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国际清算银行20120920报告

Michael Brei michael.brei@u-paris10.fr

Blaise Gadanecz blaise.gadanecz@https://www.wendangku.net/doc/c617798581.html,

Have public bailouts made banks’ loan books safer?1

In response to the financial crisis, the authorities in a number of countries used public funds to recapitalise their banks. Did a reduction of risk in banks’ lending follow these rescue operations? To help answer this question, we analyse the balance sheets and syndicated loan signings of 87 large internationally active banks. As loan signing volumes started diminishing across the board in 2009, our evidence shows that rescued banks did not reduce the risk of their new lending significantly more than non-rescued banks. Our results are relevant for the ongoing assessment of public bank rescue programmes.

JEL classification: G15, G21, G32, E51.

As the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers dramatically shook financial markets and investor confidence in September 2008, authorities around the globe announced bank rescue packages. The aim of these measures was to ensure the solvency of systemically important financial institutions and to restore confidence in the financial system. Bank recapitalisations using public funds in the G10 countries totalled close to $500 billion during the period 2007–10 (Brei et al (2011)). The appropriateness and effects of these programmes are still under assessment.2 In this special feature we examine whether the rescue operations were followed by a greater reduction of risk in new loans made by rescued banks compared to those that were not rescued. Have bank rescues helped make institutions with risky lending activities safer, as one might expect?

To address these questions, we focus on the market for syndicated loans, where a group of banks jointly extends credit to a single borrower. In particular, we examine the balance sheets and syndicated loan signings of 87 large internationally active banks from industrial economies, approximately half of which received public financial support during the crisis. With close to $7 trillion

1The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the BIS. We would like to thank Claudio Borio, Stephen Cecchetti, Peter H?rdahl and Kostas Tsatsaronis for valuable comments and suggestions, as well as Serge Grouchko, Gabriele Gasperini and Bat-el Berger for able research assistance. We gratefully acknowledge the information-gathering exercise on bank rescue operations, carried out using publicly available sources by Corrinne Ho, Arsim Arslani, Giulia Felber, Elias Hafner, Nicole Hasler and Reto Hausmann.

2See, for instance, Black and Hazelwood (2012) or Diamond and Rajan (2011).

of new facilities signed in 2007, syndicated lending has been one of the largest sources of corporate funding. Syndicated loans also form a significant component of banks’ total portfolio of commercial and industrial loans.3 Importantly, the available information on individual borrowers (like sector or nationality) and loan transaction terms (such as spreads, maturities or guarantees) makes the syndicated loan market a good laboratory for analysing bank risk.

We find no evidence that rescued banks reduced the riskiness of their new lending more than non-rescued banks in response to the crisis and the public rescues. Even as lending volumes decreased across the board in 2009, rescued banks continued to write riskier syndicated loans, as reflected by their involvement in the leveraged loan segment and in the spreads charged on the facilities that they originated. We also find, unsurprisingly, that the syndicated lending of banks that later received a bailout was riskier before the crisis than that of non-rescued institutions.

In the remainder of this article, we first outline the main questions, referring to some of the relevant literature. Thereafter we explain the data sample and methodology. In the analysis that follows we first look at whether the riskiness of banks’ syndicated loan signings carries information content for the subsequent bailouts. We then move on to the key question of this research and explore whether and to what extent rescued banks cut the riskiness of their new loans in response to the crisis and the bailouts. The final section concludes.

Public support, incentives and risk: the main questions

Between early 2007 and early 2009, the banking sectors of a number of major industrial countries moved from being highly profitable into deep crisis. Many banks lost up to two thirds of their stock market values. Authorities responded by conducting outsize rescue operations in the form of extended deposit insurance, guarantees of newly issued bank debt, capital injections, asset insurance and asset purchases.4 In this article we focus on bailouts in the form of recapitalisations5 using public funds and directed at individual banks by their home authorities.

The expectation of state support may give rise to moral hazard and lead banks to engage in higher risk-taking. Distortions often accompany bank rescues (Diamond and Rajan (2009, 2011), Farhi and Tirole (2012)). However, some might argue that in times of crisis, the objective of recapitalisations and other forms of public support is at least partly to prevent banks from cutting

3The market is representative in the sense that during 2000–10, the syndicated loan exposure of the banks that we analyse represented up to 18% of their total loans outstanding. For an overall description of the structure and behaviour of the international syndicated loan market, see Gadanecz (2004). For an analysis of its collapse during the crisis, see Chui et al (2010). 4King (2009) gives an overview of announced packages, with further detail and analysis provided in Panetta et al (2009), Petrovic and Tutsch (2009), Borio et al (2010), Brei et al (2011) and Brei and Gadanecz (2012).

