凯南长电报(英文版)

The Long Telegram

George Kennan

Moscow

22 February 1946

Answer to Dept’s 284, Feb. 3,11 involves questions so intricate, so delicate, so strange to our form of thought, and so important to analysis of our international environment that I cannot compress answers into single brief message without yielding to what I feel would be dangerous degree of oversimplification. I hope, therefore, Dept will bear with me if I submit in answer to this question five parts, subjects of which will be roughly as follows:

(1) Basic features of postwar Soviet outlook.

(2) Background of this outlook.

(3) Its projection in practical policy on official level.

(4) Its projection on unofficial level.

(5) Practical deductions from standpoint of US policy.

I apologize in advance for this burdening of telegraphic channel; but questions involved are of such urgent importance, particularly in view of recent events, that our answers to them, if they deserve attention at all, seem to me to deserve it at once. There follows:

Part 1: Basic Features of Postwar Soviet Outlook as Put Forward by Official Propaganda Machine, Are as Follows

(a) USSR still lives in antagonistic "capitalist encirclement" with which in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence. As stated by Stalin in 1927 to a delegation of American workers: "In course of further development of international revolution there will emerge two centers of world significance: a socialist center, drawing to itself the countries which tend toward socialism, and a capitalist center, drawing to itself the countries that incline toward capitalism. Battle between these two centers for command of world economy will decide fate of capitalism and of communism in entire world.

(b) Capitalist world is beset with internal conflicts, inherent in nature of capitalist society. These conflicts are insoluble by means of peaceful compromise. Greatest of them is that between England and US.

(c) Internal conflicts of capitalism inevitably generate wars. Wars thus generated may be of two kinds: intra-capitalist wars between two capitalist states and wars of intervention against socialist

world. Smart capitalists, vainly seeking escape from inner conflicts of capitalism, incline toward latter.

(d) Intervention against USSR, while it would be disastrous to those who undertook it, would cause renewed delay in progress of Soviet socialism and must therefore be forestalled at all costs.

(e) Conflicts between capitalist states, though likewise fraught with danger for USSR, nevertheless hold out great possibilities for advancement of socialist cause, particularly if USSR remains militarily powerful, ideologically monolithic and faithful to its present brilliant leadership.

(f) It must be borne in mind that capitalist world is not all bad. In addition to hopelessly reactionary and bourgeois elements, it includes (1) certain wholly enlightened and positive elements united in acceptable communistic parties and (2) certain other elements (now described for tactical reasons as progressive or democratic) whose reactions, aspirations and activities happen to be "objectively" favorable to interests of USSR. These last must be encouraged and utilized for Soviet purposes.

(g) Among negative elements of bourgeois-capitalist society, most dangerous of all are those whom Lenin called false friends of the people, namely moderate-socialist or social-democratic leaders (in other words, non-Communist left-wing). These are more dangerous than out-and-out reactionaries, for latter at least march under their true colors, whereas moderate left-wing leaders confuse people by employing devices of socialism to serve interests of reactionary capital.

So much for premises. To what deductions do they lead from standpoint of Soviet policy? To following:

(a) Everything must be done to advance relative strength of USSR as factor in international society. Conversely, no opportunity must be missed to reduce strength and influence, collectively as well as individually, of capitalist powers.

(b) Soviet efforts, and those of Russia’s friends abroad, must be directed toward deepening and exploiting of differences and conflicts between capitalist powers. If these eventually deepen into an "imperialist" war, this war must be turned into revolutionary upheavals within the various capitalist countries.

(c) "Democratic-progressive" elements abroad are to be utilized to maximum to bring pressure to bear on capitalist governments along lines agreeable to Soviet interests.

(d) Relentless battle must be waged against socialist and soial-democratic leaders abroad.

Part 2: Background of Outlook

Before examining ramifications of this party line in practice there are certain aspects of it to which I wish to draw attention.

First, it does not represent natural outlook of Russian people. Latter are, by and large, friendly to outside world, eager for experience of it, eager to measure against it talents they are conscious of possessing, eager above all to live in peace and enjoy fruits of their own labor. Party line only represents thesis which official propaganda machine puts forward with great skill and persistence to a public often remarkably resistant in the stronghold of its innermost thoughts. But party line is binding for outlook and conduct of people who make up apparatus of power--party, secret police and Government--and it is exclusively with these that we have to deal.

Second, please note that premises on which this party line is based are for most part simply not true. Experience has shown that peaceful and mutually profitable coexistence of capitalist and socialist states is entirely possible. Basic internal conflicts in advanced countries are no longer primarily those arising out of capitalist ownership of means of production, but are ones arising from advanced urbanism and industrialism as such, which Russia has thus far been spared not by socialism but only by her own backwardness. Internal rivalries of capitalism do not always generate wars; and not all wars are attributable to this cause. To speak of possibility of intervention against USSR today, after elimination of Germany and Japan and after example of recent war, is sheerest nonsense. If not provoked by forces of intolerance and subversion, "capitalist" world of today is quite capable of living at peace with itself and with Russia. Finally, no sane person has reason to doubt sincerity of moderate socialist leaders in Western countries. Nor is it fair to deny success of their efforts to improve conditions for working population whenever, as in Scandinavia, they have been given chance to show what they could do.

Falseness of these premises, every one of which predates recent war, was amply demonstrated by that conflict itself. Anglo-American differences did not turn out to be major differences of Western world. Capitalist countries, other than those of Axis, showed no disposition to solve their differences by joining in crusade against USSR. Instead of imperialist war turning into civil wars and revolution, USSR found itself obliged to fight side by side with capitalist powers for an avowed community of aims.

Nevertheless, all these theses, however baseless and disproven, are being boldly put forward again today. What does this indicate? It indicates that Soviet party line is not based on any objective analysis of situation be yond Russia’s borders; that it has, indeed, little to do with conditions outside of Russia; that it arises mainly from basic inner-Russian necessities which existed before recent war and exist today.

At bottom of Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs i s traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, this was insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on vast exposed plain in neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia came into contact with economically advanced West, fear of more competent, more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. But this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted Russian rulers rather than Russian people; for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form, fragile and artificial in its psychological foundations, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of Western countries. For this reason they have

always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between Western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned truth about world without or if foreigners learned truth about world within. And they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.

