bootstrap their corporate governance standards to a higher level,namely that of the target ?rm.To disentangle the different directions of the spillover effect,we apply an indicator-variable approach.Panel B of Table 8reports the results of the regressions that include an indicator variable capturing M&As involving a bidder with corporate governance standards above the median and a target with standards below the median.We also include an indicator variable that captures the

Table 7

The impact of corporate governance regulation on the bidder CARs in cross-border M&As

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

Corporate governance regulation effect

(Bidder)Shareholder rights index 0.0017(.329)0.0020(.248)

0.0027(.253)0.0029(.156)

(Bidder)Minority shareholder protection index

0.0043(.389)0.0026(.771)0.0022(.810)

0.0020(.753)

(Bidder)Creditor rights index 0.0005(.726)0.0012(.680)0.0006(.830)

(Target)Shareholder rights index 0.0021(.415)0.0015(.511)0.0018(.618)0.0011(.314)

(Target)Minority shareholder protection index

?0.0013(.357)?0.0032(.229)?0.0034(.216)

?0.0030(.118)

(Target)Creditor rights index 0.0004(.796)0.0014(.551)

0.0019(.408)

Bidder and target ?rms'characteristics (Bidder)Q-ratio ?0.0003(.689)?0.0002(.753)?0.0002(.745)?0.0003(.664)?0.0004(.552)?0.0013(.323)(Bidder)Leverage 0.0044(.869)0.0038(.883)0.0029(.910)0.0012(.963)0.0024(.928)0.0028(.568)(Bidder)Size (log TA)?0.0012b (.031)?0.0012b (.034)?0.0012b (.019)?0.0009a (.005)?0.0009b (.029)?0.0018a (.006)(Bidder)Cash ?ow/TA ?0.0508(.326)?0.0522(.309)?0.0511(.318)?0.0533(.299)?0.0525(.306)?0.0153(.780)(Target)Leverage ?0.0303(.702)?0.0355(.653)?0.0117(.883)?0.0162(.839)?0.0021(.979)?0.0730(.127)(Target)Cash ?ow/TA 0.0805(.569)0.0724(.399)0.0866(.251)0.0911(.241)0.0945(.336)0.0582(.647)

Deal characteristics Equity payment ?0.0140(.268)?0.0148(.239)?0.0150(.232)?0.0153(.223)?0.0144(.253)?0.0163(.122)Public target ?0.0077(.459)?0.0065(.521)?0.0069.491?0.0055(.585)?0.0043(.663)0.0034(.924)Hostile bid ?0.0302b (.021)?0.0311b (.015)?0.0314a (.010)?0.0291b (.029)?0.0269c (.062)?0.0419a (.006)M&A of 100%?0.0013(.892)?0.0009(.918)?0.0012(.897)0.0003(.970)0.0012(.895)0.0016(.556)Diversi ?cation ?0.0013(.886)?0.0012(.894)?0.0009(.916)0.0002(.977)0.0006(.945)0.0007(.935)Relative size 0.0238(.277)0.0232(.287)0.0240(.267)0.0246(.257)0.0242(.263)0.0242(.262)(Bidder)Run-up

0.0352a (.009)0.0361a (.007)0.0360a (.006)0.0358a (.007)0.0354a (.007)0.0360a (.006)

Bidder and target country characteristics Same language group 0.0010c (.064)0.0012b (.031)0.0011b (.036)0.0012b (.048)0.0008(.107)0.0026b (.012)Common border

0.0017b (.015)0.0021b (.020)0.0022b (.032)0.0024b (.018)0.0014c (.071)0.0043b (.017)(Bidder)log GNP per capita 0.0046(.316)0.0038(.415)0.0036(.422)0.0038(.385)0.0043(.368)0.0175(.211)Difference (Bidder –Target)log GNP per capita

0.0020(.532)0.0012(.701)0.0013(.655)0.0012(.629)0.0024(.828)0.0034(.502)(Target)Anti-corruption index 0.0003(.788)0.0002(.872)0.0004(.667)0.0004(.654)0.0002(.988)0.0008(.428)Intercept ?0.0147(.426)?0.0190(.554)?0.0088(.750)?0.0104(.635)?0.0029(.917)?0.0063(.679)0.0023(.753)Heckman k (inverse Mill's ratios)?0.0034a (.002)?0.0032a (.005)?0.0032a (.004)?0.0033a (.002)?0.0032a (.005)?0.0034a (.004)?0.0033a (.003)Number of obs.641641641641641641641Adjusted ?R 2 3.40%

5.33%

4.67%

5.55%

4.91%

4.85%

4.80%

212M.Martynova,L.Renneboog /Journal of Corporate Finance 14(2008)200–223

opposite case:a bidder with low standards and a target with high investor protection.While the ?rst variable is a proxy for the improvement of the target ?rms'corporate governance (the positive spillover by law and the spillover by control hypotheses ),the second variable is a proxy for the improvement of the bidder corporate governance (the bootstrapping effect )or for the dilution of the governance of the target if the bidder imposes its lower standards (the negative spillover by law hypothesis ).

