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An Alternative Transfer Pricing Norm

Mihir A. Desai

Harvard University and NBER

mdesai@https://www.wendangku.net/doc/ca8399846.html,

Dhammika Dharmapala

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

dharmap@https://www.wendangku.net/doc/ca8399846.html,

January 2011

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Abstract

This paper proposes an alternative transfer pricing norm – the performance related principle (PRP) - for tax authorities to employ in their administration of corporate taxes in the modern global economy. Given rising levels of outbound foreign direct investment, the expansion of global production networks, and the increasing importance of intangibles within multinational firms, the transfer pricing problem is central to the administration of the corporate tax. The arm’s-length principle (ALP) – which entails benchmarking the prices of intrafirm transactions reported for tax purposes against hypothetical transactions with unrelated parties - is the dominant, indeed virtually exclusive, norm employed for this purpose today. In contrast to the ALP, the PRP recommends the use of prices for tax purposes that are consistent with the internal transfer prices that the firm uses for other significant firm activities - the resource allocation and performance evaluation processes - and more broadly involves benchmarking against the overall information environment and decision rules employed by the firm. A simple model is used to show that, under fairly general conditions, implementing the PRP will maximize global welfare by reducing distortions to multinational firms’ internal resource allocation processes that are attributable to tax transfer pricing regulations. At the same time, the PRP is likely to limit the scope for firms to opportunistically reallocate taxable income across jurisdictions. The paper illustrates the proposed application of the PRP with reference to recent transfer pricing cases involving R&D cost sharing. It concludes that, while its implementation involves many complex factors, the PRP would provide a more principled basis for determining transfer prices than the ALP. Moreover, the PRP is unlikely to exhibit any systematic bias towards either taxpayers or governments relative to the current system.

Introduction The mismatch between the geographic scope of firms and political jurisdictions

represents a fundamental problem of modern capitalism. Historically, firms have been located primarily in one country with some larger firms having appendages overseas. Today, firms of all sizes are likely to transact across political boundaries and no longer have an attachment to any particular political jurisdiction. Cross-border transactions are no longer peripheral, but quite central to firms of all sizes. The tension between political demarcations and firm boundaries has been heightened by the increasing mobility of firms who move their domiciles in response to tax and regulatory concerns.1 This tension is manifest in many policy domains, including the interaction of bankruptcy regimes when multinational firms fail and the appropriate application of securities laws when investors, markets and firms all exist in different locations, as well as the design of tax policy. Within corporate tax policy, this tension is particularly evident in two domains. First, foreign-source income occasions a set of policy choices regarding the taxation of that income, methods for avoiding double taxation and the treatment of domestic expenses that may be associated with overseas income. These decisions have been the subject of considerable academic study and political debate. The second domain is arguably even more important, yet has received

considerably less attention – the design of transfer pricing regulations. Transfer pricing

regulations govern any intrafirm transaction to ensure that profits are not reallocated

opportunistically. The rise of global production networks, the intrafirm trade these networks generate, and the rising importance of services and intangible assets have greatly increased the importance of transfer pricing regulations. More broadly, many commentators have begun to question the viability of corporate taxation when firms can reallocate profits opportunistically and increasingly appear willing and able to do so.

As such, the geographic scope and mobility of firms has increased tremendously.

The arm’s-length principle (ALP) is the dominant principle for transfer pricing

regulations worldwide. The ALP is important in two respects – first, it provides firms with guidance regarding the transfer prices to use for tax purposes; and, second, it guides the

resolution of disputes between tax authorities and taxpayers. In short, the ALP indicates that the 1 See Desai (2009) for a discussion, and Desai and Dharmapala (2010) for a review of some evidence on the mobility of firms’ domiciles.

appropriate price for an intrafirm transaction is the price that would have obtained if the transaction had occurred between unrelated parties. The ALP is a major component of U.S. tax policy and has become part of the OECD guidelines for the appropriate design of corporate tax policy. As reviewed below, there is growing recognition among both scholars and practitioners that the ALP lacks intellectual coherence and is highly problematic to administer. Surprisingly, there is nonetheless no significant alternative norm that competes with ALP for guiding transfer pricing regulations.

This paper introduces an alternative norm to guide transfer pricing regulations. The performance related principle (PRP) recommends that the appropriate price for intrafirm transactions reported to tax authorities is a price that is consistent with the internal transfer price used by those firms for deploying resources and evaluating managers. The argument begins by establishing that modern multinational firms produce vast amounts of information pertaining to the profitability and performance of internal divisions and affiliates. The PRP would essentially involve harnessing this firm-specific information generated for other purposes in order to determine the appropriate division of profits for tax purposes. In doing so, the PRP emphasizes the commonality of the perspectives of managers and tax authorities along certain dimensions, notwithstanding their conflict of interest over tax payments. In particular, both managers and tax authorities are faced with the same fundamental problem of determining how much of the economic value of the multinational firm is generated by each affiliate. The allocation of profits is central to the resource allocation process and performance evaluation process within firms. Those processes should be used, according to the PRP, as the foundation of the information set for tax authorities.

Tax scholars and policymakers typically criticize the ALP for allowing multinational firms scope for tax avoidance through the opportunistic reallocation of taxable income across jurisdictions. In contrast, the literature on transfer pricing in accounting and economics (to the extent that it has incorporated tax considerations at all) emphasizes a quite different problem. Specifically, in a world where multinational firms’ efforts to coordinate and incentivize the activities of their various affiliates are subject to frictions and information asymmetries, the transfer pricing regulations imposed by tax authorities under the ALP can create distortions in firms’ internal resource allocation processes. The PRP unifies these disparate perspectives and literatures; in particular, this paper argues that the PRP can address both of these problems with

the current system. The paper sketches a simple model that shows that, under fairly general conditions, implementing the PRP will maximize global welfare by reducing distortions to multinational firms’ internal resource allocation processes that are attributable to tax transfer pricing regulations. At the same time, the PRP is likely to limit the scope for firms to opportunistically reallocate taxable income across jurisdictions.2

As foreshadowed above, the PRP is at odds with the ALP in several ways. Most importantly, the PRP explicitly acknowledges the within-firm nature of these transactions and, indeed, attempts to capitalize on information generated within firms. In contrast, the ALP ignores the within-firm setting by emphasizing counterfactual transactions among unrelated parties, thereby deliberately failing to avail itself of the information generated within the firm. The critical differences between these methods are illustrated by showing how the ALP and PRP differ in their application to both classic transfer pricing disputes from the past and to recent transfer pricing cases involving R&D cost sharing. The paper concludes that the PRP would provide a more principled basis for determining transfer prices than the ALP, and that the PRP is unlikely to exhibit any systematic bias towards either taxpayers or governments relative to the current system.

