外文翻译模板
西安交通大学城市学院本科毕业设计(论文)外文翻译
译文：
会计欺诈和机构投资者
查得·R·拉森介绍美国资本市场依赖财务报告系统来帮助有效分配资本。最近的财务报告过程中故障在许多高调公司新的人员的监管机构,会计欺诈和市场参与者的兴趣。两个重要的经验规律的文献记录极端操纵收益的决定因素和后果。首先,股票市场反应的启示会计处理显著负面。估计下降公告后的市场价值会计操作范围从20 - 40%( Palm rose、理查德森和 2003李,和马丁2007)。第二,会计操作是可预测的。文献会计操作的文档可以预测的措施准确的质量、会计性能、非金融变量声明和股市变量(如,Beneish 1999;Dechow,通用电气,拉尔森和斯隆2007)。虽然会计操作导致重大投资损失和与公司相关的特点和性能,几乎没有证据表明存在成熟的投资者是否能够避免损失与会计欺诈。
机构投资者已成为市场的重要力量在过去的几十年。上世纪八十年代初到九十年代末,机构投资者所有权翻倍,股市50%以上(龚帕斯和Metric时,2001)。机构投资者在美国市场存在的上升有意义的促使文献调查他们是否执行是有利可图的交易。文献的结果是喜忧参半。几项研究文档积极变化之间的相互关系,这些机构投资者的资产和未来的收益和回报,这表明机构通知交易员(如，柯和2005;阿里列弗,确认我也承认泰德?克里斯坦森的指导,没有它我就不会了博士学位的挑战。最后,我感谢我的家人的支持。没有这篇论文的完成并不意味着几乎一样多。介绍美国资本市场依赖财务报告系统来帮助有效分配资本。最近的财务报告过程中故障在许多高调公司新的人员监管机构,会计欺诈和市场参与者的兴趣。两个重要的经验规律的文献记录极端操纵收益的决定因素和后果。首先,股票市场反应的启示,会计处理显著负面。估计下降公告后的市场价值会计操作范围从20 - 40%(Palm rose、理查德森和朔尔茨2003;Karpo_,李,和马丁2007)。第二,会计操作是可预测的。文献会计操作的文档可以预测的措施,合格的质量、会计性能、非金融变量声明和股市变量(如,Beneish 1999;Dechow,通用电气,拉尔森和斯隆2007)。虽然会计操作导致重大投资损失和与公司相关的特点和性能,几乎没有证据表明存在成熟的投资者是否能够避免损失与会计欺诈。
机构投资者已成为市场的重要力量在过去的几十年。从八十年代初到九十年代末,机构投资者所有权翻倍,股市50%以上(。机构投资者在美国市场存在的上升促使文献调查他们是否执行有利可图的交易。文献的结果是喜忧参半。几项研究文档积极变化之间的相互关系,这些机构投资者的资产和未来的收益和回报,这表明机构通知交易员(如。、柯和Ramalingegowda 2005;柯和Petron 2004;阿里Dutch列弗,Trembles 2004)。另一方面,一些文献表明,知情交易可能更有限,发现性能优越的共同基金很少持续(Carat 1997;布朗一个曼1995年)和交易考虑通知
可能只是动量交易的结果(Bushee和古德曼,2007)。会计欺诈和大市场的可预测性与会计欺诈相关的损失表明,它是一个理想的设定检查成熟的机构投资者。如果机构投资者拥有优越的信息和复杂的会计信息的使用者对会计欺诈,他们应该在欺诈上市公司公开披露前欺诈。我的主要研究问题是机构投资者预期会计欺诈的启示和剥离的股票欺诈公司公开披露之前骗子。作为一个次要的研究问题,我检查是否机构作为有效的公司监控预防欺诈。我使用的会计、审计和执行版本(AAER)涉及欺诈和会计操作作为一个代理第一新闻文章Factiva提及会计违规的公众披露欺诈。我检查机构交易模式在322年企业,美国证券交易委员会(SEC)中标识执行行动从1982年到2005年有操纵会计收益。我的分析是在两个阶段进行。第一阶段是本文分析聚合机构公司级和欺诈检查他们的交易行为。第二阶段是一个阶段分析,利用机构投资者之间的异构性,欺诈行为检查他们的交易行为。公司的分析,我遵循Bushee(2001)组织机构分为三类根据自己的投资风格:瞬态和专用。多元化的投资组合和较低的投资组合营业额机构的特点。多样化的投资组合,投资组合交易描述瞬态高机构,和高度集中的投资组合和较低的投资组合营业额专门机构的特点。符合文学之前,我希望发现瞬态机构最有可能发起有利交易欺诈启示的预期和机构不大可能发起有利益可得交易欺诈的预期启示我没有强烈的专门机构研究预测通常找到贸易基于即将到来的未来事件。然而,欺诈是一个独特的设置可能导致专门机构剥离他们的位置。如果专门机构投资公司基于他们的信心的和意愿完整性管理、检测欺诈行为会引起专门机构剥离他们的股份。此外,由于专门机构的特点是高度的投资组合,他们可能会有更大比例的投资组合风险欺诈是否显示。因此,他们可能会有最强的激励预测欺诈和诈骗剥离他们的股票。文献表明,机构投资者作为公司监控(如果是这样的话,那么有可能是诈骗公司低水平的机构投资欺诈行为,因为他们之前缺乏效率监控。因此,我的第一组测试检查机构所有权水平是否欺诈公司立即释放之前第一次欺诈收益报告不同于人口控制的公司。在不变的分析中,我发现欺诈公司实际上有更高水平的总机构所有权,所有权和瞬态比公司所有权制度。专门机构所有权没有显著区别样本公司。接下来,我将进行回归分析,控制公司的特点。我立即发现欺诈的开始之前,机构所有权欺诈公司的总体水平高于制度所有权控制公司的一个示例。然而,我发现更高层次的机构主要是所有权的结果表明斜面更高层次的瞬态机构所有权,专门机构所有权控制后几乎是相同的形式特征。大学和回归结果表明,机构所有权水平不作为一个伶俐的监控装置在欺诈的预防。
我的下一套测试提供相关的证据,我的主要研究问题。我第一次检查机构所有权水平变化在欺诈公司在此期间公司提交欺诈。季度发行前的第一次欺诈收益报告,直到季度会计欺诈的公开披露之前,我发现机构所有权欺诈公司增加了近14%,代表一家欺诈公司已发行股份的3.9%。2因为欺诈公司经验股价下跌约35%
一旦发现欺诈,欺诈的机构增加3.9%所有权不是微不足道的。事实上,计算表明,总机构损失322年我的样品是诈骗公司的1380亿美元。增加3.9%机构所有权欺诈时期代表约200亿美元的损失。之前的研究已经检查机构是否能预测即将发生的事件在短窗口(Briber,詹金斯和王,2006)。因此,在我的下一组测试,我观察机构所有权的变化后的季度马上前,公开揭露欺诈。
我在季度立即欺诈曝光之前,所有权制度降低了大约一个半欺诈公司已发行股份的百分比。我发现能有效的降低瞬态机构持有,而专门的机构持有的变化无关紧要的不会。我也在季后立即找到有效减少欺诈启示。这些结果是强劲的几个控制变量包括现在和过去的股票回报,意想不到的收益,以及分享营业额的变化。虽然我找到证据表明瞬态机构能够预测欺诈前一个时期它的启示,这些证据必须解释的证据我之前测试。一个半百分比下降机构所有权欺诈曝光之前,虽然显著,稍微减轻相当大的机构投资者的损失。
机构更异于三类我受聘于企业层面分析。因此,我进行第二次分析进一步利用机构投资者之间的异质性。我创建代理机构的信息环境和机构的激励机制,以避免负面的市场后果与会计欺诈的启示。条件拥有欺诈公司股票欺诈开始之前,我测试是否与机构的所有权的变化相关联的代理是欺诈公司前会计欺诈的启示。结果提供一些证据表明与最强的激励制度,以避免会计欺诈和最高的质量信息环境剥离前股票欺诈公司会计欺诈的启示。尽管数据符合资产剥离率的增加在这些机构中,我无法确定这些关系的结果通知交易或自然的所有权水平均值回归。这项研究应该感兴趣的机构投资者和研究者。研究结果表明,机构投资者失去钱的重要性通过投资公司提交会计欺诈。进一步的证据有助于我的研究文献记录复杂的机构投资者。至少在这个特殊的背景下,大多数机构似乎没有复杂的会计信息用户;然而,我确实提供了有限的证据前立即通知本季度交易欺诈机构之间的一个子集的启示。这些投资的标准可能会导致这些机构倾斜特征,更有可能来证明他们的投资组合的审慎投资。例如发现高的银行向企业倾斜投资组合标准普尔股票评级。Bushee和古德曼(2007) ,这是一个指示符变量等于一个如果一个机构的市场价值的股票投资组合的五等分顶层，否则所有机构在一个特定的季度和0。因为大多数机构拥有更多的资源,我希望ISIZE是一个机构的代理获取和处理信息的能力。因此,我认为,大型机构将更有可能出售公司的股票有欺诈行为。我发现了两个额外的措施,代理机构的私人信息和激励措施,以避免会计欺诈。选择,第一个是一个变量,措施的相对大小的股权机构风险在一个特定的公司。打赌测量作为应声股本旗下机构j公司我在一季度t扩展机构j的总市场价值的投资组合在季度t。我希望押注是负相关的制度变迁在欺诈公司的所有权。与更高水平的机构选择相对比水平较低的企业风险价值选择,因此,这些机构有更大的激励来收集私人信息,避免投资公司有欺诈行为。我最后的机构公司水平变量,这是一个指示符变量等于一个如果一个机构持有的流通股总量的百分比在公司五等分顶层的制度,公司所有权和零。我希望块与私人信息优势,因为这些机构更有可能获得私人信息和更愿意承担私人信息采集和处理的成本。因此,我希望阻止将负相关的机构持有的诈骗公司的变化。Bushee和古德曼(2007)是第一个采用这两种措施指出是一个很好的衡量去激励收集公司信息。
原文：
Accounting Fraud and Institutional Investors
By Chad R. Larson
I also acknowledge the mentorship of Ted Christensen without which I would have never taken on the challenge of a doctorate. Lastly, I am grateful for the support of my family. Without them the completion of this dissertation would not mean nearly as much. Introduction U.S. capital markets rely on financial reporting systems to help effectively allocate capital. The recent breakdowns in the financial reporting process at many high profile companies have renewed researchers', and market participants' interest in accounting fraud. Two important empirical regularities emerge from the body of literature documenting the determinants and consequences of extreme earnings manipulations. First, stock market reactions to the revelation of accounting manipulations are significantly negative. Estimated declines in market value following the public announcement of accounting manipulations range from 20 to 40 percent (Palmore, Richardson, and Scholz 2003; Karpo_, Lee, and Martin 2007). Second, accounting manipulations are predictable. A body of literature documents that accounting manipulations can be predicted with measures of accurate quality, accounting performance, non-financial statement variables, and stock market variables (e.g., Beneish 1999; Dechow, Ge, Larson, and Sloan 2007). Although accounting manipulations result in significant investor losses and are associated with firm characteristics and performance, little evidence exists on whether sophisticated investors are able to avoid losses associated with accounting fraud..
Institutional investors have become a significant market force over the last several decades. From the early 1980s to the late 1990s, institutional investors doubled their ownership in the equity markets to over 50 percent (Gompers and Metrick, 2001). The rising presence of institutional investors in the U.S. markets has spurred a signi_cant body of literature investigating whether they execute pro_table trades. The results of the literature are mixed. Several studies document positive associations between changes in institutional investors' holdings and future earnings and returns, suggesting that institutions are informed traders (e.g., Ke and Ramalingegowda 2005; Ke and