The regression results from Models 1–4(panel B)show that the coef ?cient on the indicator variable capturing the improvement in the target shareholder rights is positive and statistically signi ?cant (at the 1%level).This is consistent with the positive spillover by law (and spillover by control)predictions that acquisitions of ?rms with poor shareholder orientation by ?rms with a strong shareholder orientation generate abnormal returns for the bidder through the imposition of better corporate governance on the target.

Table 8

The impact of the corporate governance spillover effects on the bidder CARs in cross-border M&As Panel A.Differences-approach (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)

(6)

Corporate governance regulation effect (Bidder)Shareholder rights index

0.0012(.478)0.0047(.242)0.0055(.145)0.0042(.231)

(Bidder)Minority shareholder protection index 0.0006(.368)0.0019(.934)0.0019(.852)

0.0020(.753)

(Bidder)Creditor rights index

0.0001(.672)

0.0026(.504)

0.0025(.512)

Corporate governance spillover effect

Diff (Bidder –Target)Shareholder rights index

0.0005(.725)0.0007(.777)0.0001(.943)0.0001(.914)

Diff (Bidder –Target)Minority shareholder protection index 0.0013(.757)0.0035(.618)0.0041(.555)

0.0040(.381)

Diff (Bidder –Target)Creditor rights index

?0.0004(.796)?0.0014(.551)?0.0019(.409)

Characteristics of the bidder and target,the M&A deal,and the bidder and target countries No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Heckman λ(inverse Mill's ratio)Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Adjusted-R 2 1.68% 4.82% 4.67% 4.55% 3.91% 3.85%Panel B.Indicator-variable approach (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)

(6)

Corporate governance regulation effect (Bidder)Shareholder rights index

0.0001(.782)0.0014(.557)0.0009(.652)0.0013(.649)

(Bidder)Minority shareholder protection index 0.0046(.395)0.0022(.815)0.0014(.879)

0.0016(.783)

(Bidder)Creditor rights index

0.0020(.341)

0.0025(.478)

0.0017(.624)

Positive spillover by law/Spillover by control hypotheses (spillover form Bidder to Target)(Target)Shareholder rights improvement 0.0173a

(.009)

0.0166a (.008)0.0153a (.008)0.0148a

(.007)

(Target)Minority shareholder protection improvement ?0.0014

(.832)

0.0088(.384)0.0086(.389)

0.0055(.566)

(Target)Creditor rights improvement ?0.0075

(.344)0.0014(.912)

?0.0017(.886)

Bootstrapping hypothesis (spillover from Target to Bidder)(Bidder)Shareholder rights improvement

0.0115b (.036)0.0041(.218)0.0042(.272)0.0024(.589)

(Bidder)Minority shareholder protection improvement ?0.0001(.990)0.0050(.720)0.0036(.792)

0.0071(.591)

(Bidder)Creditor rights improvement

?0.0013(.864)

0.0068(.588)0.0058(.642)

Characteristics of the bidder and target,the M&A deal,and the bidder and target countries No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Intercept Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes Heckman λ(inverse Mill's ratio)Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Adjusted-R 2 2.13%

5.87%

4.65%

5.71%

4.54%

4.17%

This table reports the results of the OLS regression of the bidder CARs for the sample of cross-border takeovers.The dependent variable is the bidder CARs [?1,+1].Variable de ?nitions are given in Appendix A.Six different model speci ?cations are estimated.A Heckman sample selection correction is applied to control for potential biases due to the bidder endogenous choice of participating in a cross-border (rather than domestic)takeover.We do not report the parameter estimates of the control variables,as they are similar to those reported in Table 7.The indicator ‘Yes ’denotes that a particular control variable is included in the regression and ‘No ’that it is not.Panel A reports the regression estimates of the differences -approach while Panel B reports the estimates of the indicator-variable approach.For each variable we list the coef ?cient and the heteroskedasticity-consistent p -value.a /b /c stand for statistical signi ?cance at 1%/5%/10%,respectively.The number of observations in each regression is 641.

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214M.Martynova,L.Renneboog/Journal of Corporate Finance14(2008)200–223

Model1also shows that the bidder returns are positive and signi?cant when the target has a stronger shareholder orientation than the bidder.The fact that the bidder shareholders react positively to this type of deal is congruent with the fact that the bidding?rm may adopt a higher level of shareholder orientation on a voluntary basis.18This increased shareholder orientation is then anticipated by the bidder shareholders,as re?ected in the announcement returns.However,the signi?cance of this bootstrapping effect disappears after taking into account the characteristics of the target,the bidder,the deal and countries of the bidder and target.

3.3.2.The target returns

3.3.2.1.The impact of corporate governance regulation on the target returns.We?rst focus on whether corporate governance standards in the bidder and target countries have a signi?cant effect on the target returns(after controlling for the sample-selection bias described in Section3.2).Table9shows that the target returns strongly increase with the quality of shareholder protection in the target country.The coef?cient on the target shareholder rights index is positive and statistically signi?cant in all model speci?cations.The evidence suggests that target companies from countries with better shareholder protection are able to extract higher premiums from the bidding?rms,which is also consistent with Rossi and Volpin(2004)but not with Bris and Cabolis(2008).