5Involving preferred shares, warrants, mandatory convertible notes, core Tier 1 capital or debt swaps. Expected public support can distort banks’ risk-taking incentives …

back on risk-taking too much, so as to avoid a major credit crunch. Thus, state intervention in times of stress needs to strike a balance between, on the one hand, limiting the adverse impact on the real economy and, on the other, containing moral hazard (Borio et al (2010)).6 Bearing this in mind, public recapitalisations, once they have occurred, can help make banks safer. When

banks receive a bailout, the public sector’s involvement in the banking sector

increases, and so should its power to curb the riskiness of banking activities.

Actual recapitalisations may also strengthen banks’ monitoring incentives and

reduce moral hazard by putting at risk more equity, from a broader array of

sources (Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Hellmann et al (2000), Mehran and

Thakor (2011)). Lastly, policy interventions tend to be associated with higher

regulatory supervision (Berger et al (2012)).

Public rescue operations and sample characteristics

We analyse if the public rescue measures granted to banks in 14 major economies (the G10 countries plus Austria, Australia and Spain) were

associated with a decrease in the riskiness of the new syndicated loan signings

by these banks. We use as a control sample a set of large systemically

important institutions that did not receive public support (see box for a

description of the data set). After controlling for mergers, acquisitions and

missing data, our final sample comprises 87 bank holding companies. These

institutions cover $54 trillion of bank assets, which correspond to 52% of

worldwide banking assets reported in The Banker at end-2010. Of these banks,

40 institutions (corresponding to 56% of the sample’s total assets) became

subject to a public recapitalisation programme between Q3 2008 and Q2 2010.

6 Penalising shareholders and managers, as well as imposing strict conditions and restrictions

in exchange for support, are mechanisms that can help achieve the second objective.

… but actual

rescues can make

them safer

Large public

rescues occurred in

2008 and 2009

The data set

Information on bank rescue measures, comprising 14 jurisdictions (the G10 countries plus Austria, Australia and Spain) was collected from publicly available sources① between October 2008 and September 2010. We augmented the set of rescued banks with a control sample of large systemically important banks which did not receive a public rescue. We combined this information with two data sets. First, we took annual consolidated bank financial statements from Bankscope and adjusted them for mergers and large acquisitions.② Second, we extracted individual syndicated loan transactions from Dealogic Loan Analytics. That database provides information on syndicated loan facilities, such as loan size, terms, leverage and type, as well as on a number of borrower characteristics including nationality, sector and credit rating. Information is also available on the identity of the banks that participated in the syndications (allowing the merging with the Bankscope data), as well as the amounts that they committed (making it possible to calculate individual “portfolios” of syndicated loan signings for each bank for each year). Roughly 84,000 loans were recorded in the database for the period 2000–10 for our sample of banks, each comprising on average eight individual participating banks.③

Matching of these information sets allows us to compute the average characteristics of the new loans written in a given year by a particular bank, for instance the average pricing of these exposures. Furthermore, the behaviour of banks with different characteristics (eg those which received a public recapitalisation versus those which did not) can be compared to detect different patterns in investment decisions.

__________________________________

① Eg news reports, official websites of national authorities, banks’ media releases and investor relations materials. ② Following Brei et al (2011), the decision to work with consolidated statements reflects the fact that these banks operate on a consolidated worldwide basis and, importantly, that the public recapitalisations occurred at the consolidated entity, rather than at the subsidiary, level. The statements are annual, because most banks did not report consistently at a quarterly frequency over the sample period 2000–10. To avoid discontinuities in the financial statements caused by large acquisitions, we constructed pro forma banks by aggregating the reported positions of the acquiring and acquired banks prior to the takeover. ③Where banks’ exact participation shares were not available in Dealogic Loan Analytics, we assigned equal shares of any unallocated loan amounts, in line with the literature.

As shown in Graph 1, these recapitalisations totalled close to $350 billion

between 2008 and 2010. Most of the funds were injected in Q4 2008 and

Q1 2009, primarily in the United States (with the TARP), as well as in France,

Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Banks had repaid about

50% of the capital injections by September 2010 (mainly in France and the

US).

Syndicated lending makes up a significant part of banking activities for all

banks in our sample. Although there are national differences,7 on average

signings of such loans accounted for 18% of banks’ total loans during 2000–10.

Banks that received a rescue differed in a number of ways from those that

did not. Both before and during the crisis, rescued banks were larger as a

group than non-rescued ones, as measured by their total assets (Table 1). The

business models8 also seem to differ. Before the crisis, rescued banks had a

lower average loan-to-asset ratio than non-rescued banks (46% versus 49%,

7Relative to total loans outstanding, syndicated loan issues have been most significant for banks headquartered in the US (38% of their total loans), France (26%), Switzerland and

Canada (24% in each case). Least involved have been Austrian, Belgian, Italian, Spanish and

Swedish banks (below 10% of their total loans in each case).

8Altunba? et al (2011) feature an empirical analysis of bank risk and business models, together with a literature review.

