费正清《Trade and diplomacy on the China coast
THE PROBLEM OF CHINA’S RESPONSE TO THE WEST
THE CENTURY OF THE TREATY PORTS IN CHINA, from 1842 to 1943, is now at an end, and historians may examine it for clues as to the future of Sino-Western relations. We can be sure that these three generations of steadily increasing contact have been more than a strange interlude in the long drama of China’s ethnocentric history. For better or worse, the treaty ports remade Chinese life. Through them flowed Western goods, people, and ideas. The result was to give the West a privileged position in China not unlike that of earlier barbarian conquerors.
Should we view the present rejection of the West as an anti-foreign resurgence among the Chinese people? It is, on the contrary, part of still another barbarian conquest? Or is it really an unstable mixture of the two? These are the imponderables of present day policy. They can as assessed only against the background of history.
The historical context of the period 1842-54. The modern invasion of China by the Western world really began in the middle of the nineteenth century, after the first Anglo-Chinese treaty was signed at Nanjing in 1842. Until that time relations with the West had been based upon the ancient Chinese tribute system; after that time they were based upon the “unequal” foreign treaties. Under the tribute system foreign trade had been restricted to the picturesque “factories” of old Canton. But 1842 began a new era-the opening of China to Western commercial exploitation. This was characterized by the treaty ports and the opium traffic, extraterritoriality, the treaty tariff, and the most-favored-nation clause. By the end of the nineteenth century China had been placed in a semi-colonial status, the after-effects of which have not yet passed away. In this context the years from 1842 to 1854 have significance as the transition between two unilateral, Chinese and Western, schemes of things.
These middles years of nineteenth century saw new developments in all the Far East. The first enunciation of American manifest destiny, the development of the clipper ship and the Shanghai trade in the 1840’s, were followed by the opening of Japan and the establishment of Russian on the Pacific between 1853 to 1860. The center of all this international development, however, was the British activity in China, where the treaty port consuls labored to break down the Chinese system of foreign relations and set up the Western treaty system in its place. Their initial achievement was the first treaty settlement of 1842-44; further efforts led to the invention of the Foreign Inspectorate of Customs in 1854; their final success, after the second war of 1856-60, was marked by the treaties of 1858 and 1860 which opened the interior to trade and established the Western legations at Peking.
The treaty system which had thus been created to serve as a vehicle for British and other Western trade, diplomacy, and evangelism in China, was also set up in Japan, Siam, Korea, and other Far Eastern states. It may justly be taken as the symbol of the recent century of Western superiority in the East. It forms a striking contrast with the preceding millennia of the tribute system, when the great empire of China dominated the Far Eastern scene. It contrasts perhaps less sharply with the new international order of communism of which China has become a part.
We should not forget that the treaty system represented chiefly a state of affairs in the treaty ports, a mode of Sino-foreign intercourse wich was an aspect or function of the larger situation within the Chinese boday politic. It must be viewed in the context of the great revolutionary process of disintegration and rebirth which has convulsed the Chinese people since 1842.
The fall of the Chinese empire is an epic still to be written. Seen from the Chinese side, on political collapse in history has been more cataclysmic-a decline from an age-old recognized supremacy over the known world to an abject partitioning into spheres of foreign domination, all in the space of one lifetime between 1842 and 1898. The causes of this fall were many and various. The decay of the Manchu dynasty after two centuries of power within China and the rise of the great Taiping Rebellion in 1851(an epic that would require another volume to tell) coincided with the invasion of Western arms. Western-inspired efforts at industrialization and the growth of nationalism followed hard upon this dynastic civil war. All these processes, native and foreign, have combined to produce the chaos and ferment of social change in modern China.
The resulting experience of the Chinese people in modern times has been overcast by a pall of frustration and uncertainty, owing to their inability to meet the West on equal terms. The inherited institutions of their society have played them false. More than any other mature non-Western state, China has seemed inadaptable to the conditions of modern life. Nationalism and
industrialism, which triumphed so easily in Japan, were retarded in the Middle Kingdom. Neither the scientific method nor the rule of law, the inventor or the entrepreneur, have yet had their heyday in this strangely different society. Perhaps the very maturity and stability of Chinese social structure and political institutions have proved a handicap. Their dissimilarity to the West was so deep and ingrained that adjustment to the modern world has been possible only through the break-up of the old order. China’s socity has had to be thrown into the melting pot and her people have had to accept revolution as the law of modern existence; for the process of modernization has involved intense and rapid changes on all levels of social life and practice.
This process of modernization bagan only a bare three generations ago. In the days of Calhoun and Webster, Bentham and Mill, China’s old ruling class was still firmly in the saddle, thinking in the accepted patterns of the Confucian system-universal monarchy, dynastic rather than national politics, tribute relations abroad and the Chinese way of life at home.
This ancient Confucian order and the expanding commercial empire of Britain had their first contact, on their lowest levels, through the Anglo-Indian opium traffic and the petty corruption of a demoralized Chinese bureaucracy, through privacy, brutallity, and racketeering, without benefit of common speech or writing, and with little but uncomprehending contempt for each other’s ideals and values. As we look back it seems amazing that so great a catastrophe as the invasion by the West could have been visited upon the Chinese people without producing more violent friction.No doubt this was due in part to the tolerance and passivity of a populace long inured to hardship, as well as to their relative inaccessibility to direct Western contact. It was due also to the effort of British government to serve as the handmaiden of commerce, the civilizing benefit of which was deemed obtainable only through the establishment of the rule of Anglo-Saxon law. The energies of the British consuls were bent for a generation toward the creation of a framework of legal regulation within which foreign trade might prosper and Sino-foreign relations remain tranquil. Yet in the last analysis China’s response to the West was determined most of all by the peculiar nature of her state and society.
Thus far the political collapse of the Chinese empire has been studied almost entirely from the alien view of the Western incaders, whose imperialist rivalry is recorded in numerous volumes. Nothing is more plain, however, than that the key to the story lies within. The startling contrasts between the responses of Japan and of China to the West since 1842 make it clear that imperialism was no juggernaut running roughshod over native peoples, but rather a stimulant capable of invigorating the strong or debilitating the weak, depending upon the internal condition of the recipient. Japan, for example, had a patriotic and adaptable ruling class. China did not. Japan had the medieval tradition of the samurai as a basis for modern chauvinism. The early bankers of Osaka and Tokyo were forerunners of the modern Zaibatsu. By the nineteenth century, Japan, indeed, was a nation somewhat Like Western nations, while the Midlle Kingdom was a state of a different political species altogether. Any study of China’s modern adjustment to the West must therefore begin with those peculiarities of the Chinese state which made it uniquely inadaptable to the Western scheme of things.
The nature of Chinese society and its response to the West. The recognition of China as a society differernt in strucure and character from our own suggests the need of defining and formulating this difference. All Western observers since Polo and the early Jesuits have tried to do this, either by description or by analysis. I have made my own brief attempt elsewhere. Here let us note merely that fruitful socio-historical analyses are now being developed under the general headings of “Oriental Society,”“the gentry state,” or the like - bodies of theory which are not simple magic formulae but rather broad avenues of approach that afford new insights into Chinese social behavior. With these has come a fresh appreciation of the role of the barbarians of Inner Asia in Chinese history.
All such theories assume, of course, that the record of events is still basic to our understanding. While conceptual schemes can inspire and guide research, they are not meant to substitute for it. The meagreness of our knowledge of modern China leaves us still in the stage of descriptive portraiture. Exactly how the men and events, the personallities and circumstances, the data and interpretations should be combined to form our picture of modern China’s contact with the West is a problem artistic composition more than of scientific measurement. Theories are not self-evident, any more than facts can speak for themselves. Our understanding of China must be accumulated painstakingly and in detail, through monographic research on one aspect of the record after another.