When we focus on minority shareholder protection by excluding shareholder and creditor protection indices(Model5), minority shareholder protection in the target country is still positively associated with the target returns.This implies that powerful minority shareholders are able to extract an additional premium in the deal.Still,this?nding is not corroborated when other different measures of investor protection are included in the model.

The degree of shareholder orientation in the bidder country has a positive effect on the target returns but only in Model1of Table9.This lack of a consistent signi?cant impact of the bidder shareholder protection on the target returns is also documented by Rossi and Volpin(2004).They conclude that bidders from countries with better shareholder protection do not pay more for cross-border M&As than bidders from other countries.Overall,our evidence suggests that the corporate governance regime in the target (but not the bidder)country positively affects the target shareholders returns.

As to the control variables,most of our?ndings are in line with those of other empirical studies on cross-border M&As(see,e.g. Harris and Ravenscraft,1991;Dewenter,1995).In particular,we observe that target returns are signi?cantly higher in hostile takeovers and in full takeovers,and are signi?cantly lower when equity is used as a means of payment and when corruption in the target country is high.

3.3.2.2.The impact of corporate governance spillover effects on the target returns.Whereas Table9examines the impact of the national regulation on the target returns,we now analyse in Table10the impact of corporate governance spillover.Panel A of Table 10reports that the target returns increase with the scope of potential shareholder protection spillover as measured by the differences between the bidder and target shareholder rights indices.When a bidding?rm is from a country with higher shareholder protection than the target,the bidder(better)corporate governance standard will be imposed—by law in case of a full acquisition—on the target?rm(the positive spillover by law effect)which leads to signi?cantly higher target announcement returns. Similarly,in case of a partial acquisition,the bidder?rm may voluntarily impose its better shareholder protection standards on the target(the spillover by control effect)which leads to higher target shareholder returns.This implies that part of the synergies in cross-border acquisitions result from corporate governance improvements at the target.As the target shareholders anticipate this, they are able to claim part of the expected value improvement given that they are sellers in a strong bargaining position.

Moreover,when we differentiate between the cases where the bidder is subject to stronger(weaker)shareholder protection than the target(Panel B of Table10),we?nd further con?rmation of our result.Target returns increase when there is a positive spillover effect from the bidder to the target,i.e.when the bidder is from a country with a stronger shareholder orientation.These results yield support to our positive spillover by law and spillover by control hypotheses.Interestingly,the evidence does not support the negative spillover by law hypothesis:in takeovers by bidders from countries with poorer standards,the target returns are not signi?cantly lower.

3.4.Additional analyses

3.4.1.Does a change in the target nationality matter?

Bris and Cabolis(2008)emphasize that target companies bene?t from corporate governance spillovers only when the bidder acquires100%of the target?rm's shares,i.e.when the target?rm de facto changes its nationality(spillover by law hypothesis).In case of a full acquisition,the target?rm becomes a part of the bidding?rm and hence will have to comply with the corporate governance regulation in the bidder country.To further test this hypothesis,we split our sample into full and partial acquisitions and we re-estimate the models from Tables8and10.Table11shows that,irrespective of the type of the takeover(full or partial), bidding?rms from countries with above-median shareholder protection experience signi?cantly higher returns when they acquire target?rms from countries with below-median shareholder protection.The evidence supports the spillover by control hypothesis:a well-governed bidding?rm improves the governance at the target?rm in which it holds a majority stake such that the target?rm's assets are used more ef?ciently and create more shareholder value.

18This result does not support the negative spillover by law hypothesis as under this hypothesis we would expect negative or at best insigni?cant bidder returns.

Table 11also unveils another interesting result:bidder returns are also higher in a partial acquisition involving a bidder from a country with below-median shareholder protection and a target from a country with above median shareholder protection.We interpret the positive coef ?cients as evidence consistent with the bootstrapping hypothesis :poorly governed ?rms acquire well-governed ?rms to credibly bootstrap themselves to better corporate governance standards.They bootstrap the quality of their corporate governance standards by (voluntary)adhering to the higher shareholder protection of the target ?rm.Given that the nationality of the target ?rm does not change,and that part of the equity of the target ?rm is still held by its (old)shareholders,the bidder may feel pressurized by the target minority shareholders or voluntary decide to emulate the high corporate standards in the country of the target ?rm.This is re ?ected in the bidder returns.

We also perform the analysis of the target returns for the sub-samples of full and partial acquisitions in Table 12.We observe that partitioning our sample does not materially change our original results as the positive spillover by law hypothesis (full acquisitions)and the spillover by control hypothesis (partial acquisitions)are upheld.Thus,the target returns increase with the scope of the potential corporate-governance improvement irrespective of the degree of control change (full versus partial takeovers):acquisitions by bidders with stronger shareholder protection create more value than other types of acquisitions irrespective of the takeover type (full or partial).