Petroni 2004; Ali, Durtschi, Lev, and Thrombley 2004). On the other hand, some literature suggests that informed trading might be more limited, finding that superior mutual fund performance is rarely persistent (Carhart 1997; Brown an Goetzmann 1995) and trading patterns previously considered informed might simply be the result of momentum trading (Bushee and Goodman, 2007).The predictability of accounting fraud and the large market losses associated with accounting fraud suggest that it is an ideal setting to examine the sophistication of institutional investors. If institutional investors possess superior information and are sophisticated users of accounting information with respect to accounting fraud, they should sell shares in fraud firms prior to public revelations of fraud. My primary research question is whether institutional investors anticipate accounting fraud revelations and divest shares in fraud firms prior to the public revelation of frauds. As a secondary research question, I examine whether institutions act as effective firm monitors in the prevention of fraud. I use Accounting, Auditing, and Enforcement Releases (AAER) involving accounting manipulations as a proxy for fraud and the first press article in Factiva mentioning an accounting irregularity as the public revelation of fraud.1 I examine institutional trading patterns in 322 firms that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) identified in enforcement actions from 1982 through 2005 as having manipulated their accounting earnings. My analysis is conducted in two stages. The first stage is a firm-level analysis that aggregates institutions at the firm-level and examines their trading behavior in fraud _rms. The second stage is an institution-level analysis that exploits the heterogeneity among institutional investors and examines their trading behavior in fraud _rms. For my firm-level analysis, I follow Bushee (2001) by grouping institutions into three categories based on their investment styles: quasi-indexer, transient, and dedicated. Diversified portfolios and low portfolio turnover characterize quasi-indexer institutions. Diversified portfolios and high portfolio turnover characterize transient institutions, and highly concentrated portfolios and low portfolio turnover characterize dedicated institutions. Consistent with prior literature, I expect to find that transient institutions are the most likely to initiate profitable trades in anticipation of a fraud revelation and quasi-indexer institutions are unlikely to initiate profitable trades in anticipation of a fraud
revelation (e.g., Ke and Ramalingegowda 2005; Hribar, Jenkins, and Wang 2006). I make no strong predictions for dedicated institutions as research typically finds that they do not trade based on impending future events. However, fraud is a unique setting that may lead dedicated institutions to divest their positions. If dedicated institutions invest in firms based on their confidence in the vision and integrity of management, detecting a fraud might lead dedicated institutions to divest their shares. In addition, since dedicated institutions are characterized by highly-concentrated portfolios, they are likely to have a larger percentage of their portfolios at risk if fraud is revealed. Therefore, they are likely to have the strongest incentives to anticipate fraud and divest their shares in fraud _rms. A body of literature suggests that institutional investors act as firm monitors (e.g.Chung, Firth, and Kim 2002; Chen, Harford, and Li 2007). If this is the case, then it is possible that fraud firms have low levels of institutional investment prior to committing fraud because they lack efficiency monitoring. Therefore, my first set of tests examines whether institutional ownership levels in fraud firms immediately prior to the release of a first fraudulent earnings report differ from a population of control firms. In unvaried analysis, I find that fraud firms actually have higher levels of total institutional ownership, quasi-indexer ownership, and transient institutional ownership than non-fraud firms. Dedicated institutional ownership is not significantly different from the non-fraud sample of firms. Next, I conduct regression analysis that controls for firm characteristics. I find that immediately prior to the beginning of a fraud, fraud firms' total level of institutional ownership is higher than institutional ownership for a sample of control firms. However, I find that the higher level of institutional ownership is primarily the result of a sign cant higher level of transient institutional ownership, while quasi-indexer and dedicated institutional ownership is nearly identical after controlling form characteristics. The university and regression results suggest that the level of institutional ownership does not act as a sapient monitoring device in the Prevention of fraud.
My next sets of tests provide evidence relating to my primary research question. I first examine changes in institutional ownership levels in fraud firms over the period firms commit fraud. From the quarter prior to the issuance of a first fraudulent earnings report until the quarter prior to the
public revelation of an accounting fraud, I find that institutional ownership in fraud firms increases by almost 14 percent, representing 3.9 percent of a fraud firm's outstanding stock.2 Because fraud firms experience stock price declines of approximately 35 percent once the fraud is revealed, the 3.9 percent increase in institutional ownership over the fraud period is not trivial. In fact, calculations suggest that total institutional losses for the 322 fraud firms in my sample are in order of $138 billion. The 3.9 percent increase in institutional ownership over the fraud period represents approximately $20 billion of those losses. Prior research has examined whether institutions can predict impending events over short windows (Hribar, Jenkins, and Wang, 2006). Accordingly, in my next set of tests, I observe changes in institutional ownership in the quarters immediately prior to and following the public revelation of fraud. I am that in the quarter immediately prior to a fraud revelation, institutional ownership decreases by approximately one and a half percent of a fraud firm's outstanding stock. I find significant decreases for transient institutional holdings, while changes in quasi-indexer and dedicated institutional holdings are insignificant. I also find significant decreases in the quarter immediately following the fraud revelation.