It was no coincidence that Marxism, which had smouldered ineffectively for half a century in Western Europe, caught hold and blazed for the first time in Russia. Only in this land which had never known a friendly neighbor or indeed any tolerant equilibrium of separate powers, either internal or international, could a doctrine thrive which viewed economic conflicts of society as insoluble by peaceful means. After establishment of Bolshevist regime, Marxist dogma, rendered even more truculent and intolerant by Lenin’s interpretation, become a perfect vehicle for sense of insecurity with which Bolsheviks, even more than previous Russian rulers, were afflicted. In this dogma, with its basic altruism of purpose, they found justification for their instinctive fear of outside world, for the dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not dare not to inflict, for sacrifices they felt bound to demand. In the name of Marxism they sacrificed every single ethical value in their methods and tactics. Today they cannot dispense with it. It is fig leaf of their moral and intellectual respectability. Without it they would stand before history, at best, as only the last of that long succession of cruel and wasteful Russian rulers who have relentlessly forced country on to ever new heights of military power in order to guarantee external security of their internally weak regimes. This is why Soviet purposes must always be solemnly clothed in trappings of Marxism, and why no one should underrate importance of dogma in Soviet affairs. Thus Soviet leaders are driven [by] necessities of their own past and present position to put forward a dogma which [apparent omission] outside world as evil, hostile and menacing, but as bearing within itself germs of creeping disease and destined to be wracked with growing internal convulsions until it is given final coup de grace by rising power of socialism and yields to new and better world. This thesis provides justification for that increase of military and police power of Russian state, for that isolation of Russian population from outside world, and for that fluid and constant pressure to extend limits of Russian police power which are together the natural and instinctive urges of Russian rulers. Basically this is only the steady advance of uneasy Russian nationalism, a centuries old movement in which conceptions of offense and defense are inextricably confused. But in new guise of international Marxism, with its honeyed promises to a desperate and war-torn outside world, it is more dangerous and insidious than ever before.

It should not be thought from above that Soviet party line is necessarily disingenuous and insincere on part of those who put it forward. Many of them are too ignorant of outside world and mentally too dependent to question [apparent omission] self-hypnotism, and who have no difficulty making themselves believe what they find it comforting and convenient to believe. Finally we have the unsolved mystery as to who, if anyone, in this great land actually receives accurate and unbiased information about outside world. In atmosphere of oriental secretiveness and conspiracy which pervades this Government, possibilities for distorting or poisoning sources and currents of information are infinite. The very disrespect of Russians for objective truth--indeed, their disbelief in its existence--leads them to view all stated facts as instruments for furtherance of one ulterior purpose or another. There is good reason to suspect that this Government is actually a conspiracy witin a conspiracy; and I for one am reluctant to believe that

Stalin himself receives anything like an objective picture of outside world. Here there is ample scope for the type of subtle intrigue at which Russians are past masters. Inability of foreign governments to place their case squarely before Russian policy makers--extent to which they are delivered up in their relations with Russia to good graces of obscure and unknown advisers whom they never see and cannot influence--this to my mind is most disquieting feature of diplomacy in Moscow, and one which Western statesmen would do well to keep in mind if they would understand nature of difficulties encountered here.

Part 3: Projection of Soviet Outlook in Practical Policy on Official Level

We have now seen nature and background of Soviet program. What may we expect by way of its practical implementation?

Soviet policy, as Department implies in its query under reference, is conducted on two planes: (1) official plane represented by actions undertaken officially in name of Soviet Government; and (2) subterranean plane of actions undertaken by agencies for which Soviet Government does not admit responsibility.

Policy promulgated on both planes will be calculated to serve basic policies (a) to (d) outlined in part 1. Actions taken on different planes will differ considerably, but will dovetail into each other in purpose, timing and effect.

On official plane we must look for following:

(a) Internal policy devoted to increasing in every way strength and prestige of Soviet state: intensive military-industrialization; maximum development of armed forces; great displays to impress outsiders; continued secretiveness about internal matters, designed to conceal weaknesses and to keep opponent in the dark.

(b) Wherever it is considered timely and promising, efforts will be made to advance official limits of Soviet power. For the moment, these efforts are restricted to certain neighboring points conceived of here as being of immediate strategic necessity, such as northern Iran, Turkey, possibly Bornholm. However, other points may at any time come into question, if and as concealed Soviet political power is extended to new areas. Thus a "friendly" Persian Government might be asked to grant Russia a port on Persian Gulf. Should Spain fall under Communist control, question of Soviet base at Gibraltar Strait might be activated. But such claims will appear on official level only when unofficial preparation is complete.

(c) Russians will participate officially in international organizations where they see opportunity of extending Soviet power or of inhibiting or diluting power of others. Moscow sees in UNO not the mechanism for a permanent and stable world society founded on mutual interest and aims of all nations, but an arena in which aims just mentioned can be favorably pursued. As long as UNO is considered here to serve this purpose, Soviets will remain with it. But if at any time they come to conclusion that it is serving to embarrass or frustrate their aims for power expansion and if they

see better prospects for pursuit of these aims along other lines, they will not hesitate to abandon UNO. This would imply, however, that they felt themselves strong enough to split unity of other nations by their withdrawal, to render UNO ineffective as a threat to their aims or security, and to replace it with an international weapon more effective from their viewpoint. Thus Soviet attitude toward UNO will depend largely on loyalty of other nations to it, and on degree of vigor, decisiveness and cohesion with which these nations defend in UNO the peaceful and hopeful concept of international life, which that organization represents to our way of thinking. I reiterate, Moscow has no abstract devotion to UNO ideals. Its attitude to that organization will remain essentially pragmatic and tactical.

(d) Toward colonial areas and backward or dependent peoples, Soviet policy, even on official plane, will be directed toward weakening of power and influence and contacts of advanced Western nations, on theory that insofar as this policy is successful, there will be created a vacuum which will favor Communist-Soviet penetration. Soviet pressure for participation in trusteeship arrangements thus represents, in my opinion, a desire to be in a position to complicate and inhibit exertion of Western influence at such points rather than to provide major channel for exerting of Soviet power. Latter motive is not lacking, but for this Soviets prefer to rely on other channels than official trusteeship arrangements. Thus we may expect to find Soviets asking for admission everywhere to trusteeship or similar arrangements and using levers thus acquired to weaken Western influence among such peoples.

(e) Russians will strive energetically to develop Soviet representation in, and official ties with, countries in which they sense strong possibilities of opposition to Western centers of power. This applies to such widely separated points as Germany, Argentina, Middle Eastern countries, etc.

(f) In international economic matters, Soviet policy will really be dominated by pursuit of autarchy for Soviet Union and Soviet-dominated adjacent areas taken together. That, however, will be underlying policy. As far as official line is concerned, position is not yet clear. Soviet Government has shown strange reticence since termination hostilities on subject foreign trade. If large-scale long-term credits should be forthcoming, I believe Soviet Government may eventually again do lip service, as it did in 1930’s, to desirability of building up international economic exchanges in general. Otherwise I think it possible Soviet foreign trade may be restricted largely to Soviet’s own securi ty sphere, including occupied areas in Germany, and that a cold official shoulder may be turned to principle of general economic collaboration among nations.

(g) With respect to cultural collaboration, lip service will likewise be rendered to desirability of deepening cultural contact between peoples, but this will not in practice be interpreted in any way which could weaken security position of Soviet peoples. Actual manifestations of Soviet policy in this respect will be restricted to arid channels of closely shepherded official visits and functions, with superabundance of vodka and speeches and dearth of permanent effects.