Not having a final formula for Chinese society, we can hardly invent one for China’s response to the stimulus of Western contact,(8) yet certain points may be noted. First, in the expansion of the Western state system during recent centuries, the incorporation of China into this nascent world order has proved unusually difficult. China’s political behavior has not easily been assimilated to that of the West, presumably because of the difference in her institutions. Second, the so-called Western “impact”on China has been a stimulus rather than a shttering blow. Personal contact in treaty ports and mission stations, material changes in economic life and social custom, have led to the eventual metamorphosis of Chinese institutions. But this modernization has been effected by the Chinese people through the adjustment of their own ways; it has not been simple westernization. Third, the response has worked both ways. In the hybrid society of the treaty ports, Western forms of law, finance, industry, and individualism have been subtly modified: the treary ports have represented not the Western way of life transplanted to the China coast so much as China’s accommodation to the Westerner and his ways. The handful of foreigners in the ports adjusted their lives to Chinese conditions. Your genuine Shanghailander was really a half-breed, typical of neither East nor West.
In the course of decades the new stimuli operating through the treaty ports led China into revolution. The response to the West upset traditional patterns of behavior which went far back into the past. Other great developments had indeed occurred throughout China’s far from static history, but down to the nineteenth century they had all remained within a distinctive and persistent Chinese pattern. Thus repetitive phenomena like the political cycle of dynastic disintegration, warlordism, and re-unification had all taken place within the unshaken framework of the Confucian culture. Similarly the pattern of China’s foreign relations with the barbarians of Inner Asia had been manifested inside the structure of the universal Confucian monarchy.
Although Western contact eventually destroyed this old political and cultural framework, the first phase in China’s response to the West was neither inaction nor innovation, but merely repetition of the established pattern of behavior. In short, the first overt Chinese activity in the begining of Sino-Western relations was to apply to the West those traditional attitudes which were already inbred within the Chinese way of life. This was to treat the West as though it were not the West at all, but merely a new form of Inner Asian barbarian.
This conditioned reflex made China’s adjustment to the West much more difficult than it might otherwise have been. If the British barbarians had been an entirely unprecedented phenonemnon in Chinese life, the Manchu rulers of the day might easily have formed a fresh and realistic view of them. Unfortunately, this was impossible because the British (Ying-i) were the unwitting inheritors of the status which had been reserved for barbarians (I) in Chinese society since time immemorial. Age-old stereotypes took the place of a creative response.
The first step in understanding the Western influence on China is, therefore, to understand the traditional role of the barbarian in Chinese society. The most cursory glance at this subject will indicate that the barbarians of Inner Asia had played a constant and, indeed, an integral part, in the long history of the Chinese people. Their experience had included not only recurrent phenomena like the dynastic cycle but also the recurrent phenomena of barbarian conquest. Doubtless these rhythms were not so regular and uniform as Chinese scribes have liked to assume. Yet the rise and fall of dynasties were expected, like the waxing and waning of the seasons, and have formed the main theme of the Chinese dynastic chronicles. Modern historians may be interested less in the obvious existence of these broad rhythms than in their multiplicity and interaction; China’s history gives us today an oversupply rather than a lack of patterns. Nevertheless, since Chinese historical thinking traditionally looked forward to repetitive cycle, the expectation that one dynasty would eventually be succeeded by another was an important factor in political life. Expectations or fears concerning barbarian conquest were similarly important in the conduct of foreign relations. In this way the British and other Westerners who moved into China in the nineteenth century became the heirs of the ages without knowing it.
As a first step in exploring this attitude toward the barbarians, let us note the curious alternation between Chinese and barbarian political domination of the empire in the four periods of T’ang-Sung, Liao-Chin-Yuan, Ming, and Ch’ing. Their sequence has been tabulated by Wittfogel and Feng as follows:4
During the last thousand years, in short, the Chinese people have been almost half the time under alien domination. Barbarian rule has been an integral part of their political life. We may assume that the aggression of the Western barbarians in the nineteenth century seemed to the Chinese of that day to be nothing new in principle, even though in the end it had the effect of
shattering their traditional polity. This intellectual complacency about the barbarian world was an element of weakness in China’s political heritage.
China’s conception of the Western barbarians. The concept of Europe and America which became current in Chinese thought after the beginning of Western trade in the sixteenth century was certainly as significant as the trade itself, but has been little studied. Generally speaking, in the highly categorized and hierarchic Confucian world, the Western merchants who reached the east coast of China by sea in modern times were designated, literally, “eastern barbarians”(I). Being of a different, and therefore inferior, culture, they could hardly qualify for any other appellation. Yet by this simple fact of terminology they were prejudged and stigmatized with the characteristics traditionally assigned to barbarians. In a society already stultified by its classical tradition, this ancient designation and the assumptions which went with it dulled the edge of curiosity and the Chinese scholar’s intellectual response to Western contact.
That the tributary view of the West survived beyond its time in the minds of the Chinese literati is evident from any examination of their writings. Official publications of the court, private works, and the memorials of officials who were in contact with the British, American, and France invaders in the 1840’s and 1850’s all exhibit this stultification. The first type of material, chiefly official compilations of the eighteenth century when the Manchu power was at its height, gives one the impression that there was little interest in the study of the West. The traditional Chinese idea of the barbarians seems to have been applied to the West, lock, stock and barrel. It is plain from later documents that the traditional terminology was so applied. The British minister was called the “English barbarian chieftain” for twenty years after the first treaties. In Chinese documents the British continually seemed grateful for the emperor’s compassion and stood in awe of his name. Like all barbarians, even the British had a sense of shame at their own uncouthness. Thus the bearers of Western civilization in the Orient were described to the court at Peking in the terms which were traditional for barbarous tribes like the Burut of Central Asia and the Miao-tzu and Lo-lo of China’s southwest.6
In the latter days of the Ming, Matteo Ricci and his Jesuit colleagues had interested the Confucian literati in maps of the world which showed strange countries to the west. Many of the Jesuit transliterations of these place names have survived in modern Chinese usage. But this new knowledge presented to Chinese scholarly circles in the period after 1600 did not survive for long, or at least did not retain its significance, after the establishment of the Manchu dynasty. It was generally disregarded during the eighteenth century.7 This is one of the puzzles of Chinese intellectual history, and without venturing upon an explanation, it may be strikingly illustrated.
The confusion regarding European countries. The countries of the Western Ocean were irretrievably confused with one another, even in the official publications of the imperial government.8For example, from medieval Europe via the Arabs had come the term Fo-lang-chi. This was a transliteration for “Franks,”that is, the Europeans in the Near East at the time of the Crusades. When the Portuguese traveled to China by sea after 1500, they were identified as Fo-lang-chi because they came from the West. The same term was also applied to the Spanish after their arrival in the Philippines in the sixteenth century. Since Portugal was under Spanish rule from 1580 to 1640, this confusion was no doubt inescapable. The arrival of the French created a further terminological enigma because of the similarity of France and Franks. Time and again Fa-lan-hsi, Fo-lang-hsi, Fu-lang-hsi and similar transliterations for France were erroneously identified by Chinese scholars with Fo-lang-chi, which now meant the Portuguese-Spanish. Meanwhile, the term Kan-ssu-la for Castilla, the Spanish, had also been applied to the Portuguese; in addition, two tribute missions sent by the King of Portugal, in 1670 and 1727, had been recorded in official Chinese works as from two seperate countries, Po-erh-tu-chia-li-ya and Po-erh-tu-ka-erh. But, in the meantime, the Jesuit missionaries in China had identified themselves as coming from Italy, I-ta-li-ya, and yet by their use of the Portuguese settlement of Macao, as a port of entry, had become associated with Portugal. Consequently, as late as 1844 the name of I-ta-li-ya was being applied to the Portuguese at Macao, and when a genuine Italian turned up in 1848, his country had to be identified as I-ta-li, an entirely new and seperate country from I-ta-li-ya.9 There were also other ways of referring to Portugal, in addition to the five just mentioned. It would have taken a strong mind to identify Fo-lang-chi, Kan-ssu-la, Po-erh-tu-chia-li-ya, Po-erh-tu-ka-erh, and I-ta-li-ya as all referring to the same small Western country.