These results are robust to several control variables including current and past stock returns, unexpected earnings, and changes in share turnover. Although I find come evidence that transient institutions are able to anticipate fraud one period prior to its revelation, this evidence must be interpreted in light of evidence from my previous tests. The one and a half percent decrease in institutional ownership prior to fraud revelations, though statistically significant, only slightly mitigates substantial losses for institutional investors.
Institutions are more heterogeneous than the three categories I employ in my firm-level analysis. Therefore, I conduct a second analysis at the institution-level that further exploits the heterogeneity among institutional investors. I create proxies for institutions' information environments and institutions' incentives to avoid the negative market consequences associated with the revelation of accounting fraud. Conditional on owning fraud firm shares prior to a fraud beginning, I test whether the proxies are associated with institutions' ownership changes in fraud
firms prior to the revelation of an accounting fraud. The results provide some evidence that institutions with the strongest incentives to avoid accounting fraud and with the highest quality information environments divest shares in fraud firms prior to the revelation of accounting fraud. Although the data are consistent with an increased rate of divestitures among these institutions, I am unable to establish whether these relations are a result of informed trading or natural mean reversion in ownership levels.
This study should be of interest to both institutional investors and researchers. The results suggest that institutional investors lose significant amounts of money
by investing in firms that commit accounting fraud. My study contributes further evidence to the body of literature documenting the sophistication level of institutional investors. At least for this particular context, most institutions do not appear to be sophisticated users of accounting information; however, I do provide limited evidence of informed trading in the quarter immediately prior to fraud revelations among a subset of institutions.
The remainder of my dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 examines prior literature and outlines my empirical predictions. Chapter 3 outlines my research design. Chapter 4 describes my sample selection process and provides descriptive statistics. Chapter 5 details my tests and presents results and chapter 6 concludes. Prior Literature and Empirical Predictions My dissertation builds on two streams of prior literature. The first stream of literature examines the determinants and consequences of accounting manipulations. The second stream of literature examines the trading behavior of institutional investors.
Accounting Manipulations Prior research has identified characteristics of firms that manipulate their financial statements. Dechow, Ge, Larson, and Sloan (2007) investigate a comprehensive sample of all 895 firms subject to Accounting, Auditing, and Enforcement Releases (AAER) from 1982 through July 2005. They examine the use of several financial statement variables, o_-balance sheet and non-financial variables, and market-related variables to predict accounting manipulations. They had that firms accused by the SEC of manipulating their _financial performance tend to have had strong performance prior to manipulations. They also and that
manipulations appear to be motivated by managers' desire to obfuscate deteriorating financial performance. During manipulation years, they find that cash profit margins and return on assets are declining while accruals are increasing. They also find that firms manipulating financial reporting are more likely to issue debt and equity.
Ranking firms based on the predicted likelihood of accounting manipulations from a logistic model, they classify almost 50 percent of manipulation firms in the top 20 percent of their manipulation index and 65 percent of manipulation firms in the top 40 percent of their index. Beneish (1999) creates a fraud prediction model based on a sample of 74 firms that manipulated earnings and a sample of 2,332 matched firms. Estimating probity models of accounting manipulations as a function of eight accounting based variables (indexed day's sales in receivables, gross margin, asset quality, sales growth, depreciation, sales, general and administrative expenses, leverage, and accruals to total assets) he is able to correctly classify approximately 50 to 75 percent of fraud firms, while incorrectly classifying only 10 to 20 percent of matched firms. Several other studies document relations between earnings manipulation firms and firm characteristics. Two other notable studies include Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996) and Brazel, Jones, and Zimbelman (2006). Dechow et al. (1996) examine a sample of 92 firms with an AAER from 1982 to 1992. They document that AAERs are associated with external financing needs and poor corporate governance. They also show that AAER firms experience signifies cant increases
in their cost of capital after the revelations of accounting manipulations. Brazel etffal. (2006) also and that several non-financial measures can be useful in predicting accounting manipulations.Although the number of Type I errors in fraud prediction models is relatively high, the relative cost of Type I to Type II errors for institutional investors is likely extremely low. Several studies have estimated investment losses when accounting manipulations are revealed. The latest large sample evidence suggests that the cost of Type II errors average approximately 40 percent of an institution's investment in a fraud firm (Karpo, Lee, and Martin, 2007). On the other hand, the cost of a Type I error is extremely low in a market with many substitute assets as investors can simply choose not to hold firms with a high probability of fraud. Investors may also
be privy to private information regarding firm performance and accounting manipulations. To the extent that investors possess private information and choose to use other qualitative information, they may be able to significantly reduce the number of Type I and II errors incurred when attempting to identify accounting frauds. The high number of Type I errors associated with using earnings manipulation prediction models might also suggest that investors would be willing to live with the negative returns associated with fraud _firms if the negative returns are balanced out with suficiently positive returns from non-fraud _firms with strong signals of fraud. In a concurrent working paper, Beneish and Nichols (2007), show that this is not the case. Their results reveal that _firms with a high probability of manipulated earn have lower future earnings and returns. They also show that a trading strategy based on the probability of earnings manipulation yields an abnormal hedge return of 13.9 percent.Through additional tests they conclude that the returns, which are concentrated on the short side, are not a result of asymmetric arbitrage costs, but rather a result of asymmetric errors in market expectations.
Beneish and Nichols (2007) do not provide direct evidence on _firms that actually manipulate earn, rather they examine portfolios of firms with a high probability of manipulation. They find that institutional investors increase their holdings in firms with a high probability of manipulation. My study focuses on the actual incidence of fraud. I am able to provide more detailed and direct evidence on the trading behavior of institutions in actual fraud _firms before, during, and after the period in which firms commit fraud and the frauds become public. 2.2 Institutional Investors From 1980 to 1996, institutional investors doubled their share of the market and now control over half of the U.S. equity market (Gompers and Metrick, 2001). The increased importance and perceived sophistication of institutional investors has spawned a large body of literature.
One branch of the literature examines whether institutional investors act as monitors and influence managements' decisions. The evidence suggests that the level of institutional ownership and the composition of a firm's institutional ownership base matters when determining whether institutional owners are likely to act as effective monitors. Bushee (1998) finds that managers are less likely to cut research and development expenses when facing an earnings shortfall if
institutional ownership is high. But he also finds that large proportions of ownership by institutions that trade based on momentum and have high portfolio turnover increase the likelihood that a firm will cut research and development to meet an earnings shortfall. Chung, Firth, and Kim (2002) find that large institutional shareholdings in a firm reduce the likelihood of earnings management using accruals. Chen, Harford, and Li (2007), using acquisition decisions to reveal monitoring, find that institutions with long-term investments specialize in monitoring while other institutions do not monitor. Bushee (2001) finds that high levels of short-term investors are associated with an over-weighting of near-term expected earnings and under-weighting of
long-term expected earnings. In light of this combined evidence, my first prediction is that fraud firms, prior to the issuance of their first fraudulent earnings report, are likely to have low levels of institutional ownership. I also expect that fraud firms will have higher levels of short-term, transient, institutional ownership and lower levels of long-term, dedicated, institutional ownership. Much of the accounting research on institutional investors' trading behavior suggests that institutional investors are sophisticated users of accounting information. For example, previous literature has documented that the higher the level of institutional ownership, the smaller the market reaction surrounding earnings announcements (El-Gazzar, 1998). Balsam, Bartov, and Marquardt (2002) find that the valuation implications of large discretionary accruals are incorporated into stock prices more quickly for _rms with large institutional investor bases. The presence of institutional investors is also positively associated with the extent that prices lead earnings (Jiambalvo, Raj Gopal, and Venkatachalam, 2002). Studies have also shown that institutional investors exploit accounting based stock price anomalies such as the post-earnings announcement drift (Ke and Ramalingegowda,2005) and the accruals anomaly (Collins, Gong, and Hribar, 2003). Lev and Nissim (2006) also show that the accruals anomaly is exploited by some institutional investors, but the magnitude of this accruals-related trading is rather small. They show that the continued persistence of the accruals anomaly is not explained by a lack of understanding among institutions, but rather an institutional distaste for extreme-accruals firms that are typically small, unprofitable, and risky. Ke and Ramalingegowda (2005) find that
institutions also possess information that allows them to avoid negative stock price shocks associated with a break in a string of consecutive earnings increases.