(h) Beyond this, Soviet official relations will take what might be called "correct" course with individual foreign governments, with great stress being laid on prestige of Soviet Union and its representatives and with punctilious attention to protocol, as distinct from good manners.

Part 4: Following May Be Said as to What We May Expect by Way of Implementation of Basic Soviet Policies on Unofficial, or Subterranean Plane, i.e., on Plane for Which Soviet Government Accepts No Responsibility.

Agencies utilized for promulgation of policies on this plane are following:

1. Inner central core of Communist parties in other countries. While many of persons who compose this category may also appear and act in unrelated public capacities, they are in reality working closely together as an underground operating directorate of world communism, a concealed Comintern12 tightly coordinated and directed by Moscow. It is important to remember that this inner core is actually working on underground lines, despite legaity of parties with which it is associated.

2. Rank and file of Communist parties. Note distinction is drawn between these and persons defined in paragraph 1. This distinction has become much sharper in recent years. Whereas formerly foreign Communist parties represented a curious (and from Moscow’s standpoint often inconvenient) mixture of conspiracy and legitimate activity, now the conspiratorial element has been neatly concentrated in inner circle and ordered underground, while rank and file--no longer even taken into confidence about realities of movement--are thrust forward as bona fide internal partisans of certain political tendencies within their respective countries, genuinely innocent of conspiratorial connection with foreign states. Only in certain countries where communists are numerically strong do they now regularly appear and act as a body. As a rule they are used to penetrate, and to influence or dominate, as case may be, other organizations less likely to be suspected of being tools of Soviet Government, with a view to accomplishing their purposes through [apparent omission] organizations, rather than by direct action as a separate political party.

3. A wide variety of national associations or bodies which can be dominated or influenced by such penetration. These include: labor unions, youth leagues, women’s organizations, racial societies, religious societies, social organizations, cultural groups, liberal magazines, publishing houses, etc.

4. International organizations which can be similarly penetrated through influence over various national components. Labor, youth and women’s organizations are prominent among them. Particular, almost vital, importance is attached in this connection to international labor movement. In this, Moscow sees possibility of sidetracking Western governments in world affairs and building up international lobby capable of compelling governments to take actions favorable to Soviet interests in various countries and of paralyzing actions disagreeable to USSR.

5. Russian Orthodox Church, with its foreign branches, and through it the Eastern Orthodox Church in general.

6. Pan-Slav movement and other movements (Azerbaijan, Armenian, Turcoman, etc.) based on

racial groups within Soviet Union.

7. Governments or governing groups willing to lend themselves to Soviet purposes in one degree or another, such as present Bulgarian and Yugoslav governments, North Persian regime, Chinese Communists, etc. Not only propaganda machines but actual policies of these regimes can be placed extensively at disposal of USSR.

It may be expected that component parts of this far-flung apparatus will be utilized, in accordance with their individual suitability, as follows:

(a) To undermine general political and strategic potential of major Western Powers. Efforts will be made in such countries to disrupt national self-confidence, to hamstring measures of national defense, to increase social and industrial unrest, to stimulate all forms of disunity. All persons with grievances, whether economic or racial, will be urged to seek redress not in mediation and compromise, but in defiant, violent struggle for destruction of other elements of society. Here poor will be set against rich, black against white, young against old, newcomers against established residents, etc.

(b) On unofficial plane particularly violent efforts will be made to weaken power and influence of Western Powers [on] colonial, backward, or dependent peoples. On this level, no holds will be barred. Mistakes and weaknesses of Western colonial administration will be mercilessly exposed and exploited. Liberal opinion in Western countries will be mobilized to weaken colonial policies. Resentment among dependent peoples will be stimulated. And while latter are being encouraged to seek independence [from] Western Powers, Soviet dominated puppet political machines will be undergoing preparation to take over domestic power in respective colonial areas when independence is achieved.

(c) Where individual governments stand in path of Soviet purposes pressure will be brought for their removal from office. This can happen where governments directly oppose Soviet foreign policy aims (Turkey, Iran), where they seal their territories off against Communist penetration (Switzerland, Portugal), or where they compete too strongly (like Labor Government in England) for moral domination among elements which it is important for Communists to dominate. (Sometimes, two if the elements are present in a single case. Then Communist opposition becomes particularly shrill and savage.)

(d) In foreign countries Communists will, as a rule, work toward destruction of all forms of personal independence--economic, political or moral. Their system can handle only individuals who have been brought into complete dependence on higher power. Thus, persons who are financially independent--such as individual businessmen, estate owners, successful farmers, artisans--and all those who exercise local leadership or have local prestige--such as popular local clergymen or political figures--are anathema. It is not by chance that even in USSR local officials are kept constantly on move from one job to another, to prevent their taking root.

(e) Everything possible will be done to set major Western Powers against each other. Anti-British

talk will be plugged among Americans, anti-American talk among British. Continentals, including Germans, will be taught to abhor both Anglo-Saxon powers. Where suspicions exist, they will be fanned; where not, ignited. No effort will be spared to discredit and combat all efforts which threaten to lead to any sort of unity or cohesion among other [apparent omission] from which Russia might be excluded. Thus, all forms of international organization not amenable to Communist penetration and control, whether it be the Catholic [apparent omission] international economic concerns, or the international fraternity of royalty and aristocracy, must expect to find themselves under fire from many, and often [apparent omission].

(f) In general, all Soviet efforts on unofficial international plane will be negative and destructive in character, designed to tear down sources of strength beyond reach of Soviet control. This is only in line with basic Soviet instinct that there can be no compromise with rival power and that constructive work can start only when Communist power is dominant. But behind all this will be applied insistent, unceasing pressure for penetration and command of key positions in administration and especially in police apparatus of foreign countries. The Soviet regime is a police regime par excellence, reared in the dim half world of Tsarist police intrigue, accustomed to think primarily in terms of police power. This should never be lost sight of in gauging Soviet motives.

Part 5. Practical Deductions from Standpoint of US Policy

In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over energies of one of world’s greatest peoples and resources of world’s richest national territory, and is borne along by deep and powerful currnts of Russian nationalism. In addition, it has an elaborate and far-flung apparatus for exertion of its influence in other countries, an apparatus of amazing flexibility and versatility, managed by people whose experience and skill in underground methods are presumably without parallel in history. Finally, it is seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality in its basic reactions. For it, the vast fund of objective fact about human society is not, as with us, the measure against which outlook is constantly being tested and re-formed, but a grab bag from which individual items are selected arbitrarily and tendenciously to bolster an outlook already preconceived. This is admittedly not a pleasant picture. Problem of how to cope with this force [is] undoubtedly greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably greatest it will ever have to face. It should be point of departure from which our political general staff work at present juncture should proceed. It should be approached with same thoroughness and care as solution of major strategic problem in war and, if necessary, with no smaller outlay in planning effort. I cannot attempt to suggest all answers here. But I would like to record my conviction that problem is within our power to solve--and that without recourse to any general military conflict. And in support of this conviction there are certain observations for a more encouraging nature I should like to make.