This paper proceeds as follows. Section II introduces the general problem that transfer pricing regulations are concerned with and then explains why this problem is increasingly central to the administration of the corporate tax. Section III elaborates on the ALP, its conceptual and practical difficulties, and the current attempts to reform it. Section IV introduces the PRP and emphasizes how its basic premises differ from those of the ALP. It also sketches a simple model that illustrates the distortions created by tax transfer pricing regulations and how the PRP would correct them. Finally, Section IV considers various caveats and addresses potential shortcomings of the PRP. Section V illustrates the proposed application of the PRP in specific real-world settings. Section VI concludes.

II. The Transfer Pricing Problem

2 Both the perspectives outlined here are critical of the ALP, albeit from very different perspectives. A third view (that differs from both of these) is that the ALP does indeed allow extensive scope for tax avoidance, but that this is efficient because various political and informational constraints prevent governments from setting optimally low tax rates on multinational firms. The implications of this view for the PRP, and some relevant evidence, are discussed below in Section IV.

Prior to an elaboration of the ALP and PRP, it is useful to consider the broader setting that these principles try to address. Multinational enterprises (MNEs) organized to take advantage of the comparative advantages of countries set up subsidiaries around the world and fragment their production processes to access these advantages. In the process, affiliates of these firms transact heavily with each other across political jurisdictions. These transactions require prices and, accordingly, provide an opportunity to reallocate profits opportunistically in response to tax rate differentials. Similarly, a reliance on intangibles, intellectual property and services create further opportunities for profit reallocations. For example, a patent developed through research in the U.S. can be sold to a related party in a low tax jurisdiction at an opportunistic price and the earnings generated by that patent can potentially be effectively reallocated to a low-tax jurisdiction. Various services – overhead expenses, financing, shared marketing costs – can also be distributed worldwide creating further opportunities for profit reallocation.

The potential for profit reallocation via transfer pricing is a function of statutory tax rate differences. In addition to the changing nature of multinational firm operations described below, developments in corporate tax policy over the last two decades have also given rise to greater transfer pricing opportunities. While the U.S. corporate statutory rate has remained constant for more than twenty years, statutory rates throughout the OECD and elsewhere have fallen significantly, making the U.S. one of the highest statutory rate countries in the world. Finally, increasing competition amongst low-tax jurisdictions further enhances the opportunities created by profit reallocations via transfer pricing. In order to consider this setting further, the sections below present recent data on the scope of the foreign direct investment and the growth of internal markets where transfer pricing is most prevalent.

II.A. Some Basic Facts about Multinational Firms’ Operations

Multinational firms are defined as firms that originate in one country (the “home” country) and subsequently begin operating in multiple other nation states (the “host” countries). Their home country operations are usually labeled as the “parent” company while their operations around the world are usually labeled their “foreign subsidiaries.” From a more aggregate perspective, the foreign subsidiaries of multinational firms represent “outbound foreign direct investment (FDI)” to the home country and “inbound FDI” to the host countries. Measurement of FDI typically consists of measuring its annual flow or its cumulative stock,

often relative to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or a measure of investment such as Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF).

The last thirty years have witnessed a transformation in the scope of multinational firm

activity. Outbound FDI flows have grown from $14 billion in 1970 to $2 trillion in 2007. This represents an annual growth rate of 14.3% while world GDP grew at 3.1%. In comparison, global trade in goods and services grew at only a 5.5% rate. As such, the widening scope of

multinational firms represents the most aggressive aspect of the phenomena more broadly known as globalization. Finally, the growth of FDI flows appears to be accelerating . The growth in outbound FDI averaged 8% from 1970-1990 and averaged 20% from 1991-2007. These patterns are even more pronounced outside the U.S. given the relatively closed nature of the U.S. economy.

While these dollar figures and growth rates are impressive, they do not fully account for the importance of multinational firms in the global economy. Specifically, innovation and trade are thought to be the two most important drivers of global economic growth. On these two

dimensions, multinational firms appear to be particularly important. For example, multinational firms now account for upwards of 70% of exports in most developed economies. Moreover, more than a third of those exports are to their own subsidiaries in other countries – so-called “intrafirm trade”.

Similarly, research and development activities – typically regarded as the most important source of innovations – are increasingly conducted by multinational firms. The U.S. is fairly typical in that more than half of all R&D activity is undertaken by American multinational firms. Moreover, the foreign subsidiaries of non-local multinationals are also an important source of R&D activity. In 1993, 12% of R&D conducted in OECD countries was conducted by the subsidiaries of foreign multinational firms.3 3

This means that, for example, 12% of Belgian R&D was spent by the Belgian subsidiaries of non-Belgian multinational firms. See Navaretti and Venables (2006). By 2004, this had grown to 16%. In the UK, that ratio rose from 30.1% in 1996 to 38.6% in 2004. Again, multinational firms appear to be

particularly important, and increasingly so, for the UK economy on the key dimensions that drive economic growth.

The nomenclature of parents and subsidiaries suggests a primacy and superiority of the home country operations relative to the foreign operations. Indeed, many commentators envision foreign operations as minor appendages to the relatively more significant and sophisticated parent operations. As such, it is useful to investigate the importance of foreign operations to the parent multinational. Given that the most detailed data on multinational firms is available from the U.S., it is useful to consider the experience of American firms. In general, American multinational firms are considered to be less reliant on foreign operations than the multinational firms of other countries given the size of their local market.

From 1999 to 2007, the net income of the domestic operations of U.S. parents grew from $394 billion to $701 billion. During that same period, the net income of the foreign affiliates of U.S. multinationals grew from $182 to $847 billion. This indicates that a) the growth rate of foreign operations far outstrips that of domestic operations and b) that foreign operations now account for the majority of multinational firm profits. Comparable figures for other operating metrics provide similar results. Again, these figures are likely underestimates of the importance of foreign operations to non-American multinationals.

The importance of subsidiaries is not limited to their profitability and growth. As indicated above, foreign subsidiaries of multinational firms can constitute critical elements of their production networks. As one measure of this integration and importance, consider where foreign subsidiaries sell their goods and services to and where parents export to and import from. Returning to the example of American multinational firms, foreign subsidiaries had sales of $3.3 trillion in 2004, of which $961 billion was to related parties - their parent firm and other subsidiaries. This fraction varies considerably by industry with intangible intensive industries such as pharmaceuticals relying particularly on intrafirm trade. This level of integration is also manifest in the export activities of U.S. parents. In 2004, U.S. parents exported $406 billion of which $164 billion was to related parties abroad and they imported $495 billion of which $217 came from their related parties.

