耶鲁大学文学理论公开课

乔姆斯基的转换生成语法理论

摘要：乔姆斯基的生成语法理论建立在20世纪中期的新的哲学基础上，它批判了结构主义的方法论，否定了结构主义的认识论，运用笛卡尔等人的理性主义，对语言现象做出了系统完整的解释，认为语言反映了心理，人类的语言能力包含天赋成份。熟悉了解乔姆斯基的生成语法理论的哲学基础，有助于语言学中在其他问题的分析与研究。

关键词：生成语法；语言习得机制；认知理论；理性主义；经验主义

无论是分析哲学还是欧洲大陆哲学，都重视研究语言，这是当代西方哲学的一个重要特征，语言不能脱离世界，语言只有表现世界才有它正真的存在。当代美国语言大师乔姆斯基首创了转换生成语法理论，正是这种转换生成语法在语言中挑起了一场革命。它标志着西方语言学的研究，尤其是美国的语言学界研究进入了一个崭新的时代，即乔姆斯基时期。

一、乔姆斯基“革命”

乔姆斯基的转换生成语法所研究的不是语言现象，也不是人们的语言运用，而是人们的语言能力，这种做法是对当时美国占统治地位的布龙菲尔德的结构主义语言学理论的否定。

上世纪50年代，统治美国的语言学界是以布龙菲尔德为代表的结构主义语言学。这一学派的主要实践活动是研究印第安少数民族语言。面对这些陌生的语言，他们不得不白手起家，先从收集语言索材做起，然后制定分析和描写这些语言材料的原则和方法。这种特殊的实践加上行为主义影响，在很大的程度上决定了布龙菲尔德学派在语言理论和研究方法上的特征和局限。他们研究语言主要是采用归纳的方法，对语言材料进行静态的描写。他们强调每一种语言的独特性，不相信有所谓的人类共同的普遍语法。受心理学行为主义的影响，他们认为人的语言行为不是先天就有的，而是后天习得的。他们也用“刺激-反应”来解释语言的形成。他们十分注意感性经验对于人们获得认识，形成语言的重要性。但是，由于机械狭隘的经验主义观点，造成了对语言上的一些问题不能解决的困难，暴露了经验主义的局限性。因此，受到乔姆斯基为首的转换生成语法学派的强烈反对。乔姆斯基是个彻底的理性主义者，他坚决反对语言学中的行为主义，采取心理主义语言理论。他认为，语言学家需要研究的是人的创造性的语言能力，而不是他在实际谈话中的表现。与布龙菲尔德不同，他强调人类语言的共同性、相似性。他坚信人类是相似的，因为他们的心理是相同的。既然语言是人类心理最富有人性的产物，那么，他们也是相似的，这种相似性即使不表现在语言的表面结构上，也一定会表现在语言的深层结构上。从这些出发，乔姆斯基采取演绎的方法，借逻辑与数学为工具，建立起自己的转换生成语法体系。

转换生成语法的创立，被认为是语言学中的一场革命，乔姆斯基的语言理论，很快成为现代语言学最有影响、最有活力的理论。凡是希望跟上语言学当前发展的语言学专家，都重视乔氏理论，其他各个语言学派别，也对照乔姆斯基的理论观点来阐明自己的主张和立场。一批富有朝气的年轻人，在乔姆斯基周围，形成了转换生成语法学派。这些学派由于基础理论与方法的新颖，而被公认为是与逻辑实证主义、日常语言学派相并列的现代西方语言哲学的又一个重要派别。不仅如此，这场“乔姆斯基革命”还很快波及到语言学以外的许多学科，对于哲学、心理学、逻辑学、人工智能、通讯工程等都产生了很大影响。因为人们认识到，

人类与其他种类动物的明显区别，与其说是某种思维功能或智力，不如说是语言能力。因此，人的语言的研究，对于我们理解人类本质有着不可忽视的作用。乔姆斯基的转换生成语法正是为了探究人的语言能力。目的是为了对人类语言的某些最显著的特征做出数学般的精确描写。乔姆斯基是一位语言学家，但是他的思想兴趣主要不是在纯粹的语言研究上，而是在语言与哲学相交之处。与纯粹的语言技术问题相比，他似乎更关心语言的产生与发展、语言同人的思维的关系、语言同认识能力的关系等。在他的语法体系中，他一方面用逻辑和哲学的观点和方法分析语言，建立体系，一方面他又通过这种对语言的研究来回答人的认识的发生和发展问题。因此，他的理论受到人们的普遍关注。

二、转换生成语法的理论框架。

转换生成语法单纯从形式的角度来描写语法结构，在研究中采用数学和逻辑学的符号和公式等形式化的手段来研究语法。乔姆斯基在语法研究过程中采用的是演绎法和内省法，其理论目标就是通过描述和分析语言结构和语言现象对语言使用者的语言能力作出充分解释，找出普遍语法，并进而探查人类所特有的内在语言习得机制，解释语言的生成和语言的创造性等问题。

本文仅谈及GB模型和MP模型。

GB模型是标志乔姆斯基理论成熟的模型，这个模型中他区分了语音形式PF（Phonetic Form）和逻辑形式MP(Logic Form)，它们分别是同人脑主司发音的声音系统和思维认知系统的接口，叫语言模型的外模块性。在PF的接口上语言系统输出语音或音位表达式，是关于句子声音的结构性描写；在LF接口上输出的是关于句子意义的表达式，是关于句子意义的结构性描写。当且仅当一个合格的PF表达式和一个合格的LF表达式同时生成的时候，才有合乎语法的句子。GB理论包含的基本内容有：规定深层结构形式的“X－阶标论”；决定语言类型的“中心项参数论”；“PRO－脱落参数”；“约束论”；刻画各结构成分间结构关系的“管辖论”；“核心语法”和“周边语法”的区分等。

MP模型是乔姆斯基1992年提出的，认为MP普遍语法系统模型由一个数据型的词库和一个计算系统构成，计算系统内没有任何表达式层次，直接在一个叫做“声音系统”的认知系统和一个叫做“思维系统”的认知子系统相关联，在与这两个认知子系统的接口处分别生成PF 表达式和LF表达式。MP模型强调语法模型终端生成的不是句子，而是在PF接口处生成关于句子声音形式的“结构描写”作为PF表达式，另一个PF表达式和一个LF表达式相匹配时，才有常识意义上的句子可言。PF表达式是向主管声音的认知子系统发出的指令，LF表达式是向主管思维的认知系统发出的指令。语言计算系统的总体任务是推导出成功的PF表达式，同时推导出成功的LF表达式。MP理论比GB理论有了很大的发展，取消了参数和深层表层结构的区别，同时增加了“核查理论”。

三、语言能力的天赋性与内在性

乔姆斯基的语言理论来源于他对儿童语言的研究。乔姆斯基认为语言是某种天赋，儿童天生就具有一种学习语言的能力，叫做“语言习得机制”（LAD）。这是一种很适合他们学习语言的独特的知识。在乔姆斯基看来，儿童生来就有一种独特的天赋才能。他们不仅有一般的倾向和潜力，而且有着关于世界本质的知识，尤其是关于语言本质的知识。按照他的观点，对语言或语言结构的研究能够揭示人类思维的本质。他认为小孩子无论生活在什么语言环境中，他总可以很快的学会这种环境中的语言，他不仅可以听懂别人的讲话，而且可以学会这种语言的运用，不仅是他听到过的，可以讲出来，而且，他可以根据这种语言的语法创

造出许多新的有效的句子。依据乔姆斯基，小孩子获得语言知识是一种构造理论的行为，他绝不是单凭经验学会了语言。语言需要模仿，模仿是语言的基础，但是语言不仅仅是模仿，而且主要不是模仿，主要是创造新的言语，这就是语言的创造性。乔姆斯基认为，这种创造和生成新的语言的能力是人的天赋能力，是内在的机能。人都有一本天赋的词典，具有分辨语词变化的能力。说话人通过一系列结构规则可以生成这种语言的句子的深层结构，即在每个句子表达出来以前就在大脑中存在的概念结构。形成了这种句子的深层结构之后，他头脑中已经有了一个正确的句子。在乔姆斯基看来，人们在说话之前他的头脑中存在着一个深层的语言结构或是思维能力，而且会形成一个内在的正确的句子。它仿佛是人们说话时的台词。乔姆斯基认为，深层结构通过“转换部分”可以转换成表层结构，这就是通过说话时的语音所表达出来的句子，表层结构是句子的形式，深层结构代表句子的意义。由此可见，乔姆斯基很注重两种语言结构的转换关系，但是在两种结构中他更加强调的是深层结构。