3.4.2.The bidder returns and the decision to participate in a takeover

In Section 3.2,we have discussed the potential endogeneity problem associated with the bidder and target decision to participate in cross-border M&As and have corrected for this by using Heckman's λ.While Heckman's λallows us to control for the differences in cross-border and domestic acquisitions,this still ignores the fact that ?rms involved in a takeover (be it a domestic or cross-border one)may be different from ?rms that stayed clear of the takeover process.Factors such as ?nancial constraints,growth opportunities,and share price performance (most of which are likely to be associated with corporate governance

Table 9

The impact of corporate governance regulation on the target CARs in cross-border M&As

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)(6)(7)

Corporate governance regulation effect

(Bidder)Shareholder rights index 0.0169c (.087)0.0069(.324)

0.0029(.434)0.0026(.659)

(Bidder)Minority shareholder protection index

0.0070(.733)0.0254(.193)0.0240(.542)

0.0119(.569)

(Bidder)Creditor rights index ?0.0090(.202)?0.0103(.354)?0.0107(.332)

(Target)Shareholder rights index 0.0442a (.003)0.0478b (.015)0.0508a

(.008)0.0505a

(.001)

(Target)Minority shareholder protection index

0.0075(.771)0.0015(.576)0.0002(.596)

0.0557a (.005)

(Target)Creditor rights index 0.0013(.890)0.0016(.891)

0.0010(.930)

Bidder and target ?rms'characteristics (Bidder)Q-ratio ?0.0130(.212)?0.0131(.196)?0.0128(.198)?0.0122(.232)?0.0109(.322)?0.0111(.296)(Bidder)Leverage 0.0655(.777)0.0437(.844)0.0041(.984)?0.0674(.754)0.0903(.686)0.0847(.697)(Bidder)Size (log TA)?0.0041(.759)?0.0036(.785)?0.0029(.822)?0.0021(.874)?0.0036(.798)?0.0035(.802)(Bidder)Cash ?ow/TA ?0.2838(.343)?0.3063(.289)?0.3223(.237)?0.3135(.279)?0.2952(.323)?0.2973(.307)(Target)Leverage ?0.0169(.856)?0.0018(.984)0.0190(.832)0.0429(.643)?0.0034(.971)0.0174(.851)(Target)Cash ?ow/TA 0.1026(.559)0.1377(.431)0.1522(.377)0.1969(.266)0.1214(.502)0.1681(.350)(Target)Q-ratio ?0.0018(.393)?0.0018(.382)?0.0016(.457)?0.0015(.489)?0.0015(.499)?0.0015(.481)

Deal characteristics Equity payment ?0.0929c (.078)?0.0938c (.069)?0.0942c (.065)?0.0989c (.054)?0.1054b (.039)?0.1067b (.033)Hostile bid 0.0892(.149)0.1012c (.093)0.1021c (.086)0.0996c (.099)0.0895(.142)0.1021c (.086)M &A of 100%0.1408b (.015)0.1430b (.011)0.1452a (.009)0.1545a (.005)0.1648a (.001)0.1682a (.001)Diversi ?cation 0.0832(.264)0.0864(.253)0.0862(.250)0.0864(.253)0.0806(.170)0.0841(.257)Relative size ?0.0932(.221)?0.0929(.219)?0.0878(.234)?0.0904(.227)?0.0996(.175)?0.0989(.174)(Target)Run-up

?0.1043(.177)?0.1166(.123)?0.1160(.120)?0.1082(.150)?0.0791(.263)?0.0894(.197)

Bidder and target country characteristics Same language 0.0117(.342)0.0094(.760)0.0076(.563)0.0084(.702)0.0009(.987)0.0214(.426)Common border

?0.0056(.572)?0.0038(.718)?0.0043(.745)?0.0045(711)?0.0066(.424)?0.0020(.756)(Target)log GNP per capita ?0.0018(.342)?0.0016(.486)?0.0021(.505)?0.0018(.280)?0.0012(.798)?0.0036(.222)Difference (Bidder –Target)log GNP per capita

0.0108(.308)0.0112(.276)0.0118(.268)0.0118(.243)0.0102(.405)0.0215(.155)(Target)Anti-corruption index 0.0033c (.082)0.0042c (.078)0.0040c (.064)0.0044c (.057)0.0025c (.128)0.0058c (.018)Intercept ?0.1060(.307)?0.0392(.855)?0.0795(.675)?0.1311(.267)?0.1030(.569)0.1026(.189)0.0619(.201)Heckman k (inverse Mill's ratios)0.0027a (.000)0.0018a (.000)0.0018a (.000)0.0017a (.000)0.0018a (.000)0.0022a (.000)0.0031a (.000)Number of obs.296296296296296296296Adjusted ?R 210.21%

14.97%

15.03%

13.76%

13.36%

8.11%

9.15%

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regulation)are likely to be important determinants of the bidder decision (not)to participate in a takeover.In other words,we may observe fewer takeovers by bidders from countries with weak corporate governance regulation (in terms of both (minority)shareholder and creditor protection).To control for this potential bias,we estimate yet another Heckman's λ.Applying a Probit analysis on the sample of all European public ?rms (with data available in Amadeus and DataStream),we estimate the probability that a ?rm will undertake an acquisition.19