Although much of the literature on institutional investors suggests that they are sophisticated users of financial information, this literature stands in contrast to evidence that questions whether institutions profit from informational advantages. For example, much of the literature on mutual fund performance suggests that superior performance is not persistent (e.g., Brown and Goetzmann 1995). Additionally, O'Brien and Bhushan (1990) _find that institutions are attracted to firms with more analyst following. Similarly, Bushee and Noe (2000) _find that institutions are attracted to firms with high-quality disclosure regimes. Therefore, if public and private information are substitutes, institutions should have fewer opportunities to benefit from informational advantages. If institutional investors possess superior private information or information processing abilities, I expect to find support for my second prediction that institutional investors divest shares in firms that are committing accounting fraud. A lack of evidence that institutions divest shares in fraud firms prior to public revelations of fraud would suggest that either investors are unable to use private information to anticipate public announcements of fraud or the cost of anticipating the public announcements of fraud are too great relative to the benefits. Institutional investors exhibit heterogeneity in their investment styles. Prior literature has shown that the likelihood of informed trading varies with institutional investors' characteristics (e.g., Hribar and Jenkins 2004; Ke and Ramalingegowda2005). Much of the prior literature has relied on a methodology proposed by Bushee (1998). In this methodology, institutions are first classified into one of three investment strategies (quasi-indexer, transient, and dedicated institutional investors) based on portfolio turnover and stake sizes. The institutions are then aggregated at the firm level. The body of evidence that uses this methodology typically finds that profitable trading in anticipation of future events is only identity able for the transient investor category. Therefore, I expect any evidence that institutional investors predict accounting fraud will be concentrated among transient institutional investors. Because dedicated institutional owners have the largest portion of their portfolios at stake when a fraud is revealed, I also anticipate the possibility that
they may divest shares in anticipation of fraud revelations.
In a recent paper, Bushee and Goodman (2007) exploit the heterogeneity among institutional investors and the positions they hold by conducting an analysis that includes not only
institution-level variables such as portfolio size and trading strategy but also institution firm-level characteristics such as the size of a position in a particular firm and the size of the position in a firm relative to an institution's portfolio size. They find that private information trading are most pronounced when large positions are taken by investment advisers in small firms. In the spirit of Bushee and Goodman (2007), I conduct an institution-level analysis that exploits the heterogeneity among institutional investors that are not captured by the threemtypes of trading strategies employed in my firm-level analysis. Using proxies for the quality of an institution's information environment and the incentives an institution has to avoid fraud _firms, I expect to
_find that institutions with the strongest incentives to avoid accounting fraud and higher-quality information environments are more likely to divest shares in fraud firms prior to the revelation of accounting fraud. I define and discuss in the institution-level analysis section the total institutional ownership representing only a 4.7 percent decrease in total institutional holdings. The decrease in transient institutional ownership in the quarter immediately prior to the fraud revelations represents only a 15.1 percent decrease in their institutional holdings. Thus, although institutions mitigate losses by divesting fraud firms prior to fraud revelations, overall they still lose a considerable amount of their investments. 5.2 Institution-level Analysis Institutions exhibit significant heterogeneity beyond the three investment styles I employ in my first analysis; therefore, I conduct a second analysis at the institution level. In this analysis, I test whether institution-level proxies for incentives to avoid accounting fraud and for private information are negatively associated with changes in institutions' ownership of fraud _rms. In this section, private information refers to both an institution's ability to gather private information and an institution's ability to process both private and public information. I employee two sets of variables in my tests. The first set is measured at the institution level and the second set is measured at the
institution-firm level.
My first variables are measured at the institution level and include an institution's investment strategy, fiduciary type, and size. To measure investment strategy, I create indicator variables for the three trading strategies that I employee in my firm-level analysis: INDEXERS, TRANSIENT, and DEDICATED. Next, I classify institutions into four categories based on fiduciary type: bank trusts (BANK), insurance companies (INSURANCE), investment advisors (IA), and pensions and Endowments (PENSION). Bank trusts and pensions face strict prudent investment standards under the Employee Retirement Income Securities Act and common law.
These investment standards may lead these institutions to tilt their portfolios toward characteristics that are more likely to justify the prudence of their investments. For example, Guercio (1996) _nds that banks tilt their portfolios toward firms with high S&P stock ratings. Following Bushee and Goodman (2007), my last institution-level measure is ISIZE, which is an indicator variable equal to one if the market value of an institution's equity portfolio is in the top quintile for all institutions in a particular quarter and zero otherwise. Because larger institutions have more resources, I expect that ISIZE is a proxy for an institution's ability to acquire and process information. Therefore, I expect that large institutions will be more likely to divest shares in firms committing fraud. At the institution-firm level, I employ two additional measures that proxy for an institution's private information and incentives to avoid accounting fraud. The first, BET, is a variable that measures the relative size of the stake an institution has at risk in a particular firm. BET is measured as the market-value of equity owned by institution j in firm i in quarter t scaled by the total market value of institution j's portfolio in quarter t. I expect BET to be negatively associated with institutional changes in ownership in fraud firms. Institutions with higher levels of BET have relatively more value at risk than firms with lower levels of BET; therefore, these institutions have greater incentives to gather private information and avoid investments in firms committing fraud. My last institution firm level variable is BLOCK, which is an indicator variable equal to one if the percent of total shares outstanding held by an institution in a firm is in the top quintile of institutional ownership for that firm and zero otherwise. I expect that BLOCK is associated with private information advantages because these institutions are more likely to have access to private
information and are more willing to incur the costs of private information acquisition and processing. Therefore, I expect that BLOCK will be negatively associated with changes in institutional holdings of fraud firms. Bushee and Goodman (2007) were the first to employ these two measures and point out that while BET and BLOCK are probably positively correlated, BET is likely a better measure of incentives to gather private information about a firm. BLOCK, include the pre-fraud level of institutional ownership, and help as a control variable.