Rescued and non-rescued banks: overview 1 Rescued Non-rescued Number of banks 40 40 47 47 Bank characteristics (year-end, USD trn) 2007 2010 2007 2010 Assets 31.29 30.38 21.82 24.01 Deposits 11.62 11.81 9.54 11.29 Loans 13.57 13.48 10.00 11.34 Syndicated loan signings 4.57 2.11 2.35 1.76 Net income 0.15 0.11 0.14 0.12 Balance sheet ratios (period averages, %) Pre-crisis 2 Δ crisis Pre-crisis Δ crisis Total loans relative to total assets 45.6 –1.8 48.6 –1.3 Total deposits relative to total assets 39.6 –1.9 46.7 –1.8 Profitability (ROE) 12.4 –14.6*** 9.8 –2.9*** Impaired loans over total lending 2.0 2.3*** 2.8 –0.5* 1 The sample period is 2000–10 and includes 87 banks and 927 observations. “Rescued” denotes banks which received a public recapitalisation during 2008–10, while “non-rescued” indicates banks which did not receive such support. 2 “Pre-crisis” = 2000–07. “Δ crisis” is the value during the crisis (2008–10) minus the pre-crisis value (2000–07). ***, ** and * indicate that the differences are significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, based on a weighted t-test. Sources: Bankscope; Dealogic; authors’ calculations. Table 1 respectively). That could indicate that they may have been holding more securities or securitised more of their customer loans (Altunba? et al (2009)). On the liability side, rescued banks relied to a greater extent on non-deposit funding (by 7% of assets pre-crisis), a possible source of vulnerability to a freeze of wholesale funding markets (Huang and Ratnovski (2011)). The crisis severely dented the profitability of both rescued and non-rescued banks. Not surprisingly, the financial crisis hit rescued banks most. Their profitability (gauged by ROE) plunged during the crisis (from 12% to –2%), while it fell less abruptly in the case of non-rescued banks (from 10% to 7%). Likewise, rescued banks’ ratio of impaired to total loans jumped more sharply during the crisis (either because they were facing more impaired loans or because the rescues were associated with higher recognition of such loans). Have bailouts been associated with riskier loan signings before the crisis? Several risk indicators consistently show higher risk in the flow of syndicated loans written before the crisis by banks that later received a rescue, relative to non-rescued banks. Of particular relevance are signings of leveraged

loans 9 as a share of total syndicated lending, the Libor spreads on the loan

9 We divide loans into two categories: leveraged and non-leveraged. We rely on the definition of

Dealogic Loan Analytics for leveraged loans, which is based on borrower financial leverage,

loan spreads, borrower ratings and loan purpose (especially leveraged buyouts). For the

purposes of this special feature we also include in the leveraged category those facilities

Rescued banks

participated in

riskier loans before

the crisis

signings and the average rating changes of borrowers after the loans were signed (see Graph 2 and the “Pre-crisis” columns of Table 2).

Before the crisis, banks that later received a rescue wrote more leveraged loans as a share of their total syndicated lending (39%) than their non-rescued peers (33%). Moreover, average Libor spreads (weighted by participation amounts) on rescued banks’ new loan signings were significantly higher compared to non-rescued banks’ (149 versus 127 basis points). And the average maturity of rescued banks’ loans was higher than that of non-rescued banks. In addition, borrowers who had been granted syndicated loans by rescued banks were subsequently downgraded to a greater extent than borrowers who had received loans from non-rescued institutions.

identified by Dealogic as “highly leveraged”. Dealogic ceased to distinguish between highly leveraged and leveraged for loans signed after 2008, and since then have reported only leveraged versus non-leveraged status. Every loan is classified according to the definition which was valid when it was signed. It is not possible to reclassify earlier loans when the definition changes.

Syndicated lending of rescued versus non-rescued banks 1 Rescued Non-rescued Rescued minus non-rescued Pre-crisis Δ crisis Pre-crisis Δ crisis Pre-crisis During crisis Δ crisis Syndicated loan signings relative to total assets (%) 12.1 –4.9*** 8.1 –1.6*** 4.0*** 0.7 –3.3*** Share of leveraged loans in new signings (%) 38.5 3.3** 32.5 –7.7*** 6.0*** 17.0*** 11.0* Average Libor spread on new signings (bp) 148.8 23.1*** 126.7 –36.4*** 22.1*** 81.6*** 59.5*** Average rating change 2 (notches) –0.8 0.4*** –0.7 0.3*** –0.1** 0.0 0.1 Average maturity of new signings (years) 4.5 1.2*** 4.3 –0.2 0.2** 1.6** 1.4 Average pricing error 3 on new signings (bp) –2.5 1.1 0.5 –5.6** –3.0** 3.6 6.7 1 See Table 1, footnotes 1 and 2. Averages are weighted either by total assets or syndicated loan participations. “During crisis” = 2008–10. 2 See Graph 2, footnote 4. 3 See Graph 2, footnote 5. Sources : Bankscope; Dealogic; authors’ calculations. Table 2 These results suggest that rescued banks may have had a more relaxed attitude towards risk before the crisis. As such, engaging in riskier loans is not necessarily undesirable if the corresponding price (Libor spread) is appropriate, or if the bank manages them well (better than other banks). To interpret the findings further, we look at the “pricing error” on the loan signings relative to a benchmark. Following Carey and Nini (2007) and Gadanecz et al (2008), we calculate these errors by taking the difference between the observed syndicated loan spread over Libor, and the spread predicted by a regression incorporating observable loan features (size, maturity, guarantees, collateral, facility purpose and type), borrower characteristics (sector, rating, first-time borrower) and the state of the market (total volumes, level of interest rates). We calculate the resulting score for every year on every bank’s signings (weighted by participation amounts). Negative (positive) pricing errors suggest that banks “underprice” (“overprice”) risk according to this model. It is interesting to note that before the crisis, rescued institutions had been participating in facilities that were systematically more underpriced (in the sense of being below a benchmark predicted by observable risk factors) than those of non-rescued banks. We surmise that they may not have been properly compensated for the higher risk they took on, adding to their vulnerability when the crisis hit. Market and accounting measures did not pick up the difference in riskiness. Indeed, CDS spreads and EDF measures did not appear higher for rescued banks than for non-rescued banks before the crisis (Graph 3). Given