四、转换生成语法的局限性

乔姆斯基自己不承认他的语言学是结构主义语言学，但是许多人认为他与结构主义还是有联系的，这主要表现在他与索绪尔语言学方法的关系。无论他如何反对索绪尔的语言学方法，他继承了索绪尔以后的结构主义方法还是一个事实。而且他的深层结构与表层结构等观点也与一般结构主义有许多类似之处，如深层是神话结构，表层是神话；深层是亲属结构，表层是婚姻和家庭关系以及亲属关系；这些说法的重点是深层结构的先验性。乔姆斯基的语言学方法既有结构主义的因素，又有唯理论哲学的因素，是二者的有机结合。唯理论哲学观点主要是笛卡尔的“天赋观念”是一种“思维能力”，“天然能力”，“潜在性”，“倾向”，“习性”以及莱布尼茨等哲学家的观点。

乔姆斯基语言学观点在哲学上的错误在于把感性认识与理性认识的关系割裂开来，对立起来，片面夸大理性认识的作用。他把语言分为深层结构与表层结构就是这种割裂所引起的。不论深层结构还是表层结构都涉及语言意义问题，深层结构是语言意义的一种说法，正确地认识深层结构实际上就是深入地分析句子的意义。深层结构决不是天赋的先验的能力的产物。乔姆斯基的深层结构与表层结构的语言学理论对结构主义发生了重要影响。结构主义者关于不同结构的划分理论正是从乔姆斯基那里受到了启示。

另外一个局限性表现为：乔姆斯基对语言转换的研究强调形式，偏废内容。他把语言的创造性看成是一种形式化的系统，否认语言学习与经验习惯的关系，否认语言形式是具有内容的。他关于语言的创造性，生成性与形式化的理论实质上是把语言材料纳入形式化的语言框架之中，再由语言框架造出新的句子来，这是先验论哲学观点在语言学上的体现。

如果撇开哲学观点，仅仅从语言本身来看，我们必须承认对语言结构的研究不完全是形式化的，也是实质性的，它是对语言认识的深入，标志着语言学的发展。任何事物都存在着结构，语言也不例外。结构主义者认为语言存在着二元结构，在索绪尔那里是能指和所指的结构关系，在乔母斯基那里是深层结构和表层结构的关系，认识语言就是要认识它的结构。结构主义语言学对于我们学习语言（特别是外语），学习各类语言（包括人机对话的语言）的转换技术，区分语言的能指和所指，理解语言的表层含义和深层含义，具有重要的启示作用。

五、小结

乔姆斯基的转换生成语言学理论在现代语言学上有极其重要的意义。尽管他的理论存在不少问题，但“不论功与过，对与错，乔姆斯基的语法理论无疑是最有活力最有影响力的；任何一个语言学家，只要他不愿在自己的学科中落伍，都不敢漠视乔姆斯基的理论。现今每一个其他“流派”的语言学都要以乔姆斯基在某些问题上的观点为参照来界定自己的地位。”（Lyons,1991导言，转引自封宗信，2006：134），何况，乔姆斯基一生都在不断地完善和修订自己的理论，不断地自我超越，这本身就就值得我们敬佩和学习。

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另：

生成语法学家采用数学模拟的方法进行研究，其研究的对象是大脑的一种独特的认知系统──语法系统，因此乔姆斯基认为它属于经验科学，是一种特殊的心理学,最终将归入研究人脑机制的生物学。乔姆斯基说,与其把生成语法看作一种理论,不如看作一门“学科”,其性质和研究方法与以往的语言学有本质的区别，而与其他自然科学则基本一致。

发展过程一般人认为,乔姆斯基的生成语法有4个发展阶段，但是他本人认为只有两个转折点。下文按他本人的意见，分语法规则系统和语法原则系统两项来叙述。

60年代的语法规则系统早期的生成语法学家研究以数学的集合论为语法研究的基础。他们认为，每种语言都是句子的无穷集合，不能列举,只能用规则描述,因此学语言的人不可能一句句地学会，必须掌握语法规律。但是，一般人虽有说话和听话的能力，却并不意识到有哪些规律在起作用。生成语法学家认为，应该假设一套规则来描写语言能力。例如用语类规则来描述句子、词组等各种语类的内部结构，用S→NP＋VP来表示一个句子，句子(sentence)由一个名词词组(noun phrase)加上一个动词词组(verb phrase)构成。这种精确的、形式化的语法称为生成语法。20世纪80-90年代曾邦哲从符号学的系统科学（《结构论》）观提出英语的语序结构由Vi.j.、Aj.v.(l.,a.,m.)、Nc.u.、P(C)四种词符的六种关联或连接模式相加展开构成。

他们认为，传统语法学的规则太含混，只能意会，不易发展成精密科学；结构主义语法学的规则又内容太贫乏，只能作成分分析，不易揭示丰富多彩的语言规律。他们主张采用更加灵活的规则──转换规则,以便反映出下面这种规律:“他吃了这个苹果”,“他把这个苹果

吃了”,“这个苹果他吃了”,这3个句子虽然表面不同，但彼此之间有其内在的联系。转换规则也用形式化的符号表达，例如用X—V—NP→NP—X—V表示名词词组NP在句中变换了位置。用转换规则的语法叫转换语法,既生成又转换的语法叫转换-生成语法。现在一般称生成语法。

人的语言知识不仅有句法结构方面，也有语音和语义方面。例如我们都知道句子中哪个词应该读得最重,某个句子是什么意思等等，因此完整的生成语法应该包括音系规则和语义规则，分别描写人们头脑中潜在的音系知识和语义知识。

乔姆斯基于1957年后做了几年研究，到了1965年便建立起一个完整的生成语法系统，包括语类、转换、音系、语义4个子系统，各子系统之间有一定的顺序关系。每个子系统都有一套规则，规则之间有一定的使用顺序，像用数学公式一样，逐步推导出句子来，不同的规则推导出不同的句子。这样，生成语法系统好比一部机械装置,运转起来能够生成某种语言中的一切合格的句子,而且只能生成那些合格的句子。

80年代的语法原则系统经过不断研究，生成语法规则越来越丰富，规则系统也越来越复杂，结果是有利于描写，却不利于解释，不利于说明儿童怎么掌握语法。为了解决这个矛盾，乔姆斯基从70年代起另辟蹊径。他认为，语法能力体现在辨别哪些句子合格，哪些句子不合格上，想要反映这种能力，不一定靠假设具体的规则来生成一切合格的句子，也可以靠假设更概括的原则来排除那些不合格的句子。他觉得，掌握语法主要是掌握一些抽象的原则，于是他逐步转而深入研究什么是原则，原则有什么作用，有什么特点。

原则的第一个作用是限制句子结构。例如“他不怕生病”可以改说成“生病，他不怕”，但是“他因为生病没有来”不可改为“生病，他因为没有来”。这是因为前一句虽把“生病”提前，动词“怕”能够管住后面的“空位”，后一句把“生病”提前，介词“因为”就管不住后面的“空位”了。这种空位他认为在语法上属于“空语类”,它必须受到严格控制,否则就不成句。这种对句子结构加以限制的原则叫做管辖，它是一个概括性原则，可以说明许多现象。例如英语要表达“谁买了什么”，可以说Who bought what，但不可说What did who buy；要表达“他看起来年轻”，可以说He seems to be young，但不可说He seems is young；又如意大利语、西班牙语可以省略主语,英语、法语却不可以。以上现象，表面上好象彼此毫不相关，其实与空位的管辖有关。

原则的另一个作用是限制语义解释。在“小张说小李批评了他自己”中,“他自己”指“小李”,不指“小张”；而在“小张说小李批评了他”中，“他”可以指“小张”，不能指“小李”。这是因为“他自己”所指的对象必须约束在一定的范围之内，而“他”所指的对象则不在此范围之

内。这个把语义解释加以限制的原则叫做约束。它也能说明不同语言中的各种现象，假如把以上这两个句子译成其他语言，语义解释也受到类似的限制。除以上所说这两条原则以外，还有其他原则，共同组成语法的原则系统。由于80年代的生成语法用原则系统取代了60年代的规则系统。现在通常用“管辖与约束理论”来概称对普遍语法原则系统的研究，简称“管约论”。