外文文献翻译——参考格式
广东工业大学华立学院 本科毕业设计（论文） 外文参考文献译文及原文 系部经济学部 专业经济学 年级 2007级 班级名称 07经济学6班 学号 16020706001 学生姓名张瑜琴 指导教师陈锶 2011 年05月
目录 1挑战：小额贷款中的进入和商业银行的长期承诺 (1) 2什么商业银行带给小额贷款和什么把他们留在外 (2) 3 商业银行的四个模型进入小额贷款之内 (4) 3.1内在的单位 (4) 3.2财务子公司 (5) 3.3策略的同盟 (5) 3.4服务公司模型 (6) 4 合法的形式和操作的结构比较 (8) 5 服务的个案研究公司模型：厄瓜多尔和Haiti5 (9)
1 挑战：小额贷款中的进入和商业银行的长期承诺 商业银行已经是逐渐重要的运动员在拉丁美洲中的小额贷款服务的发展2到小额贷款市场是小额贷款的好消息客户因为银行能提供他们一完整类型的财务的服务，包括信用，储蓄和以费用为基础的服务。整体而言，它也对小额贷款重要，因为与他们广泛的身体、财务的和人类。如果商业银行变成重的运动员在小额贷款，他们能提供非常强烈的竞争到传统的小额贷款机构。资源，银行能廉宜地发射而且扩张小额贷款服务rela tively。如果商业广告银行在小额贷款中成为严重的运动员，他们能提出非常强烈的竞争给传统的小额贷款机构。然而，小额贷款社区里面有知觉哪一商业银行进入进入小额贷款将会是短命或浅的。举例来说，有知觉哪一商业银行首先可能不搬进小额贷款因为时候建立小额贷款操作到一个有利润的水平超过银行的标准投资时间地平线。或，在进入小额贷款，银行之后可能移动在－上面藉由增加贷款数量销售取利润最大值－或者更坏的事，退出如果他们是不满意与小额贷款的收益性的水平。这些知觉已经被特性加燃料商业银行的情形进入小额贷款和后来的出口之内。在最极端的，一些开业者已经甚至宣布，”降低尺度死！”而且抛弃了与主意合作的商业银行。 在最 signific 看得到的地方，蚂蚁利益商业银行可能带给小额贷款，国际的ACCION 发展发射而且扩张的和一些商业银行的关系小额贷款操作。在这些情形的大部分方面， ACCION 和它的合伙人正在使用方法，已知的当做服务公司模型，表演早答应当做一个能工作的方法克服真正的。 商业银行的障碍进入和穿越建立长命的小额贷款操作一个商业银行 这论文描述如何服务公司模型、住址商业银行中的主要议题进入进小额贷款，监定成功建立的因素动作井小额贷款服务公司，和礼物结果和小额贷款的课servic e 公司用最长的经验，在海地和审判官席 del 的 SOGEBANK│ SOGESOL 初期结果指出那这服务公司模型表现一重要的突破在促成商业银行进入和留在小额贷款。在厄瓜多尔的 Pichincha│ CREDIFE。初期结果指出服务公司模型在促成商业广告中表现一次重要的突破银行进入而且留在小额贷款。
3外文翻译模板格式及要求
杭州电子科技大学 毕业论文外文文献翻译要求 根据《普通高等学校本科毕业设计（论文）指导》的内容，特对外文文献翻译提出以下要求： 一、翻译的外文文献可以是一篇，也可以是两篇，但总字符要求不少于1.5万（或翻译成中文后至少在3000字以上）。 二、翻译的外文文献应主要选自学术期刊、学术会议的文章、有关著作及其他相关材料，应与毕业论文（设计）主题相关，并作为外文参考文献列入毕业论文（设计）的参考文献。并在每篇中文译文首页用“脚注”形式注明原文作者及出处，中文译文后应附外文原文。 脚注的方法：插入----引用---脚注和尾注 三、中文译文的基本撰写格式为： 1.题目:采用小三号、黑体字、居中打印； 2.正文:采用小四号、宋体字，行间距为固定值20磅，标准字符间距。页边距为左3cm，右2.5cm，上下各2.5cm，页面统一采用A4纸。英文原文如为word文档，请用罗马字体排版，段前空两格。 从正文开始编写页码，页码居中。 四、封面格式由学校统一制作（注：封面上的“翻译题目”指中文译文的题目），填充内容为加粗小三号楷体_GB2312，并按“封面、译文一、外文原文一、译文二、外文原文二、考核表”的顺序统一装订。 五、忌自行更改表格样式，学号请写完整。 封面和考核表均为一页纸张，勿换行换页。
毕业论文外文文献翻译 毕业设计（论文）题目Xxx 翻译（1）题目指翻译后的中文译文的题目翻译（2）题目指翻译后的中文译文的题目学院会计学院（以本模板为准）专业会计学（以本模板为准）姓名XXXXXX（以本模板为准）班级XX020811（以本模板为准）学号XX023101（以本模板为准）指导教师XXXXXX（以本模板为准）
外文翻译模板2010
中国石油大学（华东） 本科毕业设计（论文）外文翻译 学生姓名：王辰 学号：0607XXXX 专业班级：信息与计算科学06-2班 指导教师：陈华 2010年6月24日
（原文复印或打印材料,B5纸） In this paper based on the unique geometry and mechanical movement of beam pumping unit,we have presented a simple swing equation and computed motorial parameter;meanwhile under the conditions of the static load and inertial load of the polished-rod of a conventional pumping unit,we have also presented on equivalent dynamic model of the pumping unit system and the type-curves of net torque of the crankshaft with the characteristic of inertial counterbalance have been computed;Based on features and mechanical analysis of belt，a simple model for calculating belt transmission efficiency is developed the model can provide a theoretical base for study on the other transient variable of beam pumping unit;the cyclic loading coefficients is defined once and compute the nominal Power of the motor; at last we compare the beam pumping unit and the adjustable diameter and changeable toque pumping unit, based on this a program have been finished，and we also introduce other power saving pumping units. This graduation project mainly completes through the high accuracy data acquisition, the gain installs on the oil well oil extraction equipment the electric current, the voltage, the temperature, the pressure, the fluid position, the contact surface, the current capacity, contains water data and so on sensor, corresponds the connection with the many kinds of wireless communications (for example GPRS/CDMA) transmits it to the observation and control center, as well as will receive in the central server to the parameter carries on the real-time analysis and the processing parallel intergrowth becomes the database and the curve report form. Is advantageous for the oil field management level to carry on the prompt accurate management to the scene equipment. This system depends on in the Beijing Kunlun passing condition automation software science and technology limited company's entire center cultural work
土木工程外文翻译参考3篇
学校 毕业设计（论文）附件 外文文献翻译 学号： xxxxx 姓名： xxx 所在系别： xxxxx 专业班级： xxx 指导教师： xxxx 原文标题： Building construction concrete crack of prevention and processing 2012年月日 .
建筑施工混凝土裂缝的预防与处理1 摘要 混凝土的裂缝问题是一个普遍存在而又难于解决的工程实际问题，本文对混凝土工程中常见的一些裂缝问题进行了探讨分析，并针对具体情况提出了一些预防、处理措施。 关键词：混凝土裂缝预防处理 前言 混凝土是一种由砂石骨料、水泥、水及其他外加材料混合而形成的非均质脆性材料。由于混凝土施工和本身变形、约束等一系列问题，硬化成型的混凝土中存在着众多的微孔隙、气穴和微裂缝，正是由于这些初始缺陷的存在才使混凝土呈现出一些非均质的特性。微裂缝通常是一种无害裂缝，对混凝土的承重、防渗及其他一些使用功能不产生危害。但是在混凝土受到荷载、温差等作用之后，微裂缝就会不断的扩展和连通，最终形成我们肉眼可见的宏观裂缝，也就是混凝土工程中常说的裂缝。 混凝土建筑和构件通常都是带缝工作的，由于裂缝的存在和发展通常会使内部的钢筋等材料产生腐蚀，降低钢筋混凝土材料的承载能力、耐久性及抗渗能力，影响建筑物的外观、使用寿命，严重者将会威胁到人们的生命和财产安全。很多工程的失事都是由于裂缝的不稳定发展所致。近代科学研究和大量的混凝土工程实践证明，在混凝土工程中裂缝问题是不可避免的，在一定的范围内也是可以接受的，只是要采取有效的措施将其危害程度控制在一定的范围之内。钢筋混凝土规范也明确规定：有些结构在所处的不同条件下，允许存在一定宽度的裂缝。但在施工中应尽量采取有效措施控制裂缝产生，使结构尽可能不出现裂缝或尽量减少裂缝的数量和宽度，尤其要尽量避免有害裂缝的出现，从而确保工程质量。 混凝土裂缝产生的原因很多，有变形引起的裂缝：如温度变化、收缩、膨胀、不均匀沉陷等原因引起的裂缝；有外载作用引起的裂缝；有养护环境不当和化学作用引起的裂缝等等。在实际工程中要区别对待，根据实际情况解决问题。 混凝土工程中常见裂缝及预防: 1.干缩裂缝及预防 干缩裂缝多出现在混凝土养护结束后的一段时间或是混凝土浇筑完毕后的一周左右。水泥浆中水分的蒸发会产生干缩，且这种收缩是不可逆的。干缩裂缝的产生主要是由于混凝土内外水分蒸发程度不同而导致变形不同的结果：混凝土受外部条件的影响，表面水分损失过快，变形较大，内部湿度变化较小变形较小，较大的表面干缩变形受到混凝土内部约束，产生较大拉应力而产生裂缝。相对湿度越低，水泥浆体干缩越大，干缩裂缝越易产 1原文出处及作者：《加拿大土木工程学报》
论文及外文翻译格式(标准)
附件5 论文及外文翻译写作格式样例 附录1 内封格式示例（设置成小二号字，空3行） 我国居民投资理财现状及发展前景的研究 （黑体，加粗，小二，居中，空2行） The Research on Status and Future of Inhabitants’ Investment and Financial Management in China （Times New Roman体，加粗，小二，居中，实词首字母大写，空5行） 院系经济与管理学院（宋体，四号，首行缩进6字符） 专业公共事业管理（宋体，四号，首行缩进6字符） 班级 6408101 （宋体，四号，首行缩进6字符） 学号 200604081010 （宋体，四号，首行缩进6字符） 姓名李杰（宋体，四号，首行缩进6字符） 指导教师张芸（宋体，四号，首行缩进6字符） 职称副教授（宋体，四号，首行缩进6字符） 负责教师（宋体，四号，首行缩进6字符） （空7行） 沈阳航空航天大学（宋体，四号，居中） 2010年6月（宋体，四号，居中）