These figures indicate a remarkable level of integration of activities within multinational firms and the willingness to assign various activities around the world. This level of integration is not limited to the production and distribution of goods. Research and development activities (R&D), typically considered the highest value-added activity within firms, is also distributed

around the world through foreign subsidiaries. The level of integration of innovative activity can be measured by considering where R&D is conducted within a multinational firm and by analyzing the flows of royalty payments and license fees.

In 2004, more than 20% of all R&D conducted by American multinational firms was conducted by their foreign subsidiaries. As with goods and services, there appears to be a significant internal market for innovations and intellectual property. This market is manifest through the flows of royalty payments, license payments, and payments for technology between parents and subsidiaries. The subsidiaries of American multinational firms had receipts of royalties, license fees, and proceeds from sales of technology of $14.6 billion of which $11.1 billion was from related parties. Similarly, these subsidiaries made payments of royalties, license fees or for the acquisition of technology of $46.8 billion of which $42.3 billion was from related parties. Finally, in addition to $25 billion of R&D conducted through foreign affiliates, foreign affiliates fund another $24 billion of R&D.

Finally, it should be noted that the internal markets of multinational firms also feature significant internal capital flows, in addition to the flows of goods, services and intellectual property discussed above. Specifically, the typical portrait of multinational firms sending capital abroad to capitalize subsidiaries is incomplete. Multinational firms often use their foreign subsidiaries to capitalize new foreign subsidiaries. Indeed, recent research labels this phenomena “chains of ownership” as more than 15% of the subsidiaries of American multinational firms are actually owned by other subsidiaries of American multinational firms (Desai, Foley and Hines, 2003). Similarly, subsidiaries often lend to other subsidiaries and even back to their parents. These activities become particularly important at times of crisis as the internal capital markets of multinational firms allow subsidiaries to overcome particularly difficult local conditions.

The preceding analysis makes clear that it is commonplace to shift activities to subsidiaries. These activities include the production and distribution of goods and services, innovative activities of various kinds, and financing of various kinds. More generally, it portrays a multinational firm not as a large parent entity with minor appendages nor as a “mother ship” with satellites operating worldwide. Rather, this analysis suggests a robust set of two-way interactions between parents and subsidiaries where goods, knowledge and financing flow freely within the organization in response to local opportunities wherever they might best be capitalized

upon. These internal capital markets, internal product markets, and internal knowledge markets all distinguish multinational firms from other firms and are thought to serve as part of their competitive advantage.

II.B. Is the transfer pricing regime broken?

The opportunistic location of profits by multinational firms has prompted significant

attention and policy proposals. Recent administration proposals on international taxation have envisioned significant revenue gains by altering international tax rules. These proposals respond to data of the following variety. The Congressional Research Service (2009) compares the ratio of American multinational foreign profits located in a country to that country’s GDP for the G-7, larger tax havens and smaller tax havens.

Such data is often used to extrapolate to potential revenue losses from the opportunistic

reallocation of profits in fairly simple ways. The estimates of lost revenues range widely. The IRS had estimated non-compliance by U.S. multinationals to cost the fisc approximately $3 billion. Commentators have suggested that the revenue loss from transfer pricing abuses could be $20 billion or higher; estimates range as high as $60 billion.4 4 Martin Sullivan “U.S. Multinationals Shifting Profits Out of the United States,” Tax Notes , March 10, 2008, pp. 1078-1082.

These estimates all effectively apply a 35% tax rate on profits in low-tax countries that are deemed to be excessive (via the comparison displayed above). While such estimates are highly conjectural, they have prompted

significant policy proposals.

The surprising location of profits described above has occasioned concern, but it has largely focused on the regime for taxing overseas income. In particular, the debate between territorial or worldwide tax regimes is often informed by concerns over these allocations of profits. Worldwide regimes are thought to limit the overly opportunistic use of transfer prices by providing a backstop for the home statutory rates. Said another way, the profits shifted abroad to low tax jurisdictions would still be taxed by a worldwide regime. And, by implication, a territorial regime that does not assert taxing jurisdiction over overseas profits is thought to give rise to increased transfer pricing incentives to low tax jurisdictions.

The link between transfer pricing and overall foreign tax regimes is tenuous while the connection to transfer pricing regimes appears clear. There is little evidence comparing how territorial and worldwide regimes compare in transfer pricing abuses. Moreover, some of the few countries still operating worldwide tax regimes, most notably the UK and Japan, have migrated to territorial regimes making the debate on overall tax regimes more U.S. specific. The links between transfer pricing abuses and transfer pricing regulations, on the other hand, are omnipresent and clear cut. As such, to the degree that the opportunistic reallocation of profits is excessive, attention is best focused on the transfer pricing regime itself rather than the broader policy question of how to tax foreign profits. Surprisingly, as described below, the ALP is omnipresent and no meaningful alternative exists other than proposals to create a coordinated multilateral regime which has significant feasibility obstacles.

III. The Arm’s-Length Principle (ALP)

The arm’s length principle states that the amount charged by one related party to another for a given product must be the same as if the parties were not related. More formally, the arm's length principle as it applies in the United States is presented in Section 482-1 (b) of the transfer pricing regulations:

(b) Arm's length standard--(1) In general. In determining the true taxable income of a

controlled taxpayer, the standard to be applied in every case is that of a taxpayer dealing at arm's length with an uncontrolled taxpayer. A controlled transaction meets the arm's length standard if the results of the transaction are consistent with the results that would have been realized if uncontrolled taxpayers had engaged in the same transaction under the same circumstances (arm's length result). However, because identical transactions

can rarely be located, whether a transaction produces an arm's length result generally

will be determined by reference to the results of comparable transactions under

comparable circumstances.

This statement is followed by a discussion of the methods that are employed to arrive at an arm’s length result.

The arm’s length principle emerged out of the League of Nations’ efforts to coordinate the jurisdiction of countries to tax international business. The Carroll Report, initiated by the League’s Fiscal Committee in 1928, explored alternative methods for allocating profits across jurisdictions and avoiding double taxation. The method that ultimately grew into the arm’s length principle was labeled separate accounting and was contrasted primarily with fractional apportionment. While fractional apportionment was considered, it was deemed to give rise to the potential for double taxation and, instead, the separate accounts method was advanced in the 1935 draft Convention as the primary, but not exclusive, means for avoiding the problem of double taxation. The language from that Convention is highly similar to the language adopted subsequently in the 1995 OECD Model Treaty. The 2010 revision to the Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations has preserved the arm’s length principle but contains more detailed guidance on the nature of comparability analyses and how to select comparable transactions. While an OECD document, the model treaty is viewed as highly influential throughout the developed and developing world.