Table 10

The impact of the corporate governance spillover effect on the target CARs in cross-border M&As Panel A.Differences-approach (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)

(6)

Corporate governance regulation effect (Target)Shareholder rights index

0.0612a (.007)0.0435b (.020)0.0463b (.013)0.0309b (.018)

(Target)Minority shareholder protection index 0.0146(.632)0.0261(.515)0.0292(.445)

0.0402b (.025)

(Target)Creditor rights index

0.0041(.701)

0.0018(.883)

0.0005(.968)

Corporate governance spillover effect

Diff (Bidder –Target)Shareholder rights index

0.0169b (.017)0.0189a (.007)0.0168a (.002)0.0113a (.007)

Diff (Bidder –Target)Minority shareholder protection index 0.0070(.733)0.0159(.529)0.0096(.670)

0.0016(.928)

Diff (Bidder –Target)Creditor rights index

?0.0089(.202)?0.0095(.224)?0.0092(.228)

Characteristics of the bidder and target,the M&A deal,and the bidder and target countries No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Heckman λ(inverse Mill's ratio)Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Adjusted-R 210.18%14.83%14.75%14.08%13.70%10.02%Panel B.Indicator-variable approach (1)

(2)(3)(4)(5)

(6)

Corporate governance regulation effect (Target)Shareholder rights index

0.0501a (.003)0.0295b (.022)0.0245b (.030)0.0144b (.032)

(Target)Minority shareholder protection index 0.0076(.794)

0.0231(.573)0.0142(.716)

0.0246b (.029)

(Target)Creditor rights index

0.0117(.247)

0.0026(.824)

0.0041(.700)

Positive spillover by Law/Spillover by control hypotheses (spillover form Bidder to Target)(Target)Shareholder rights improvement 0.0107a

(.007)

0.0111a (.004)0.0177a (.000)0.0229a (.004)

(Target)Minority shareholder protection improvement 0.0301

(.415)

0.0264(.508)0.0248(.539)

0.0256(.519)

(Target)Creditor rights improvement 0.0673

(.889)0.0729(.105)

0.0597(.171)

Bootstrapping hypothesis (spillover from Target to Bidder)(Bidder)Shareholder rights improvement

?0.0171(.605)?0.0069(.854)?0.0125(.741)?0.0125(.733)

(Bidder)Minority shareholder protection improvement 0.0183(.584)0.0109(.774)0.0110(.774)

?0.0086(.816)

(Bidder)Creditor rights improvement

0.0941(.953)0.1104(.850)0.1043(.101)

Characteristics of the bidder and target,the M&A deal,and the bidder and target countries No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Intercept Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes Heckman λ(inverse Mill's ratio)Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Adjusted-R 211.71%

15.31%

15.53%

14.77%

12.99%

10.48%

This table reports the results of the OLS regression of the target CARs for the sample of cross-border takeovers.The dependent variable is the target CARs [?1,+1].Variable de ?nitions are given in Appendix A.Six different model speci ?cations are estimated.A Heckman sample selection correction is applied to control for potential biases due to the target endogenous choice of participating in a cross-border (rather than domestic)takeover.We do not report the parameter estimates of the control variables,as they are similar to the ones reported in Table 9.The indicator ‘Yes ’denotes that a particular control variable is included in the regression and ‘No ’that it is not.Panel A reports the regression estimates of a differences -approach while Panel B reports the estimates of an indicator -variable approach.Variable de ?nitions are given in Appendix A.For each variable we show the heteroskedasticity-consistent p -value.a /b /c stand for statistical signi ?cance at 1%/5%/10%,respectively.The number of observations in each regression is 296.

The regression results are not reported but available from the authors upon request.

216M.Martynova,L.Renneboog /Journal of Corporate Finance 14(2008)200–223

We perform two tests of the signi ?cance of this censoring problem.First,in the regression analysis of the bidder returns,we include the new Heckman's λinstead of the Heckman's λestimated based on the equation that predicts a cross-border bidder.We ?nd that the null hypothesis that the new Heckman's λis insigni ?cant cannot be rejected.This suggests that this type of sample-selection bias is not a signi ?cant problem in our sample and hence is not likely to cloud our estimation procedure.Second,we also re-estimate our regressions by including both the initial (cross-border takeover)Heckman's λand the new one (related to the general M&A decision).We ?nd that whereas the former is still signi ?cant,the new Heckman's λremains insigni ?cant.

3.4.3.Means of payment effect of the offer

Starks and Wei (2005)hypothesize that the means of payment has a signi ?cant impact on the premiums paid in cross-border acquisitions.The argument is the following:when target shareholders accept equity in an all-equity or mixed offer,they remain involved in the merged ?rm and will demand additional compensation when the bidding ?rm is from a country with low shareholder protection.Thus,they require a higher premium to make up for the increased risk exposure due to the poor governance standards of the bidder (and hence the merged ?rm if the bidder does not voluntarily bootstrap its governance standards).Thus,the takeover premium should be decreasing in the corporate governance quality of the bidding ?rm.Although our analyses include a variable capturing the means of payment,we re-estimate our models for sub-samples of all-equity payment/mixed offers,and of all-cash offers.Unlike Starks and Wei (2005),we ?nd that our results regarding the spillover by law and the bootstrapping hypotheses do not depend on the means of payment.