(1) Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic nor adventuristic. It does

not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw--and usually does--when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there need be no prestige-engaging showdowns.

(2) Gauged against Western world as a whole, Soviets are still by far the weaker force. Thus, their success will really depend on degree of cohesion, firmness and vigor which Western world can muster. And this is factor which it is within our power to influence.

(3) Success of Soviet system, as form of internal power, is not yet finally proven. It has yet to be demonstrated that it can survive supreme test of successive transfer of power from one individual or group to another. Lenin’s death was first such transfer, and its effects wracked Soviet state for 15 years. After Stalin’s death or retirement will be second. But even t his will not be final test. Soviet internal system will now be subjected, by virtue of recent territorial expansions, to series of additional strains which once proved severe tax on Tsardom. We here are convinced that never since termination of civil war have mass of Russian people been emotionally farther removed from doctrines of Communist Party than they are today. In Russia, party has now become a great and--for the moment--highly successful apparatus of dictatorial administration, but it has ceased to be a source of emotional inspiration. Thus, internal soundness and permanence of movement need not yet be regarded as assured.

(4) All Soviet propaganda beyond Soviet security sphere is basically negative and destructive. It should therefore be relatively easy to combat it by any intelligent and really constructive program.

For these reasons I think we may approach calmly and with good heart problem of how to deal with Russia. As to how this approach should be made, I only wish to advance, by way of conclusion, following comments:

(1) Our first step must be to apprehend, and recognize for what it is, the nature of the movement with which we are dealing. We must study it with same courage, detachment, objectivity, and same determination not to be emotionally provoked or unseated by it, with which doctor studies unruly and unreasonable individual.

(2) We must see that our public is educated to realities of Russian situation. I cannot overemphasize importance of this. Press cannot do this alone. It must be done mainly by Government, which is necessarily more experienced and better informed on practical problems involved. In this we need not be deterred by [ugliness?] of picture. I am convinced that there would be far less hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country today if realities of this situation were better understood by our people. There is nothing as dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown. It may also be argued that to reveal more information on our difficulties with Russia would reflect unfavorably on Russian-American relations. I feel that if there is any real risk here involved, it is one which we should have courage to face, and sooner the better. But I cannot see what we would be risking. Our stake in this country, even coming on heels of tremendous demonstrations of our

friendship for Russian people, is remarkably small. We have here no investments to guard, no actual trade to lose, virtually no citizens to protect, few cultural contacts to preserve. Our only stake likes in what we hope rather than what we have; and I am convinced we have better chance of realizing those hopes if our public is enlightened and if our dealings with Russians are placed entirely on realistic and matter-of-fact basis.

(3) Much depends on health and vigor of our own society. World communism is like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue. This is point at which domestic and foreign policies meet. Every courageous and incisive measure to solve internal problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiqués. If we cannot abandon fatalism and indifference in face of deficiencies of our own society, Moscow will profit--Moscow cannot help profiting by them in its foreign policies.

(4) We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive picture of sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in past. It is not enough to urge people to develop political processes similar to our own. Many foreign peoples, in Europe at least, are tired and frightened by experiences of past, and are less interested in abstract freedom than in security. They are seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than Russians to give them this. And, unless we do, Russians certainly will.

(5) Finally we must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society. After all, the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.

KENNAN

苏联行为的根源（译文）

乔治·凯南

一

我们今天所看到的苏联政权的政治性格是意识形态和环境的产物苏联现今领导人从产生也们政治背景的那个运动中继承下来的意识形态和他们在俄国执掌已近三十年的政权的环境。很少有心理分析的工作比弄清这两种因素的相互作用及每个因素在决定苏联行为中的地位这个工作更难的了。尽管如此, 为了理解和有效地对付苏联的行为, 必须作这样的努力。

要概括出苏联领导人夺取政权时所带着的一整套意识形态观念是困难的。马克思的理论在俄国共产主义版本中总是在发生着微妙的变化。作为其理论基础来源的材料是广泛而又复杂的。但是年时, 俄国共产主义思想的最主要内容可以归纳如下人类生活的中心因素是物质产品的生产和交换制度, 它决定社会生活的性质与“社会面貌” , 资本主义的生产方式是罪恶的, 它必然导致资本拥有者阶级对工人阶级的剥削, 不能充分发展社会经济和公平地分配劳动者创造的物质产品资本主义包含着导致白身毁灭的种子, 由于资本拥有者阶级不能适应经济的发展变化, 它必然引起革命和使政权转移到工人阶级手中,作为资本主义最后阶段的帝国主义必定导致战争和革命。其也内容可用列宁自己的话来概括“经济政治发展的不平衡是资本主义的绝对规律。由此就应得出结论社会主义可能首先在少数或者甚至在单独一个资本主义国家内获得胜利。这个国家内获得胜利的无产阶级既然剥夺了资本家并在本国组织了社会主义生产, 就会起来反对其余的资本主义世界, 把其池国家的被压迫阶级吸弓到自己的方面来, ? ?”1应当指出, 他们认为如果没有无产阶级革命, 资本主义不会自行灭亡。为了推翻摇摇欲坠的制度, 一定要有来自无产阶级革命运动的最后推动力。这种推动力被认为迟早是要到来的。

在俄国革命爆发以前五十多年中, 参加革命运动的人们狂热地信奉这套思想。由于受挫, 不满、无自我表现的希望或急于自我表现以及在沙皇统治制度的严密控制下选择流血的革命作为改善社会境况的手段此种行为缺乏“泛的支持, 这些革命家们便在马克思主义理论中为自己本能的欲望找到了极为方便的理论依据。马克思主义理论为他们烦躁情绪、全盘否定沙皇制度下的价值观、追求权力的欲望和雪耻心理以及寻求捷径实现这些愿望的倾向提供了违反科学的理论根据。因此毫不奇怪, 他们坚信马克思列宁主义教义是千真万确、合理有效的, 因为这一教义迎合他们那种易冲动, 激情感的心理。没必要怀疑他们的虔诚。这是和人性本身一样久的现象。爱德华特·吉本2说得最精辟不过了, 池在《罗马帝国的衰亡史》中这样写道“笃信到欺骗, 这一步是非常危险而又不知不觉的圣贤苏格拉底告诉我们, 聪明的人可能为自己欺骗, 善良的人可能愚弄池人, 人的良心正是处于自我幻觉和有意欺骗的混和的中间状态。”正是带着这一整套观念, 布尔什维克党夺取了政权。