III. A. Difficulties with the ALP

The most fundamental conceptual problem with the ALP is that it is profoundly in tension with current theories of why firms become multinational. The ALP envisages a world in which both related and unrelated parties engage in economically similar transactions across national borders. However, the modern theory of the multinational enterprise suggests that the raison d’etre of these firms is that ownership confers various advantages in terms of productivity and the avoidance of opportunistic behavior. In those areas of business in which these ownership advantages are important (such as those in which intangible assets are crucial), cross-border transactions will come to be dominated by MNCs, with no arm’s-length transactions between unrelated parties that can serve as a standard of comparison. Even when related and unrelated transactions coexist in the same industry, the latter may have such different characteristics and economic motivations that they cannot be viewed as meaningfully comparable for the purposes of transfer pricing. As such, the premise of ALP – that unrelated party transactions serve as

reasonable comparisons for intrafirm transactions – is inconsistent with the modern theory of multinational firms.

This basic shortcoming of the ALP is widely recognized. In addition, the administrative complexity to which the ALP gives rise is also significant and widely known. According to the IRS international examiner Frances Zuniga: “No one knows what arm’s length means. This is especially true because there are simply no comparable transactions for many of these companies. The arm’s length standard exists in a world of smoke and mirrors. The arm’s length standard pretends that related companies behave as if they are unrelated, and assumes that in each market place there are willing buyers and sellers. This assumption clearly does not work where the market is controlled…no one knows or can agree on what exactly is an arm’s length standard.”[need citation] The inability for the ALP to be administered simply stems from the ambiguity of what a comparable transaction is and how to select one amongst the many possibilities. This ambiguity and administrative complexity leads to costs borne by taxpayers and the tax authority.

III. B. Alternative Proposals

Despite these well-known difficulties, there are no clear alternatives to the ALP that have emerged. This is true not only in practice, but also at a conceptual level, if we exclude solutions that would fundamentally alter the structure of international taxation and obviate the need for transfer prices. There have been proposals to move the international tax system towards a unitary system with formulary apportionment, as used by the US states (Avi Yonah and Clausing, 2008). This would involve abandoning the attempt to measure the separate taxable income of multinational affiliates, and instead divide up among countries the worldwide income of the multinational enterprise based on a formula. While this would solve the transfer pricing problem, it would fundamentally transform the nature of corporate taxation, and would also give rise to various behavioral responses by firms – vertically integrating or disintegrating in an attempt to opportunistically manipulate the formula – that would entail potential efficiency costs of a quite different form than those associated with the current international tax regime. To be fully implemented, it is likely to require a much greater degree of international tax coordination than currently exists.

Recent debates on international corporate taxation have mostly pitted defenders of the ALP against advocates of formulary apportionment. One strand of discussion has sought to combine elements of the two approaches (e.g. Avi Yonah and Benshalom, 2010), for example, by modifying the ALP in the direction of using profit splits, rather than relying solely on prices of comparable transactions. For instance, Vann (2010) advocates the use of data on profits and payrolls to allocate income across jurisdictions, but is careful to distinguish this proposal from formulary apportionment. This approach uses some of the same information that the PRP might also draw on, as discussed below. However, it starts from fundamentally different premises, seeking to shore up the ALP by using profit splits as essentially a backstop to achieve a “reasonable” outcome in circumstances where an arm’s-length price is nonexistent or difficult to define.

The existence and relevance of managerial accounting and internal transfer prices has previously been noted in the literature. For instance, Sch?n (2010) advocates using internal transfer prices in the wider context of a general proposal for an extended version of the ALP that avoids sharp discontinuities in tax regimes across jurisdictions, while allowing source countries to tax synergy rents generated by MNCs operating in their territory. However, managerial accounts and internal transfer prices have not previously been proposed as a foundation for conceptualizing the transfer pricing problem from the tax authorities’ perspective.

IV. The Performance Related Principle (PRP)

IV. A. Basic premises

The PRP is built on three premises. First, an alternative information source is available for benchmarking intrafirm transactions for tax purposes. Specifically, the firm’s own need to monitor performance, allocate resources, and compensate managers generates a set of managerial accounts that corresponds to a set of prices for transactions within the firm. Second, that source of information provides information in a manner that is consistent with the goals of a tax system. Finally, the overall resource allocation and incentive process within firms, apart from specific managerial accounts, is also a suitable source of information in determining the pricing of goods for tax purposes.

Given the complexity of the operations and internal transactions of multinational firms, the existence of managerial accounts of the type described above is indisputable. Granular

depictions of these managerial accounts have been provided in the case of the some of the largest multinational firms, including ABB and China Resources Corporation. These case studies demonstrate that managers are tracking costs and profits at business unit and country level regularly and for the purposes of resource allocation and compensation. The use of “ABACUS” in ABB is worth reviewing briefly as it details just how much information is available within a firm. In this case study, a business unit head discusses how he uses internal reporting and what constitutes the internal reports:

With our matrix structure, we always have two people looking at every part of the

business. The Business Area managers take a high level, strategic perspective by

managing the worldwide implications of the businesses they run. The country managers focus on execution at the regional level by staying close to their customers and

markets….I use ABACUS to manage these businesses and countries….My controller and

I spend a lot of time pulling out specialized information to focus on specific questions: at

any time, it may be cash flows, asset utilization, inventories, or investments….I focus

intensely on orders, revenues, earnings and employee by Business Area and by country.5 This account, from the early 1990s and prior to the full IT revolution, indicates the breadth and depth of information that exists within firms on levels of profitability. As such, there can be little question that a rich information source exists within firms for questions related to the allocation of profits and intrafirm transactions.

These accounts, and the internal transfer prices that they rely on, differ somewhat from the more familiar financial accounts of firms in that the latter are designed to provide information to outside investors rather than to managers, and as such are subject to disclosure to outsiders. There is a longstanding debate about the merits of “book-tax conformity” in the context of financial reporting (e.g. Desai and Dharmapala, 2009). In the case of managerial accounts, there is ordinarily no obligation to disclose internal transfer prices, but there is an analogy with the argument that is sometimes made with respect to financial reports – tying the transfer prices used by the tax authorities to those used by firms will make it more costly for firms to behave opportunistically in their tax planning decisions.

