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国际经济学第八版下册答案

【篇一：克鲁格曼《国际经济学》第八版课后答案(英

文)-ch10】

>trade policy in developing countries

? chapter organization

import-substituting industrialization

the infant industry argument

promoting manufacturing through protectionism

case study: mexico abandons import-substituting industrialization

results of favoring manufacturing: problems of import-substituting industrialization

trade liberalization since 1985

export-oriented industrialization: the east asian miracle

the facts of asian growth

trade policy in the hpaes

industrial policy in the hpaes

box: india’s boom

other factors in growth

summary

? chapter overview

the final two chapters on international trade, chapters 10 and 11, discuss trade policy considerations in the context of specific issues. chapter 10 focuses on the use of trade policy

in developing countries and chapter 11 focuses on new controversies in trade policy.

while there is great diversity among the developing countries, they share some common policy concerns. these include the development of domestic manufacturing industries, the uneven degree of development within the country, and the desire to foster economic growth and improve living standards. this chapter discusses both the successful and unsuccessful trade policy strategies which have been applied by developing countries in attempts to address these concerns.

many developing countries pose the creation of a significant manufacturing sector as a key goal of economic development. one commonly voiced argument for protecting manufacturing industries is the infant industry argument, which states that

developing countries have a potential comparative advantage in

manufacturing and can realize that potential through an initial period of protection. this argument assumes market failure in the form of imperfect capital markets or the existence of externalities in production. such a market failure makes the social return to production higher than the private return. this implies that a firm will not be able to recapture rents or profits that are in line with the contribution to welfare made by the product or industry establishment of the firm. without some government support, the argument goes, the amount of investment which will occur in this industry will be less than socially optimal levels.

chapter 10 trade policy in developing countries 43

given these arguments, many nations have attempted import-substitution-led industrialization. in the 1950s and 1960s the strategy was quite popular and did lead to a dramatic reduction in imports in some countries. the overall result, though, was not a success. the infant industry argument did not always hold, as protection could let young industries survive, but could not make them efficient. by the late 1980s, most countries had shifted away from the strategy, and the chapter includes a case study of mexico’s change from import substitution to a more open strategy.

since 1985 many developing countries had abandoned import substitution and pursued (sometimes

aggressively) trade liberalization. the chapter notes two sides of the experience. on the one hand, trade has gone up considerably and changed in character. developing countries export far more of the gdp

than prior to liberalization, and more of it is in manufacturing as opposed to agricultural or mining sectors. at the same time, the growth experience of these countries has not been universally good and it is difficult to tell if the success stories are due to trade or due to reforms that came at the same time as liberalization. the east asian “miracle” of the high-performing asian economies (hpaes) provides a striking and

controversial example of export-oriented industrialization. while these countries encountered difficulties in the late 1990s (see chapter 22), this chapter focuses on their spectacular

growth from the 1960s to 1990s. it is acknowledged that the growth was extremely impressive; the controversy is over the source of the success in these countries. some observers argue that although these countries do not practice free trade, they have lower rates of protection (and more outward orientation) than other developing countries. other observers argue that the interventionist industrial policies pursued by the hpaes have been the reason for success, and outward orientation is just a by-product of active rather than passive government involvement in industry. still others argue that high rates of domestic savings and rapid improvements in education are behind the stunning growth performance.

? answers to textbook problems

1. the countries that seem to benefit most from international trade include many of the countries of the

pacific rim, south korea, taiwan, singapore, hong kong, malaysia, indonesia, and others. though the experience of each country is somewhat different, most of these countries employed some kind of infant industry protection during the beginning phases of their development, but then withdrew protection relatively quickly after industries became competitive on world markets. concerning

whether their experiences lend support to the infant industry argument or argues against it is still a matter of controversy. however, it appears that it would have been difficult for these countries to engage in export-led growth without some kind of initial government intervention.

the japanese example gives pause to those who believe that protectionism is always disastrous.

however, the fact of japanese success does not demonstrate that protectionist trade policy was

responsible for that success. japan was an exceptional society that had emerged into the ranks of advanced nations before world war ii and was recovering from wartime devastation. it is arguable that economic success would have come anyway, so that the apparent success of protection represents a “pseudo-infant-industry” case of the kind discussed in the text.

a. the initial high costs of production would justify infant industry protection if the costs to the

society during the period of protection were less than the future stream of benefits from a mature, low cost industry.

b. an individual firm does not have an incentive to bear development costs itself for an entire

industry when these benefits will accrue to other firms. there

is a stronger case for infant

industry protection in this instance because of the existence

of market failure in the form of the

appropriability of technology. 2. 3.