3.4.4.Further sensitivity tests

Our results are also robust to the following alternative speci ?cations:(i)we measure abnormal returns over alternative event windows such as [?5,+5]and [?60,+60];(ii)we employ industry-adjusted characteristics of bidding and target ?rms such as Q-ratio,leverage,size,and cash ?ow;(iii)we control for both bidder and target collateral (the ?xed assets)as a proxy for ?nancial takeover synergies and access to debt ?nancing;(iv)we include year and industry ?xed effects;(v)we control for the bidder

Table 11

The impact of corporate governance spillover on the bidder CARs in full and partial acquisitions

M&A of 100%(Full acquisitions)M&A of less than 100%(Partial acquisitions)(1)

(2)(3)(4)

(1)(2)(3)(4)

Corporate governance regulation effect (Bidder)Shareholder protection index

?0.0005(.986)?0.0006(.734)0.0004(.942)

0.0030(.422)0.0017(.518)0.0000(.995)

(Bidder)Minority shareholder protection index 0.0009(.413)0.0011(.450)0.0019(.819)0.0029(.559)0.0036(.624)0.0036(.741)(Bidder)Creditor protection index

0.0000(.987)

0.0003(.529)

0.0034(.125)

0.0022(.527)

Positive spillover by law/Spillover by control hypotheses (spillover form Bidder to Target)(Target)Shareholder rights improvement 0.0134c (.081)0.0178b

(.029)

0.0170b (.022)

0.0130c (.065)0.0137b (.037)0.0140c (.074)

(Target)Minority shareholder protection improvement 0.0059(.639)0.0132

(.378)

0.0097(.487)

?0.0064(.428)0.0032(.728)?0.0035(.968)

(Target)Creditor rights improvement ?0.0128(.380)?0.0056

(.752)?0.0034(.681)?0.0014(.904)

Bootstrapping hypothesis (spillover from Target to Bidder)

(Bidder)Shareholder rights improvement

0.0128b (.041)0.0122(.206)0.0107(.267)

0.0217b (.014)0.0290b (.041)0.0285b (.028)

(Bidder)Minority shareholder protection improvement 0.0006(.968)0.0041(.829)0.0049(.786)

?0.0022(.788)0.0013(.927)0.0076(.556)

(Bidder)Creditor rights improvement

?0.0011(.447)

0.0032(.860)0.0062(.438)0.0034(.769)Characteristics of the bidder and target,the M&A deal,and the bidder and target countries No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Intercept Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Heckman λ(inverse Mill's ratio)Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Number of observations 292292292292356356356356Adjusted-R 2 2.05%

4.05%

4.07%

3.27%

3.47%

4.29%

5.42%

3.59%

This table reports the results of the OLS regression of the bidder CARs for the samples of full and partial cross-border takeovers.The dependent variable is the bidder CARs [?1,+1].Variable de ?nitions are given in Appendix A.Four different model speci ?cations are estimated.A Heckman sample selection correction is applied to control for potential biases due to the bidder endogenous choice of participating in a cross-border (rather than domestic)takeover.We do not report the parameter estimates of the control variables,as they are similar to the ones reported in Table 7.The indicator ‘Yes ’denotes that a particular control variable is included in the regression and ‘No ’that it is not.For each variable we show the heteroskedasticity-consistent p -value.a /b /c stand for statistical signi ?cance at 1%/5%/10%,respectively.

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toehold in the target company accumulated prior to the initial takeover bid;and (vi)we control for the stock market ‘bubble ’period (1998–99).4.Conclusion

We demonstrate that differences between the bidder and target corporate governance standards have an important impact on the returns from cross-border mergers and acquisitions.To proxy for the quality of corporate governance in the countries of the target and the bidder,we have developed with the help of 150lawyers in 32countries time-varying corporate governance indices capturing the changes in corporate governance regulation over the past 15years.The indices cover three dimensions of corporate governance:shareholder rights,minority shareholder rights,and creditor rights,while also embedding the ef ?ciency of the judicial systems.

In a full takeover,the corporate governance standards of the bidder may be imposed on the target.When the bidder is from a country with stronger shareholder orientation,part of the total synergy value of the takeover may result from the fact that the stronger shareholder focus of the acquirer may generate additional returns due to better management of the target assets.We call this the positive spillover by law hypothesis .Given that this future value creation can be anticipated at the takeover announcement,the abnormal returns will re ?ect this potential.We expect that both the bidder and target ?rms share the returns from improved corporate governance (improved shareholder rights protection)and that their relative bargaining power determines how these returns are shared.Our empirical analysis corroborates the positive spillover by law hypothesis :the better the bidder corporate governance standards,the higher are the bidder and target takeover announcement returns.