The second premise of PRP is that the rich information set available to managers on intrafirm prices and profits is also a suitable information set for tax authorities. Here, the premise rests on the motivation for the firm’s own information systems and the similarity

5 This account is excerpted from Robert Simons, “Asea Brown Boveri: The ABACUS System,” HBS Case 9-192-140.

between those motivations the goals of the tax authorities. Accounts of managerial accounting systems, such as that provided by Ittner and Larcker (2001, p. 350), emphasize that: “The past two decades have witnessed considerable change in managerial accounting practice. From its traditional emphasis on financially oriented decision analysis and budgetary control, managerial accounting has evolved to encompass a more strategic approach that emphasizes the identification, measurement, and management of the key financial and operational drivers of shareholder value.” As such, these information systems are designed to allocate economic value across business lines and geographic boundaries. The MNE thus faces a task analogous to that of the tax authorities – determining the sources of economic value and allocating them across jurisdictions. The firm’s internal accounts will do this in a manner that maximizes the aggregate value of the MNE. The PRP takes the position that the firm’s own assessment of the geographic allocation of its sources of value is the best available measure, and that the tax authorities can do no better in allocating taxable income across jurisdictions. These claims are formulated more precisely in the simple model sketched in the next subsection.

Finally, the PRP is premised on the intuition that the information setting of the firm is useful beyond the actual managerial reports themselves. That is, the PRP does not confine the definition of useful within-firm information to specific managerial accounts. Rather, the overall set of resource allocation and compensation arrangements within firms can be useful in determining appropriate transfer prices and where profit belongs. That is, the allocation of value by firms across jurisdictions for tax purposes should be consistent, according to the PRP, with the overall pattern of resource allocation and compensation across firms. As such, transfer prices and profit allocations that are not consistent with these overall allocations would be subject to scrutiny. The PRP recommends that the information set of the firm – manifest in actual managerial accounts and in the broader pattern of activities – is the suitable information set for tax authorities. This broader interpretation is likely to be particularly useful in a setting where many transfer pricing abuses involve tax havens with minimal economic activity.

Taken together, the PRP is best understood as the principle that the intrafirm prices used for tax purposes should be consistent with the managerial accounting reports, resource allocation and compensation arrangements employed by firms for nontax purposes.

IV. B. A Simple Model Illustrating the PRP

The advantages of the PRP and the circumstances in which these hold can be illustrated more precisely by using a simple version of the basic analytical framework that has been used in the literature on transfer pricing in accounting and economics. This can be summarized as follows (relying especially on the formulation in Baldenius et al., 2004, pp. 594-598). Consider a MNE that has affiliates in countries A and B. The affiliate in country (hereafter affiliate A) produces a quantity q of an intermediate good at constant marginal cost c. This intermediate good is transferred to affiliate B, which sells the output and earns revenue R(q), where R(q) is an increasing, concave function. This revenue is net of any direct costs incurred by affiliate B, other than the transfer price p I paid to affiliate A (or equivalently, it can be assumed that B’s direct costs are zero). Given these assumptions, the worldwide profits of the MNE in a world without taxes can be expressed as R(q) – cq, and the maximization of worldwide profits entails the first-order condition (FOC):

R′(q)=c (1)

(As discussed below, this is also the condition required for the maximization of global welfare).

In practice, as the example of ABB above suggests, it will not generally be possible for the MNE to choose q in a completely centralized manner. Rather, it will need to set up a system of internal transfer prices (in this simple model, the transfer price p I) and other incentive schemes in order to overcome information asymmetries among affiliates, incentivize managers, and make resource allocation decisions. This is because, when managerial actions are not perfectly observable to the MNE’s central decisionmakers, the managers of an affiliate will typically have an incentive to maximize the profits of their own affiliate, rather than the profits of the MNE as a whole. Thus, the MNE will wish whenever possible to choose the transfer price p I in order to ensure that the decentralized decisions of the managers of affiliates A and B result in the maximization of the MNE’s worldwide profits. The profits of affiliates A and B are given by:

πA=(p I?c)q (2)

πB=R(q)?p I q (3) It is clear that if the MNE sets p I=c, affiliate B will choose to buy the efficient quantity of the intermediate good (i.e. in maximizing its own profits, affiliate B will set R′(q)=p I=c, so that

the incentives of B’s managers are aligned with those of the MNE as a whole). This simply represents the well-known Hirshleifer (1956) result that internal transfer prices should generally be set equal to marginal cost.

Now, introduce taxation, assuming in particular that country A (the low-tax country) imposes a corporate tax at rate t, while country B (the high-tax country) imposes a corporate tax at rate (t + h), where h > 0. Assume that both countries impose purely territorial taxation, within a separate accounting framework. In this setting, the transfer pricing regulations of the countries’ tax authorities are of particular interest. For now, suppose that the tax authorities exogenously set a tax transfer price p T to value transactions between affiliates A and B (and hence to determine the taxable income of affiliates A and B). Under these circumstances, the after-tax profits of affiliates A and B are given by:

πA=(p I?c)q?t(p T?c)q (4)

πB=R(q)?p I q?(t+?)(R(q)?p T q) (5) Note that even when p I and p T are not constrained to be identical (the “decoupling” case discussed below), the tax transfer price p T is relevant for determining the accounting (or “book”) profits of each affiliate because it affects their tax payments and hence their after-tax cash flows. In the literature on the responses of firms to transfer pricing regulations, it is generally assumed that after-tax book profits play an important role in resource allocation and managerial compensation. For example, suppose that affiliate A is a majority-owned but not wholly-owned subsidiary of affiliate B, and that the managers of A are partly paid in the form of stock in affiliate A. Then, the after-tax (rather than pretax) profits of affiliate A will be critical to the achievement of incentive-alignment and coordination within the MNE. Similarly, but more generally, suppose that an affiliate’s tax liability depends both on tax transfer prices and on purely domestic tax planning efforts. Conditioning managers’ compensation purely on pretax profits would then create a moral hazard problem whenever managers’ efforts on domestic tax planning are unobservable to the MNE; thus, compensation is likely to be conditioned on after-tax profits instead.

The early economic literature on transfer pricing (e.g. Elitzur and Mintz, 1996; Haufler and Schjelderup, 2000) assumed that firms were required to use the tax authorities’ tax transfer

price for their internal managerial purposes, as well as for determining taxable income – i.e. that p I ≡p T .6 πB =?1?(t +?)?(R (q )?p T q ) (6) In such circumstances, affiliate B’s profits will be:

Affiliate B will thus maximize its own profits by setting R ′(q )=p T ≠c , and so this will in

general lead to an inefficient outcome in which the MNE’s pretax profits are not maximized.