that both rescued and non-rescued banks in our sample are systemically

important, it is hard to conclude that any differences in these market and

accounting measures are due to differential expectations of bailouts, consistent

with broader evidence that such indicators tend to act more like

Their loans have

been underpriced

Differences in risk

were not apparent

in market-based

measures

contemporaneous than leading indicators of financial distress (Borio and

Drehmann (2009)). And non-performing loan ratios were higher before the

crisis for non-rescued banks, which may have been more diligent in

recognising them than their rescued peers, although this is also influenced by

accounting standards.

All in all, signs of higher risk before the crisis in rescued banks’ syndicated

loan signings suggest that such risk measures carry information about the

subsequent incidence of public rescues.10 Having established this, in the next

section we use the risk measures derived from the syndicated loan market to

test whether rescued banks reduced the risk of their new loans relatively more

than their non-rescued peers in response to the crisis.

Did rescued banks cut the riskiness of their loan signings more

than non-rescued banks in response to the crisis?

In this section we compare changes in the riskiness of loan signings of rescued

and non-rescued banks in response to the crisis. We calculate the

corresponding changes in the risk proxies discussed above with respect to new

loan signings. We test the statistical significance of the difference between the

crisis and pre-crisis values, comparing the crisis responses across rescued and

non-rescued institutions.

During the crisis, rescued banks did not reduce the riskiness of their new

syndicated lending compared to their non-rescued peers. In fact, our results

suggest that the relative riskiness of their lending increased. This is apparent

when comparing how the two types of institutions changed their participation in

leveraged facilities (relative to their total new signings), as well as the average

Libor spread on those signings and the corresponding average maturities. As

shown in the rightmost column of Table 2, for both loan leverage and spreads,

10 In Brei and Gadanecz (2012), we corroborate this finding econometrically by means of a logit

regression which explains the probability of receiving public financial support. That model

confirms that leveraged lending is a significant determinant of public rescues.

Measured by loan leverage, spreads and maturities …

the differences, calculated as rescued banks’ minus non-rescued banks’ crisis-related changes, are positive and statistically significant (11 percentage points and 60 basis points, respectively). The riskiness of non-rescued banks’ new syndicated lending diminished with the onset of the crisis. These institutions cut their participation in leveraged loans from 33% to 25% of their total new signings (change shown in the fourth column of Table 2, together with the crisis-related changes in their other loan risk proxies, all of them statistically significant with the exception of average maturities). Moreover, the average Libor spread on non-rescued banks’ new signings fell by 36 basis points. These findings are consistent with the collapse of the leveraged loan market during the crisis (Chui et al (2010)) and also with a move towards less risky lending. At the same time, rescued banks increased the riskiness of their new signings. They participated to a greater extent in leveraged loans (with the

share of such loans in their total new signings rising from 39% to 42%; we report this and other statistically significant different changes in the second column of Table 2). They also increased the average spread on their new signings by 23 basis points (while raising the average maturity). In response to the crisis and particularly during 2009–10, they aligned their pricing to better reflect the observed risk factors, although the increase is not statistically significant. Again, these findings point to a possibly more relaxed attitude of rescued banks towards risk.11

During the crisis, spreads on rescued banks’ domestic syndicated loan signings increased more strongly than those on their foreign exposures (Brei and Gadanecz (2012), Graphs 5a and 5b). That could be indicative of either higher risk, or higher margins exploiting a degree of imperfect competition or monopolistic power in home markets (Santos (2011)).

Concluding remarks

In this special feature, we examine whether large internationally active banks which received public rescue packages during 2008–10 reduced the riskiness of their syndicated lending during the crisis relatively more than non-rescued institutions. Our analysis shows that this is not the case. Specifically, rescued banks continued to add to the share of leveraged loans in their total signings. They also kept increasing the average maturity and Libor spreads of their new loans (which, however, remained underpriced with respect to a standard benchmark). Unsurprisingly, rescued banks were riskier than non-rescued ones along all these dimensions also prior to the crisis.