While the positive spillover by law effect applies to full takeovers,we de ?ne the spillover by control hypothesis for partial takeovers (whereby a bidder acquires majority control but buys less than 100%of the voting rights).In partial takeovers,the bidder may impose its governance standards which may yield positive returns if it is from a country that protects shareholder rights better

Table 12

The impact of corporate governance spillover on the target CARs in full and partial acquisitions

M&A of 100%(Full acquisitions)M&A of less than 100%(Partial acquisitions)(1)

(2)(3)(4)

(1)(2)(3)(4)

Corporate governance regulation effect (Bidder)Shareholder protection index

0.0439b (.021)0.0261c (.073)0.0377b (.036)

0.0376(.035)0.0239(.050)0.0400(.022)

(Bidder)Minority shareholder protection index 0.0076(.904)0.0159(.818)0.0115b (.042)0.0174(.398)?0.0039(.926)0.0204(.075)(Bidder)Creditor protection index

0.0084(.567)

?0.0014(.928)

0.0098(.342)

0.0100(.484)

Positive spillover by law/Spillover by control hypotheses (spillover form Bidder to Target)(Target)Shareholder rights improvement 0.0356a (.001)0.0198b

(.045)

0.0173b (.029)

0.0266b (.043)0.0194b (.048)0.0226b (.034)

(Target)Minority shareholder protection improvement 0.0333(.290)0.0516

(.314)

?0.0235(.715)

?0.0019(.952)?0.0111(.768)?0.0329(.448)

(Target)Creditor rights improvement 0.0962(.097)0.0929

(.122)0.0179(.657)?0.0308(.587)

Bootstrapping hypothesis (spillover from Target to Bidder)

(Bidder)Shareholder rights improvement

?0.0059(.896)?0.0141(.765)?0.0072(.878)

?0.0284(.427)?0.0272(.658)?0.0214(.673)

(Bidder)Minority shareholder protection improvement 0.0143(.757)0.0037(.938)?0.0049(.917)

0.0259(.465)0.0250(.672)?0.0207(.674)

(Bidder)Creditor rights improvement

0.0432(.356)0.0454(.408)0.0037(.919)?0.0466(.409)Characteristics of the bidder and target,the M&A deal,and the bidder and target countries No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Intercept Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Heckman λ(inverse Mill's ratio)Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Number of observations 12112112112172727272

Adjusted-R 212.13%

19.05%

18.34%

17.14%

13.73%

18.92%

20.14%

20.50%

This table reports the results of the OLS regression of the target CARs for the samples of full and partial cross-border takeovers.The dependent variable is the target CARs [?1,+1].Variable de ?nitions are given in Appendix A.Four different model speci ?cations are estimated.A Heckman sample selection correction is applied to control for potential biases due to the target endogenous choice of participating in a cross-border (rather than domestic)takeover.We do not report the parameter estimates of the control variables,as they are similar to the ones reported in Table 9.The indicator ‘Yes ’denotes that a particular control variable is included in the regression and ‘No ’that it is not.For each variable we show the heteroskedasticity-consistent p -value.a /b /c stand for statistical signi ?cance at 1%/5%/10%,respectively.

218M.Martynova,L.Renneboog /Journal of Corporate Finance 14(2008)200–223

than the target.The bidder may voluntary opt to apply such standards or may be pressurized by the minority shareholders of the target ?rm.Our results con ?rm the spillover by control hypothesis :both the bidder and target returns are higher in a partial acquisition if the bidder is subject to stronger shareholder rights protection than the target.

In full takeovers where the bidder is from a country that protects shareholders less well than the target country,the negative spillover by law hypothesis states that the target and bidder anticipated gains will be lower given that the poorer corporate governance regime will be imposed on the target.The alternative bootstrapping hypothesis is that poor-governance bidders voluntarily bootstrap to the better-governance regime of the target,which yields a share price increase.Our evidence supports the bootstrapping hypothesis :the bidder abnormal returns are higher when a bidder with weaker shareholder orientation acquires a target with better standards.Importantly,the effect is only valid for partial acquisitions or,in other words,for deals which still involve some of the target shareholders (who did not sell out)and for which the target ?rm remains listed on the stock exchange in the country of the target.The results are robust with respect to several model speci ?cations that control for potential endogeneity problems.We conclude that an improvement in corporate governance at the target ?rm is an important source of gains in cross-border M&As.

Overall,our results suggest that cross-border takeovers between bidders and targets with dissimilar corporate governance standards can generates synergies which are partially related to corporate governance improvements (especially,those consisting of increases in shareholder rights).Acknowledgments