The more recent literature (e.g. Baldenius et al ., 2004; Choe and Hyde, 2005) has contemplated the possibility of “decoupling” – i.e. that the firm can set p I ≠p T , even while complying fully with the tax law requirement that its taxable income be determined using p T . An important insight of this literature is that, even when decoupling is possible, the tax transfer pricing regulations may, as a general matter, frustrate the MNE’s attempts to coordinate and incentivize the activities of its affiliates. To illustrate this point, suppose that the MNE chooses the same internal transfer price that is optimal in the absence of taxes (i.e. p I =c ), perhaps because (as discussed further below) there are costs or frictions associated with deviating from this internal price. Then, affiliate B’s profits are given by:

πB =R (q )?cq ?(t +?)(R (q )?p T q ) (7)

Affiliate B will thus maximize its own profits by setting: R ′(q )=c?p T (t+?)1?(t+?) (8)

This will typically result in an inefficient outcome in which the MNE’s pretax worldwide profits are not maximized. It is important to note that this inefficiency is specifically attributable to the tax authorities’ transfer pricing regulations. In the case where the MNE can costlessly set any internal transfer price it wishes, Baldenius et al . (2004) show that the MNE can choose an internal transfer price that will offset the distortion created by the tax authorities’ tax transfer 6 A possible rationale is that keeping two sets of books for managerial accounting and tax purposes entails extra costs. Moreover, it is possible that if a firm’s managerial accounts deviate from the transfer prices it uses for tax purposes, the tax authorities may view this with concern, or use this as evidence of tax avoidance.

price.7 However, the conditions required for this result may not be entirely realistic, as the authors acknowledge.8

To illustrate the foregoing arguments more concretely, suppose that affiliate A produces 1 unit of the intermediate good at a cost of $100, and transfers it to affiliate B, which sells the good to an external party for $150. In a world without taxes, the MNE would set p I=c=$100, and the profits of affiliate A would be zero. Now, suppose that country A imposes a 10% tax and country B a 20% tax. The tax authorities determine using the ALP that a comparable arm’s-length transaction between unrelated entities would be priced at $110 (i.e. p T=$110). If the MNE maintains the original internal transfer price of $100, the book profits of affiliate A will now be -$1 (i.e. p I?c? (10% of the $10 taxable income that the tax authorities impute to affiliate A)). This decrease in after-tax book profits is likely to result in reduced compensation for A’s managers, and more broadly a reduced allocation of resources to affiliate A. If the MNE can costlessly choose p I, then it can counteract this distortion by setting p I=$101. Then, affiliate A’s profits (p I?c?$1) will return to zero, and resource allocation to affiliate A will not be distorted.

However, this new higher p I will adversely affect the compensation of affiliate B’s managers, relative to the natural benchmark p I=c that is based on economic fundamentals. They can thus be expected to resist this approach. More generally, the adjustment of internal transfer prices to counteract distortions created by tax transfer pricing regulations is likely to encounter various frictions, including the resistance of those managers who would lose from such adjustment. Of course, the fact that the MNE’s worldwide profits are higher under the adjusted internal transfer price suggests that the MNE could potentially arrange side-payments to losing managers. However, there are likely to be barriers to such arrangements. For instance, a manager’s prospects on the outside managerial labor market may depend on her division’s performance, and any side-payments received may be unobservable to outsiders.

7 More precisely, using our notation, Baldenius et al. (2004, Proposition 1) show that setting: p

I=(1?t)c+tp T will result in the maximization of the MNE’s worldwide profits.

8 Indeed, the primary focus of the Baldenius et al. (2004) analysis is ultimately not on the decoupling case, but on the case where the firm is constrained to choose one transfer price for both managerial and tax purposes. In this context, they derive the result that the optimal (single) transfer price is a weighted average of the pretax marginal cost and the most favorable price from the firm’s perspective that is permitted under the ALP.

These considerations suggest that the most relevant scenario may be one in which it is costly for the MNE to move p I away from c. As an extreme example of this, consider the

example above where the MNE is constrained to set p I=c. The literature in accounting and economics has primarily been firm-centered, in that it has focused on firms’ optimal responses to tax transfer pricing regulations that are exogenously imposed on them. The question of the optimal transfer pricing policy from the government’s perspective has not been addressed. This question, of course, is of central interest to scholars of tax policy, and it so happens that the framework sketched above can be used to address this issue. Specifically, how should tax authorities choose p T in order to maximize global welfare? In this simple setting, global welfare can be defined as the sum of the MNE’s after-tax worldwide profits and the tax revenues of countries A and B. Thus, global welfare is simply equal to the pretax profits of the MNE – i.e.

R(q) – cq, and the maximization of global welfare entails simply that: R′(q)=c.

Equation (8) characterizes affiliate B’s after-tax profits when the MNE is constrained to set p I=c. The problem of maximizing global welfare entails that the tax authorities choose p T such that affiliate B’s managers’ incentives when choosing q are aligned with the maximization of global welfare. If the tax authorities set p T=c, then affiliate B’s profits are:

πB=R(q)?cq?(t+?)(R(q)?cq)=?1?(t+?)?(R(q)?cq) (9) The managers of affiliate B will thus choose q such that R′(q)=c: i.e. such that the pretax worldwide profits of the MNE are maximized and such that global welfare (the after-tax worldwide profits of the MNE and all governments’ tax revenue) is maximized. In this simple setting, a policy of p T=c implements the PRP. As discussed below, the PRP does not necessarily imply marginal cost pricing in more general settings; however, it always entails setting p T equal to the p I that would be chosen by the firm on the basis of economic fundamentals. Note also that the government here is assumed to be able to observe c; the consequences of relaxing this assumption are discussed below.

To summarize, the use of arbitrary tax transfer prices potentially creates distortions to resource allocation within MNEs by changing the after-tax cash flows of each affiliate. This is the distinctive inefficiency associated with transfer pricing regulations. The tax authorities can eliminate these inefficiencies – and thereby maximize global welfare, holding everything else

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系列服务器windows操作系统安装步骤

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驱动程序详解及安装方法

驱动程序详解及安装方法想要熟知驱动安装方法首先要了解电脑硬件大概信息，了解了硬件信息安装就比较简单了，下面笔者为大家详解，首先我们了解驱动为何物。一、什么是驱动程序根据百度百科：驱动程序，英文名为Device Driver，全称为设备驱动程序，是一种可以使计算机和设备通信的特殊程序，可以说相当于硬件的接口，操作系统只有通过这个接口，才能控制硬件设备的工作，假如某设备的驱动程序未能正确安装，便不能正常工作。因此，驱动程序被誉为硬件的灵魂、硬件的主宰、和硬件和系统之间的桥梁等。刚安装好的系统操作系统，很可能驱动程序安装得不完整。硬件越新，这种可能性越大。菜菜熊之前看到的图标很大且颜色难看就是没有安装好驱动的原因。二、驱动程序的作用随着电子技术的飞速发展，电脑硬件的性能越来越强大。驱动程序是直接工作在各种硬件设备上的软件，其驱动这个名称也十分形象的指明了它的功能。正是通过驱动程序，各种硬件设备才能正常运行，达到既定的工作效果。