11 The causal relation between risk and bailouts may be that rescued banks wrote riskier

syndicated loans before the crisis than non-rescued ones, insofar as they were expecting to receive public financial support (the moral hazard argument). Conversely, riskier lending could have necessitated bailouts. The result that rescued banks did not reduce the riskiness of their syndicated loan signings in response to the crisis, at least not relatively more than non-rescued institutions, holds even when allowing for the possibility that bailouts are endogenously determined (see Brei and Gadanecz (2012) for a two-stage regression analysis of bank risk, using an instrumented public bailout variable).

… rescued banks

remained riskier

A limitation of the analysis is the focus on only one facet of the banking business: the international syndicated loan market. At the utmost, syndicated loan issuance accounts for 18% of the total loans of the banks in our sample and, as such, cannot characterise their overall behaviour. Furthermore, all our risk proxies pertain to new lending (a flow measure), which has an influence on, but cannot totally characterise, banks’ overall risk profile (a stock measure). However, we find that indicators extracted from syndicated lending do convey interesting risk information not contained in market-based proxies like CDS spreads or EDF measures, or balance sheet indicators such as non-performing loan ratios.

It is not surprising that rescued banks’ (syndicated) lending was riskier than that of non-rescued banks prior to the public recapitalisations. Indeed, it is consistent with the literature on the effect (actual or expected) of state support on bank risk. Rescued banks’ incentives to monitor risks might be distorted by the implicit bailout guarantee. It could also be that during the crisis rescued banks’ inefficiency in providing loans at competitive spreads was compounded by the higher funding costs that they were facing themselves. In any case, the absence of a reduction in the riskiness of rescued banks’ syndicated lending relative to non-rescued institutions warrants further cost-benefit analysis of the rescue operations.

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Santos, J A C (2011): “Bank corporate loan pricing following the subprime crisis”, Review of Financial Studies, vol 24, no 6.

欧洲清算系统介绍

欧元区支付结算系统字号大中小文章来源：国际司2008-03-20 17:19:00 打印本页关闭窗口欧元区的支付结算系统分为两类：一是大额支付结算系统。它主要包括泛欧自动实时全额结算快速转账（TARGET1）以及欧洲银行业协会（EBA2）的EURO1系统。此外，还有三家区域性的大额净额结算系统，分别是芬兰的POPS系统，西班牙的SPI系统，法国的巴黎净额结算系统（PNS）；二是跨境零售支付系统。欧元区的零售业务支付系统大都依赖于各成员国内的零售业务支付系统。涵盖整个欧元区并对所有银行开放的跨境零售业务支付系统为欧洲银行协会(EBA)的STEP3系统。在证券领域中，欧盟各国中央银行建立了中央银行结算代理模式（CCBM4）。在CCBM中，中央银行互为代理行，用于货币政策操作以及欧洲中央银行体系日间信贷的证券可以实现跨境转账。随着欧元证券跨境转让的需求不断上升，欧盟各国的证券结算系统（SSS5）也已实现相互连接，可用于证券跨境转账交易。一、欧元区支付结算制度概况（一）法律及监管框架欧共体条约和ESCB6法中有关对支付和清算系统的重要条款如下： 1、欧共体条约第105(2)条(其内容在ESCB法第3.1条中重申)，规定欧元体系7的一项基本任务就是努力维护支付系统的平稳运行； 2、ESCB法第22条，规定ECB8为确保欧共体内以及同其他国家之间清算和支付系统高效稳定的运行，ECB和NCB9负责提供相关的清算便利，而ECB负责制定法规。ECB的规章直接适用于所有采用欧元的欧共体成员国。 ECB法规有两类：第一类是针对除欧元体系中各国中央银行外的第三方的。这些法规包括ECB规章、决议、建议与意见；第二类为ECB内部法规，主要是ECB 的工作指南、指示以及内部决定。此外，欧共体条约也授予欧盟理事会和欧洲议会审定通过相关法律文件的权力。这些适用于所有成员国的法律包括与银行业相关的法规和有关金融服务的规定，因此它们也将影响到支付和证券结算系统的基本框架。影响支付和证券结算系统的主要法令和法规有：《关于结算最终性的指示》、《跨境贷记转账指示》、《电子货币指示》、《投资服务指示》和《跨境欧元支付指示》。（二）欧元体系根据ESCB法第22条的具体规定，欧元体系将着重于承担两方面的工作，对支付系统进行监督并同时提供支付服务。此外，欧元体系还促进支付体系领域里的变革。