44 krugman/obstfeld ? international economics: theory and policy, eighth edition

4. india ceased being a colony of britain in 1948, thus its dramatic break from all imports in favor of

mexico (as opposed to recently deposed colonial firms in india) may have helped keep mexico open to importing capital goods necessary in the manufacturing process.

in some countries the infant industry argument simply did not appear to work well. such protection will not create a competitive manufacturing sector if there are basic reasons

why a country does not have a competitive advantage in a particular area. this was particularly the case in manufacturing where many low-income countries lack skilled labor, entrepreneurs, and the level of managerial

acumen necessary to be competitive in world markets. the argument is that trade policy alone cannot rectify these problems. often manufacturing was also created on such a small-scale that it made the industries noncompetitive, where economies of scale are critical to being a low-cost producer.

moreover protectionist policies in less-developed countries have had a negative impact on incentives, which has led to “rent-seeking” or corruption.

question 6 involves assessing the impact of dual labor markets. the topic is not covered extensively in the current edition of the book and instructors may not want to assign the question unless they bring additional material into the classroom to augment the text.

a. we know that the wages should be equivalent, so, given that

80 – la ? wa, we can substitute wm for wa, and recall that wm ? 100 – lm. combined with the information that la ? lm ? 100, we getl*a?40 and the equilibrium wage ? 40.

b. since wm ? 50, lm ? 50 and thus la ? 50 and wm ? 30, we have a net loss of (0.5)(10)(20) ? 100 in national income. 5. 6.【篇二：国际经济学(克鲁格曼)课后习题答案1-8章】1．为什么说在决定生产和消费时，相对价格比绝对价格更重要？

答案提示：当生产处于生产边界线上，资源则得到了充分利用，这时，要想增加某一产品的生产，必须降低另一产品的生产，也就是说，增加某一产品的生产是有机会机本（或社会成本）的。生产可

能性边界上任何一点都表示生产效率和充分就业得以实现，但究竟

选择哪一点，则还要看两个商品的相对价格，即它们在市场上的交

换比率。相对价格等于机会成本时，生产点在生产可能性边界上的

位置也就确定了。所以，在决定生产和消费时，相对价格比绝对价

格更重要。

2．仿效图1—6和图1—7，试推导出y商品的国民供给曲线和国民

需求曲线。答案提示：

3．在只有两种商品的情况下，当一个商品达到均衡时，另外一个商

品是否也同时达到均衡？试解释原因。答案提示：

4．如果生产可能性边界是一条直线，试确定过剩供给（或需求）曲线。答案提示：

5．如果改用y商品的过剩供给曲线（b国）和过剩需求曲线（a国）来确定国际均衡价格，那么所得出的结果与图1—13中的结果是否

一致？

答案提示：国际均衡价格将依旧处于贸易前两国相对价格的中间某点。 6．说明贸易条件变化如何影响国际贸易利益在两国间的分配。答案提示：一国出口产品价格的相对上升意味着此国可以用较少的