Confusion was, of course, not confined to the books. Just as Chinese, Japanese, and Korean look much the same to the Western man in the street, so the Westerners in China, as in Japan, were distinguishable in their common outlandishness. The colloquial term, Hung-mao-fan, “red-haired barbarians (or foreigners),” was applied to both the Dutch and the English, whose blue eyes, red complexions, beak noses, and tawny hair made them all indiscriminately exotic.10
Since the Jesuit map of the world had not gained much acceptance in China, the native habitat of these Europeans remained shadowy. They all arrived by sea from the southwest, and the Collected Statues of 1818 therefore opined that their homelands were “in the southwestern sea,” the same as Siam, Sungora, Ligor, Patani, Johore and way stations on the route to Singapore and the Straits of Malacca. One of the Portugals (Kan-ssu-la, or Castilla), however, was in the northwestern sea, as were also Sweden and Denmark. The exact location of the Western Ocean (Hsi-yang) was a bit hazy since the term had originally been applied to the waters west of Borneo leading into the Indian Ocean, on the ancient western trade route, the route which went down the Indo-Chinese-Malayan coast and was to be distinguished from the eastern route through the Philippines and Moluccas.
When the early Europeans used the term Western Ocean to refer to the Atlantic it was not illogically objected that the Western Ocean, as known to the Chinese, had been sailed through, from the end to end, by the great Ming expenditions under Cheng Ho, without anyone noting a trace of Europe. A compromise was finally worked out by referring to the Indian Ocean as the Little Western Ocean, Hsiao-hsi-yang, while the Atlantic became the Great Western Ocean, Ta-shi-yang. Ta-shi-yang, incidentally, was another of the names applied to Portugal.11
The relations between these minuscule kingdoms in the Great Western Ocean were naturally difficult to keep straight, particularly when they were not too permanent in actual fact and were differently described by the patriotic members of each nationality on their visits to Chinese ports.
This official knowledge of the West was reflected, for example, in a special compendium entitled “Illustrations of the Regular Tributaries of the Imperial Ch’ing” which was compiled by imperial decree during the 1750’s.12 The high officials of the border provinces supplied materials to indicate how “within and without the empire united under our dynasty, the barbarian tribes submit their allegiance and turn toward civilization.” It is significant that among these ten elaborate volumes, the great bulk of which dealt with the tribes of Inner Asia and of Southwest China, the first volume was devoted to the overseas tributaries. They are listed in the regular order: Korea. Liu-ch’iu, Annam, Siam, Sulu, Laos, Burma, and Great Western Ocean. The last named, however, is described in twelve plates with text as opposed to twenty-six plates for all the preceding. This is followed by sections on Small Western Ocean, England, France, Sweden, Holland, Russia, and the Philippines. The European countries occupy twenty-eight out of seventy-four plates, and are thus considerably more prominent than in the antiquated Ch’ing dynasty lists based on Ming sources, in which the European countries are almost lost to view among the numerous small states of Southeast Asia and India.
Considering this prominence given the Europeans, it is surprising how little is recorded in this work concerning them. First of all, there is great confusion as to the European states. The Great Western Ocean country is identified both with Ricci and the Pope and with the Portuguese at Macao.Modern France is again confused with Fo-lang-chi or the Portugal of the Ming period. England and Sweden are recorded as countries dependent upon Holland. In religious matters, the Portuguese-French are reported to have been Buddhist countries before they accepted Catholicism, and the Pope is said to have come from Italy to present tribute in 1725.
The characterization of the Western barbarians stresses superficialities: “their flesh is dazzling white, and their noses are lofty ... Their custom is to esteem women and think highly of men. Marriages are left to mutual arrangement. The men are violent and tyrannical and skilled in the use of weapons. They wear short coats and tip their black felt hats as a sign of politeness. The Swedes and Englishmen like to take snuff, which they carry in little containers made of golden thread.”