原则有普遍性，又有组合性。几条原则配合起来可以说明一组语言事实，另外几条原则配合起来又可以说明另一组语言事实。用为数不多的原则就可以解释各种语言中千变万化的现象，就象使用组合式家具那样方便。用普遍语法的组合理论最能说明各国儿童为什么都能在短短的2、3年内掌握如此复杂的语言，这在乔姆斯基看来，就是揭示人脑语言思维规律的科学假设。

评价和影响对于生成语法，人们毁誉不一。当前活跃在国际语言学理论界的孟德鸠语法、广义的词组结构语法、词汇-功能语法、关系语法等各派学者均与生成语法有一定的渊源关系。他们接受乔姆斯基某些观点，却又反对他的另一些观点（见N.乔姆斯基）。但是有两点大家基本上承认：生成语法与比它早出现的理论相比，有根本突破；对比它后出现的理论有巨大影响。

福柯和乔姆斯基的世纪辩论

Let me begin by referring to something that we have already discussed, that is, if it is correct, as I believe it is, that a fundamental element of human nature is the need for creative work, for creative inquiry, for free creation without the arbitrary limiting effect of coercive institutions, then, of course, it will follow that a decent society should maximise the possibilities for this fundamental human characteristic to be realised. That means trying to overcome the elements of repression and oppression and destruction and coercion that exist in any existing society, ours for example, as a historical residue.

Now any form of coercion or repression, any form of autocratic control of some domain of existence, let's say, private ownership of capital or state control of some aspects of human life, any such autocratic restriction on some area of human endeavour, can be justified, if at all, only in terms of the need for subsistence, or the need for survival, or the need for defence against some horrible fate or something of that sort. It cannot be justified intrinsically. Rather it must be overcome and eliminated.

And I think that, at least in the technologically advanced societies of the West we are now certainly in a position where meaningless drudgery can very largely be eliminated, and to the marginal extent that it's necessary, can be shared among the population; where centralised autocratic control of, in the first place, economic institutions, by which I mean either private capitalism or state totalitarianism or the various mixed forms of state capitalism that exist here and there, has become a destructive vestige of history.

They are all vestiges that have to be overthrown, eliminated in favour of direct participation in the form of workers' councils or other free associations that individuals will constitute themselves for the purpose of their social existence and their productive labour.

Now a federated, decentralised system of free associations, incorporating economic as well as other social institutions, would be what I refer to as anarcho-syndicalism; and it seems to me that this is the appropriate form of social organisation for an advanced technological society, in which human beings do not have to be forced into the position of tools, of cogs in the machine. There is

no longer any social necessity for human beings to be treated as mechanical elements in the productive process; that can be overcome and we must overcome it by a society of freedom and free association, in which the creative urge that I consider intrinsic to human nature, will in fact be able to realise itself in whatever way it will.

And again, like Mr. Foucault, I don't see how any human being can fail to be interested in this question. [Foucault laughs.]

ELDERS:

Do you believe, Mr. Foucault, that we can call our societies in anyway democratic, after listening to this statement from Mr. Chomsky?

FOUCAULT:

No, I don't have the least belief that one could consider our society democratic. [Laughs.]

If one understands by democracy the effective exercise of power by a population which is neither divided nor hierarchically ordered in classes, it is quite clear that we are very far from democracy. It is only too clear that we are living under a regime of a dictatorship of class, of a power of class which imposes itself by violence, even when the instruments of this violence are institutional and constitutional; and to that degree, there isn't any question of democracy for us.

Well. When you asked me why I was interested in politics, I refused to answer because it seemed evident to me, but perhaps your question was: How am I interested in it?

And had you asked me that question, and in a certain sense I could say you have, I would say to you that I am much less advanced in my way; I go much less far than Mr. Chomsky. That is to say that I admit to not being able to define, nor for even stronger reasons to propose, an ideal social model for the functioning of our scientific or technological society.

On the other hand, one of the tasks that seems immediate and urgent to me, over and above anything else, is this: that we should indicate and show up, even where they are hidden, all the relationships of political power which actually control the social body and oppress or repress it. What I want to say is this: it is the custom, at least in European society, to consider that power is localised in the hands of the government and that it is exercised through a certain number of particular institutions, such as the administration, the police, the army, and the apparatus of the state. One knows that all these institutions are made to elaborate and to transmit a certain number of decisions, in the name of the nation or of the state, to have them applied and to punish those who don't obey. But I believe that political power also exercises itself through the mediation of a certain number of institutions which look as if they have nothing in common with the political power, and as if they are independent of it, while they are not.

One knows this in relation to the family; and one knows that the university and in a general way, all teaching systems, which appear simply to disseminate knowledge, are made to maintain a certain social class in power; and to exclude the instruments of power of another social class. Institutions of knowledge, of foresight and care, such as medicine, also help to support the political power. It's also obvious, even to the point of scandal, in certain cases related to psychiatry. It seems to me that the real political task in a society such as ours is to criticise the workings of institutions, which appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticise and attack them in such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight against them.

This critique and this fight seem essential to me for different reasons: firstly, because political power goes much deeper than one suspects; there are centres and invisible, little-known points of support; its true resistance, its true solidity is perhaps where one doesn't expect it. Probably it's insufficient to say that behind the governments, behind the apparatus of the State, there is the dominant class; one must locate the point of activity, the places and forms in which its domination is exercised. And because this domination is not simply the expression in political terms of economic exploitation, it is its instrument and, to a large extent, the condition which makes it possible; the suppression of the one is achieved through the exhaustive discernment of the other. Well, if one fails to recognise these points of support of class power, one risks allowing them to continue to exist; and to see this class power reconstitute itself even after an apparent revolutionary process.

CHOMSKY:

Yes, I would certainly agree with that, not only in theory but also in action. That is, there are two intellectual tasks: one, and the one that I was discussing, is to try to create the vision of a future just society; that is to create, if you like, a humanistic social theory that is based, if possible, on some firm and humane concept of the human essence or human nature. That's one task.

Another task is to understand very clearly the nature of power and oppression and terror and destruction in our own society. And that certainly includes the institutions you mentioned, as well as the central institutions of any industrial society, namely the economic, commercial and financial institutions and in particular, in the coming period, the great multi-national corporations, which are not very far from us physically tonight [i.e. Philips at Eindhoven].

Those are the basic institutions of oppression and coercion and autocratic rule that appear to be neutral despite everything they say: well, we're subject to the democracy of the market place, and that must be understood precisely in terms of their autocratic power, including the particular form of autocratic control that comes from the domination of market forces in an inegalitarian society. Surely we must understand these facts, and not only understand them but combat them. And in fact, as far as one's own political involvements are concerned, in which one spends the majority of one's energy and effort, it seems to me that they must certainly be in that area. I don't want to get personal about it, but my own certainly are in that area, and I assume everyone's are.

Still, I think it would be a great shame to put aside entirely the somewhat more abstract and philosophical task of trying to draw the connections between a concept of human nature that gives full scope to freedom and dignity and creativity and other fundamental human characteristics, and to relate that to some notion of social structure in which those properties could be realised and in which meaningful human life could take place.

And in fact, if we are thinking of social transformation or social revolution, though it would be absurd, of course, to try to sketch out in detail the goal that we are hoping to reach, still we should know something about where we think we are going, and such a theory may tell it to us.

FOUCAULT:

Yes, but then isn't there a danger here? If you say that a certain human nature exists, that this human nature has not been given in actual society the rights and the possibilities which allow it to realise itself...that's really what you have said, I believe.

CHOMSKY:

Yes.

FOUCAULT:

And if one admits that, doesn't one risk defining this human nature which is at the same time ideal and real, and has been hidden and repressed until now - in terms borrowed from our society, from our civilisation, from our culture?

I will take an example by greatly simplifying it. The socialism of a certain period, at the end of the nineteenth century, and the beginning of the twentieth century, admitted in effect that in capitalist societies man hadn't realised the full potential for his development and self-realisation; that human nature was effectively alienated in the capitalist system. And it dreamed of an ultimately liberated human nature.

What model did it use to conceive, project, and eventually realise that human nature? It was in fact the bourgeois model.

It considered that an alienated society was a society which, for example, gave pride of place to the benefit of all, to a sexuality of a bourgeois type, to a family of a bourgeois type, to an aesthetic of a bourgeois type. And it is moreover very true that this has happened in the Soviet Union and in the popular democracies: a kind of society has been reconstituted which has been transposed from the bourgeois society of the nineteenth century. The universalisation of the model of the bourgeois has been the utopia which has animated the constitution of Soviet society.