出口换得较多的进口产品，有利于此国贸易利益的获得，不过，出

口价格上升将不利于出口数量的增加，有损于出口国的贸易利益；

与此类似，出口商品价格的下降有利于出口商品数量的增加，但是

这意味着此国用较多的出口换得较少的进口产品。对于进口国来讲，贸易条件变化对国际贸易利益的影响是相反的。

7．如果国际贸易发生在一个大国和一个小国之间，那么贸易后，国

际相对价格更接近于哪一个国家在封闭下的相对价格水平？

答案提示：贸易后，国际相对价格将更接近于大国在封闭下的相对

价格水平。 8．根据上一题的答案，你认为哪个国家在国际贸易中福

利改善程度更为明显些？答案提示：小国。

9*．为什么说两个部门要素使用比例的不同会导致生产可能性边界

曲线向外凸？答案提示：

第二章答案

1．根据下面两个表中的数据，确定（1）贸易前的相对价格；（2）比较优势型态。表1 x、y的单位产出所需的劳动投入

x y

6 2

15 12

表2 x、y的单位产出所需的劳动投入

b 5 5

x 10 y

答案提示：首先将劳动投入转化为劳动生产率，然后应用与本章正

文中一样的方法进行比较。（表2-2（a）和表2-2（b）部分的内容） 2．假设a、b两国的生产技术条件如下所示，那么两国还有进行贸

易的动机吗？解释原因。

表3 x、y的单位产出所需的劳动投入

x y

a 4 2

b 8 4

答案提示：从绝对优势来看，两国当中a国在两种产品中都有绝对

优势；从比较优势来看，两国不存在相对技术差异。所以，两国没

有进行国际贸易的动机。

3．证明如果一国在某一商品上具有绝对优势，那么也必具有比较优势。——题出错了证明即使一国在某一商品上具有绝对优势，也未

必具有比较优势。

答案提示：如果ax?bx，则称a国在x生产上具有绝对优势；如果

ax/ay?bx/by，则称a国在x生产上具有比较优势。当ay?by或者ay?by的时候，由ax?bx可以推出

ax/ay?bx/by，但是，当ay?by的时候，ax?bx不能保证

ax/ay?bx/by。所以，即使一

国在某一商品上具有绝对优势，也未必具有比较优势。

4．根据书中第二个例子的做法，如果按照比较劣势的原则进行国际

分工，那么会对世界生产带来什么净影响？答案提示：

5．假设某一国家拥有20，000万单位的劳动，x、y的单位产出所

要求的劳动投入分别为5个单位和4个单位，试确定生产可能性边

界方程。

答案提示：

1111lx?ly?200000000;x?lx;y?ly

4545

6．根据上一题的条件，再加上以下几个条件，试确定该国的出口量，并在图中画出贸易三角形。

（1）x的国际相对价格为2；（2）进口为2，000个单位。

答案提示：封闭条件下，此国生产可能性边界的斜率是????x。因

为x的国际相

14py5

对价格为2，所以此国出口x进口y。出口1,000个单位的x可以换得2,000个单位的y。贸易三角是cada’（见图2-5（a））。

7．在图2—2（b）中，过剩供给曲线两端是否有界限？试解释原因。答案提示：过剩供给曲线两端是有界限的，因为一国生产能力和消

费需求是有界限的。

8*．仿照图2—4，你能否画出这样一种情形：两条曲线的交点所决

定的国际均衡价格与某一国封闭下的相对价格完全相同？如何解释

这种结果？答案提示：从大国、小国的角度考虑。 9．试对下列说

法加以评价：

（1）由于发达国家工资水平高于发展中国家，所以发达国家与发展

中国家进行贸易会无

利可图；

（2）因为美国的工资水平很高，所以美国产品在世界市场缺乏竞争力；（3）发展中国家的工资水平比较低是因为国际贸易的缘故。

答案提示：以上三种观点都不正确。

10*．试根据李嘉图模型证明：如果a国在两种产品上都具有绝对优势，那么贸易后a国的名义工资水平肯定高于b国。

apx与wbpx之间的大小。

第三章答案

1．根据下面的两个表，试判断：（1）哪个国家是资本相对丰富的；（2）哪个国家是劳动相对丰富的；（3）如果x是资本密集型产品，y是劳动密集型产品，那么两国的比较优势如何？