In view of the trouble which the Manchu court had already had with the British at Canton, the scant attention given to England is particularly noteworthy: “This barbarian people’s clothing and adornment resemble those of a country which is very wealthy. The males mostly wear wool and love to drink wine. The females, when they have not yet married, bind their waists, desiring that they be slender. They wear disheveled hair which hangs waists over their eyebrows, short clothing and layers of
skirts. When they go out for a walk, then they add a big coat.”13
Rather curiously, space is devoted to central European countries like Hungary and Poland, whose people are said to resemble Mongols. The Hungarians ride on horseback, educate their women, and are rich in natural resources of livestock and metals. Poland is very cold and the people wear furs. Presumably this sort of information was secured by the Chinese compilers from Russian rather than Cantonese sources. Russia is said correctly to have presented tribute in 1676 and to have made a boundary agreement in 1689.
The illustrations in this work are obviously copied by Chinese artists from foreign originals. The Europeans have Chinese eyes, but authentic Western costumes. One interesting sociological reference is to the “Black-devil slaves” (hei-kuei-nu) born in the islands beyond the seas, who serve the Dutch.14 But the final effect, after the major states of Southeast Asia have been listed, is an utter and indiscriminate confusion among the barbarians of England, France, Sweden, Japan, Borneo, Johore, Holland, Russia, Sungora, Cambodia, Spain in the Philippines, Java, Malacca, and Sumatra.
How long this confusion persisted was strikingly shown by the imperial commissioner Ch’i-ying in November 1844, just after he had negotiated the treaties with Britain, the United States, and France which opened China to the West. No one in China should have been better informed than he about the barbarians. He explained to the emperor that France (Fo-lan-hsi) was the same as the Fo-lang-chi (Portugal) of the Ming period; that under the influence of Matteo Ricci, the great Jesuit, the French had been induced to give up Macao to the Portuguese, even though France was ten times as strong. 15 France, of course, had never held Macao. This whole cock-and-bull story probably illustrates the Paul Bunyan quality taken on by the legend of Matteo Ricci, who had already become the tutelary deity of clocks in China (known popularly as Li-ma-tou p’u-sa).
费正清美国与中国读后感
费正清《美国与中国》读后感 作为一名学生对中国历史的了解是必不可少的，它有利于我们增强爱国主义精神和民族荣誉感和自豪感。但一直以来自己对历史的某些理解总是不全面的、缺乏公正的。正好利用这次机会我读了费正清的《美国与中国》，它主要包括三部分内容第一部分讲述中国早期的历史；第二部分为近代中国革命史的描述，从西方入侵直至中国共产党的建立；第三部分讲述中华人民共和国建国前后的中美关系。不可否认的是费正清对中国的认识是独具建树的，有人这样评价他：“费正清笔下对于中国人与中国几千年的悠久历史所发的精简、深入、权威之论，史学界无出其右者”；“费正清博学而不拘泥于传统的风格，大师风范以及风趣、清晰在他的著作中可以一览无余，有充分的学术资料，也有奥妙的个人领会。” 读了费正清的《美国与中国》令我感触最深的是他第二部分对中国革命史的描述，公正客观的将中国的现实社会展现在我们眼前。虽说不上百分百正确，但基本上符合客观实际。第二部分主要从西方的侵入、叛乱与复辟、维新与革命、国名党的兴起、南京政府、共产党的兴起这几个章节入手。从这些章节的纵向发展中不难看出中国由胜到衰的场面，19世纪以前，面对东方这个国力强盛的宗主大国，西方出于无耐，只能采取较为缓和平等的政策，以贸易作为与中国交往的手段。政府的朝贡制度的秘密在于它已成了通商的媒介。西方列强通过这一制度在获取利益的同时也在不断地向东方学习着。当时的中国是世界的中心。到了晚清时期，由于清政府的闭关锁国政策，中国错过了一个走向世界的机会。清政府的腐朽无能与西方列强的大肆侵略，中国逐渐进入衰落时期。 1840年，外国资本主义用坚船利炮打开了古老中国的大门。鸦片战争、中法战争、中日甲午战争、八国联军侵华，并且与清政府签订了《南京条约》、《中法新约》、《马关条约》、《辛丑条约》等给中国民族带来了前所未有的灾难。在中华民族危难之际，一代民族精英觉醒：魏源等的“师夷之长技以制夷”；洪秀全领导的反清农民起义；康有为、梁启超的“变法图强”；孙中山的国民革命。正是他们在民族生死存亡的紧要关头，挺身而出，为反对外来侵略，争取民族独立和解放，同仇敌忾，英勇奋斗，前赴后继，拼搏不息，谱写了中国近代史上可歌可泣的悲壮篇章。但是这些中国革命的探索者只是主张从器物、思想上去救国救民，历史的实践证明他们不能彻底的完成反帝反封建的任务，不能真正的救中国于水深火热之中。这就表明中国迫切需要一个新的阶级引领人民走向胜利。 1919年5月爆发了"五·四"学生爱国运动，它是中国新民主主义的开端。这个运动，标志着中国无产阶级开始登上政治舞台。同时也标志着资产阶级领导的旧民主主义革命的结束和无产阶级领导的新民主主义革命的开始。1921年7月23日，毛泽东、董必武、陈潭秋、李达等代表各地共产主义小组在上海举行第一次全国代表大会，中国共产党诞生了。在国民大革命时期，为了反对西方列强中国共产党与国民党两次结成统一战线，而蒋介石发动的“四·一二”反革命政变，致使第一次国共合作公开破裂。终于，在中国共产党的领导下，中国人民推翻了帝国主义，资本主义，官僚主义三座大山，取得了伟大胜利。大革命失败后初期中国共产党处于艰难时期，在马克思主义思想的指导下中国共产党开始了探索革命的新时期。在面对日本的侵华战争时，中国人民又团结起来建立了抗日民主统
13.费正清中国：传统与变迁
《中国：传统与变迁》 费正清 第一章中国概况 1．中国是人口大国，其文化与西方迥然不同，生活方式也千差万别。而且，她正经历着一场迅猛的发展与变革。 2．中西方之间的和谐相处需要以互相谅解为基础。要做到谅解，远观式的了解是不够的，日渐频繁的接触则有助弥合这一差距。但某些因素反而会扩大这一分歧，一是中国人高涨的民族意识与爱国精神，二是中西方物质生活水平上的差距，三是中西对于战争的不同体验。3．了解中国不仅仅是为了发展和平，中国的传统社会是西方文化的一面镜子，它展现出另外一套价值和信仰体系、不同的审美传统及不同的文学表现形式。 4．通过中国历史就可以最好地了解中国，因为相对于其他民族，中国人更爱从历史角度观察自身，他们强烈地感受到传统的存在。只有在中国历史长河的背景下，我们才会发现其运动的轨迹和未来的动向。 5．当代中国变革转型的根本原因，主要源于西方的新兴力量与本土传统习惯及思维方式之间的冲突互动。 6．本书分为两大部分：（1）3000多年来中国传统文明在相对隔绝的状况下的衍变 （2）近代以来作为对现代西方社会的回应，所经历的变故和转型一、东亚的土地、民族与语言 1．“东亚”的三种含义：（1）地理上指亚洲被高山大漠一分为二的东部地区 （2）人种学上指蒙古人种的栖居区 （3）文化上指深受中国古代文明影响的地区（中、日、朝、越）二、中国的地理环境 1．山系交错形成若干独特的地理环境，为经济和政治的统一造成了不少麻烦，并且对军事战略也有决定性影响。 2．河流：中国的江河为人烟稠密的山村提供了水源。 3．气候：大陆性气候明显，降水不均。北方降水少，易干旱，南方降水多，水土流失。三、中国的传统经济与社会 1．农田一直是中国最大的自然资源，因此，气候与地势对中国经济发展和社会制度的形成具有很大作用。