硬件如果缺少了驱动程序的驱动，那么本来性能非常强大的硬件就无法根据软件发出的指令进行工作，硬件就是空有一身本领都无从发挥，毫无用武之地。这时候，电脑就正如古人所说的万事俱备，只欠东风，这东风的角色就落在了驱动程序身上。如此看来，驱动程序在电脑使用上还真起着举足轻重的作用。从理论上讲，所有的硬件设备都需要安装相应的驱动程序才能正常工作。但像CPU、内存、主板、软驱、键盘、显示器等设备却并不需要安装驱动程序也可以正常工作，而显卡、声卡、网卡等却一定要安装驱动程序，否则便无法正常工作。这是为什么呢？这主要是由于这些硬件对于一台个人电脑来说是必需的，所以早期的设计人员将这些硬件列为BIOS能直接支持的硬件。换句话说，上述硬件安装后就可以被BIOS和操作系统直接支持，不再需要安装驱动程序。从这个角度来说，BIOS也是一种驱动程序。但是对于其他的硬件，例如：网卡，声卡，显卡等等却必须要安装驱动程序，不然这些硬件就无法正常工作。三、驱动程序的界定驱动程序可以界定为官方正式版、微软WHQL认证版、第三方驱动、发烧友修改版、Beta测试版。初学者尽量安装官方正式版，当然如果你脱离了菜鸟就可以尝试下各种版本的驱动。动手安装驱动程序之前，必须先搞清楚，哪些硬件是需要安装驱动程序的，哪些是不需要的。根据前面的介绍，CPU、内存、软驱、键盘、显示器等一般都

Windows7安装方法有多少种

Windows7安装方法有多少种 Windows7安装方法可分为：光盘安装法、模拟光驱安装法、硬盘安装法、优盘安装法、软件引导安装法、VHD安装法等。以下是的Windows7安装方法，希望大家认真阅读! 一、光盘安装Windows7法：简述：光盘安装法可以算是最经典、兼容性最好、最简单易学的安装方法了。可升级安装，也可全新安装(安装时可选择格式化旧系统分区)，安装方式灵活。不受旧系统限制，可灵活安装Windows7的32/64位系统。而且，现在有个软件，让你可以把你的Windows7光盘变成任意一种版本，可以随便切换喔，具体的参看Windows7之家文章：《想装啥版装啥版：Windows7安装光盘版本转换软件》方法： 1、下载相关系统安装盘的ISO文件，刻盘备用。(有光盘可省略此步骤) 2、开机进BIOS(一般硬件自检时按DEL或F2或F1键进，不同电脑设定不同)，设定为光驱优先启动。按F10保存退出。 3、放进光盘，重启电脑，光盘引导进入安装界面。按相应选项进行安装。选择安装硬盘分区位置时，可选择空白分区或已有分区，并可以对分区进行格式化。其他不再详述。缺点：在WIN7测试版本满天飞的情况下，这种刻盘安装无疑是最奢侈、最浪费、最不环保的方法了。只有在不具备或不能胜任其他安装方法的情况下才建议使用。

二、模拟光驱/虚拟光驱安装Windows7法： (特定情况下可能安装不能成功) 简述：模拟光驱(或称为虚拟光驱)安装法安装最简单，安装速度快，但限制较多，推荐用于多系统的安装。方法：在现有系统下用模拟光驱程序加载系统ISO文件，运行模拟光驱的安装程序，进入安装界面，升级安装时C盘要留有足够的空间。多系统安装最好把新系统安装到新的空白分区。缺点： 1、由于安装时无法对现有系统盘进行格式化，所以无法实现单系统干净安装。因旧系统文件占用空间，也比较浪费磁盘空间。要有旧的操用系统。 2、因无法格式化旧系统分区，残留的病毒文件可能危害新系统的安全性。 3、旧32位系统无法安装64位系统，旧64位系统无法安装32位系统。三、Windows7硬盘安装法： (特定情况下可能安装不能成功) 硬盘安装法可分两种： 1、最简单的硬盘安装法：把系统ISO文件解压到其他分区，运行解压目录下的SETUP.EXE文件，按相应步骤进行，不再详述。此方法限制与缺点同模拟光驱安装法。同样不能格式化旧系统及32/64位不同系统不能混装。推荐用于多系统的安装。

如何在windows7下安装hp1020打印机驱动程序

在 Windows 7 下安装 HP1020 打印机驱动程序方法注意事项: 电脑上曾经安装过HPLaserJet 激光打印机的驱动程序，重新安装驱动程序之前，需要先删除以前安装的驱动程序，否则可能会出现无法找到设备或者安装不上驱动程序的现象。一、Windows 7 下手动删除驱动程序的方法。安装网站下载的即插即用驱动程序前，建议先手动删除打印机驱动程序，然后再安装驱动程序。适用机型 HP LaserJet 1018、HP LaserJet 1020、HP LaserJet 1022、HP LaserJet P1505、HP LaserJet P1007、HP LaserJet P1008。操作方法：依次点击“开始（）”→“控制面板”，在“控制面板”窗口中，点击“设备和打印机”选项。注:本文以HP LaserJet 1020 激光打印机的操作方法为例，其他型号打印机的操作方法也可以以此作为参考。

在“设备和打印机”窗口中，右键点击“HP LaserJet 1020”图标，选择“删除设备”菜单项。如图 1 删除设备所示：图1: 删除设备在“删除设备”窗口中，点击“是”按钮。如图 2 确认删除设备所示：图2: 确认删除设备

必须断开USB 连接线，重新启动电脑。重新启动电脑后不要进行任何打印操作。在“设备和打印机”窗口中，点击“Microsoft XPS DocumentWriter”打印机图标，选择“打印服务器属性”菜单。如图 3 打印服务器属性所示：图3: 打印服务器属性在“打印服务器属性”窗口中，点击“驱动程序”选项卡，选择“HP LaserJet 1020”打印机型号，然后点击“删除”按钮。如图 4 属性所示：

抗疟药

原发性红细胞外期：在蚊子叮咬人体时，疟原虫孢子进入人体并侵入肝细胞进行发育繁殖，然后从肝细胞释放，进入红细胞，此时无症状，为疟疾的潜伏期。疟原虫感染红细胞时期称红细胞内期，此时疟原虫产生的代谢产物和红细胞碎片刺激机体，引起寒战、高热、出汗等疟疾的临床症状。继发性红细胞外期：肝细胞中部分处于休眠状态疟原虫是疟疾复发的根源。抗疟药分为3类：（1）控制疟疾症状：氯喹、奎宁、甲氟喹、青蒿素、咯萘啶、本芴醇（2）控制疟疾复发和传播：伯氨喹（3）疟疾预防：乙胺嘧啶、磺胺类。一、控制疟疾症状主要杀灭红细胞内期疟原虫氯喹药理作用：杀灭红细胞内期的间日疟、三日疟以及敏感的恶性疟原虫，迅速控制疟原虫症状的发作，对恶性疟有根治作用，是控制疟疾症状的首选药物。特点：起效快、疗效高、作用持久。对红细胞外期无效，不能用作病因性预防和良性疟的根治。