应当指出, 在整个准备革命的时期, 这些人的注意力, 跟马克思本人一样3, 更多的放在击败竟争对手而非今后社会主义所采取的形式上, 在他们看来, 前者先于后者。一旦掌权, 他们对应该实施的纲领的看法很大部分一上是模糊的、空想的和不切实际的。除了工业国有化和剥夺私人大资本外, 没有一致的纲领方针。他们对待农民的办法根据马克思主义的公式不同于对待无产阶级在俄国共产主义思想中就是一个含糊不清的问题, 在共产党执政的最初十年中, 一直是一个引起争论、举棋不定的问题。

革命后最初一段时期的环境一一内战、外来千涉以及共产主义者仅仅代表着俄国人民中极少的一部分—这使得必须建立独裁政权。“战时共产主义”和过急消灭私人生产与私人

1列宁《论欧洲联邦的口号》,1915年8月, 《列宁全集》中译本第21卷第321页, 1959年人民出版社。

2爱德华?吉本, 1737——1794, 英国历史学家。——译注。

3本文之“社会主义”指马克思主义者或列宁主义者的社会主义, 不是第二国际的自由社会主义。——原注。

商业造成了不良的经济后果、招来了对新生政权更多的敌视。暂时缓慢俄国的共产主义化过程是以新经济政策为标志, 减缓了某些经济困难, 达到了一定目的。然而它也表明, “社会中的资本主义因素”总是设法从政府放松政策中谋取好处, 如果允许其继续存在的话, 他们始终是威胁苏维埃政权的强大的反对力量与竞争对手。个体农民的情况也类似, 尽管力量很少, 他们亦属私有生产者。

如果列宁在世的话, 为着俄国社会的最终利益, 他或许会以伟人的气魄调和这些相冲突的力量, 当然我们不能确定池真的会这样做，即使列宁会这样做, 斯大林及其在争夺列宁继承权斗争中的追随者们也不会容忍他们所凯觑的政权下存在着竞争的政治力量。他们的不安全感太强烈了。他们那种特有的极度强烈的狂热性和戒备心理与盎格鲁—撒克逊的妥协传统格格不入, 使得不可能实行长久的分权。从孕育他们的俄罗斯—亚细亚世界, 他们形成了对于竞争力量长久地和平共处的可能性极度怀疑的心理。由于轻信自己教义的正确性, 他们总是坚持竞争力量或屈从我或被消灭。共产党之外的俄国社会本身并不僵化。人们的任何形式的共同行为与组织皆受党的操纵。在俄国, 不允许存在其他具有活力与感召力的组织。只有党具有严密的组织结构。除了党之外, 便是无组织无月的的杂乱的群众。

苏联党内, 情况亦如此。党员群众虽然可能参加选举, 参与制订、讨论和执行政策, 但是他们参加这些活动时并不是从自己的意愿出发, 而是要仰上级党的领导的鼻息, 揣摸“指示”的含义。

应当再次强调的是, 这些人搞专制主观上或许并不是出干个人的目的。他们无疑相信—井且很容易这样相信一一自己知道什么是于社会有益的, 一旦权力获得稳固和不可改变的地位, 就会努力为社会谋福利。为了达到权力稳固的目的, 他们不顾上帝规条与人类道德不择一切手段。只有等到他们觉得安全时, 才会开始考虑如何使信赖自己的人民过得幸福与舒适。

关于苏联政权最突出的环境即, 迄今为止, 该政权的政治巩固过程尚未完成, 克里姆林宫的人还深陷于巩固和强化他们在年所获得的政权之斗争中。他们这样做的主要目的是对付俄国内部的反对势力, 但也有对付外部世界的意图。因为意识形态教导它们, 外部世界是敌视苏联的, 最终推翻境外的政治势力是他们的历史使命。俄国的历史与传统支持了他们的这种认识。最后, 他们自己挑衅性的不妥协行动惹来了外部世界的反应。于是也们, 用吉本的另一句话来说, 又被迫应付自己所挑起的敌对行为。通过把外部世界描绘成自己的敌人从而证明自己正确, 这是每个人所具有的、无可否认的特权因为如果池经常地、反复地这么认为并将之作自己的行为基础, 那么他必定是正确的。

由于他们精神世界和意识形态的特点, 苏联领导人从不承认敌对他们的行为含有合理的、正义的因素。这种敌对行为, 从理论上说, 只能来自反动的、顽固的和垂死的资本主义。只要宫方承认俄国尚存资本主义的残余, 这就可以被当作维持独裁政权的原因。但是,当这些残余开始逐渐消失, 独裁政权之合理性就越来越站不住脚了, 而且当官方正式宣称这些残余已被最后清除之后, 其存在之合理依据就完全丧失了。这促使苏联统治集团采取新的手法, 因为俄国已不存在资本主义, 同时又不允许处于其统治下的人民自发产生的严重的与广泛的异己力量之存在, 这样就有必要通过强调国外资本主义的威胁, 为继续维持独裁制度提供合法依据。

这种做法很早就己开始。年, 斯大林特别指出, 维持“镇压机关”主要指军队和秘密警察是因为“只要存在资本主义的包围, 就有被干涉的危险和由此引起的一切后果。”根据这种理论, 从那时起, 俄国国内的一切反对力量均被描述为敌视苏联政权的国外反动势力的代理人。

同样地, 他们极力强调社会主义和资本主义世界存在着根本的对抗这一共产主义观点。许多事实证明, 这是毫无根据的。由于一方面国外确实存在由苏联哲学与行为所引起的敌视

心理, 另一方面历史上某些时候军事强国特别是三十年代的纳粹德国和日本确实有侵略苏联的计划, 真实的情况被掩盖了。但事实上, 莫斯科强调面临着外部世界对苏联社会的威胁,并不是因为真有来自国外的敌视的现实, 而是为了给维持国内独裁制度制造借口。

因此, 维护苏联现政权即在国内建立至高无上的权威, 和由此而来的编造外国敌视的神话, 这一切决定了我们今天所看到的苏联政权机器的特征。未能适应上述目的的国内机关逐渐被裁减与取缔, 反之则不断膨胀。苏联政权的安全是建立在党的铁的纪律、无所不在和严厉残暴的秘密警察以及牢固的国家经济垄断的基础上的。苏联领导人得以对付竞争力量以求得安全的“镇压机关” , 很大程度上成了人民他们应当服务的对象的太上皇。今天, 苏联主要政权机关的任务是完善独裁制度和在民众中维持这么一种观念, 即俄国处于包围之中,敌人就在城墙下。组成权力机构的百万官僚们必须尽一切努力在人民中维持这种观念, 否则他们自己就是多余的了。

从目前看来, 俄国统治者不会取消镇压机关。建立专制政权的过程己经进行了近三十年, 这在当代是空前的至少从范围之广‘这一点来说, 它除了弓起国外的敌视外, 亦导致了国内反抗。警察机关强化的结果, 是使反对政权的潜在力量越来越强大与危险。

俄国统治者决不会放弃也们借以维持独裁政权的神话。因为这个神话己成苏联哲学不可分割的一部分, 通过比单纯的意识形态力量还大的纽带, 它己深深地嵌人苏联思想体系之中。

二

前面谈了这么多的厉史背景。那么它是如何反映在我们今天所看到的苏联政权的政治性格上呢?