五、费正清：《剑桥中华民国史》
费正清：《剑桥中华民国史》 作者简介： 费正清（John King Fairbank，1907～1991），美国哈佛大学终身教授、著名历史学家，生前历任美国远东协会副主席、亚洲协会主席、历史学会主席、东亚研究理事会主席等重要职务。凭借其坚定的毅力、顽强的精神，费正清毕生致力于中国、东亚区域，以及中国与西方关系等问题，主张跳出传统“汉学”的束缚，重视研究近代以来中国的历史发展变迁，为美国的“中国学”研究事业做出重要贡献，开创了“中国学”研究的新局面。 费正清一生著述颇丰，在西方影响很大，被誉为“美国现代中国学的创建之父”、“头号中国通”。美国《评论》杂志评论，费正清是美国“中国学发展过程中，最重要的，无与匹敌的人物”。他的主要著作有《美国与中国》、《伟大的中国革命》、《剑桥中国史》、《中国：传统与变迁》、《东亚文明史》和《中国沿海的贸易与外交》等。 名著拾萃： 战争持续了八年。它的直接或间接结果是大约1500万至2000万中国人死亡。财产损失难以数计。而且战争结束后，国民党政府和军队精神疲惫，风纪败坏。因此这场战争对中国人民造成了惊人的损失，并直接有助于1949年共产党的胜利。同日本的这场战争，确实是中华民国史上最重大的事件。…… 蒋介石曾经长期力图避免敌对行动。自从1927 年国民党人执掌政权以来，尽管日本曾多次进行干涉和侵略，他却始终奉行一种和解政策。他深信要抵抗强大的外国侵略者，中国是太弱了，并且又是分裂的，因此他曾默认日本侵占东北四省（满洲），缔结消除国民党在华北影响的停战协定，并屈服于日本的压力，
镇压反日的学生运动。然而，从1935 年晚些时候开始，反日情绪已经变得如此强烈，致使国民政府觉得对日反应非强硬不可。于是，在1936 年12 月西安事变之后，蒋介石逐步开始了战争的准备。他大概口头许诺过他将抵抗外来侵略，换取了西安获释。因此，1937 年2 月他撤换了据说亲日的外交部长张群，而且他开始与他长期的敌人——共产党人谈判和解。因此，当战事在卢沟桥爆发的时候，蒋介石已经下定决心抗击日本的进一步侵略行动。举国一致，异口同声都支持他，在整个一代人中达到了空前的统一。 蒋介石的战略基于“以空间换时间”的原则。他锐敏地感到他的军队劣于日本，甚至在战前他即已构想了撤至中国西南偏远内地的战略。1935 年8月他对一次政治干部集会说，“我们本部十八个省份哪怕丢了十五省，只要川滇黔三省能够巩固无恙，一定可以战胜任何的强敌，恢复一切的失地”。蒋介石的信心建立在对中国的经济和社会仍然处于前现代、前工业阶段这样一种认识上。因此，他相信民族的抗战能够持续下去，不管有多少个城市和工厂沦于敌手。万一入侵的军队竟然前进到中国几乎无边无际的内地，他们势必要被截断补给来源而精疲力竭。偶尔如在上海，他并不坚持以空间换时间的原则，然而这个战略毕竟如他所预期的那样，得到了很大成功。日本人相当容易地占领了中国北方和东部的都市中心，并沿主要公路和铁路线持续攻击，迅速推进。但这些交通干线并不穿过华西的山岳和峻岭，而防守的中国人就隐蔽在后面。日本人因而逡巡不前。 ——费正清：《剑桥中华民国史》，上海：上海人民出版社，1983年，第371～375页。 名著导读： 鸦片战争后，被西方的“船坚炮利”轰开天国大门的中国近代历史先是被迫，再是不得已，后是必须，与外来的“侵入者”或“进入者”发生极为密切的关联，
从费正清的中国史观看中国近代师范教育变革
从费正清的中国史观看中国近代师范教育变革 覃延华 （柳州师范高等专科学校中文系广西·柳州545004） 中图分类号：６５９．２９文献标识码：Ａ文章编号：１６７２－７８９４（２０１３）０９－００１０－０２ 摘要对于中国与西方两种文明的冲突，费正清提出了“冲击—反应”的理论，这对中国近代史研究产生了极其深远的影响。这种中国史观也为我国近代师范教育的研究提供了一种视角。近代中国师范教育变革的过程，与西方文化的冲击有着千丝万缕的联系，而且也是在这种冲击下的一个不断内化的过程。 关键词费正清冲突—反应近代中国师范教育 On China＇s Modern Normal Education Reform from the Perspective of John King Fairbank＇s Outlook on Chinese History／／ＱｉｎＹａｎｈｕａ AbstractＯｎｃｕｌｔｕｒａｌｃｏｎｆｌｉｃｔｂｅｔｗｅｅｎＣｈｉｎａａｎｄＷｅｓｔ，ＪｏｈｎＫｉｎｇＦａｉｒｂａｎｋｐｒｏｐｏｓｅｄｔｈｅｔｈｅｏｒｙｏｆ＂ｃｏｎｆｌｉｃｔ－ｒｅｆｌｅｃｔｉｏｎ＂，ｗｈｉｃｈｐｒｏｆｏｕｎｄｌｙｉｎｆｌｕｅｎｃｅｓｔｈｅｒｅｓｅａｒｃｈｏｎＣｈｉｎａ＇ｓｍｏｄｅｒｎｈｉｓｔｏｒｙ，ａｎｄｉｔａｌｓｏｐｒｏｖｉｄｅｓａｐｅｒｓｐｅｃｔｉｖｅｆｏｒｔｈｅｒｅｓｅａｒｃｈｏｎＣｈｉｎａ＇ｓｍｏｄｅｒｎｎｏｒｍａｌｅｄｕｃａｔｉｏｎ．ＴｈｅｃｈａｎｇｅｏｆＣｈｉｎａ＇ｓｍｏｄｅｒｎｎｏｒｍａｌｅｄｕｃａｔｉｏｎｗａｓｃｌｏｓｅｌｙｒｅｌａｔｅｄｔｏｔｈｅｃｕｌｔｕｒａｌｃｏｎｆｌｉｃｔｂｅｔｗｅｅｎｔｈｅＷｅｓｔ，ａｎｄｉｔｗａｓａｌｓｏａｐｒｏｃｅｓｓｏｆｃｏｎｔｉｎｕｉｎｇｉｎｔｅｒｎａｌｉｚａｔｉｏｎ．Key wordsＪｏｈｎＫｉｎｇＦａｉｒｂａｎｋ；ｃｏｎｆｌｉｃｔ－ｒｅｆｌｅｃｔｉｏｎ；Ｃｈｉｎａ＇ｓｍｏｄ－ｅｒｎｎｏｒｍａｌｅｄｕｃａｔｉｏｎ 费正清（ＪｏｈｎＫｉｎｇＦａｉｒｂａｎｋ，１９０７—１９９１），作为美国著名历史学家在中国近代史研究方面占据着举足轻重的地位，被称为西方中国学研究的泰斗。学界普遍认为，迄今为止，尚无一位西方学者能在近代中国学研究领域超越费正清。２０世纪的半个多世纪里，作为哈佛大学东亚研究中心创始人，费正清在中国研究这个领域辛勤开拓、耕耘。其主要著作有：《美国与中国》（ＴｈｅＵｎｉｔｅｄＳｔａｔｅｓａｎｄＣｈｉｎａ）、《伟大的中国革命（１８００－１９８５年）》（ＴｈｅＧｒｅａｔＣｈｉｎｅｓｅＲｅｖｏｌｕｔｉｏｎ１８００－１９８５）、《观察中国》（ＣｈｉｎａＷａｔｃｈ）以及《中国：传统与变迁》（Ｃｈｉｎａ：ＴｒａｄｉｔｉｏｎａｎｄＴｒａｎｓｆｏｒｍａｔｉｏｎ）等，主编了《剑桥中国史》（ＴｈｅＣａｍｂｒｉｄｇｅＨｉｓｔｏｒｙｏｆＣｈｉｎａ）。他的研究、著作和主要观点不仅在西方的中国研究领域有重大影响，而且也在一定程度上影响了美国对中国的政治决策，同时也影响了美国民众的对华态度。 １“冲击—反应” 在《剑桥中国晚清史》一书中，费正清就明确指出，“中西两种文明是冰炭不相容的”。因此，当两种文化相碰撞，难以避免会发生冲突。 费正清认为中国和西方社会的发展过程截然不同导致了中西方两种文明的相互对立。华夏文明是一种与竞争的个人本位相异的顺从的伦理本位文明。相比较来看西方文明充满活力，但是古老的东方文明却存在顽固惰性。华夏文明缺乏内在动力，难以突破中国社会长期以来形成的超稳 定传统构架。因此，在西方文明的强烈冲击下，它只能被迫做出回应。这就是费正清所提出的“冲击—反应”模式。“文明冲突论”正是费正清中国史观的核心。 “冲击—反应”模式是费正清在很长一段时期里对近代中国历史一直坚持的一个基本史学模式。他认为近代中国文明开始进入一个变革时期，是由于强大的外来社会入侵所推动的，是西方力量促成的。但是由于中国传统文化具有着非常强的惰性，在这种文明未和西方文明接触之前，中国社会只是在传统范围内发生过变化，并没有发生过根本性的转变，亦即，近代中国社会的质变是中国对西方的冲击所做出回应的结果。 ２“冲击—反应”史观的修正 在费正清后期研究中，他对“冲击—反应”模式的认识做了一定程度的修正。在１９８０年出版的《剑桥中国晚清史》（下）的前言页里，他一方面强调在科技和工业化方面，外部影响对晚清历史起了重大的作用；另一方面又指出：“晚清对西方的反应现在开始显得只是一个次要的主题；主要的过程乃是在新条件—— —包括西方的影响下中国继续对它的过去所作的反应。”这说明了，费正清非常明确地认为，促使近代中国发生变革的真正原因是内部因素，而不是外部因素，这反映了他的史学观点开始了由“内”向“外”倾斜的一种倾向。 在《伟大的中国革命》一书中则更清晰地体现了这种由内向外倾斜的倾向。他在该书中强调，尽管外国的入侵，以及外国文化与制度的影响对中国是一种刺激力，然而中国近现代史毕竟是中国造就的，不是外国造就的。中国的重力中心在于内部，“中国革命的构成因素也是在那里积累起来的”，因为“２０世纪以来税捐对农民负担日益加重。这就导致了一个道德共同体的崩溃，和建筑在它上面的政治制度的崩溃，新的组织形式必然出现”。而且，他也引用了当时西方学术界在表述同一个问题时的形成的共识，“国内发展已使老的帝国秩序分崩离析。新的社会力量脱颖而出，终于使中国的生活革命化了”。尽管在７０年代初，他曾对自己原来的“冲突—反应”理论做过一些修正，但并没有明确的主次之分。 费正清的“冲击—反应”史观，主要是通过分析近代中国的原始资料来研究中国对西方的冲击所做出的反应，这种努力可以说是一种超越前人之举。由于此前西方学界的中国研究大多依靠西方的文献资料，因此，对于近代中国本身究竟发生了什么，无法很深入地去进行探究。应该说，作为一种论说模式，“冲击—反应”说还是比较有说服力的。这可在汤因比的史学巨著《历史研究》中得到证明。汤因比主张把人类文明的发生与发展看作是一个不断受到挑战并做 作者简介：覃延华（1965-），广西柳州师范高等专科学校中文系讲师，研究方向为教育史、课程与教学论。（下转第１２页） 教育观察１０
历史书籍 内容概要