We would like to thank all the corporate governance regulation experts and lawyers listed in the data appendix for their help.We are grateful for valuable comments from Bernard Black,Arturo Bris,Christos Cabolis,Hans Degryse,Espen Eckbo,Julian Franks,Marc Goergen,Kate Litvak,Dennis Mueller,Steven Ongena,Annette Poulsen,Peter Szilagyi,Hubert Waelrant,Adriaan Willaert,Hannes Wagner,and Chendi Zhang and the participants of seminars at Cambridge University,CUNEF (Madrid),Keele University,New Economic School,Tilburg University,Shef ?eld University,Standard &Poor's Moscow of ?ce,and University of Lille 2.We also acknowledge suggestions from the participants of the Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (New York,2007),FMA Annual Meeting (Orlando,2007),EFA Meeting (Ljubljana,2007),Citicorp's Quantitative Conference (Cannes,2007),EFMA Meeting (Vienna,2007),the University of Shef ?eld —ECGI Symposium on Contractual Corporate Governance (Shef ?eld,2007),FinLawMetrics Conference (Milan,2007),FMA European Meeting (Barcelona,2007),and Corporate Governance Conference (Cambridge,2007).The authors gratefully acknowledge support from the European Commission via the ‘New Modes of Governance ’-project (NEWGOV)led by the European University Institute in Florence;contract No.CIT1-CT-2004-506392.Luc Renneboog is also grateful to the Netherlands Organization for Scienti ?c Research for a replacement subsidy of the programme ‘Shifts in Governance ’.

Appendix A.Variable de ?nition

Variable De ?nition

#Domestic acquisitions/#listed ?rms 1year prior Number of domestic acquisitions in the bidder/target country during the year prior to the deal announcement divided by the number of listed ?rms registered in this country.Source:computed from SDC,DataStream.(Bidder)Creditor rights improvement Indicator equals one if the bidder creditor rights index is below the median index and the target index is above the

median,zero otherwise.Source:Martynova and Renneboog (2007b)and Appendix B/C.

(Bidder)Minority shareholder protection improvement Indicator equals one if the bidder minority shareholder protection index is below the median index and the target index is above the median,zero otherwise.Source:Martynova and Renneboog (2007b)and Appendix B/C.

(Bidder)Shareholder rights improvement Indicator equals one if the bidder shareholder rights index is below the median index and the target index is above the

median,zero otherwise.Source:Martynova and Renneboog (2007b)and Appendix B/C.

(Target)Creditor rights mprovement Indicator equals one if the bidder creditor rights index is above the median index and the target index is below the

median,zero otherwise.Source:Martynova and Renneboog (2007b)and Appendix B/C.

(Target)Minority shareholder protection improvement Indicator equals one if the bidder minority shareholder protection index is above the median index and the target index is below the median,zero otherwise.Source:Martynova and Renneboog (2007b)and Appendix

B/C.

(Target)Shareholder rights improvement Indicator equals one if the bidder shareholder rights index is above the median index and the target index is below the

median,zero otherwise.Source:Martynova and Renneboog (2007b)and Appendix B/C.

1997–1999Indicator equals one if the bid was initiated in the period between January 1,1997and December 31,1999(the climax

of the 5th takeover wave);and equals zero otherwise.

2000–2001Indicator equals one if the bid was initiated in the period between January 1,2000and December 31,2001(the decline

of the 5th takeover wave);and equals zero otherwise.

Anti-corruption index The extent to which one can exercise public power for private gain It quanti ?es indicators ranging from the frequency

of “additional payments to get things done ”to the effects of corruption on the business environment.The index ranges between 0and 5,with higher values corresponding to the lower level of corruption.Source:The World Bank (https://www.wendangku.net/doc/ba10265685.html,/wbi/governance/).

CFlow/TA Ratio of total cash ?ow (including cash ?ow from operating,?nancial,and investment activities)to total assets,at the

year-end prior to the deal announcement.Source:based on SDC and Amadeus/Fame/Reach and DataStream.

Common border Indicator equals one if the bidder and target are from countries that have a common border,and equals zero otherwise.

(continued on next page)

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M.Martynova,L.Renneboog /Journal of Corporate Finance 14(2008)200–223

2020年国家治理体系和治理能力现代化试题解析

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A《中央党政机关机构改革第一阶段总结和下一阶段打算》 B《国家机关改革第一阶段总结和下一阶段打算》|C、《党政军机关改革第一阶段总结和下一阶段打算》 C《人民代表大会机构改革第一阶段总结和下一阶段打算》正确答案：A 正确答案：正确 A抓统筹 B抓落实 C抓方案 D抓调研正确答案：A, B, C, D

A1929 B1949 C1954 D1956 正确答案：C A实现温饱 B成为社会主义国家 C达到小康水平 D建设社会主义现代化强国正确答案：D A2030 B2040 C2050 D2060 正确答案：C

A全面性 B特殊性 C普遍性 D一致性正确答案：A A党的领导体系 B国家治理体系 C政府治理体系 D群团工作体系正确答案：B A减少多头管理，减少职责分散交叉B避免政出多门、责任不清、推诿扯皮C精干设置各级政府部门及其设机构

D明确要求正确理解和落实党政职责分工，确保党实施集中统一领导，保证其他机构协同联动，高效运行正确答案：A, B, C, D A改革围的全面性是突出特点 B改革的深度具有革命性 C改革设计的科学性 D改革的成果法定化 E充分发挥中央和地方两个积极性正确答案：A, B, C, D, E 正确答案：错误正确答案：错误

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国家治理体系应包括五大基本内容文稿归稿存档编号：[KKUY-KKIO69-OTM243-OLUI129-G00I-FDQS58-

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