传统的意识形态理论尚未被放弃。他们仍然坚信资本主义是罪恶的、必然要灭亡的, 无产阶级的历史使命是促使资本主义灭亡, 将政权掌握在自己手中。但他们更多的强调关系到苏联政权本身的一些观念上, 即作为黑暗、误入岐途的世界中唯一的、真正的社会主义政权。的地位及其内部之权力关系。

在这些观念中, 首先他们强调资本主义与社会主义之间固有的对抗。我们己经看到, 这个观念是如此之深地嵌人苏联政权基础中。它对作为国际社会一员的苏联的行为有着深远的影响。这意味着苏联总不可能真正地相信自己与资本主义强国的目标有一致的地方。莫斯科总是认为, 资本主义世界的目的是敌视苏联的, 因而也就是违背它所控制的苏联人民的利益的。如果某个时候, 苏联会在违背这一观念的协议上签字的话, 这只不过是对付敌手的策略手段而已, 苏联的做法是“买主自行当心”。苏联人声称这种对抗仍然存在。这是虚构的。由此产生了克里姆林宫对外政策中许多令人迷惑的现象躲躲闪闪、守口如瓶、欺诈蒙骗、疑心重重以及不怀好意。在可见的将来, 这些现象不会消失。当然, 其程度与侧重点会有所不同。当苏联人有求于我们时, 上述这种或那种行为会有所收敛这种时候, 总有些美国人会欣喜若狂, 认为“俄国人变了”,甚至有些人竟以所谓的自己带来了这种“变化”而居功。我们切不可为策略手段所迷惑。苏联政策的这些特征以及导致其产生的观念, 与苏联内部政权性质密切相关, 只要苏联政权性质没有改变, 我们就必然要面对着这种行为, 不管是明示的还是暗示的。

这意味着, 在今后很长时间内, 苏联仍是很难打交道的。但并不是说, 苏联要进行你死我活的斗争, 以便在一个确定的时间内推翻我们的社会制度。值得庆幸的是, 苏联关于资本主义最终必然灭亡的理论包含这样一层意思, 即它并不急于实现这一目标。进步势力可以为最后决战作长期的准备。在此期间, 至关重要的是, 国内外的共产主义者应当热爱与捍卫“社会主义祖国”—已经取得胜利的、作为社会主义力量中心的苏维埃社会主义联盟, 促进她的繁荣, 困扰与消灭她的敌人。在国外推行未成熟的、“冒险的”革命计划, 会使莫斯科处境难堪, 因此被视为“决不能原谅”甚至是“反革命”的行动。莫斯科所定义的

社会主义事业, 就是支持和发展苏联的力量。

我们再来看苏联的第二个观念, 即克里姆林宫是一贯正确的。在苏联权力思想中, 不允许存在除党之外的独立组织, 因此就必须在理论上把党的领导作为真理的唯一源泉。如果其他地方亦有真理的话, 那就应允许其池组织存在与自由表达其意志, 这是克里姆林宫不能也决不会允许的。

因此党的领导总是正确的, 甚至自从年斯大林通过宣布政治局一致原则从而正式确立池的个人权力以来, 亦是如此。

由于党一贯正确, 因而便有党的铁的纪律。事实上, 两者是互为依据的。建立严格的纪律需要承认党的一贯正确, 党的一贯正确要求遵守纪律。两者一起决定了整个苏联政权机器的行为。如果不考虑第三个因素, 还不足以理解这两者的作用, 即党为了策略上的考虑, 可以在任何时候随心所欲地提出某种理论, 如果它被认为有益于其事业的话, 并且要求全体党员忠实地、无条件地接受这种理论。这就是说, 真理不是永恒的, 它实际上可以由苏联领导人自己根据需要与目的创造出来。真理可以每周不同、月月有异, 它不是绝对的、不可变更的—非产生于客观现实。这仅仅是某些人当时智慧的表白, 因为他们代表着历史的规律。这些因素造成了苏联政权机器的目标是僵硬与固执的。这种目标可由克里姆林宫随意改变,而其他国家则无法做到这一点。一旦在某个特定的问题上制定了党的路线, 整个苏联政府机构包括外交机关, 就象上满发条的玩具汽车沿着既定的方向前进, 直至遇到不可抗拒的力量才停下来。组成这个政权机器的个人, 不为外来的论点与理由所打动。他们受到的全部教育就是教导他们不信任与怀疑外部世界。就象留声机前的白狗, 他们只听“主人的声音”。只有主人才能改变也们的目标。因此, 外国使节不可企望池的话会对苏联领导有所影响。他们至多能希望的是自己的话会被传给苏联最高领导阶层, 只有他们才能改变党的路线。但是,这些人不可能会为资产阶级代表通常的逻辑所动摇。由于目标不同, 思维方式亦不可能一致。因此, 事实比言辞对克里姆林宫更有说服力, 只有以无可辨驳的事实作后盾的言辞, 俄国人才听得进。

但是, 我们已经知道, 意识形态并没要求他们急于实现目标。和教会一样, 他们只经营意识形态概念具有长远意义, 可以耐心等待目标的实现。他们决不会为了虚幻的未来而冒丧失目前所得的风险。列宁本人就教导说, 追求共产主义目标既要谨慎又要灵活。这种告诫由于俄国历史上的教训更显重要在毫无防御的广阔平原上与游牧民族进行了几个世纪“”混战, 谨慎、考虑周全灵活与欺诈是非常有用的品质这些品质为俄罗斯和东方民族所崇尚。因此, 俄国人并不因为在此自己更强大的敌手面前退却而觉得丢面子。由于没有一个达到目的的确定时间, 他们不会为进行必要的退却而不安。俄国的政治行为就象一条不停流动的溪流, 朝着一个既定的目标前进。它主要关心的是灌满世界权力盆地中可以达到的每一个角落和缝隙。如果在前进的道路遇到不可逾越的障碍, 它会达观地接受并适应这一现实。重要的是永远朝着一个最终的目标前进。在苏联哲学中, 并无一定要在一个确定时间内实现目标的思想。

因此, 对付苏联外交比对付诸如拿破仑和希特勒等极富侵略性的首脑人物的外交既容易又困难。一方面, 也们对敌手的力量更敏感, 当觉得对方力量太强大时, 更愿意在外交上作出让步, 因此在权力逻辑与语言上更有理智。另一方面, 敌方的一次胜利并不能击败他们或使他们丧失信心。由于它坚定固执, 对付俄国不能靠偶而采取的、反映民主世界公众舆论某个时候要求的行动, 而要执行明智的、具有远见的政策—它在目标坚定、执行中方式多样与灵活应变上都不比苏联的政策逊色。