历史书籍内容概要 1.《吕著中国通史》 这部《吕著中国通史》是吕思勉先生史学论著的一种。 这部书针对当时上海大学文科学生学习上的需要，没有采用一般通史的体例。全书分上下两册，上册分门别类地、有系统地叙述了社会经济制度、政治制度和文化学术的发展情况；下册分章按时代顺序有条理地叙述了政治历史的变革。作者认为当时上海流行的通史著作，虽然在叙述理乱兴亡的过程中，夹叙一些典章制度，但是往往缺乏条理系统，上下不够连贯，使初学者摸不清头绪，不能构成系统的历史知识。特别是大学文科的学生，他们正需要有系统的历史知识，以求进一步的钻研，因此就有采用这样特殊体例来编写通史的必要。在今天看来，这种体例的中国通史，对于初学者还是有一定用处的，它对帮助读者初步掌握中国历史的各个方面，特别是社会经济、政治制度以及学术文化等系统的历史知识有很大的好处。 2.《中国文明起源新探》 是苏秉琦在其生命的最后时段撰写的一部考古学著作，由三联书店出版。除《开头的话》、《中国考古学文化区系年表》及《苏秉琦论著目录》等外，讨论的主题有如下七节： 《两个怪圈》、《学读“天书”》、《解悟和顿悟》、《“条块”说》、《满天星斗》、《三部曲与三模式》和《双接轨》。苏秉琦教授说，这部著作讲的仅是他“探索中华文化、中华文明和中华传统起源的过程中所走过的不平凡的历程”，但读者从书中更能见到他对这些问题的见解和颇为周详的论述。 3.孟森《明史讲义》 《明史讲义》全书分为二编：第一编总论明史在史学上的地位和明史体例，第二编对明朝各个时期的史实进行了考订叙述，多有发明创见，所作评议，亦具精辟独到之处。 4.孟森《清史讲义》 《清史讲义》虽为残稿，但对清朝二百多年的政治、经济、文化进行了全面的述评，史实详尽，论析缜密，被史学界誉为我国近代清史学派的开山之作。 5.《中国近代史》 蒋廷黻的《中国近代史》是一本学术含量很高的著作，作为史书，她却不像一般的历史学著作那样需要读者正襟危坐来诵读她的。正文部分很薄，只92页，读来相当轻松，不费精力，但是却能启发你的很多思考，关于民族命运，关于社会进步。概括地说，就是好看耐读、通俗易懂。 本书时段从鸦片战争到抗日战争前夕。作者在书中阐述本书的目的“是以中国近代史的一些经验教训来为当时的抗日建国谋出路”，这也是史学著作“以史资治”的功能。 本书在结构上分为四章，第一章讲外患，第二章讲内忧，这二章是大背景，第三章讲自强运动，第四章主要讲戊戌变法、义和团运动和辛亥革命这三个救国方案，三四两章是主旨。“总体上看，这本著作是从外交内政的关系入手，重点论述了自鸦片战争以来中国为抵御外敌入侵而改革内政的各种方案，表现了寻求救亡之道的使命感” 6.《元朝史》韩儒林 本书是一部简明的元朝断代史，具体有十一章内容，包括蒙古国家的建立、蒙古国的统治、元朝的建立、元代的社会经济、元朝社会矛盾的发展、元代的边疆各族等方面。
冲击回应模式 费正清
冲击回应模式 费正清 一、费正清与“冲击—回应”模式费正清是美国现代中国学研究的开拓者，他早年赴英国牛津大学攻读博士学位，曾受过英国著名汉学家马士（Hosea B. Morse）的指导，同他进行过深入交谈，③马士的《中华帝国对外关系》（The International Relations of the Chinese Empire）是根据大量英国档案和中国海关史料撰写而成，对费正清决定研究海关档案作为他的博士论文，开始从事中国近代史研究有很大影响，为他一生从事中国学研究奠定基础。费正清来中国后又受美国汉学家拉铁摩尔（Owen Lattimore)和中国历史学家蒋廷黻的影响，拉铁摩尔地缘政治研究的许多新观点“恰好可以和费正清关于“东南沿海的贸易与外交研究”计划互相补充”④。费正清在中国期间，在蒋廷黻指导下，致力于《筹办夷务始末》研究，以中国档案与英国档案互相堪对，蒋的外交史研究方法在观念上对费正清有重要启发，他在多年从事中国学研究中注重从外部逐渐进入中国史的内层，这对他用“冲击—回应”模式来解释中国近代史进程，无疑是一个自然的发展。费正清的著作很多，其中《美国与中国》(The United States and China)、《中国沿海的贸易与外交:条约港口的开放》（费正清博士论文）（Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast：The Opening of the Treaty Ports）、《中国对西方的反应》（China’s Response to the West-A Documentary Survey,1839-1923),建立了近代中国研究的基本框架和模式。其中“冲击—回应”模式作为一个架构的核心，贯穿他中国近代史研究的始终。无论是《美国与中国》，还是他与邓嗣禹合著的《中国对西方的反应》，对“冲击—回应”模式都作了极为深刻的论述。在阐述西方侵略对传统中国社会产生灾难性的影响时，费正清认为，这种影响渗透到中国社会的各个领域和一系列复杂的历史进程，而且“经过三代人的更替，旧秩序已经改变模样。”⑤费正清强调，西方的挑战对中国是一种刺激，为中国提供一种进步的机遇。他在《中国对西方的反应》中一开始就提出中国文化“既有传统的遗产，又受西方的影响，他们相互交织在一起”。⑥认为这种以“西方为中心”的“外向型”模式在美国现代中国学界一直占有统治地位，成为一种学术规范。⑦费正清把中国近代史看作是中国从传统向现代化缓慢迈进的过程,这种近代化过程,就是中国对西方的冲击回应过程. “冲击—回应”模式包含着这样一个假设：即中国的文化一旦形成传统，就具有巨大的稳定性，即使有发展，也不过是内部稍作调整，除非外来作用，否则中国难以跳出传统的窠臼。这种观点，费正清在他的《美国与中国》一书中也有所反映。他认为，“传统中国不是不变的，也不是静态的或停滞的。正相反，它曾经有过不断的变化，并且变化多端。可是变化总是在一个明显的文化形式与规章制度形式的范围之内。这个无所不包的典型之所以能如此坚强持久，是因为在中国的地理范围内，中国规章制度——经济的、政治的、社会的、文化的——曾经在许多世纪发展了规模宏大的自给自足、平衡和稳定。”他运用物理学原理分析道，“就物理学的动量的意义而言，联系性已经形成了惰性，积重难返，但还没有达到一成不变的地步。”⑧费正清还从思想意识方面论述中国对西方入侵的反应，认为，“面对近代西方的侵略扩张，中国的士大夫阶层在认识外来文明的过程中采取行动来维护自己的文明和政治、社会制度。”⑨ “冲击—回应”模式的核心问题是中国的传统社会和传统文化。在费正清看来，中国传统的儒家学说在长期以来成功地占据了意识形态上的正统地位，从而使中国社会保持极大的稳定。当近代大量西方人来到中国沿海寻求贸易机会时，这个古老的中华帝国对外部世界表现出惊人的惰性，它闭关自守，排斥一切外来势力，费正清指出，“中国政府在外交方面的冥顽和愚钝，实可追溯到它久远的历史。对中国的朝贡制度的评价，费正清认为“最成功之处在于它与中华帝国的各种制度和社会生活融为一体，同时表明它的既稳定又脆弱，中国没有能力对西方的挑战做出有效的反应。” “冲击—回应”模式是一个以西方人价值观来认识东方的研究模式，它把西方资本主义社会比作是一个动态的社会，而把中国说成是一个长期以来处于停
费正清介绍
费正清John King Fairbank 费正清是哈佛大学终身教授，著名历史学家，美国最负盛名的中国问题观察家，美国中国近现代史研究领域的泰斗，“头号中国通”，哈佛东亚研究中心创始人。生前历任美国远东协会副主席、亚洲协会主席、历史学会主席、东亚研究理事会主席等重要职务，还曾是美国政府雇员、社会活动家、政策顾问。 费正清致力于中国问题研究长达50年，从他进入牛津直到他1991年去世，他的著作绝大部分都是论述中国问题的。在半个多世纪里，费正清以自己独特的视角审视、考察中国，他的研究、著作和主要观点代表了美国主流社会的看法，不仅影响了几代美国汉学家和西方的中国学界，而且直接或间接地影响了美国政界和公众对中国的态度、看法以及美国对华政策的制定，当今美国诸多有影响的中国问题专家皆出自其门下。 一、生平简历 费正清1907年5月24日生于南得克萨斯州胡龙镇，是亚瑟·波·费和罗莱娜的独生子。父亲是位牧师的儿子，早年立志跟随其父从事教会，后从学法律，入考圣路易斯的华盛顿大学法学院。1901年毕业后在南德克塔州定居，在胡龙镇做律师，任市镇律师。 母亲罗莱娜对费正清的成长影响很大。她出生于德克塔，在芝加哥就学，最后又回到故乡，但她所留恋的始终是芝加哥、纽约、波士顿和那里的文化。她是美国大学妇女协会成员，随后任该协会一分支机构主席。罗莱娜毕生为争取妇女权利而工作，参加妇女选举权的游行和示威活动，组织各种集会，是位政治上相当活跃的人物，费正清早年的从政志向都与其母亲的引导有关。 在1927年进入哈佛时，费正清尚未考虑研究中国，而且，当时的哈佛还没有开设系统研究现代西亚的课程。他主攻文科，包括希腊语、历史、哲学、政治、艺术和经济。 1929年秋，费正清赴牛津大学。他的专业方向为东亚研究，但当时他尚不具备汉语和中国历史文化的基础，好在当时牛津大学的学位论文不要求参加考试，也不要求相关的学术经历。1931年论文完成后，费正清开始攻读博士学位。是年，费正清在华盛顿美国国会档案局收集资料，随后在剑桥和巴黎查资料。 费正清在牛津大学的两年研究收获甚丰，他把现代中国作为研究主题，以中美外交和机构史为新视点，他的博士论文正是从以上三个方面探讨中美关系的发展史，突破了传统汉学的局限，具有相当的创新意义。 费正清认为中国研究不应只局限于西方的资料，还应依靠中国本土的资源，考察中国的观点，这自然要求掌握汉语和在中国的生活经历。牛津的治学研究队伍十分有限，而且没有汉语课程。费正清向罗德奖学金委员会提出申请，罗德奖学金委员会批准了他的申请，费正清成为第一位在远东地区的罗德奖学金学者。 1932年初，费正清来华，一面进修汉语，一面从师清华大学蒋廷黻进行研究工作。1936年1月，他回到英国牛津，获得了博士学位，学位论文题为《中国海关的起源》。这篇论文后经过修改、补充，以《中国沿海的贸易与外交：1842——1854年通商口岸的开埠》为题，于1954年出版。 获得博士学位后，费正清于是返回哈佛大学任教。从1939年起，他与赖肖尔一起在哈佛大学开设了东亚文明课程。太平洋战争爆发前的四个月，他被征召到情报协调局工作，中间两次来华任职。1946年8月，费正清回到哈佛大学，担任区域研究(中国)项目的第一任主持人。1955年，他取得哈佛大学的支持和福特基金会的资助，创建了哈佛大学东亚研究中心，并且亲自出任主任，直至1973年。1977年，他从教职退休时该中心命名为费正清东亚研究中心。 1966年3月，费正清在听证会上作证： 二、中国学研究 美国的中国学研究始于费正清，是因为作为现代中国学的奠基人和开拓者，费正清首先成为由汉学研究向近现代中国研究演变的过渡性学者，他完成了从古典汉学研究向近现代中国研究的过渡，创立了以地区研究为标志的现代中国学。作为东亚地区研究的开创者，费正清把对近现代中国的研究