表1

要素禀赋劳动资本

表2

要素禀赋劳动资本

12 48

b 30 60

45 15

b 20 10

答案提示：表1中a国劳动相对丰裕，a国在生产y产品上有比较

优势。表2中a国资本相对丰裕，a国在生产x产品上有比较优势。 2．如果a国的资本、劳动总量均高于b国，但资本相对更多些，

试仿照图3—3和图3—4的做法，确定两国生产可能性边界线的位

置关系。答案提示： o

答案提示：yk

（x=a）

（x=b）

（y=a）（y=b）

3．根据上一题，试在图中画出两国在封闭和开放下的一般均衡。

ypea

4．如果两个部门的要素密度完全相同，那么要素禀赋差异还会引

发国际贸易吗？如果贸易发生的话，那么国际分工与贸易型态如何？试将你得出的结果与李嘉图模型加以比较。答案提示：如果两个部

门的要素密度完全相同，那么要素禀赋差异将不会引发国际贸易。

不过，国际贸易还可能存在，这时候的国际分工将有更多的偶然性质。

5*．试证明在图3—7中，两国的消费点共同位于从原点出发的一条

直线上。答案提示：根据两国的消费结构来判断

6*. 如果两国存在技术差异，那么贸易后两国要素价格是否均等，为

什么？

答案提示：如果两国存在技术差异，那么贸易后两国要素价格将不

均等。可采用图3—8的方式来解释

7．需求逆转是否会影响要素价格均等？为什么？

答案提示：需求逆转导致两个国家相同产品的价格不一样，使得要

素价格无法均等。

8．如何根据罗伯津斯基定理，来解释要素禀赋不同的两个国家生

产可能性边界之间的差别？

答案提示：罗伯津斯基定理是，在商品相对价格不变的前提下，某

一要素的增加会导致密集使用该要素部门的生产增加，而另一部门

的生产则下降。如果两个国家的要素禀赋不一样，则某种要素多的

国家，会生产更多密集使用该要素的产品，反之亦然。所以，两个

国家的生产可能性边界就出现了差别。

9．如果一国的资本与劳动同时增加，那么在下列情况下，两种产

品的生产以及该国的贸易条件如何变化？

（1）资本、劳动同比例增加；（2）资本增加的比例大于劳动增加

的比例；（3）资本增加的比例小于劳动增加的比例。

答案提示：（1）两种产品的产量同比例增加，贸易条件没有变化。（2）资本密集型产品的生产增加更快，资本密集型产品的价格有下降的压力。（3）劳动密集型产品的生产增加更快，劳动密集型产品的价格有下降的压力。

10．对小国来说，经济增长后福利如何变化？

答案提示：对于小国来说，经济增长以后，不对国际价格形成影响，其贸易条件不会变化，所以福利将上升。

11．在战后几十年间，日本、韩国等东亚的一些国家或地区的国际

贸易商品结构发生了，

【篇三：克鲁格曼《国际经济学》第八版课后答案(英

文)-ch18】

monetary system, 1870–1973

? chapter organization

macroeconomic policy goals in an open economy

internal balance: full employment and price-level stability

external balance: the optimal level of the current account

international macroeconomic policy under the gold standard, 1870–1914

origins of the gold standard

external balance under the gold standard

the price-specie-flow mechanism

the gold standard “rules of the game”: myth and reality

box: hume v. the mercantilists

internal balance under the gold standard

case study: the political economy of exchange rate regimes: conflict over america’s monetary standard during the 1890s

the interwar years, 1918–1939

the fleeting return to gold

international economic disintegration

case study: the international gold standard and the great depression

the bretton woods system and the international monetary fund goals and structure of the imf

convertibility and the expansion of private capital flows

speculative capital flows and crises

analyzing policy options under the bretton woods system

maintaining internal balance

maintaining external balance

expenditure-changing and expenditure-switching policies

the external-balance problem of the united states

case study: the decline and fall of the bretton woods system worldwide inflation and the transition to floating rates

summary

chapter 18 the international monetary system, 1870–1973 95 ? chapter overview

this is the first of five international monetary policy chapters. these chapters complement the preceding theory chapters in several ways. they provide the historical and institutional background students require to place their theoretical knowledge in a useful context. the chapters also allow students, through study of historical and current events, to sharpen their grasp of the theoretical models and to develop the intuition those models can provide. (application of the theory to events of current interest will hopefully motivate students to return to earlier chapters and master points that

may have been missed on the first pass.) chapter 18 chronicles the evolution of the international monetary system from the gold standard of 1870–1914, through the interwar years, and

up to and including the post-world war ii bretton woods regime that ended in march 1973. the central focus of the chapter is

the manner in which each system addressed, or failed to address, the requirements of internal and external balance for its participants. a country is in internal balance when its resources are fully employed and there is price level stability. external balance implies an optimal time path of the current account subject to its being balanced over the long run. other factors have been important in the definition of external balance at various times, and these are discussed in the text. the basic definition of external balance as an appropriate current-account level, however, seems to capture a goal that most policy-makers share regardless of the particular circumstances. the price-specie-flow mechanism described by david hume shows how the gold standard could ensure convergence to external balance. you may want to present the following model of the price-specie-flow mechanism. this model is based upon three equations:

3. the balance sheet of the central bank. at the most simple level, this is just gold holdings equals the money supply: g ? m. the quantity theory. with velocity and output assumed constant and both normalized to 1, this yields the simple equation m ? p.

a balance of payments equation where the current account is a function of the real exchange rate and

there are no private capital flows: ca ? f(e ? p*/p)

these equations can be combined in a figure like the one below. the 45? line represents the quantity theory, and the vertical line is the price level where the real exchange rate results in a balanced current account. the economy moves along the 45? line back towards the equilibrium point 0 whenever it is out of equilibrium. for example, the loss of four-fifths of a country’s gold would put that country at point a with lower prices and a lower money supply. the resulting real exchange rate depreciation causes a current account surplus

which restores money balances as the country proceeds up

the 45? line from a

to 0.

figure 18.1

the automatic adjustment process described by the price-specie-flow mechanism is expedited by following “rules of the game” under which governments contract the domestic source components of

their monetary bases when gold reserves are falling (corresponding to a current-account deficit) and expand when gold reserves are rising (the surplus case).

in practice, there was little incentive for countries with expanding gold reserves to follow the “rules of the game.” this increased the contractionary burden shouldered by countries with persistent current account deficits. the gold standard also subjugated internal balance to the demands of external balance. research suggests price-level stability and high employment were attained less consistently under the gold standard than in the post-1945 period.

the interwar years were marked by severe economic instability. the monetization of war debt and of reparation payments led to episodes of hyperinflation in europe. an ill-fated attempt to return to the pre-war gold parity for the pound led to stagnation in britain. competitive devaluations and protectionism were pursued in a futile effort to stimulate domestic economic growth during the great depression. these beggar-thy-neighbor policies provoked foreign retaliation and led to the disintegration of the world economy. as one of the case studies shows, strict adherence to the gold standard appears to have hurt many countries during the great depression.

determined to avoid repeating the mistakes of the interwar years, allied economic policy-makers met at bretton woods in 1944 to forge a new international monetary system for the postwar world. the exchange-rate regime that emerged from this conference had at its center the u.s. dollar. all other currencies had fixed exchange rates against the dollar, which itself had a fixed value in terms of gold. an international monetary fund was set up to oversee the system and facilitate

its functioning by lending to countries with temporary balance of payments problems.

a formal discussion of internal and external balance introduces the concepts of expenditure-switching and expenditure-changing policies. the bretton woods system, with its emphasis on infrequent adjustment of fixed parities, restricted the use of expenditure-switching policies. increases in u.s. monetary growth to finance fiscal expenditures after the mid-1960s led to a loss of confidence in the dollar and the termination of the dollar’s convertibility into gold. the analysis presented in the text demonstrates

how the bretton woods system forced countries to “import” inflation from the united states and shows that the breakdown of the system occurred when countries were no longer willing to accept this burden. ? answers to textbook problems

1. a. since it takes considerable investment to develop uranium mines, you would want a larger current

account deficit to allow your country to finance some of the investment with foreign savings.

b. a permanent increase in the world price of copper would cause a short-term current account

deficit if the price rise leads you to invest more in copper mining. if there are no investment

effects, you would not change your external balance target because it would be optimal simply to spend your additional income.

c. a temporary increase in the world price of copper would cause a current account surplus. you

would want to smooth out your country’s consumption by saving some of its temporarily higher income.

d. a temporary rise in the world price of oil would cause a current account deficit if you were an

importer of oil, but a surplus if you were an exporter of oil. chapter 18 the international monetary system, 1870–1973 97

2. because the marginal propensity to consume out of income is less than 1, a transfer of income from b

to a increases savings in a and decreases savings in b. therefore, a has a current account surplus and b has a corresponding deficit. this corresponds to a balance of payments disequilibrium in

hume’s world, which must be financed by gold flows from b to a. these gold flows increase a’s money supply and decrease b’s money supply, pushing up prices in a and depressing prices in b.

these price changes cease once balance of payments equilibrium has been restored.