银行账户年检工作总结教学教材

银行账户年检工作总结

银行账户年检工作总结关于基本存款账户年检的总结为了有效识别客户身份，保证存款人开户资料真实、完整，并为机构信用代码试点工作打好良好的基础，根据《关于在全省开展基本存款账户年检的通知》和省联社的文件精神，结合我县实际，在我社开展了单位基本存款账户的年检工作，并于12月20日前圆满完成了此项工作，现总结如下：一、加强领导，强化账户年检培训工作。我联社成立了以理事长为组长，分管财务副主任为副组长，财务核算部为成员的账户年检领导小组，办公室设财务核算部，财务部经理负责，主管全县的账户年检培训及协调工作，各网点账户专管员严格按照联社的工作方案执行账户年检工作。县联社财务部于×月×日邀请市人行中心支行会计科的专家就账户管理展开了专题培训，为了有效的督促基本存款账户年检及信用代码证试点工作按时完成，于×月×日对全县的账户管理员开展再培训及任务调度工作。二、抓紧落实，全面完成账户年检工作。通过清理，×年×月×日前在我联社辖内×个营业网点开户的基本存款账户有×户，经过一个月的不懈努力，对×个基本存款账户进行账户年检，对×个基本存款账户

设置了久悬，于×月×日全面完成了基本存款账户年检工作，并将已年检的基本存款账户资料进行整理装订成册。三、存在的问题及困难。通过对基本存款账户的年检，进一步识别了客户身份，确保了存款人开户资料的真实完整性，但实际中存在以下的问题： 1、单位法人变更频繁，账户变更不及时。通过年检发现，有部分村民小组和事业法人其单位负责人因各种原因变更较为频繁，但开户单位不及时提供变更资料，且预留印鉴不及时更换，造成法人变更而账户未能及时变更的现象。 2、事业法人单位对有效证件不重视造成有效证件失效。因我县各乡镇地处城乡结合处，分布较广，各乡镇事业法人对组织机构代码证和法人事业证书年检工作不够重视，造成部分有效证件因未年检而失效，还有一部分事业法人机构遗失有效证件而不补办造成账户不能及时年检。 3、企业单位解散不及时通知。部分企业单位因经营不善解散，尽管有小部分资金留存账户，但不通知开户银行。还有部分企业开户后就无资金往来，且联系不上经办人员，造成不能及时年检。 4、基本存款账户账号不能变更。自xx年账户管理系统上线以来，我信用社程序系统联网和升级后造成很多基

人民币银行结算账户自查报告

人民币银行结算账户自查报告根据县联社《关于开展人民币银行结算账户自查活动的通知》（农信联发（XX） 75号）文件精神，我社领导高度重视，及时组织我社员工进行学习，同时开展一次人民币银行结算账户自查活动，现在将自查情况汇报如下: 为确保此项工作有序开展，我社成立了人民币银行结算账户自查小组: 人民币银行结算账户自查情况: 一、银行结算账户的基本情况: ㈠、银行结算账户业务内控管理: 1、明确专人负责银行结算账户开立、使用和撤销的审查和管理；实行复核制度，防止银行结算账户业务处理“一手清”。 2s账户管理系统二级操作员与三级操作员分开，各司其职。 3s执行开销户登记制度；建立银行结算账户档案，并按规定由专人保管。 4、对银行结算账户实行年检，对未通过年检的账户按规定及时处理。 5s规定与存款人进行对账，执行记账与对账相分离制度。 6、印鉴卡的保管.使用.更换符合规定。㈡银行结算账户的开立、变更.撤销业务处理情况: ＞对存款人提交的中请书填写事项和证明文件的真实性.完整性1. 和合规性进行审查。 2、与存款人签订银行结算账户管理协议及补充协议，明确双方的权利与义务。

3、不存在未经人行核准，私自为存款人违规开立核准类账户（基木存款账户、临时存款账户.预算单位专用存款账户）的情况。 4.不存在为存款人违规开立备案类账户的情况。 5、为存款人开立一般存款账户、专用存款账户.临时存款账户按规定及时书而通知基本存款账户开户银行。 6、销户时有按规定收回未用的重要空口凭证及印鉴卡?等资料。㈢银行结算账户的使用情况: K单位银行结算账户不允许自开立之R起3个工作R内办理付款业务。 2s 一般存款账户没有办理现金支取。 3s专用存款账户按国家现金管理规定和账户使用规定支取现金。㈣账户实名制落实和公民身份信息联网核查工作情况按规定对银行结算账户业务涉及的相关个人身份信息进行联网核查。二、存在问题 Is对银行结算账户实行年检，但对未通过年检的账户按规定及时处理。 2s账户实名制落实和公民身份信息联网核查工作情况按规定对银行结算账户业务涉及的相关个人身份信息进行联网核查，但未对所有相关的业务相关个人身份信息进行联网核查。三.整改措施 1、尽快对未通过年检的银行结算账户实行年检，不能通过年检的账户按规定及时处理。