作用机制：干扰疟原虫体内代谢产物的处理，导致虫体溶解；使疟原虫分解和利用血红蛋白的能力降低，引起氨基酸缺乏而抑制疟原虫的生长繁殖。氯喹临床应用（1）控制疟疾的急性发作和根治恶性疟，是治疗疟疾的首选药物；（2）治疗肠外阿米巴病可用于甲硝唑治疗无效或禁忌的阿米巴肝炎或肝脓肿。（3）免疫抑制治疗类风湿性关节炎、系统性红斑狼疮等。氯喹不良反应头晕、头痛、胃肠不适、皮疹，眼耳毒性、心血管反应、白细胞减少、肝脏、肾脏损害。心肌损害，有致畸作用，孕妇禁用。青蒿素及其衍生物药理作用产生自由基，破坏疟原虫的生物膜、蛋白质等，使之死亡。对红细胞内期原虫有效，对间日疟和恶性疟，包括耐氯喹虫株有强大而快速的杀灭作用，但对红外期疟原虫无效。主要用于控制症状。青蒿素临床应用控制间日疟和恶性疟的症状治疗耐氯喹虫株，

如何手动安装驱动

如何手动安装驱动？作者：Alright 编辑：Alright2010-01-11 10:27:59 13827 人阅读把所有要安装的驱动程序都准备好后，我们就可以开始安装驱动程序了。驱动程序的安装方法也有很多种，下面就从易到难慢慢来看看。 1.安装傻瓜化——双击安装现在硬件厂商已经越来越注重其产品的人性化，其中就包括将驱动程序的安装尽量简单化，所以很多驱动程序里都带有一个“Setup.exe”可执行文件，只要双击它，然后一路“Next（下一步）”就可以完成驱动程序的安装。有些硬件厂商提供的驱动程序光盘中加入了Autorun 自启动文件，只要将光盘放入到电脑的光驱中，光盘便会自动启动。然后在启动界面中单击相应的驱动程序名称就可以自动开始安装过程，这种十分人性化的设计使安装驱动程序非常的方便。 2.从设备管理器里自己指定安装如果驱动程序文件里没有Autorun自启动也没有有“Setup.exe”安装可执行文件怎么办？这时

我们就要自己指定驱动程序文件，手动安装了。我们可以从设备管理器中来自己指定驱动程序的位置，然后进行安装。当然这个方法要事先准备好所要安装的驱动程序，该方法还适用于更新新版本的驱动程序。首先从控制面板进入“系统属性”，然后依次点击“硬件”——“设备管理器”。如图，网卡是没有安装驱动程序的设备，其前面会有感叹号“！”标示。右键点击该设备，然后选择“更新驱动程序”。

接着就会弹出一个“硬件更新向导”，我们既然知道了它是属于什么型号的设备，而且还有它的驱动程序，选择“从列表或指定位置安装”。

如果驱动程序在光盘或软盘里，在接着在弹出的窗口里把“搜索可移动媒体”勾上就行，如果在硬盘里，则把“在搜索中包括这个位置”前面的复选框勾上，然后点“浏览”。接着找到咱们准备好的驱动程序文件夹，要注意的是很多硬件厂商会把其生产的很多类型的硬件设备驱动都压制在一张盘中，而且还会有不同的操作系统版本，如For Win2K（Win2000）和For WinXP的，要注意选择正确的设备和操作系统版本。点“确定”之后，点击“下一步”就行了。

中药药理试题

1、较长时间用药可引起血小板减少症的药物是 A、穿琥宁注射液? B、生天南星? C、蟾酥? D、关木通? E、鸦胆子? 2、“四气”不包括 A、寒? B、凉? C、温? D、热? E、平? 3、以下药物具有致癌作用的是 A、甘草? B、黄芩? C、山豆根? D、雷公藤? E、川楝子? 4、以下哪项是酸味药的主要药理作用 A、抗肿瘤? B、解热? C、发汗? D、利胆? E、保护创面? 5、以下不属于妊娠禁忌药物的是 A、附子? B、肉桂? C、黄芩? D、桃仁? E、大黄? 6、以下哪项是相畏配伍的目的 A、协同作用? B、减少个体差异? C、更易吸收? D、加速分布? E、减少毒性? 7、苦味药抗菌、抗炎、解热的主要成分是 A、生物碱? B、黄酮? C、苷类? D、挥发油? E、有机酸? 二、B 1、A.单行、相使B.单行、相反C.相恶、相反D.相须、相使E.相畏、相杀 <1>?、起增强疗效作用的配伍是 <2>?、起降低毒性或消除毒性作用的配伍是 1、解表药的主要药理作用，下列表述有误的是 A、固表止汗作用? B、解热作用? C、抗病原微生物作用? D、镇痛、镇静作用? E、抗炎和调节免疫作用? 2、下列药物解热作用最显着的是 A、柴胡? B、紫苏? C、防风? D、葛根? E、桂枝? 3、以下药物发汗作用机制是通过抑制汗腺导管对钠离子重吸收而产生的是 A、荆芥? B、防风? C、麻黄? D、桂枝? E、生姜? 4、以下哪项是麻黄平喘的有效成分 A、桂皮油? B、小檗碱? C、绿原酸? D、麻黄碱? E、皂苷类? 5、以下哪项是桂枝的现代应用 A、支气管哮喘? B、病毒性肝炎? C、偏头痛? D、突发性耳聋? E、低血压症? 6、以下哪种药物治疗突发性耳聋 A、柴胡? B、葛根? C、细辛? D、麻黄? E、桂枝? 7、细辛的药理作用不包括的是 A、保肝? B、平喘? C、镇静? D、解热? E、镇痛? 8、以下具有保肝利胆作用的药物是 A、柴胡? B、细辛? C、葛根? D、麻黄? E、桂枝? 9、以下哪项是柴胡影响脂质代谢的主要成分 A、柴胡挥发油? B、柴胡皂苷? C、柴胡多糖? D、苷类? E、黄酮类成分? 10、以下哪项不属于麻黄的主治范围 A、支气管哮喘? B、低血压? C、感冒? D、白细胞减少症? E、鼻塞? 11、柴胡的现代应用不包括

电脑驱动程序安装顺序

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北京中医药大学远程教育《中药化学B》作业5答案

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