在这种情形下, 很清楚, 美国对苏政策最主要方面就是长期的、耐心但坚定和保持警惕的对俄国扩张倾向的遏制。应当指出, 这种政策与装腔作势是不相容的, 它并不等于威胁、恫吓或摆出“强硬”的姿态。虽然说克里姆林宫对政治现实的反应基本上是灵活的, 但这决

不意味着它会不顾自己的声誉。跟几乎所有其它政府一样, 苏联政权不会在笨拙的恫吓行为面前退缩。俄国领导人很了解人类的心理, 他们知道大发脾气和丧失自控决非政治活动中力量的源泉。他们会极力利用敌方这种弱点。因此, 为了有效地与俄国打交道, 外国政府绝对必要在任何时候保持冷静与镇定, 要以不易损害其威望的方式向俄国提出要求。

三

根据上面的分析, 很清楚, 苏联对西方世界自由制度的压力, 可以通过在一系列变化着的地理与政治点上, 随着俄国政策和手法的变化, 灵活、保持警惕地使用反抗力量而被遏制, 不能以魔力或劝说使之消失。俄国人期望万古长存, 并且看到自己已经取得了巨大的成就。应当记住, 曾经有一个时期, 共产党在俄国国内比苏联今天在世界更缺乏代表性。

如果说意识形态使俄国统治者认为真理在他们一边, 他们可以耐心等待最终的胜利, 那么我们则不受这种意识形态的约束, 可以自由地、客观地判断这一论点是否站得住脚。苏联这一理论意味着它不仅完全不允许西方对其经济命脉的控制, 而且设想俄国在很长时间能保持团结、纪律和坚韧不拔。把这种假定变为现实, 如果西方以足够的资源和力量对苏联政权遏制一年, 这对俄国将意味着什么呢？

苏联领导人利用现代技术给专制带来的便利, 使得人民在其政权下服服贴贴。很少有人对也们的权威进行挑战, 就是有也都在国家镇压机关面前败下阵来。

克里姆林宫亦证明自己能不顾居民的利益, 在俄国建立起重工业基础, 虽然这一过程尚未完成, 但是它仍在继续发展中, 并且日益接近主要工业国家的水平。所有这些, 不管是维持国内政治安全还是建立重工业, 都是以人民生活受压抑、期望未实现、精力被耗费为代价的。它要求使用强迫劳动, 其规模与程度在和平时期的现代社会是空前的。它造成忽视和损害苏联经济生活的其池方面, 特别是农业、消费品生产、住房建设与交通运输。

此外, 战争又使得财产损失巨大、人员伤亡惨重和民众疲惫不堪。所有这些, 使得今天的苏联人在肉体和精神上都极为疲乏。人民群众感到失望并且不再轻信上当, 如果说苏联政权在国外还有一些吸引力的话, 那么它的国内已经不象过去那么具有魅力了。在战时为了策略方面的原因而给予宗教的苟延残喘的机会被人民以极大的热情紧紧抓住了。这一事实雄辨地证明、人民对这个政权的目标没有表现出多少信仰和献身的精神。

在这种情况下, 人民的肉体与精神力量都是有一定限度的。如果超过了这个限度, 就是最残酷的独裁政府也无法驱使他们。强制劳动营地和其池强制机关以临时性的条件强迫人民工作, 劳动时间超过了劳动者意愿与单纯的经讲压力所允许的范围即使他们能幸免于难,那时他们也已衰老了, 成了独裁的牺牲品。在上面任何一种情况下, 他们最主要的力量都未能用于造福社会和为国家服务。

希望只有在年轻一代的身上。青年一代尽管历尽磨难, 但是他们数量众、有活力况且俄国民族是一个很有才能的民族。不过还有待于观察儿童时代苏联独裁政权施加的并随战争增长的精神压力, 于他们成年时的行为有什么样的影响。除了最边远地带的农场与村庄, 诸如家园安全与和平的观念在苏联已经不存在了。至今尚不清楚, 这是否对现在正在走向成熟的新的一代的全面能力产生影响。

另外, 苏联经济虽取得了某些惊人的发展, 但其发展是不平衡的、有缺陷的。说“资本主义发展不平衡”的俄国共产党人, 当想想自己的国民经济状况时, 应该觉得脸红。苏联经济的某些部门如冶金和机器制造业所占的比重大大超过其池部门。当它还没有称得上公路网的东西仅有一个原始的铁路网时,就竟然想在短时间内成为世界上的工业强国之一。他们虽然已做了不少工作努力提高劳动生产率, 教很原始的农民一些机器操作常识, 但是整个苏联经济严重管理不善,建设投资急、质量次, 折旧费必须很大, 在广大的经济部门, 尚未把西方熟练工人具有的生产观念与技术自尊运用于生产中。

很难相信, 这些弊端可能为一个疲惫的、士气低落的人民在短期内所克服, 他们在恐淇

和压力的阴影下生活。只要这些弊端未被克服, 俄国就将仍然是一个经济上脆弱的、并且在某种意义虚弱的国家, 它有能力出口它的热情和发出那种奇怪的政治魅力, 但是不能维持那些靠真正的物质力量和繁荣的产品的出口。

同时, 苏联政治生活也极不稳定。这种不稳定是由于权力从一个人或集团转移到另一个人或集团而形成的。

这主要是斯大林个人地位问题。我们应当知道, 斯大林代替列宁成为共产主义运动的领袖, 仅仅是苏联第一次个人权威的转移。这一转移花了年时间才巩固下来。它使得上百万人丧生, 从根本冲击了这个国家。共影响达及整个国际苹命达动, 极不利于克里姆林宫自己。

有可能下一次最高权力转移会是静悄悄的、不惹人注目的, 不会引起其它地区的反响。但是用列宁的话来说, 这很可能促成从“巧妙的欺诈”到“野蛮的暴力”的迅速转变, 这是俄国历史的特点, 它将从根本上动摇苏联政权的基础。

但这不仅仅是斯大林本人的问题。自从年以来, 苏联政权高级领导阶层中, 政治生活就有着危险的死气沉沉的局面。理论上说, 全俄苏维埃代表大会是党的最高权力机构,至少每三年开一次会。然而, 从上次代表大会以来已经块整整八年没开会了。在此期间, 党员数量增加了一倍。战争中大量的党员丧生今天一半以上的党员是在上次党代会以后被吸收的。而同时, 在民族经历了剧烈的变动后, 仍然是原来一小批人踞于最高地位。确实, 有某些原因使战争给西方每个大国的政府带来了根本的政治变动, 造成这种现象的原因也基本上存在于费解的苏联政治生活中, 但是, 这些原因在俄国尚未得到承认。