附录2 摘要格式示例（设置成三号，空2行） 摘要（黑体，加粗，三号，居中，两个字之间空两格） （空1行） 我国已经步入经济全球化发展的21世纪，随着市场经济的快速增长和对外开放的进一步深化，我国金融市场发生了巨大的变化。一方面，投资理财所涉及到的领域越来越广，不仅仅是政府、企业、社会组织进行投资理财，居民也逐步进入到金融市场中，开始利用各种投资工具对个人、家庭财产进行打理，以达到资产保值、增值，更好的用于消费、养老等的目的；另一方面，我国居民投资理财观念逐渐趋于成熟化、理性化；同时，其投资理财工具以及方式手段亦越来越向多元化、完善化发展。 本论文以我国居民投资理财为研究对象，综合运用现代经济学、金融学和管理学的理论；统计学、概率学的方法和工具，主要对我国居民投资理财的历史演变、发展现状、意识观念、存在的问题和主要投资理财工具进行了分析和探讨，并提出了改善和促进我国居民理财现状的对策和建议，指出了普通居民合理化投资理财的途径。 摘要以浓缩的形式概括研究课题的内容，摘要应包括论文的创新性及其理论和实际意义。摘要中不宜使用公式、图表，不标注引用文献编号。中文摘要在300-500字左右。（首行缩进两个字符，宋体，小四，行距最小值：22磅）（空1行） 关键词：（宋体，小四，加粗，左缩进：0）投资理财资理财工具通货膨胀（宋体，小四，每个关键词之间空两格，关键词的个数在3到5个之间）
外文翻译模板
最佳分簇规模的水声传感器网络 Liang Zhao,Qilian Liang 德州大学阿灵顿分校电子工程系 Arlington, TX 76010, USA Email: https://www.wendangku.net/doc/f56518929.html,, https://www.wendangku.net/doc/f56518929.html, 摘要：在这篇论文中,我们主要关注的是的最优化分簇规模对水声传感器网络的影响。由于稀疏部署和信道属性的水声传感器网络是不同于地面传感器。我们的分析表明,最优分簇规模主要工作频率所决定的声音的传播。此外,区域数据聚合中也起着因素在很大程度上决定最佳分簇规模。 1引言 水下传感器网络(UW-ASN)可看成是个自组织网络，组成的传感器与一个声音进行分配感应的任务。为了达到这个目的,传感器必须自组织成一个独立的可以适应水下环境的网络,。UW-ASNs可以沿用许多通讯技术传统自组织网络和陆地的无线传感器网络,但仍有一些重要的区别为有限的能量和带宽约[1],[5],此协议对传统发展无线自组网路并不一定适合绝无仅有的网络的特点。当一个无线传感器可能要在一个微小的电池持续比较长的时间，能源效率就成为一个大问题。 由于广播的性质和有限的带宽，在浅水通信[6] [7]，多跳可以引起传感器节点之间严重干扰。一个新的路由称为“矢量为基础的转移” （VBF）缓解了这个问题 [8]。 VBF本质上是一种基于位置的路由选择方法：节点紧邻“矢量”转发源宿信息。 通过这种方式，只有一小部分的节点参与路由。另一种解决办法是，每一个传感器分簇通信应该直接指向簇头和内部分簇通信应协调由簇头，以最大限度地提高带宽利用率以往的研究水下通信经常使用时间计划调度方法[9],[10],这可能是适合的小型网络简单。然而，扁平架构还可能限制网络的规模。特别是由于传播延迟声汇简单的时间调度算法方案并不适合较大的水下网络[11]。在文献[11]中，Salva-Garau 和 Stojanovic建议聚类水声载体网络的方案，这组相邻载体进入分簇，和使用的TDMA（时分多址）内每个群集。在分簇管理的干扰是分配到相邻的簇不同的扩频码，同时可扩展性是通过在空间复用码。网络运行开始初始化阶段，并移动到不断维修期间而流动性管理。他们还利用仿真分析，以获得最佳簇大小和传输功率为一种具有一定的载体密度网络。[12]提出了平台，同时使用光学和声汇水下通信。虽然光通信可以达到更高的数据速率，它的应用仅限于短距离点至点通信。该平台也使得移动使用data muling,，这对于大批量的理想延迟容许的应用程序。
外文文献翻译封面格式及要求(模版)
毕业论文外文文献翻译 院 年级专业： 2009 级XXXXXXXXXXX 姓 名：学 号：附 件： 备注：（注意：备注页这一整页的内容都不需要打印，看懂了即可）
1.从所引用的与毕业设计（论文）内容相近的外文文献中选择一篇或一部分进行翻译（不少于3000实词）； 2.外文文献翻译的装订分两部分，第一部分为外文文献；第二部分为该外文文献的中文翻译，两部分之间用分页符隔开。也就是说，第一外文文献部分结束后，使用分页符，另起一页开始翻译。 3.格式方面，外文文献的格式，除了字体统一使用Times new roman 之外，其他所有都跟中文论文的格式一样。中文翻译的格式，跟中文论文的格式一样。 （注意：备注页这一整页的内容都不需要打印，看懂了即可,定稿后,请删除本页.） 范文如下：注意,下面内容每一部份均已用分页符分开了,如果用本模板,请将每一模块单独删除,直接套用到每一模板里面,不要将全部内容一次性删除. 【Abstract】This paper has a systematic analysis on outside Marco-environment of herbal tea beverage industry and major competitors of brands inside the herbal tea market. Based on
the theoretic framework, this paper takes WONG LO KAT and JIA DUO BAO herbal tea as an example, and researches the strategy on brand positioning and relevant marketing mix of it. Through analysis on the prevention sense of WONG LO KAT herbal tea, it was positioned the beverage that can prevent excessive internal heat in body, a new category divided from the beverage market. the process of brand positioning of it in Consumers brain was finished. Based on this positioning strategy, WONG LO KAT reasonably organized and arranged its product strategy, price strategy, distribution strategy and promotion strategy, which not only served for and further consolidated the position of preventing excessive internal heat in body, but also elevated the value of brand. The JDB and WONG LO KAT market competition brings us enlightenment. Reference the successful experience from the JDB and lessons from the failure of the WONG LO KAT.，Times New Roman. 【Key Words】Brand positioning; Marketing mix; Positioning Strategy; enlightenment, lessons；ABC （本页为英文文献摘要，关键词两项一起单独一页，字体为：Times New Roman，小四号，1.5倍行距）
最新外文翻译模板精编版
2020年外文翻译模板 精编版
精品好文档，推荐学习交流 华北电力大学 毕业设计（论文）附件 外文文献翻译 学号：201001000826姓名：郑蓓 所在院系：电力工程系专业班级：电力1002 指导教师：刘英培 原文标题：Simulation of PMSM Vector Control System based on Non-linear PID and Its Easy DSP Realization 2014年4月10日
基于非线性PID永磁同步电机矢量控制系统仿真及其DSP实现 摘要 本文给出空间矢量脉宽调制（SVPWM）的基本原理，以及构建两条闭合回路矢量控制永磁同步电机（PMSM）的仿真模型方法。同时，在速度闭环对于新型非线性PID控制器进行了研究。仿真结果表明它具有无超调和小速度脉动良好的动态和静态性能。此外，利用在MATLAB中嵌入式目标为TI C2000（C2000 ETTI）的工具，我们将SVPWM仿真模型转换成可执行代码，并下载到TMS320F2812，实现基于DSP永磁同步电机的开环控制。这种方法避免了繁琐的编程工作，缩短了系统开发周期，实现了同步模拟和DSP实现永磁同步电机矢量控制系统的目标。 1 引言 永磁同步电机被广泛使用在交流伺服系统，因为它有如快速响应，出色的操控性能，尺寸小和重量轻等优点。最近，SVPWM技术逐渐取代了传统的SPWM。SVPWM的目的是产生磁通矢量来接近交流电机实际气隙磁通圆，通过在逆变器装置调整切换时间和控制电功率的通断模式。相较于SPWM，SVPWM 技术降低了谐波含量和开关损耗，其直流电压利用率也提高了很多。此外，它很容易被数字化。因此，我们在本文应用SVPWM技术。 原文出处及作者：Wang Song; Shi Shuang-shuang; Chen Chao, "Simulation of PMSM vector control system based on non-linear PID and its easy DSP realization," Control and Decision Conference, 2009. CCDC '09. Chinese , vol., no., pp.949,953, 17-19 June 2009
最新外文翻译模板
外文翻译模板
精品好文档，推荐学习交流 华北电力大学 毕业设计（论文）附件 外文文献翻译 学号：201001000826姓名：郑蓓 所在院系：电力工程系专业班级：电力1002 指导教师：刘英培 原文标题：Simulation of PMSM Vector Control System based on Non-linear PID and Its Easy DSP Realization 2014年4月10日
基于非线性PID永磁同步电机矢量控制系统仿真及其DSP实现 摘要 本文给出空间矢量脉宽调制（SVPWM）的基本原理，以及构建两条闭合回路矢量控制永磁同步电机（PMSM）的仿真模型方法。同时，在速度闭环对于新型非线性PID控制器进行了研究。仿真结果表明它具有无超调和小速度脉动良好的动态和静态性能。此外，利用在MATLAB中嵌入式目标为TI C2000（C2000 ETTI）的工具，我们将SVPWM仿真模型转换成可执行代码，并下载到TMS320F2812，实现基于DSP永磁同步电机的开环控制。这种方法避免了繁琐的编程工作，缩短了系统开发周期，实现了同步模拟和DSP实现永磁同步电机矢量控制系统的目标。 1 引言 永磁同步电机被广泛使用在交流伺服系统，因为它有如快速响应，出色的操控性能，尺寸小和重量轻等优点。最近，SVPWM技术逐渐取代了传统的SPWM。SVPWM的目的是产生磁通矢量来接近交流电机实际气隙磁通圆，通过在逆变器装置调整切换时间和控制电功率的通断模式。相较于SPWM，SVPWM 技术降低了谐波含量和开关损耗，其直流电压利用率也提高了很多。此外，它很容易被数字化。因此，我们在本文应用SVPWM技术。 原文出处及作者：Wang Song; Shi Shuang-shuang; Chen Chao, "Simulation of PMSM vector control system based on non-linear PID and its easy DSP realization," Control and Decision Conference, 2009. CCDC '09. Chinese , vol., no., pp.949,953, 17-19 June 2009
外文翻译合同(合同示范文本)
( 合同范本 ) 甲方： 乙方： 日期：年月日 精品合同 / Word文档 / 文字可改 外文翻译合同(合同示范文本) The contract concluded after the parties reached a consensus through equal consultations stipulates the mutual obligations and the rights they should enjoy.