3. changes in parities reflected both initial misalignments and balance of payments crises. attempts to

return to the parities of the prewar period after the war ignored the changes in underlying economic fundamentals that the war caused. this made some exchange rates less than fully credible and

encouraged balance of payments crises. central bank commitments to the gold parities were also less than credible after the wartime suspension of the gold standard, and as a result of the increasing

concern of governments with internal economic conditions.

4. a monetary contraction, under the gold standard, will lead

to an increase in the gold holdings of the

contracting country’s central bank if other countries do not pursue a similar policy. all countries

cannot succeed in doing this simultaneously since the total stock of gold reserves is fixed in the short run. under a reserve currency system, however, a monetary contraction causes an incipient rise in the domestic interest rate, which attracts foreign capital. the central bank must accommodate the inflow of foreign capital to preserve the exchange rate parity. there is thus an increase in the central bank’s holdings of foreign reserves equal to the fall in its holdings of domestic assets. there is no obstacle to a simultaneous increase in reserves by all central banks because central banks acquire more claims on the reserve currency country while their citizens end up with correspondingly greater liabilities.

5. the increase in domestic prices makes home exports less attractive and causes a current account

deficit. this diminishes the money supply and causes contractionary pressures in the economy

which serve to mitigate and ultimately reverse wage demands and price increases.

6. a “demand determined” increase in dollar rese rve holdings would not affect the world supply of

money as central banks merely attempt to trade their holdings of domestic assets for dollar reserves.

a “supply determined” increase in reserve holdings, however, would result from expansionary

monetary policy in the united states (the reserve center). at least at the end of the bretton woods era the increase in world dollar reserves arose in part because of an expansionary monetary policy in the united states rather than a desire by other central banks to increase their holdings of dollar assets. only the “supply determined” increase in dollar reserves is relevant for analyzing the

relationship between world holdings of dollar reserves by central banks and inflation.

7. an increase in the world interest rate leads to a fall in a central bank’s holdings of foreign reserves as

domestic residents trade in their cash for foreign bonds. this leads to a decline in the home country’s money supply. the central bank of a “small” country cannot offset these effects since

it cannot alter the world interest rate. an attempt to sterilize the reserve loss through open market purchases would fail unless bonds are imperfect substitutes.

8. capital account restrictions insulate the domestic interest rate from the world interest rate. monetary

policy, as well as fiscal policy, can be used to achieve internal balance. because there are no

offsetting capital flows, monetary policy, as well as fiscal policy, can be used to achieve internal

balance. the costs of capital controls include the inefficiency which is introduced when the domestic interest rate differs from the world rate and the high costs of enforcing the controls.

9. yes, it does seem that the external balance problem of a deficit country is more severe. while the

macroeconomic imbalance may be equally problematic in the long run regardless of whether it is a deficit or surplus, large external deficits involve the risk that the market will fix the problem quickly by ceasing to fund the external deficit. in this

case, there may have to be rapid adjustment that could be disruptive. surplus countries are rarely forced into rapid adjustments, making the problems less risky.

10. an inflow attack is different from capital flight, but many parallels exist. in an “outflow” attack,

speculators sell the home currency and drain the central bank of its foreign assets. the central bank could always defend if it so chooses (they can raise interest rates to improbably high levels), but if it is unwilling to cripple the economy with tight monetary policy, it must relent. an “inflow” attack is

similar in that the central bank can always maintain the peg, it is just that the consequences of doing so may be more unpalatable than breaking the peg. if money flows in, the central bank must buy foreign assets to keep the currency from appreciating. if the central bank cannot sterilize all the inflows (eventually they may run out of domestic assets to sell to sterilize the transactions where they are buying foreign assets), it will have to either let the currency appreciate or let the money supply rise. if it is unwilling to allow and increase in inflation due to a rising money supply, breaking the peg may be preferable.

11. a. we know that china has a very large current account surplus, placing them high above the xx

line. they also have moderate inflationary pressures (described as “gathering” in the question, implying they are not yet very strong). this suggests that china is above the ii line, but not too far

above it. it would be placed in zone 1 (see below).

b. china needs to appreciate the exchange rate to move down on the graph towards balance.

(shown on the graph with the dashed line down)

c. china would need to expand government spending to move to the right and hit the overall balance

that the appreciation might generate.