The result is that you too realised, I think, that it is difficult to say exactly what human nature is. Isn't there a risk that we will be led into error? Mao Tse-Tung spoke of bourgeois human nature and proletarian human nature, and he considers that they are not the same thing.

CHOMSKY:

Well, you see, I think that in the intellectual domain of political action, that is the domain of trying to construct a vision of a just and free society on the basis of some notion of human nature, we face the very same problem that we face in immediate political action, namely, that of being impelled to do something, because the problems are so great, and yet knowing that whatever we do is on the basis of a very partial understanding of the social realities, and the human realities in this case.

For example, to be quite concrete, a lot of my own activity really has to do with the Vietnam War, and some of my own energy goes into civil disobedience. Well, civil disobedience in the U.S. is an action undertaken in the face of considerable uncertainties about its effects. For example, it threatens the social order in ways which might, one might argue, bring about fascism; and that would be a very bad thing for America, for Vietnam, for Holland and for everyone else. You know, if a great Leviathan like the United States were really to become fascist, a lot of problems would result; so that is one danger in undertaking this concrete act.

On the other hand there is a great danger in not undertaking it, namely, if you don't undertake it, the society of Indo-China will be torn to shreds by American power. In the face of these uncertainties one has to choose a course of action.

Well, similarly in the intellectual domain, one is faced with the uncertainties that you correctly pose. Our concept of human nature is certainly limited; it's partially socially conditioned, constrained by our own character defects and the limitations of the intellectual culture in which we

exist. Yet at the same time it is of critical importance that we know what impossible goals we're trying to achieve, if we hope to achieve some of the possible goals. And that means that we have to be bold enough to speculate and create social theories on the basis of partial knowledge, while remaining very open to the strong possibility, and in fact overwhelming probability, that at least in some respects we're very far off the mark.

ELDERS:

Well, perhaps it would be interesting to delve a little deeper into this problem of strategy. I suppose that what you call civil disobedience is probably the same as what we call extra-parliamentary action?

CHOMSKY:

No, I think it goes beyond that.

Extra-parliamentary action would include, let's say, a mass legal demonstration, but civil disobedience is narrower than all extra-parliamentary action, in that it means direct defiance of what is alleged, incorrectly in my view, by the state to be law.

ELDERS:

So, for example, in the case of Holland, we had something like a population census. One was obliged to answer questions on official forms. You would call it civil disobedience if one refused to fill in the forms?

CHOMSKY:

Right. I would be a little bit careful about that, because, going back to a very important point that Mr. Foucault made, one does not necessarily allow the state to define what is legal. Now the state has the power to enforce a certain concept of what is legal, but power doesn't imply justice or even correctness, so that the state may define something as civil disobedience and may be wrong in doing so.

For example, in the United States the state defines it as civil disobedience to, let's say, derail an ammunition train that's going to Vietnam; and the state is wrong in defining that as civil disobedience, because it's legal and proper and should be done. It's proper to carry out actions that will prevent the criminal acts of the state, just as it is proper to violate a traffic ordinance in order to prevent a murder.

If I had stopped my car in front of a traffic light which was red, and then I drove through the red traffic light to prevent somebody from, let's say, machine-gunning a group of people, of course that's not an illegal act, it's an appropriate and proper action; no sane judge would convict you for such an action.

Similarly, a good deal of what the state authorities define as civil disobedience is not really civil disobedience: in fact, it's legal, obligatory behaviour in violation of the commands of the state, which may or may not be legal commands.

So one has to be rather careful about calling things illegal, I think.

FOUCAULT:

Yes, but I would like to ask you a question. When, in the United States, you commit an illegal act,

do you justify it in terms of justice or of a superior legality, or do you justify it by the necessity of the class struggle, which is at the present time essential for the proletariat in their struggle against the ruling class?

CHOMSKY:

Well, here I would like to take the point of view which is taken by the American Supreme Court and probably other courts in such circumstances; that is, to try to settle the issue on the narrowest possible grounds. I would think that ultimately it would make very good sense, in many cases, to act against the legal institutions of a given society, if in so doing you're striking at the sources of power and oppression in that society.

However, to a very large extent existing law represents certain human values, which are decent human values; and existing law, correctly interpreted, permits much of what the state commands you not to do. And I think it's important to exploit the fact...

FOUCAULT:

Yeah.

CHOMSKY:

...it's important to exploit the areas of law which are properly formulated and then perhaps to act directly against those areas of law which simply ratify some system of power.

FOUCAULT:

But, but, I, I...

CHOMSKY:

Let me get...

FOUCAULT:

My question, my question was this: when you commit a clearly illegal act...

CHOMSKY:

...which I regard as illegal, not just the state.

FOUCAULT:

No, no, well, the state's...

CHOMSKY:

...that the state regards as illegal...

FOUCAULT:

...that the state considers as illegal.

CHOMSKY:

Yeah.

FOUCAULT:

Are you committing this act in virtue of an ideal justice, or because the class struggle makes it useful and necessary ? Do you refer to ideal justice, that's my problem.

CHOMSKY:

Again, very often when I do something which the state regards as illegal, I regard it as legal : that is, I regard the state as criminal. But in some instances that's not true. Let me be quite concrete about it and move from the area of class war to imperialist war, where the situation is somewhat clearer and easier.

Take international law, a very weak instrument as we know, but nevertheless one that incorporates some very interesting principles. Well, international law is, in many respects, the instrument of the powerful : it is a creation of states and their representatives. In developing the presently existing body of international law, there was no participation by mass movements of peasants.

The structure of international law reflects that fact; that is, international law permits much too wide a range of forceful intervention in support of existing power structures that define themselves as states against the interests of masses of people who happen to be organised in opposition to states.

Now that's a fundamental defect of international law and I think one is justified in opposing that aspect of international law as having no validity, as having no more validity than the divine right of kings. It's simply an instrument of the powerful to retain their power.

But, in fact, international law is not solely of that kind. And in fact there are interesting elements of international law, for example, embedded in the Nuremberg principles and the United Nations Charter, which permit, in fact, I believe, require the citizen to act against his own state in ways which the state will falsely regard as criminal. Nevertheless, he's acting legally, because international law also happens to prohibit the threat or use of force in international affairs, except under some very narrow circumstances, of which, for example, the war in Vietnam is not one. This means that in the particular case of the Vietnam War, which interests me most, the American state is acting in a criminal capacity. And the people have the right to stop criminals from committing murder. Just because the criminal happens to call your action illegal when you try to stop him, it doesn't mean it is illegal.

A perfectly clear case of that is the present case of the Pentagon Papers in the United States, which, I suppose, you know about.

Reduced to its essentials and forgetting legalisms, what is happening is that the state is trying to prosecute people for exposing its crimes. That's what it amounts to.

Now, obviously that's absurd, and one must pay no attention whatsoever to that distortion of any reasonable judicial process. Furthermore, I think that the existing system of law even explains why it is absurd. But if it didn't, we would then have to oppose that system of law.

FOUCAULT:

So it is in the name of a purer justice that you criticise the functioning of justice ?

There is an important question for us here. It is true that in all social struggles, there is a question of "justice". To put it more precisely, the fight against class justice, against its injustice, is always part of the social struggle : to dismiss the judges, to change the tribunals, to amnesty the

condemned, to open the prisons, has always been part of social transformations as soon as they become slightly violent. At the present time in France the function of justice and the police is the target of many attacks from those whom we call the "gauchistes". But if justice is at stake in a struggle, then it is as an instrument of power; it is not in the hope that finally one day, in this or another society, people will be rewarded according to their merits, or punished according to their faults. Rather than thinking of the social struggle in terms of "justice", one has to emphasise justice in terms of the social struggle.

CHOMSKY:

Yeah, but surely you believe that your role in the war is a just role, that you are fighting a just war, to bring in a concept from another domain. And that, I think, is important. If you thought that you were fighting an unjust war, you couldn't follow that line of reasoning.

I would like to slightly reformulate what you said. It seems to me that the difference isn't between legality and ideal justice; it's rather between legality and better justice.