仓库组长岗位主要职责

仓库组长岗位主要职责仓库组长岗位主要职责:负责仓库所有事务及人员调动,主要工作是负责仓库的日常工作流程,包括原料的接收、原料的发放、成品入库、成品出货, 以及对车间生产需要的协调和对客户投诉问题的解决等.熟悉仓库流程，善于现场管理和人员沟通。能够合理分配人员的工作。主要职责是对仓库的规划。协调和调度仓管员工作,定期核对报表检查仓管员工作有无差错,定期培训仓库管理知识,安全知识，及时反馈仓库库存信息。负责不良品追踪及最终处理结果报告、生产加工领料单和成品出货单审核、ERP单据确认仓库组长： 1、仓库每日工作按排。 2、仓库工作筹划与进度控制，合理调配人力资源，对仓库现场各个工作的监控。 3、各部门的沟通与协调。 4、参与公司宏观管理和策略制定。 5、现场管理的督导、6S推行情况、目视化管理执行情况。 6、审订和修改仓库的工作操作流程和管理制度。 7、对下属员工进行业务技能培训和考核，提高员工素质和工作效率。 8、签发仓库各级文件和单据； 9、管理会议资料报告（主要提供物料呆滞库存）。 1. 负责仓库收发存的全面管理工作; 2. 仓库操作流程和作业指导书的制定和优化; 3. 仓库人员的培训、指导、优化和考核 ; 4. 循环盘点、月度盘点、年中盘点、年终盘点的统筹按排; 5. 提高和优化仓库空间的利用率和库存的周转率; 6. 与各部门之间的沟通及协调. 1、有较强的沟通协调能力，善于处理人际关系。 2、熟悉ISO9000-2001品质管制体系运作以及ISO14000环境管理系。 3、熟悉电脑操作，OFFICE办公软体，ERP系统。 4、负责货仓的整体规化，作业程序。 5、负责仓库管理盘点工作事项。 6、负责物料的先进先出管理以及仓库“5S”管理和产品的标识管理 7、负责仓库物料的进出管理，储存管理，账务管理，确保仓库账、卡、物一致。

账户年检自查报告

账户年检自查报告保安服务有限公司自查自检报告本年度，我公司在市局治安支队、分局治安大队的带领下，认真贯彻落实区厅、市局加强保安服务市场监管的相关工作，进一步推进我公司保安队伍正规化、规范化、职业化建设。一、根据《保安服务管理条例》的有关法律规定，我公司已向公安机关提交申请，并取得区公安厅核发的保安服务许可证，许可证号为：。并在规定时限内向工商行政管理机关办理工商登记。公司提供保安服务所需的设施、装备齐全，总经理、副总经理等主要管理人员无违法问题。二、公司建立健全了组织机构，保安服务管理制度、岗位责任制、保安员管理制度和应急处突预案等一系列规章制度，并正常执行。三、公司招录的保安员均符合《保安服务管理条例》规定的有关条件，并定期对保安员进行考核，均考核通过。

四、公司与被招录的保安员及时依法签订劳动合同，并及时缴纳养老、医疗、失业、生育、工伤、住房公积金和人身意外伤害保险。五、客户单位要求提供的保安服务具备合法性，没有泄露在保安服务中获知的国家秘密及客户单位明确要求保密的信息事件发生。六、无指使、纵容保安员阻碍依法执行公务、参与追索债务、采用暴力或者以暴力相威胁的手段处置纠纷事件发生。无指使和调动保安员侮辱殴打群众，侵害公民合法权益，破坏公共秩序的违法犯罪活动发生。七、公司保安员的服装均由上级主管部门统一订购、配发。八、公司无违 __、行业和地方有关价格管理标准，恶意压价、商业贿赂等不正当竞争行为。九、公司保安员的服装均由上级主管部门在公安部制定厂家为保安员统一订购、配发。

十、本公司从没有违反法律、行政法规的行为，也坚决杜绝此类事件出现。二O一三年一月五日童星幼儿园xx年年检自查报告 xx年以来，童星幼儿园在区教育局的正确领导下，深入贯彻 __颁发的《幼儿园工作规程》、《幼儿园教育指导纲要》，紧紧围绕“打造安全乐园，促进营养健康，开发智力潜能，养成良好习惯”的办园方针，以养成教育、幼儿健康和特色教育为中心，力求在提高保教质量上下功夫，努力实现园务管理的规范化、科学化，为幼儿健康成长与和谐发展奠定坚实的基础。根据《甘州区民办幼儿园年度办学情况检查细则》的评价体系，我园成立自查工作小组，组织全体教职员工认真学习《评估方案》，逐项自查，全面评估，客观量化，完成了自查工作。现将自查情况汇报如下：一、指导思想全面贯彻国家教育方针，坚持社会主义办学方向，坚持“面向全