近五十年来美国中国史研究的两次转向
近五十年来美国中国史研究的两次转向作者：乔新华文章来源：中国近代史研究所网点击数：1060 更新时间：2007年08月17日 从20世纪50年代至今，美国的中国史研究经历了两次重要的转向。一是从“西方中心主义”到“中国中心观”的转变，二是从“中国中心观”到“时空双向交叉比较史观”的转变。前者以柯文为代表，探讨了中国史研究中以何者为参照系的问题；后者以加州学派王国斌为代表，探讨了单向度参照系的科学性和如何比较的问题。从比较史观而言，“中国中心观”蕴涵的方法论意义即是要摆脱中国史研究中被动、片面而绝对地以西欧经验为参照系的束缚，强调从中国内部探索中国历史的真相，进而探讨隐藏其后的历史观———传统与现代性问题，意欲重新检讨中国史研究始终为西方现代化的普遍性进程提供一个地区性注脚的依附局面，它推动了中国史研究向纵深方向的发展。但“中国中心观”因过分注重内在因素而对外在影响重视不够而遭遇尴尬，且在本质上未能完全摆脱“西方中心主义”的羁绊。王国斌的“空间与时间的双向交叉比较史观”则彻底抛弃了中心和边缘的观念，有助于学界走出不论是“西方中心主义”还是“中国中心观”在某种程度上所导致的尴尬局面，从而为美国的中国史研究领域打开了另一扇透视中国的新视窗，标志着世纪之交美国中国史研究的又一新转向。 从20世纪50年代到70年代末，美国对中国近代史研究的主流受费正清与李文森等人影响，一直都以西欧经验作为参照系。简言之，该时期美国学者主要围绕“冲击—回应”、“传统—近代”和“帝国主义”模式展开对中国史的研究。而在国内，学术界对于现代化过程普遍采取简单笼统的认同态度，而没有对现代化的各种理论框架提出反思性的批判，远未形成具有本土解释和反思能力的有效性框架。但从70年代以来，在美国逐渐发展起一种与之相反的日益明显的趋势，在对上述三种以西方为出发点之模式产生质疑和提出挑战的同时，倡导以中国史为出发点，深入精密地探索中国社会内部的变化动力与形态结构，并力主进行多学科协作研究。柯文敏锐地注意到这一新动向并加以理论阐述，称之为“中国中心观”。从而打破了“西方中心主义”的垄断地位，摆脱了中国史研究中被动、片面而且绝对地以西欧经验为参照系的束缚，为科学全面地理解和认识中国历史打开了新视窗。 事实证明，自1984年柯文倡导的“中国中心观”以来，美国的中国史研究领域（尤指近世史）取得了可喜的成果。对中国传统制度和社会变迁因素的分析渐呈多元并趋、群论争鸣的态势，出现了诸如施坚雅的区域经济理论，萧公权、周锡瑞的士绅社会理论，罗威廉的市民社会分析，黄宗智的“经济过密化”分析，杜赞奇的“权力的文化网络”及乡村基层政权内卷化的研究，艾尔曼的文化资本解释方法等。这种“中国中心观”扭转了以“西方中心主义”为基础的中国史研究局面，并意欲走
费正清“冲击—反应”模式
费正清认为中国相对稳定的传统秩序一直延续到19 世纪, 此时它遇到了一个截然不同的而且更为强大的文明一一西方文明。西方的强大冲击无可挽回地改变了中国的社会和政治, 给中国注人了引起现代化并导致永久性变化的力量。面对这一冲击, 中国作出的回应是在逐渐引进引起“永久性变化”的要素的同时, 背弃传统的“周期性变化”模式, 走上现代化道路。这种观点被称为“冲击反应”模式。 “冲击—反应”模式的内容： (l)中西文化的差别与冲突 他认为中国文化是一种内向型的大陆文化,而西方文化是一种开放性的海洋文化。西方文化洋溢着勃勃生机,代表了“不可遏制的活力”;而中国文化则充斥着顽固的“惰性”、消极、墨守成规。他认为,中西文化“冰炭不相容”,一经接触就不可避免地发生涉及社会制度、价值观念和生活方式的广泛的文化冲突。文化冲突是费正清提出“冲击—反应”模式的基础和依据。 (2)“西方的冲击” 费正清认为, 西方是中国近代转型的推动者, 是西方规定了中国近代史的全部主题。鸦片战争以后西方的“冲击”儿乎一夜之间改变了中国社会的走向与中国思想主题。冲击是指来自西方政治、经济、社会、宗教及文化等方面一系列的影响； (3)“中国的反应” 中国对西方的反应主要表现为中国为适应现代化进程而做出的一系列的改良和革命，勾勒出中国近代史的主要面貌。 (4)“西方中心” 费正清在论述近代中西关系时,并没有明说他坚持“西方中心论”,但是实际上,“西方中心”成为“冲击—反应”模式的指导思想。在费正清看来,传统的中国文明充斥着顽固的惰性。传统模式阻碍了中国近代化的进程。费正清认为,西方资本主义是一个动态的社会,西方文明充满着活力。因此,中国的传统社会,只有经过西方的冲击,才有可能摆脱困难,取得进步。他认为近代中国的变化就是最好的证明 评价： (一),“冲击—反应”模式的合理性 “冲击—反应”模式与中国历史演化的实际情况有相符之处。中西文化的冲突确实是不争的事实。作为后发型的中国近代化过程毫无疑问地受到了外来的影响与刺激。面对这一冲击,近代中国人也确实做出了反应,洋务运动,维新运 动便是突出的例子。从这个意义上讲,“冲击—反应”模式的合理性是存在的。 (二)“冲击—反应”模式的片面性 首先, 他看到了中国传统的惰性, 看到中国农业经济不利于生发资本主义以及对西方工业革命反应的迟钝, 然而却忽视了中国传统内部的自我更新能力。 其次，费正清只看到了儒家思想被政治曲解的一面, 他对于儒学的看法显然是几乎完全接受了五四以来的成果,即把儒学看成是维护专制的思想工具。 第三, “冲击一反应”模式体现了一种“外因决定论”,它既不符合中国历史发展的事实, 也违背内因、外因辩证关系的原理。 第四, 忽视了文明的兼容性。费正清过分强调中西的差异，忽视了中国和西方之间的相互作用。
中国史一级学科学术学位硕士研究生培养方案(学科代码
中国史一级学科学术学位硕士研究生培养方案 （学科代码：0602） 一、培养目标 本学科学术学位硕士研究生教育旨在培养有道德、有知识、有见识、有能力的适应社会发展需要的学术后备人才。使学生具备以下素质： 1.树立爱国主义和集体主义思想，具有优良的道德品质和强烈的社会责任感。 2.具有良好的敬业精神，遵守学术道德规范。 3.系统掌握本学科的理论、专业知识和研究动态，掌握本学科的学术研究方法，熟悉 本学科、专业及相近相关学科的知识体系。 4.能够熟练地使用一门外国语阅读本学科文献并进行学术交流，具备独立从事教学、 科研和其他实际工作的创新和分析能力。 二、研究方向 1．中国古代史 2．中国近现代史 3．东北区域史 4．中国历史地理学 5．历史文献学与中国史学史 三、学制与学分 基本学制为三年，最长修业年限为四年。 实行学分制，总学分不低于38学分。课程学分不低于34学分，学位论文开题报告与个人研究计划1学分，学位论文3学分。 允许学生提前毕业，但最低修业年限不得少于2.5年，提前毕业条件如下： 1．在CSSCI期刊上公开发表第一署名或独撰论文1篇以上（含1篇）。 2．课程学习成绩优秀率达2/3以上。 3. 经本人申请、指导教师同意与学院审核批准，并顺利通过学位论文答辩。 非全日制硕士生、跨门类及同等学力学生，不得申请提前毕业。 四、培养方式 1．凡报考本学科的学生，在确定录取后，由本学科、专业硕士研究生指导小组提供一份经典文献目录，由学生根据自身兴趣选择阅读（至少两本）。在第二学期的期末，学生需提交两份书面经典文献阅读报告，计1学分。
2．硕士研究生培养采取导师负责与集体培养相结合的方式，导师是硕士研究生培养的第一责任人。各专业方向根据实际情况成立硕士研究生指导小组，每个小组一般由3-5人组成，在配合导师的前提下充分发挥集体培养的作用。 3．根据专业和培养计划需要，有计划地聘请国内外专家来校授课，在必要情况下，鼓励学生跨专业、跨院系或到国内著名高校学习部分课程，或联合培养研究生。 五、课程学习 1．课程设置与学分要求 课程学分不低于34学分 中国史一级学科学术学位硕士研究生课程设置表 课程 类别课程编号课程名称 学 时 学 分 开课 学期 备注 公共基础课128000MX001 马克思主义理论60 3 Ⅱ128OOOMX002 基础外国语80 4 Ⅰ、Ⅱ 学科基础课164002MX001 史学理论与方法60 3 Ⅰ 必修，总计9 学分。164002MX101 中国史前沿问题60 3 Ⅰ 164002MX102 中国历史文献研读60 3 Ⅰ 专业主干课164002MX401 中国古代史专题60 3 Ⅰ 164002MX402 中国近代史专题60 3 Ⅰ 学生须在导 师指导下至 少选择3门， 计9学分的课 程。多选课程 可计入发展 方向课课程 学分。164002MX403 中国现当代史专题60 3 Ⅰ 164002MX404 历史文献学与中国史学史专题60 3 Ⅰ 164002MX405 中国东北地方史60 3 Ⅰ 164002MX406 中国历史地理学专题60 3 Ⅰ 164002MX407 中国思想史专题60 3 Ⅱ 164002MX408 中国古代原典导读60 3 Ⅱ 164002MX409 中国近现代文献导读与检索60 3 Ⅰ 164002MX410 先秦史专题40 2 Ⅱ 164002MX411 先秦诸子研究40 2 Ⅱ 164002MX701 秦汉史专题40 2 Ⅱ
费正清《Trade and diplomacy on the China coast