I would agree that we are certainly in no position to create a system of ideal justice, just as we are in no position to create an ideal society in our minds. We don't know enough and we're too limited and too biased and all sorts of other things. But we are in a position-and we must act as sensitive and responsible human beings in that position to imagine and move towards the creation of a better society and also a better system of justice. Now this better system will certainly have its defects. But if one compares the better system with the existing system, without being confused into thinking that our better system is the ideal system, we can then argue, I think, as follows : The concept of legality and the concept of justice are not identical; they're not entirely distinct either. Insofar as legality incorporates justice in this sense of better justice, referring to a better society, then we should follow and obey the law, and force the state to obey the law and force the great corporations to obey the law, and force the police to obey the law, if we have the power to do so.

Of course, in those areas where the legal system happens to represent not better justice, but rather the techniques of oppression that have been codified in a particular autocratic system, well, then a reasonable human being should disregard and oppose them, at least in principle; he may not, for some reason, do it in fact.

FOUCAULT:

But I would merely like to reply to your first sentence, in which you said that if you didn't consider the war you make against the police to be just, you wouldn't make it.

I would like to reply to you in terms of Spinoza and say that the proletariat doesn't wage war against the ruling class because it considers such a war to be just. The proletariat makes war with the ruling class because, for the first time in history, it wants to take power. And because it will overthrow the power of the ruling class it considers such a war to be just.

CHOMSKY:

Yeah, I don't agree.

FOUCAULT:

One makes war to win, not because it is just.

CHOMSKY:

I don't, personally, agree with that.

For example, if I could convince myself that attainment of power by the proletariat would lead to a terrorist police state, in which freedom and dignity and decent human relations would be destroyed, then I wouldn't want the proletariat to take power. In fact the only reason for wanting any such thing, I believe, is because one thinks, rightly or wrongly, that some fundamental human values will be achieved by that transfer of power.

FOUCAULT:

When the proletariat takes power, it may be quite possible that the proletariat will exert towards the classes over which it has just triumphed, a violent, dictatorial and even bloody power. I can't see what objection one could make to this.

But if you ask me what would be the case if the proletariat exerted bloody, tyrannical and unjust power towards itself, then I would say that this could only occur if the proletariat hadn't really taken power, but that a class outside the proletariat, a group of people inside the proletariat, a bureaucracy or petit bourgeois elements had taken power.

CHOMSKY:

Well, I'm not at all satisfied with that theory of revolution for a lot of reasons, historical and others. But even if one were to accept it for the sake of argument, still that theory maintains that it is proper for the proletariat to take power and exercise it in a violent and bloody and unjust fashion, because it is claimed, and in my opinion falsely, that that will lead to a more just society, in which the state will wither away, in which the proletariat will be a universal class and so on and so forth. If it weren't for that future justification, the concept of a violent and bloody dictatorship of the proletariat would certainly be unjust. Now this is another issue, but I'm very sceptical about the idea of a violent and bloody dictatorship of the proletariat, especially when expressed by self-appointed representatives of a vanguard party, who, we have enough historical experience to know and might have predicted in advance, will simply be the new rulers over this society.

FOUCAULT:

Yes, but I haven't been talking about the power of the proletariat, which in itself would be an unjust power; you are right in saying that this would obviously be too easy. I would like to say that the power of the proletariat could, in a certain period, imply violence and a prolonged war against a social class over which its triumph or victory was not yet totally assured.

CHOMSKY:

Well, look, I'm not saying there is an absolute.. . For example, I am not a committed pacifist. I would not hold that it is under all imaginable circumstances wrong to use violence, even though use of violence is in some sense unjust. I believe that one has to estimate relative justices.

But the use of violence and the creation of some degree of injustice can only be justified on the basis of the claim and the assessment-which always ought to be undertaken very, very seriously and with a good deal of scepticism that this violence is being exercised because a more just result is going to be achieved. If it does not have such a grounding, it is really totally immoral, in my

opinion.

FOUCAULT:

I don't think that as far as the aim which the proletariat proposes for itself in leading a class struggle is concerned, it would be sufficient to say that it is in itself a greater justice. What the proletariat will achieve by expelling the class which is at present in power and by taking over power itself, is precisely the suppression of the power of class in general.

CHOMSKY:

Okay, but that's the further justification.

FOUCAULT:

That is the justification, but one doesn't speak in terms of justice but in terms of power.

CHOMSKY:

But it is in terms of justice; it's because the end that will be achieved is claimed as a just one.

No Leninist or whatever you like would dare to say "We, the proletariat, have a right to take power, and then throw everyone else into crematoria." If that were the consequence of the proletariat taking power, of course it would not be appropriate.

The idea is-and for the reasons I mentioned I'm sceptical about it-that a period of violent dictatorship, or perhaps violent and bloody dictatorship, is justified because it will mean the submergence and termination of class oppression, a proper end to achieve in human life; it is because of that final qualification that the whole enterprise might be justified. Whether it is or not is another issue.

FOUCAULT:

If you like, I will be a little bit Nietzschean about this; in other words, it seems to me that the idea of justice in itself is an idea which in effect has been invented and put to work in different types of societies as an instrument of a certain political and economic power or as a weapon against that power. But it seems to me that, in any case, the notion of justice itself functions within a society of classes as a claim made by the oppressed class and as justification for it.

CHOMSKY:

I don't agree with that.

FOUCAULT:

And in a classless society, I am not sure that we would still use this notion of justice.

CHOMSKY:

Well, here I really disagree. I think there is some sort of an absolute basis--if you press me too hard I'll be in trouble, because I can't sketch it out-ultimately residing in fundamental human qualities, in terms of which a "real" notion of justice is grounded.

I think it's too hasty to characterise our existing systems of justice as merely systems of class oppression; I don't think that they are that. I think that they embody systems of class oppression

and elements of other kinds of oppression, but they also embody a kind of groping towards the true humanly, valuable concepts of justice and decency and love and kindness and sympathy, which I think are real.

And I think that in any future society, which will, of course, never be the perfect society, we'll have such concepts again, which we hope, will come closer to incorporating a defence of fundamental human needs, including such needs as those for solidarity and sympathy and whatever, but will probably still reflect in some manner the inequities and the elements of oppression of the existing society.

However, I think what you're describing only holds for a very different kind of situation.

For example, let's take a case of national conflict. Here are two societies, each trying to destroy the other. No question of justice arises. The only question that arises is which side are you on ? Are you going to defend your own society and destroy the other ?

I mean, in a certain sense, abstracting away from a lot of historical problems, that's what faced the soldiers who were massacring each other in the trenches in the First World War. They were fighting for nothing. They were fighting for the right to destroy each other. And in that kind of circumstance no questions of justice arise.

And of course there were rational people, most of them in jail, like Karl Liebknecht, for example, who pointed that out and were in jail because they did so, or Bertrand Russell, to take another example on the other side. There were people who understood that there was no point to that mutual massacre in terms of any sort of justice and that they ought to just call it off.

Now those people were regarded as madmen or lunatics and criminals or whatever, but of course they were the only sane people around.

And in such a circumstance, the kind that you describe, where there is no question of justice, just the question of who's going to win a struggle to the death, then I think the proper human reaction is : call it off, don't win either way, try to stop it-and of course if you say that, you'll immediately be thrown in jail or killed or something of that sort, the fate of a lot of rational people.

But I don't think that's the typical situation in human affairs, and I don't think that's the situation in the case of class-conflict or social revolution. There I think that one can and must give an argument, if you can't give an argument you should extract yourself from the struggle. Give an argument that the social revolution that you're trying to achieve is in the ends of justice, is in the ends of realising fundamental human needs, not merely in the ends of putting some other group into power, because they want it.

FOUCAULT:

Well, do I have time to answer ?

ELDERS:

Yes.

FOUCAULT:

How much ? Because. . .

ELDERS:

Two minutes. [Foucault laughs.]

FOUCAULT:

But I would say that that is unjust. [Everybody laughs.]

CHOMSKY:

Absolutely, yes.

FOUCAULT:

No, but I don't want to answer in so little time. I would simply say this, that finally this problem of human nature, when put simply in theoretical terms, hasn't led to an argument between us; ultimately we understand each other very well on these theoretical problems.

On the other hand, when we discussed the problem of human nature and political problems, then differences arose between us. And contrary to what you think, you can't prevent me from believing that these notions of human nature, of justice, of the realisation of the essence of human beings, are all notions and concepts which have been formed within our civilisation, within our type of knowledge and our form of philosophy, and that as a result form part of our class system; and one can't, however regrettable it may be, put forward these notions to describe or justify a fight which should-and shall in principle--overthrow the very fundaments of our society. This is an extrapolation for which I can't find the historical justification. That's the point. ..