外文翻译合同(合同示范文本) 甲方(聘用方)：____________________________________________ 联系地址：__________________________________________________ 联系电话：__________________________________________________ 传真：______________________________________________________ 邮编：______________________________________________________ 乙方(受聘方)：____________________________________________ 联系地址：
__________________________________________________ 联系电话：__________________________________________________ 鉴于甲方拍摄的_____集电视连续剧《》（暂定名，最终定名以通过审核的完成片片名___________为准，改变剧名和集数不影响本合同的效力及履行，以下简称该剧）外文翻译事宜，拟聘请乙方担任该剧外文翻译等相关后期工作，经甲、乙双方充分协商，达成以下协议，以兹共同信守。 第一条聘用期限 本合同有效期限自合同签订之日起至甲方交付乙方的全部工作完成后为有效期。因不可抗力原因延期拍摄时，甲乙双方协商本合约可顺延。 第二条乙方的工作 乙方负责如下事项。 1．除日文之外其它各外文语种的全部翻译工作（外文配音台词本的制作、外文翻译中文并校对、配合后期配音工作的要求、配合
毕业论文外文翻译模板
农村社会养老保险的现状、问题与对策研究社会保障对国家安定和经济发展具有重要作用，“城乡二元经济”现象日益凸现，农村社会保障问题客观上成为社会保障体系中极为重要的部分。建立和完善农村社会保障制度关系到农村乃至整个社会的经济发展，并且对我国和谐社会的构建至关重要。我国农村社会保障制度尚不完善，因此有必要加强对农村独立社会保障制度的构建，尤其对农村养老制度的改革，建立健全我国社会保障体系。从户籍制度上看，我国居民养老问题可分为城市居民养老和农村居民养老两部分。对于城市居民我国政府已有比较充足的政策与资金投人，使他们在物质和精神方面都能得到较好地照顾，基本实现了社会化养老。而农村居民的养老问题却日益突出，成为摆在我国政府面前的一个紧迫而又棘手的问题。 一、我国农村社会养老保险的现状 关于农村养老，许多地区还没有建立农村社会养老体系，已建立的地区也存在很多缺陷，运行中出现了很多问题，所以完善农村社会养老保险体系的必要性与紧迫性日益体现出来。 （一）人口老龄化加快 随着城市化步伐的加快和农村劳动力的输出，越来越多的农村青壮年人口进入城市，年龄结构出现“两头大，中间小”的局面。中国农村进入老龄社会的步伐日渐加快。第五次人口普查显示：中国65岁以上的人中农村为5938万，占老龄总人口的67.4%.在这种严峻的现实面前，农村社会养老保险的徘徊显得极其不协调。 （二）农村社会养老保险覆盖面太小 中国拥有世界上数量最多的老年人口，且大多在农村。据统计，未纳入社会保障的农村人口还很多，截止2000年底，全国7400多万农村居民参加了保险，占全部农村居民的11.18%，占成年农村居民的11.59%.另外，据国家统计局统计，我国进城务工者已从改革开放之初的不到200万人增加到2003年的1.14亿人。而基本方案中没有体现出对留在农村的农民和进城务工的农民给予区别对待。进城务工的农民既没被纳入到农村养老保险体系中，也没被纳入到城市养老保险体系中，处于法律保护的空白地带。所以很有必要考虑这个特殊群体的养老保险问题。
外文翻译格式示范
重庆科技学院学生毕业设计（论文）外文译文 学院建筑工程学院 专业班级土木应08(3) 学生姓名谭梳琪 学号2008540402
译文要求 1.外文翻译必须使用签字笔，手工工整书写，或用A4纸打印。 2.所选的原文不少于10000印刷字符，其内容必须与课题或专业方向紧密相关， 由指导教师提供，并注明详细出处。 3.外文翻译书文本后附原文（或复印件）。
外文原文出自：R.帕克、T.波利编著的《钢筋混凝土结构》中的417-423页 7.4 有腹筋钢筋混凝土梁的抗剪机理 7.4.1腹筋的作用 梁内有了像箍筋这样的腹筋之后，不会从根本上改变前面所描述的抗剪机理。作为梁作用的主要元件的混凝土悬臂这时将像被拉住的悬臂那样工作。除去有骨料咬合、销栓和悬臂的弯曲作用所联合承担的粘结力ΔT之外，还有一部分粘结力ΔT′能够由习惯上所说的“桁架作用”来承担。在这个桁架中，悬臂起斜向压杆的作用（见图7.14）。 图7.14 起斜压杆作用的混凝土悬臂 箍筋的存在在其他许多方面对梁作用也是有益的，它通过以下方式对抗剪机构的强度发挥作用： 1.改进销栓作用。箍筋能够有效地支承在它附近与弯剪裂缝相交的纵向钢筋。 2.通过桁架作用产生的斜压力C d抵消悬臂块体内的弯曲拉应力。 3.限制斜裂缝在弹性范围内的张开程度，从而使由骨料咬合作用传递的剪力得以维持 和增强。 4.当箍筋布置得足够密时，能对混凝土提供约束，从而特别是在受拱作用影响的部位 提高其抗压强度。 5.当在锚固区内由于销栓力和锚固力的作用而形成劈裂裂缝时，能防止粘结遭到破 坏。 总之，可以说，做了适当的细部设计的腹筋将能保持梁的整体性，并因而能够保持前面已经详述的梁机构的强度V e，从而使更多的建立V s能由桁架机构来承担。 7.4.2桁架机构 一个平行弦桁架与一个有腹筋混凝土梁之间在抗剪作用方面的相似性是混凝土结构的一个古老的概念。这种由Morsch[7.2.23]在本世纪初所假定的相似性的含义是，等效桁架的腹杆是由起拉杆作用的箍筋和走向平行于斜裂缝的、通常是与梁轴成45°角的混凝土压杆所组成的。混凝土的弯曲受压区和弯曲受拉钢筋构成这种比拟铰接桁架的上弦和下弦。桁架的内力只需根据平衡条件就能确定。这个桁架的性能与前已详述的“理想梁作用”相似到了如此地步，以至它能承受分散于弯曲受拉钢筋方向上的各个虚拟铰接点处的粘结力ΔT′，从而以不变的内力偶臂长来抵抗变化的外弯矩。 在梁内伴随着梁作用或拱作用以及桁架机构而出现的变形之间是不协调的。这种按惯例不予考虑的应变不协调性在趋近极限（即塑形）状态时越来越不显著。 图7.15中的比拟桁架描绘了腹筋以β角倾斜于水平线的一般情况。它也可以用来表示有桁架所承担的外剪力V s与各内力之间的关系。承受压力的C s的斜压杆与水平线的交角为
任务书 开题报告 文献综述 外文翻译模板
江汉大学毕业论文（设计）任务书物理和信息工程学院通信和电子信息系 电子信息工程专业 题目：智能家居门禁系统的研究及电子密码锁的设计 起止日期：2010年12月20日至2011年5月30日 学生姓名：xxxxxxx 学号：xxxxxxxxxxxxx 指导教师：漆为民 教研室主任：____________ 年月日审查 系主任：年月日批准 2010 年 12 月 20日至 2011年5月30日
学生进行毕业论文（设计）前，指导教师应填好此任务书，经教研室、系主任签字后，正式给学生下达任务。 江汉大学毕业论文（设计） 开题报告 论文题目智能家居门禁系统的研究及电子密码锁的设计
（英文）Access control system for smart home and the designof electronic locks 学院物理和信息工程学院 专业电子信息工程 姓名 xxxxxx 学号 xxxxxxxxxxxx 指导教师漆为民 2011年1月16日
注：本页为毕业论文(设计)开题报告的封面,请将开题报告正文装订于后。 开题报告 一．课题来源和背景 20世纪80年代初，随着大量采用电子技术的家用电器面市，住宅电子化出现。80年代中期，将家用电器、通信设备和安保防灾设备各自独立的功能综合为一体后，形成了住宅自动化概念。80年代末，由于通信和信息技术的发展，出现了对住宅中各种通信、家电、安保设备通过总线技术进行监视、控制和管理的商用系统，这在美国称为Smart Home，也就是现在智能家居的原型。 Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 我的课题是关于智能家居之门禁系统篇，主题是基于AT89C51单片机电子密码锁的设计和研究，运用了Proteus这一仿真平台。在对电子密码锁的设计的同时，也对各种门禁系统的核心技术进行了学习和比较。 二．研究目的以及意义 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx。 意义：通过该设计的经历，了解当今世上的有关智能家居门禁系统的一些新的发展，新的技术以及产品的使用。并通过对电子密码锁的设计研究，来学习通过一个基于AT89C51单片机的电子密码锁的仿真设计过程展示Proteus软件在数字电路及单片机开发中的巨大作用以及相比于传统设计方法的巨大优势．显示了Proteus能快速的进行单片机仿真．加快系统开发的过程而且降低的我们的开发成本。在设计过程中所使用到的Proteus的功能只是Proteus强大功能中的一小部分，Proteus还具有环境模拟、图表分析、噪声分析等高级使用．甚至能使用于自动控制领域对复杂的自控算法进行仿真．通过深入学习．我们可以进一步的了解Proteus在各个领域的强大使用。在数字电路和单片机的课程教学中Proteus也不失