THE PROBLEM OF CHINA’S RESPONSE TO THE WEST THE CENTURY OF THE TREATY PORTS IN CHINA, from 1842 to 1943, is now at an end, and historians may examine it for clues as to the future of Sino-Western relations. We can be sure that these three generations of steadily increasing contact have been more than a strange interlude in the long drama of China’s ethnocentric history. For better or worse, the treaty ports remade Chinese life. Through them flowed Western goods, people, and ideas. The result was to give the West a privileged position in China not unlike that of earlier barbarian conquerors. Should we view the present rejection of the West as an anti-foreign resurgence among the Chinese people? It is, on the contrary, part of still another barbarian conquest? Or is it really an unstable mixture of the two? These are the imponderables of present day policy. They can as assessed only against the background of history. The historical context of the period 1842-54. The modern invasion of China by the Western world really began in the middle of the nineteenth century, after the first Anglo-Chinese treaty was signed at Nanjing in 1842. Until that time relations with the West had been based upon the ancient Chinese tribute system; after that time they were based upon the “unequal” foreign treaties. Under the tribute system foreign trade had been restricted to the picturesque “factories” of old Canton. But 1842 began a new era-the opening of China to Western commercial exploitation. This was characterized by the treaty ports and the opium traffic, extraterritoriality, the treaty tariff, and the most-favored-nation clause. By the end of the nineteenth century China had been placed in a semi-colonial status, the after-effects of which have not yet passed away. In this context the years from 1842 to 1854 have significance as the transition between two unilateral, Chinese and Western, schemes of things. These middles years of nineteenth century saw new developments in all the Far East. The first enunciation of American manifest destiny, the development of the clipper ship and the Shanghai trade in the 1840’s, were followed by the opening of Japan and the establishment of Russian on the Pacific between 1853 to 1860. The center of all this international development, however, was the British activity in China, where the treaty port consuls labored to break down the Chinese system of foreign relations and set up the Western treaty system in its place. Their initial achievement was the first treaty settlement of 1842-44; further efforts led to the invention of the Foreign Inspectorate of Customs in 1854; their final success, after the second war of 1856-60, was marked by the treaties of 1858 and 1860 which opened the interior to trade and established the Western legations at Peking. The treaty system which had thus been created to serve as a vehicle for British and other Western trade, diplomacy, and evangelism in China, was also set up in Japan, Siam, Korea, and other Far Eastern states. It may justly be taken as the symbol of the recent century of Western superiority in the East. It forms a striking contrast with the preceding millennia of the tribute system, when the great empire of China dominated the Far Eastern scene. It contrasts perhaps less sharply with the new international order of communism of which China has become a part. We should not forget that the treaty system represented chiefly a state of affairs in the treaty ports, a mode of Sino-foreign intercourse wich was an aspect or function of the larger situation within the Chinese boday politic. It must be viewed in the context of the great revolutionary process of disintegration and rebirth which has convulsed the Chinese people since 1842. The fall of the Chinese empire is an epic still to be written. Seen from the Chinese side, on political collapse in history has been more cataclysmic-a decline from an age-old recognized supremacy over the known world to an abject partitioning into spheres of foreign domination, all in the space of one lifetime between 1842 and 1898. The causes of this fall were many and various. The decay of the Manchu dynasty after two centuries of power within China and the rise of the great Taiping Rebellion in 1851(an epic that would require another volume to tell) coincided with the invasion of Western arms. Western-inspired efforts at industrialization and the growth of nationalism followed hard upon this dynastic civil war. All these processes, native and foreign, have combined to produce the chaos and ferment of social change in modern China. The resulting experience of the Chinese people in modern times has been overcast by a pall of frustration and uncertainty, owing to their inability to meet the West on equal terms. The inherited institutions of their society have played them false. More than any other mature non-Western state, China has seemed inadaptable to the conditions of modern life. Nationalism and