CHOMSKY:

It's clear.

ELDERS:

Mr. Foucault, if you were obliged to describe our actual society in pathological terms, which of its kinds of madness would most impress you ?

FOUCAULT:

In our contemporary society?

ELDERS:

Yes.

FOUCAULT:

If I were to say with which malady contemporary society is most afflicted ?

ELDERS:

Yes.

FOUCAULT:

The definition of disease and of the insane, and the classification of the insane has been made in such a way as to exclude from our society a certain number of people. If our society characterised itself as insane, it would exclude itself. It pretends to do so for reasons of internal reform. Nobody is more conservative than those people who tell you that the modern world is afflicted by nervous

anxiety or schizophrenia. It is in fact a cunning way of excluding certain people or certain patterns of behaviour.

So I don't think that one can, except as a metaphor or a game, validly say that our society is schizophrenic or paranoid, unless one gives these words a non-psychiatric meaning. But if you were to push me to an extreme, I would say that our society has been afflicted by a disease, a very curious, a very paradoxical disease, for which we haven't yet found a name; and this mental disease has a very curious symptom, which is that the symptom itself brought the mental disease into being. There you have it.

ELDERS:

Great. Well, I think we can immediately start the discussion.

QUESTION:

Mr. Chomsky, I would like to ask you one question. In your discussion you used the term "proletariat"; what do you mean by "proletariat" in a highly developed technological society ? I think this is a Marxist notion, which doesn't represent the exact sociological state of affairs.

CHOMSKY:

Yes, I think you are right, and that is one of the reasons why I kept hedging on that issue and saying I'm very sceptical about the whole idea, because I think the notion of a proletariat, if we want to use it, has to be given a new interpretation fitting to our present social conditions. Really, I'd even like to drop the word, since it's so loaded with specific historical connotations, and think instead of the people who do the productive work of the society, manual and intellectual work. I think those people should be in a position to organise the conditions of their work, and to determine the ends of their work and the uses to which it's put; and, because of my concept of human nature, I really think of that as partially including everyone. Because I think that any human being who is not physically or mentally deformed-and here I again must disagree with Monsieur Foucault and express my belief that the concept of mental illness probably does have an absolute character, to some extent at least-is not only capable of, but is insistent upon doing productive, creative work, if given the opportunity to do so.

I've never seen a child who didn't want to build something out of blocks, or learn something new, or try the next task. And the only reason why adults aren't like that is, I suppose, that they have been sent to school and other oppressive institutions, which have driven that out of them.

Now if that's the case, then the proletariat, or whatever you want to call it, can really be universal, that is, it can be all those human beings who are impelled by what I believe to be the fundamental human need to be yourself, which means to be creative, to be exploratory, to be inquisitive. . .

QUESTION:

May I interrupt ?

CHOMSKY:

. . to do useful things, you know.

QUESTION:

If you use such a category, which has another meaning in Marxist ...

CHOMSKY:

That's why I say maybe we ought to drop the concept.

QUESTION:

Wouldn't you do better to use another term ? In this situation I would like to ask another question : which groups, do you think, will make the revolution?

CHOMSKY:

Yes, that's a different question.

QUESTION:

It's an irony of history that at this moment young intellectuals, coming from the middle and upper classes, call themselves proletarians and say we must join the proletarians. But I don't see any class-conscious proletarians. And that's the great dilemma.

CHOMSKY:

Okay. Now I think you're asking a concrete and specific question, and a very reasonable one.

It is not true in our given society that all people are doing useful, productive work, or self-satisfying work-obviously that's very far from true - or that, if they were to do the kind of work they're doing under conditions of freedom, it would thereby become productive and satisfying.

Rather there are a very large number of people who are involved in other kinds of work. For example, the people who are involved in the management of exploitation, or the people who are involved in the creation of artificial consumption, or the people who are involved in the creation of mechanisms of destruction and oppression, or the people who are simply not given any place in a stagnating industrial economy. Lots of people are excluded from the possibility of productive labour.

And I think that the revolution, if you like, should be in the name of all human beings; but it will have to be conducted by certain categories of human beings, and those will be, I think, the human beings who really are involved in the productive work of society. Now what this is will differ, depending upon the society. In our society it includes, I think, intellectual workers; it includes a spectrum of people that runs from manual labourers to skilled workers, to engineers, to scientists, to a very large class of professionals, to many people in the so-called service occupations, which really do constitute the overwhelming mass of the population, at least in the United States, and I suppose probably here too, and will become the mass of the population in the future.

And so I think that the student-revolutionaries, if you like, have a point, a partial point : that is to say, it's a very important thing in a modern advanced industrial society how the trained intelligentsia identifies itself. It's very important to ask whether they are going to identify themselves as social managers, whether they are going to be technocrats, or servants of either the state or private power, or, alternatively, whether they are going to identify themselves as part of the work force, who happen to be doing intellectual labour.

If the latter, then they can and should play a decent role in a progressive social revolution. If the

former, then they're part of the class of oppressors.

QUESTION:

Thank you.

ELDERS:

Yes, go on please.

QUESTION:

I was struck, Mr. Chomsky, by what you said about the intellectual necessity of creating new models of society. One of the problems we have in doing this with student groups in Utrecht is that we are looking for consistency of values. One of the values you more or less mentioned is the necessity of decentralisation of power. People on the spot should participate in decision-making. That's the value of decentralisation and participation : but on the other hand we're living in a society that makes it more and more necessary--or seems to make it more and more necessary-that decisions are made on a world-wide scale. And in order to have, for example, a more equal distribution of welfare, etc., it might be necessary to have more centralisation. These problems should be solved on a higher level. Well, that's one of the inconsistencies we found in creating your models of society, and we should like to hear some of your ideas on it.

I've one small additional question--or rather a remark to make to you. That is : how can you, with your very courageous attitude towards the war in Vietnam, survive in an institution like MIT, which is known here as one of the great war contractors and intellectual makers of this war?

CHOMSKY:

Well, let me answer the second question first, hoping that I don't forget the first one. Oh, no, I'll try the first question first; and then remind me if I forget the second.

In general, I am in favour of decentralisation. I wouldn't want to make it an absolute principle, but the reason I would be in favour of it, even though there certainly is, I think, a wide margin of speculation here, is because I would imagine that in general a system of centralised power will operate very efficiently in the interest of the most powerful elements within it.

Now a system of decentralised power and free association will of course face the problem, the specific problem that you mention, of inequity-one region is richer than the other, etc. But my own guess is that we're safer in trusting to what I hope are the fundamental human emotions of sympathy and the search for justice, which may arise within a system of free association.

I think we're safer in hoping for progress on the basis of those human instincts than on the basis of the institutions of centralised power, which, I believe, will almost inevitably act in the interest of their most powerful components.

Now that's a little abstract and too general, and I wouldn't want to claim that it's a rule for all occasions, but I think it's a principle that's effective in a lot of occasions.

So, for example, I think that a democratic socialist libertarian United States would be more likely to give substantial aid to East Pakistani refugees than a system of centralised power which is basically operating in the interest of multinational corporations. And, you know, I think the same is true in a lot of other cases. But it seems to me that that principle, at least, deserves some thought. As to the idea, which was perhaps lurking in your question anyway-it's an idea that's often