每日工作总结一句话

每日工作总结一句话 1、就是人生的价值，人生的欢乐，也是幸福之所在。 2、无论是阅读东西，还是学东西，或者不得不去面对自己从没有知识积累和经验的难题，都不能仅仅只停留在表面，对付了事。因为，这些经验、知识乃至解决它们的能力技巧，骨子里，其实是相通的，敷衍了这次，下次就得从头再来一次，是一种更加浪费时间和生命的行为。 3、人能为自己心爱的工作贡献出全部力量、全部精力、全部知识，那么这项工作将完成得出色，收效也更大。 4、在工作中，我们面临跟别人的竞争，有时候甚至会发展成争斗和斗争，都是难免的，这时候，我们应该不畏惧于去斗争，但却千万不要热衷于斗争。 5、一个人要么把握很好的专业技巧，要么控制在生涯中无孔不入的本事。这两者都是生财之道。 6、小细节往往是影响到大局和事态发展结果的关键。事无巨细，都全力以赴、尽职尽责地去完成，才有可能将工作目标完成得尽善尽美。 7、一个人要一直晋升本人的境界，从而看得更高、更远，做事也更有效力，这请求人学会自发地学习跟踊跃的思考，只要才能进步，对环境变更的适应性增强，人必定可以在人群中居于上风位置。 8、当我们在一起进行工作时，就组成了一个团队。而

自己不再是一个人在工作，而是一个团队在齐心协力同心同德忘我的工作。工作做得好，只能反映一个人的工作能力。会做事而不懂得做人，无疑在一个团队中是很孤独的。 9、人只有为自己同时代的人完善，为他们的幸福而工作，他才能达到自身的完善。 10、工作不仅是为了拿份薪水，还为了成长和快乐。不要仅仅为了薪水而工作，还应该为梦想而工作，为自己的前途而工作，在以后的工作中只有踏踏实实的干，用心去干，有责任感，才能把工作做得更好 11、无论何时，对自我的教育，要不吝钱财。很多人打小见到父母对自己的教育不吝钱财，自己有了子女后，对自己的子女不吝钱财，却恰恰忘了，对自己的教育，也应该不吝钱财。实际上，从自己开始叛逆，能独立思考开始，或者离开父母，自己独自生存开始，我们也就开始了自己对自己教育的过程。如果这个过程中自己不愿意付出心血，又不愿意在自我教育上投入钱财，那么，发展不好，关键时候，才疏学浅，无力胜任新工作，也就不应该有怨言。 12、倾材足以聚人，量宽足已得人，身先足以率人，律己足以服人，得人心者得天下! 13、生命是没有意义的，除非有工作;所有的工作都是辛苦的，除非有知识;所有的知识是空虚的，除非有热望;所有的热望是盲目的，除非有爱。有爱的工作才是生命的具体

员工每日工作总结

员工每日工作总结篇一：每日工作汇报制度每日工作汇报制度一、目的为规范公司的工作分配、汇报制度，加强公司内部事务的管理，提高员工的工作效率和公司的运营质量，及时了解每位员工的工作情况，掌控各项工作进展情况，解决工作中出现的各种问题，特制定每日工作汇报。二、适用范围全体员工三、适用平台微信群、QQ群四、主要内容 1.员工每天23：00前，以“姓名：+今日工作总结+明日工作安排+日期”的形式，在微信群里发送。 2.汇报内容为：当天工作内容；自己分管工作的进展情况；领导安排的临时性工作完成情况；对工作的看法及建议；其他需要汇报的内容； 3.相关上级领导负责对每日工作日报进行批阅，对工作中出现的问题要及是纠正，对延迟的工作任务要严加督促，对员工提出的问题及建议要及时反馈。

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做到不相容岗位相互分离、相互制约、相互监督，对结算账户对账工作实行专人管理，做到权责分明，责任清晰。同时对会计人员岗位定期轮换和强制休假制度，进一步落实以岗位制约为主要内容的内控机制，防范内控管理隐患。三、加强自查力度，防范操作风险通过本次检查，对开户申请、开户资料实行重点检查，对开户资料的有效、真实性，实行逐一梳理，不留死角，真正把账户管理各项规章制度落到实处。对在综合业务系统操作中的每笔大额支付汇划往来业务、同城交换业务等业务进行核查，严格按照操作规程，规范业务操作，确保资金安全，防范操作风险。 2 在今后的工作中，我行将以上级行有关文件精神为指导，对账户开立、变更、撤销严格实行临柜人员、坐班主任审核把关，健全完善内控制度，加大奖惩力度，进一步提高工作的责任心，真正从源头上防止问题发生。 **县支行二0一0年五月十二日篇二:结算账户自查报告支行结算账户自查报告为了加强银行结算账户管理工作，维护支付结算的正常秩序，按照人民币银行结算账户管理办法实施细则要求，结合账户管理实施细则，提出了具体的检查要求，由账户管理专人对银行结算账户进行了一次全面详细的检查。现检查工作已经结束，汇报如下: 一、基本情况我行截止月共有单位银行结算账户个，其中，基本账户个、一般账户个、专用账户123个、临时账户1个。现有的银行结算账户中，全部已按办理开户许可证，开立符合人民银行对于账户管理的要求。

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