即使在象共产党这样具有高度纪律的组织里, 大批只是最近参加共产主义运动的党员群众与终身踞于最高领导地位的小集团之间在年令、观点和利益上的差异一也势必扩大, 大部分党员群众从未见过这些最高领导人, 从未与他们谈过话, 也不可能与他们有密切的政治联系。

在这种情况下, 谁能肯定党的领导新老交替其发生只是时间问题能够顺利地、和平地进行, 或者竞争对手们不会为了自己的目标而寻求这些尚未成熟的、缺乏经验的群众的支持如果真的出现这种情况, 将产生难以想象的后果, 因为一般说来全体党员历来习惯于铁的纪律与服从而不适应妥协与和解。如果团结遭破坏从而使党瘫痪, 俄国社会将会出现难以描述的混乱和虚弱。因为我们知道, 苏联政权只是装着一群乌合之众的容器外壳而已。在俄国根本没有地方政府这类东西。目前这一代的俄国人从不知道自发的集体行为。假如出现一些情况, 破坏了作为政治工具的党的团结与效率, 那么苏联很可能会在一夜之间, 由一个最强大的国家变为一个最弱的、最可怜的国家之一。因此, 苏联政权的未来根本不会象克里姆林宫主义所幻想的那么安全。他们表明自己能够保持政权。他们能否平静地、顺利地完成政权的新老交替, 尚有待证明。同时, 国内政权的淫威和国际生活的动荡己经严重地挫伤了该政权赖以依靠的伟大的人民, 使他们丧失了希望。十分令人惊奇的是, 今天, 苏联政权的意识形态力量在俄国境外即在它的警察力量所及的范围之外, 其影响更大。这种现象使人想起托马斯·曼在池的著名的小说《布登勃洛克一家》4中所用的一个比喻。托马斯·曼认为, 人类组织在其内部已经严重衰败时, 往往外表上显得十分强盛, 他把处于极盛时期的布登勃洛克一家比作一颗向地球发着最亮的光但事实上早已不存在的星体之一。谁敢否认, 克里姆林宫洒向西方世界失望不满的人民的强光不是事实上行将消失的星座的余辉了既不能证明是这样, 也不能证明不是这样。但是存在这么一种可能性作者认为这种可能性很大, 即苏联政权, 正象他们所说的资本主义世界, 本身包含着衰败的种子, 这个种子已经萌茅滋长。

4托马斯?曼, 1875——1955, 二十世纪最杰出的德国小说家, 1929获诺贝尔文学奖, 1944年加入美国国籍。1990年他因小说《布登勃洛克一家》问世而一举成名。这部小说描写一个资产阶级家庭三代人和他们商号的兴衰史。——译注。

四

显然, 美国不可指望在可见的将来与苏联政权保持密切的关系。在政治舞台上, 应继续将苏联当作竞争对手而非伙伴。苏联今后不可能真心热爱和平与稳定、不相信社会主义世界和资本主义世界可以长期地、友好地共处, 而是谨慎地、不懈地施加压力, 削弱与瓦解所有竞争对手的影响与力量。

然而, 俄国虽然总的说来是敌视西方的, 但是至今它仍是相对弱的国家, 它的政策很灵活, 苏联社会包含着衰败的种子。这就要求美国对坚定的遏制政策充满信心, 在俄国人露出侵害世界和平与稳定迹象的每一个点上, 使用不可更改的反击力量。

但是实际上, 美国的政策并不是纯粹的维持现状以及守株待兔。美国安全可能通过自己的行动影响俄国内部乃至整个国际共产主义运动的发展俄国政策主要依此而制定。这不单单指在苏联及其它地方搞些情报活动, 尽管这也很重要。最主要的是, 美国要在世界民众中树立这样一个印象目标明确、能够成功地解决国内生活中的问题、可以承担起一个世界强国的责任和在目前几个主要的意识形态潮流面前保持自己的信念。倘若做到这一点, 俄国共产主义目标就如堂吉柯德想法无望实现, 莫斯科追随者们的希望与热情必逐渐减退, 将给克里姆林宫对外政策增加新的困难。因为资本主义必然衰亡的神话是共产主义哲学的基石。甚至二战以后, 美国并未经历红场鸟鸦们所预言的一场衰退, 这一事实就将引起共产主义世界强大的、深远的反响。

同样地, 如果美国表现出优柔寡断、纷争不和以及内部分裂的迹象, 这也将极大地鼓舞整个共产主义运动。如果上述任何一种倾向出现的话, 共产主义世界将大受鼓舞、兴高采烈莫斯科会显得得意洋洋莫斯科在国外的支持者将增加以及大大加强莫斯科在国际事务中的影响。

说美国单独就能对共产主义运动的命运起决定性的作用并很快使苏联政权在俄国垮台,这是夸大其词的。但是美国确实能够对苏联的政策施加极大的压力, 迫使克姆林宫的行为要比近年所为更加温和与明智, 从而最后导致俄国政权的垮台或逐渐软化。因为, 任何神秘的救世运动—特别是克里姆林宫的救世运动—如果不使自己适应于事态发展的逻辑, 就必然遇到挫败。

因此, 决定权很大程度上落在美国的身上。苏美关系从本质上是对作为世界民族之一的美国的价值之考验。为了避免毁灭, 美国只需达到其民族之最好传统, 并证明值得作为一个伟大的民族而生存下去。

确实, 没有比这样对民族素质的考验更公平的了。在这种情况下, 有头脑的苏美关系观察家没有理由埋怨克里姆林宫对美国的挑战。他应当感谢上帝, 上帝使美国人民受到这种无法改变的挑战, 从而使美国全民族的安全依赖于他们的团结及接受历史要求他们负有的道义和政治领导的责任。

If I have a time machine, there are three periods I want to go back to. They are Han Dynasty, Tang Dynasty and Republic of China.

Han Dynasty is famous for its military might and at that time it has no competent rivals in East Asia. We all know that ancient China is an agricultural country. Because of this, in most dynasties, infantry dominates all other branches of the armed forces. But in Han dynasty, things are different. During the whole dynasty, the central government established a highly flexible and mobile cavalry. Xiongnu was defeated and driven to the west where they ransacked the Roman Empire.

Its head, Atila the Hun, was called The Scourage/ sk??d?; sk?d?/of God.

Tang Dynasty is majestic and splendid. What makes it distinctly from other periods is that people are more open-minded and confident.. Many overseas students come to its capital thanks to its cultural and economical appeal, not military domination.

Poetic fairy——李白

Poetic Sage——杜甫

Tang is the best period of ancient China and dynasties after Tang begin to decline and make no progress

The last period I want to go is Republic of China. It lasts from 1911 to

1949. Republic of China bridges ancient China and modern China. During Republic of China revolutionists tried to salvage old China and the choice they made shaped China today.

The splendid Gathering of outstanding masters is greatly impressed in our mind.

Time machine does not exist, but the memories of the past can guide our dreams.