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(a). 假设两名律师达成一致，决定两个人都付出一样多的劳动，并通过合同的形式规定了劳动量的指标。如果他们想要最大化净收益（即收益减去劳动成本），他们应该在合同中规定各自付出多大的劳动量呢？这与课堂上得出的理性策略的劳动量相比有什么不同？[提示：为了解题方便，可以暂时考虑b=0的特殊情况] (b). 假设第(a)题中的合同只对合伙人2有约束力，即合伙人2需要按照要求中的付出等量的劳动，而合伙人1可以任意在[0,4]的劳动量中自由选择。合伙人1会选择付出多少劳动呢？这与 和有什么不同吗？请给出简明的解释。 (c). 回到最开始的博弈状态，假设现在，即合伙人的辛勤劳动起到了反协同效果。求出这种情况下的最佳对策函数，并绘制相应的函数图像，找出这种情况下对应的理性策略。把它与(a)中的指标作比较。[提示：并不需要重做(a)的全部过程] 3. 纳什均衡与迭代剔除（Gibbons教科书上的习题）：请看下面的这个博弈： (a). 哪些策略不会被迭代剔除严格劣势策略的过程剔除？ (b). 找出此博弈的（纯策略）纳什均衡 (c). 请尽可能详尽地解释说明，通常情况下（并不要局限于此博弈），组成纳什均衡的策略是否无法被迭代剔除严格劣势策略的过程剔除？ 4. 分钱计划（Gibbons教科书中习题）：参与人1和参与人2因为如何分配10美元的问题争执不休。每个参与人都说出了一个自己预期金额，该金额在0到10之间且允许出现小数。两人需要同时做出选择。参与人的收益就是她分得的钱款。这个博弈有两条规则。无论按哪条规则来分钱，如果出现的情况，每人获得自己的预期金额，剩余的钱款被销毁。 (a).第一条规则是，如果，那么每个参与人都一无所获并且钱会被销毁。这种情况下的（纯策略）纳什均衡是什么？ (b).第二条规则是，如果，并且每个人的预期金额是不同的，那么预期金额最小的参与人分得等值的钱款而剩余的钱款归另一个参与人。如果，并且，那么每个人都分得5美元。这种情况下的（纯策略）纳什均衡是什么？ (c).假如我们为前两条规则增加一个限制条件，即预期金额必须是整数。这是否会改变前两条规则下的（纯策略）纳什均衡？

耶鲁大学开放课程《古希腊历史简介》(全24集)

耶鲁大学开放课程《古希腊历史简介》（全24集） 讲师介绍： 名称：Donald Kagan 职业：耶鲁大学经典与历史学院教授 学位：俄亥俄州立大学博士学位 唐纳德卡根是耶鲁大学经典与历史学院Sterling教授。耶鲁大学的前院长，他在1958年从俄亥俄州立大学获得博士学位博士。他的著作包括Archidamian战争，尼西阿斯和平和西西里远征，伯里克利和关于战争的起源与维护和平，和伯罗奔尼撒战争中雅典帝国的诞生。2002年，他是全国人文奖章获得人，2005年被任命为国家人文基金会杰斐逊讲师。About Professor Donald Kagan Donald Kagan is Sterling Professor of Classics and History at Yale University. A former dean of Yale College, he received his Ph.D. in 1958 from The Ohio State University. His publications include The Archidamian War, The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition, Pericles and the Birth of the Athenian Empire, On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace, and The Peloponnesian War. In 2002 he was the recipient of the National Humanities Medal and in 2005 was named the National Endowment for the Humanities Jefferson Lecturer.

耶鲁公开课笔记2

美国耶鲁大学网络公开课《金融市场》视频笔记2 耶鲁大学网络公开课《金融市场》由罗伯特.J.希勒（Robert J. Shiller）教授主讲。共26课（集），每课时长均为一个多小时，配有字幕。 [第2课] 风险管理中的普遍原理：风险汇聚和对冲（时长1小时09分） 本课主题是风险管理中的普遍原理----风险汇聚和对冲（Pooling and Hedging of Risk）。 希勒认为这是金融理论中最基本、最核心的概念。 本课先讲概率论(Probability Theory)，再讲通过风险汇聚来分摊风险的概念。 概率论是极具智慧的构想，诞生于历史上的特定时期，并令人意想不到地获得广泛应用，金融是其应用领域之一。 对部分学生来说，本课相对所讲的其他课会显出更多的技术性，并且遗憾的是又安排在学期初。 对于学过概率和统计的学生而言，就不是新知识了。这是从数学角度的看法。 概率论是新知识，但不要太畏惧。课前有个学生告诉希勒，他的数学有些生疏了，是否还能选这门课？希勒说，如果你能听懂这堂课，那就不会有问题。 什么是概率？通过举例说明。 比如，今年股票市场会走高的概率是多少？例如认为概率是0.45，是因为对股市悲观，预测股市会走高的可能性是45%，而股市会走平或走低的可能性是55%。这就是概率。 听了这个例子，人们就会觉得这个概念是熟悉的，如果有人提到概率是0.55或0.45，也就知道他说的意思了。 话锋一转，希勒强调，概率并非总是以这种方式来表述的。 概率论成形于十七世纪，此前没有人提出过。撰写概率论历史的作者伊恩.哈金（Ian Hacking），查遍世界所有关于概率论的文献，没有发现在十七世纪之前有概率论的文献，也就是说，在十七世纪产生了一次智慧的飞跃，当时用概率词汇来表述非常时髦，引用概率进行表述的方式很快传遍世界。 但是，有意思的是，如此简单的概念此前从未使用过。下面希勒详细介绍哈金的成果。 哈金研究表明，概率词汇早已存在于英语中，莎士比亚就用过，但其所代表的意思是什么呢？哈金举了一个年轻小姐的例子，这位小姐描述她喜欢的男子，说道，“我太喜欢他了，我觉得他有很大‘可能’”(probable)。 1

耶鲁大学公开课博弈论笔记 博弈论 讲

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耶鲁大学公开课

甭看名人励志演讲了，去看看耶鲁大学的公开课吧(中文字幕)，能学到太多了，国内的大学真是误国误民啊。。。转来当日志收着来源：陈俐彤小C~的日志 最近一朋友和我讲，YALE大学把他们上课的内容录了下来，并发布在因特网上，供网络传播浏览。 一个全世界排名第二的大学，竟然把自己课程的内容完全录了下来，并在全世界传播，在大学产业化的中国，有些人会觉得不可思议，你没交学费，怎么可以把我的课程免费的给公众提供呢？可是人家并不是这样认为的，本着人不分贵贱，教育不分你我的原则，耶鲁大学做出了这个匪夷所思的举动，实在是非常钦佩。。。 好了，不说大话，这个公开课真的非常的好，我有义务分享给我的朋友们 首先你得会用电驴，具体怎么用百度去 ps:我分享的这个是有字幕的，而且这个字幕是非常考究的，所以出的非常慢，理解一下。。。 ＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝ 音乐学 聆听音乐Listening to Music（教授本人著述） 课程简介： 本课程培养在对西方音乐理解基础上对音乐的感悟。它会介绍各种类型的音乐是如何搭配，并教导如何聆听各种类型的音乐，从巴赫，莫扎特，格里高利咏叹调到蓝调 关于课程主讲人： Craig Wright在1966年于the Eastman School获得钢琴乐和音乐史双学位，在1972年于哈佛大学获得博士学位。 Craig Wright从1973年开始在耶鲁大学任教，目前是the Henry L. and Lucy G的音乐教授。 在耶鲁大学，Craig Wright的成就包括常年流行的入门课程“聆听音乐”和选择性研讨会“探索大自然的天才”。 每年夏天，他都会带领一些耶鲁大学的社团区法国，德国和意大利采风。

(完整版)耶鲁公开课--博弈论笔记

耶鲁公开课一博弈论笔记 第一节、 名词解释 优势策略（Dominant strategy ）:不论其他局中人采取什么策略，优势策略对一个局中人而言都是最好的策略。 即某些时候它胜于其他策略，且任何时候都不会比其他策略差。 注：1、"优势策略”的优势是指你的这个策略对你的其他策略占有优势，而不是无论对手采用什么策略，都占有优势的策略。 2、采用优势策略得到的最坏的结果不一定比采用另外一个策略得到的最佳的结果略胜一筹。 严格劣势策略（strictly dominated strategy）:被全面的严格优势策略压住的那个策略， 也就是说不是严格优势策略以外的策略。 弱劣势策略：原来不是严格劣势策略，但是经过剔除严格劣势策略后，这个策略就成了严格 劣势策略。 例：囚徒困境 甲沉默｛合作）甲认罪（背叛 乙沉默（合作）二人同服刑半年甲即时获释！乙眼刑F评 乙认罪（背扳）甲腮刑10年；乙即时获释二炯服刑2年 囚徒到底应该选择哪一项策略，才能将自己个人的刑期缩至最短？两名囚徒由于隔绝监禁，并不知道对方选择；而即使他们能交谈，还是未必能够尽信对方不会反口。就个人的理性选 择而言，检举背叛对方所得刑期，总比沉默要来得低。试设想困境中两名理性囚徒会如何作出选择：若对方沉默、背叛会让我获释，所以会选择背叛。 若对方背叛指控我，我也要指控对方才能得到较低的刑期，所以也是会选择背叛。 二人面对的情况一样，所以二人的理性思考都会得出相同的结论一一选择背叛。背叛是两种 策略之中的支配性策略。因此，这场博弈中唯一可能达到的纳什均衡，就是双方参与者都背叛对方，结果二人同样服刑2年。 例：协和谬误20 世纪60 年代，英法两国政府联合投资开发大型超音速客机，即协和飞机。该种飞机机身大、装饰豪华并且速度快，其开发可以说是一场豪赌，单是设计一个新引擎的成本就可能高达数亿元。难怪政府也会被牵涉进去，竭力要为本国企业提供更大的支持。 项目开展不久，英法两国政府发现：继续投资开发这样的机型，花费会急剧增加，但这样的设计定位能否适应市场还不知道；但是停止研制也是可怕的，因为以前的投资将付诸东流。随着研制工作的深入，他们更是无法做出停止研制工作的决定。协和飞机最终研制成功，但因飞机的缺陷（如耗油大、噪音大、污染严重等）以及运营成本太高，不适合市场竞争，英法政府为此蒙受很大的损失。