山东建筑大学本科毕业设计说明书外文文献及翻译格式模版
附件3： （本科毕业论文）文献、资料题目： 院（部） 专 班 姓名：张三 学号： 指导教师：张九光 翻译日期：2005.6.30
，the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has been working to develop a new encryption standard to keep government information secure ．The organization is in the final stages of an open process of selecting one or more algorithms ，or data-scrambling formulas ，for the new Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and plans to make adecision by late summer or early fall ．The standard is slated to go into effect next year ． AES is intended to be a stronger ，more efficient successor to Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES)，which replaced the aging DES ，which was cracked in less than three days in July 1998． “Until we have the AES ，3DES will still offer protection for years to come ．So there is no need to immediately switch over ，”says Edward Roback ， acting chief of the computer security division at NIST and chairman of the AES selection committee ．“What AES will offer is a more efficient algorithm ．It will be a federal standard ，but it will be widely implemented in the IT community ．” According to Roback ，efficiency of the proposed algorithms is measured by how fast they can encrypt and decrypt information ，how fast they can present an encryption key and how much information they can encrypt ． The AES review committee is also looking at how much space the algorithm takes up on a chip and how much memory it requires ．Roback says the selection of a more efficient AES will also result in cost savings and better use of resources ． “DES w as designed for hardware implementations ，and we are now living in a world of much more efficient software ，and we have learned an awful lot about the design of algorithms ，”says Roback ．“When you start multiplying this with the billions of implementations done daily ，the saving on overhead on the networks will be enormous ．” ……
(完整版)外文翻译格式样本
毕业设计外文资料翻译 学院：信息科学与工程学院 专业：电子科学与技术 姓名：康兴华 学号：040704128 外文出处：填入英文资料名称 (用外文写) 指导教师评语： 签名： 年月日
附件1：外文资料翻译译文 UART的核 核的概况 带有Avalon接口的通用异步接收/发送器的核（UART的核）所执行的方式是为了沟通一个系统内置的Altera FPGA和外部设备之间的串行字符流。核实行RS-232协议计时，并提供可调波特率，奇偶，停止和数据位，以及可选RTS/CTS的流量控制信号。它的功能设置是可配置的，对于给定的系统，它允许设计者实现必要的功能。 核提供了一个简单的寄存器映射的Avalon存储器映射（Avalon-MM）的从属接口，使Avalon-MM的主控外设（如一个NiosII处理器）通过读和写控制寄存器和数据寄存器来简单的与核沟通。 该UART的核是SOPC Builder-ready，并且可以轻松的集成到任何SOPC Builder产生的系统中，本章包含以下章节： ■“功能描述”见8-2页 ■“设备和工具支持”见8-4页 ■“在SOPC Builder中对核实例化”见8-4页 ■“硬件仿真考虑”见8-9页 ■“软件编程模型”见8-9页 1. 功能描述 图1 展示了UART核的分块表
核有两个用户可见部分： ■寄存器文件，它通过Avalon-MM从属端口来存取 ■RS-232的信号，RXD，TXD，CTS和RTS 1.1 Avalon-MM从属接口和寄存器 该UART的核提供了一个Avalon-MM从属接口到内部寄存器文件。连接用户接口包含6个16位的寄存器：控制，状态，rxdata，txdata，除数，endofpacket。一个主控外设，如一个NiosII处理器，可以使寄存器通过串行连接来控制核和传输数据。 该UART的核提供了一个活跃的中断请求（IRQ）输出，当新的数据已收到或当核心准备传输另一字符时，可以要求一个中断，进一步的细节见8-20页“中断行为”。 Avalon-MM从属端口有能力随流量控制来转移。该UART的核可用于连接直接存储器（DMA）外设与Avalon-MM流量控制来使连续数据传输自动化。比如，UART的核和存储器之间。见“计时器核心”篇章细节。见“Avalon存储器映射接口规格”内容来了解Avalon-MM接口细节。 1.2RS-232接口 该UART的核实现了RS-232的异步传输和接收逻辑。该UART的核通过TXD和RXD端口发送和接收串行数据。大多数Altera的FPGA系列产品的输入/输出缓冲不符合RS-232的电压水平，如果由一个RS-232连接器的信号来直接驱动，将有可能受到损害。为了遵守RS-232的电压信号规格，在FPGA的I/O引脚与外部RS-232连接器之间需要一个外部电平移动式缓冲（例如Maxim Max3237）。 该UART的核使用逻辑0为标志，逻辑1为空间0。必要的话，FPGA里面的逆变器可以用来扭转任何RS-232信号的极性。 1.3发射器的逻辑 该UART的发射器包含一个7位，8位或9位的txdata控制寄存器和一个相应的7位，8位或9位的发射移位寄存器。Avalon-MM主控外设通过Avalon-MM从属端口来写入txdata控制寄存器。当一个串行发射移位操作当前没有进展时，发射移位寄存器自动从txdata寄存器上载入。发射移位寄存器直接提供TXD输出。数据以最低有效位元（LSB）开头，转移出TXD脚发送。