耶鲁大学公开课

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Syllabus by (course_default) — last modified 10-14-2008 04:00 PM Document Actions ?This course is an introduction to game theory and strategic thinking. Ideas such as dominance, backward induction, Nash equilibrium, evolutionary stability, commitment, credibility, asymmetric information, adverse selection, and signaling are discussed and applied to games played in class and to examples drawn from economics, politics, the movies, and elsewhere. ECON 159: Game Theory (Fall, 2007) Syllabus Professor: Ben Polak, Professor of Economics and Management, Yale University Description: This course is an introduction to game theory and strategic thinking. Ideas such as dominance, backward induction, Nash equilibrium, evolutionary stability, commitment, credibility, asymmetric information, adverse selection, and signaling are discussed and applied to games played in class and to examples drawn from economics, politics, the movies, and elsewhere. Texts: A. Dixit and B. Nalebuff. Thinking Strategically, Norton 1991 J. Watson. Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory, Norton 2002 P.K. Dutta. Strategies and Games: Theory And Practice, MIT 1999 Requirements: Who should take this course? This course is an introduction to game theory. Introductory microeconomics (115 or equivalent) is required. Intermediate micro (150/2)

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耶鲁大学公开课博弈论课习题

耶鲁大学公开课：博弈论 习题集1（第1-3讲内容） Ben Polak, Econ 159a/MGT522a. 由人人影视博弈论制作组Darrencui翻译 1.严格劣势策略与弱劣势策略：严格劣势策略的定义是什么？弱劣势策略的定义是什么？请用 一个包含两个参与人的博弈矩阵来举例说明，要求其中一个参与人有三个策略且三者之一为严格 劣势策略；另一个参与人有三个策略但三者之一为弱劣势策略。请指出你所举例子中的劣势策略。 2.迭代剔除（弱）劣势策略：请看下面的博弈 2 (a). 这个博弈中是否存在严格劣势策略和弱劣势策略？如果存在，请指出并说明。 (b). 剔除掉严格劣势策略和弱劣势策略之后，在简化的博弈中是否还有劣势策略呢？如果是，请指出并说明。最后哪些策略不会被剔除呢？ (c). 回顾你第一次剔除劣势策略时哪些策略是劣势策略并给出解释。把它与第二次剔除的劣势策略作比较。从中你能得出关于迭代剔除劣势策略的何种结论？ 3. 霍特林的选址博弈（也称霍特林模型）：回顾一下课堂中所讲的选票博弈。其中有两个参与人，每个参与人都从集合* +中选出自己的立场。这十个立场均分全部的选票。选民把选票投给与自己立场最接近的候选人。如果两个候选人站在同一个立场上，那么持该立场选民 的选票平均分给每个候选人。候选人想要最大化自己的得票率。举例来说，()。而 () [提示：回答这道题时不必画出整个矩阵] (a).课堂中我们指出立场2严格优于立场1，而实际上还有其它的立场也是严格优于立场1的，请找出所有优于立场1的立场并作出解释。 (b).假设现在有三名候选人。举例来说，()而()。此时立场2是否严格优于立场1？立场3呢？请作出解释。另外，假设我们剔除了立场1和10，但是该立场的选票依然存在。在简化的博弈中，立场2是否严格劣于或弱劣于其它（纯）策略？请作出解释。

耶鲁公开课[1].心理学导论

我要用一个不同的演示I'll begin the class officially来正式开始这堂课的内容with a different sort of demonstration.我想给你们看一个在现实中进行的I want to just show you one of the change-Blindness studies变化盲视实验that has been done in the real world.这些录像带没有公开发行And these videotapes are not available publicly.我们在网上找到了这些录像带We get them from the web然后用了一些java脚本来打开and see them as little java scripts.这是丹尼尔·西蒙斯So, this is one of the first studies done在康奈尔大学时所做的早期研究之一by Dan Simons when he was at cornell.他当时的导师是如今在我们系任教的And his adviser at the time was our Frank Keil,弗兰克·凯尔Who's now in our department.这就是他的研究So, here's the study.人们根本没有注意到And you don't notice it.变化盲视是实验科学家们Change blindness is one of the more striking phenomena和心理学家们所发现的discovered by laboratory scientists较为引人注意的现象之一and by psychologists.但是请大家But it's important to realize,抛开对大猩猩的惊奇to get away from the sort of surprise of the gorilla,以及人们很难看到闪过物体的and the fact that it's hard to see the flickering,这个事实the object that's flickering,理解这之中隐含的寓意是非常重要的and appreciate the big moral of this,因为我觉得这里的寓意because the big moral of this is actually, I think,实际上是非常惊人也是十分重要的striking and quite important.你觉得你正在感知着这个世界You think right now that you're perceiving the world.我在这里俯视你们I look down on you 觉得自己对每个人的位置都了如指掌and I think I have a whole sense of where everybody is.我无法看清坐在后面的每位同学I can't see everybody perfectly in back.因为你们离我太远有点模糊You're kind of far away and blurry但我还是能感知到周围的世界but there's a sense in which I have a world around me.同样如果我把眼睛闭上几秒钟Similarly, if I'm to close my eyes for a second,一切照旧everything just remains我大概能够记起一些原先的事物and I could sort of remember some of the things that are there.刚才的声音是我做的一个很好的声音定位That's really good sound localization by me.你们从下面往讲台上看So you're looking up觉得自己感知并记住了这个场景and you think you have a sense of the world both in perception and memory.而变化盲视实验则表明事实并非如此The change-blindness experiment suggested this isn't true.变化盲视实验表明The change-blindness experiment suggests that如果你盯着我看一小会if you look at me for a second而在这段时间里and during that second你所有的同学包括坐在你旁边的同学all of your classmates change positions,都换了座位including those next to you,你是很难注意到的you are extremely unlikely to notice.变化盲视实验表明The change-blindness experiment suggests如果你将目光从我身上挪到那边去that if you turn your eyes away from me towards there停留片刻然后再看回来for a second and turn back,即便我换了一身完全不同的衣服and I'm dressed entirely differently,你也不会注意到you wouldn't notice.除非你有意识地告诉自己The exceptions would be if you told yourself consciously,"记住这个人的衣着"remember what this guy is wearing;他穿的是这样那样的衣服"He's wearing this, that and the other."但如果你并不是有意识地去观察But if you don't do it consciously那你就不会注意到了you'll lose it,通常情况下这是没问题的and usually this is okay.通常来说没什么问题Usually, it's okay是因为你的记忆系统和视觉系统because your memory and your visual system会应用一个关于宇宙万物的基本事实exploits a basic fact about the universe,这个事实就是which is that多数事物在大部分的时间里是保持不变的most things stay the same most of the time.我转头的时候I don't have to explicitly remember并不需要明确地记住that you're over there你是在那里的when I turn my head for a second因为无论如何你还是会在那里because you'll be over there in any case.你不需要拥有关于世界的准确表征You don't need to hold precise representations of the world.所以只有在某些特定情况下And so you only notice it你才会注意到这些变化in certain clever circumstances.一种特定情况是心理学家们One sort of clever circumstance is when psychologists change reality在变化盲视实验中改变现实场景as in the change-blindness studies.另一种情况就是电影A second sort of circumstance is in movies.人们在制作那些含有切换画面的电影时So, one of the big surprises会惊奇地发现when people started making movies involving cuts想要连续地理解电影中的一切was it is extremely difficult是极其困