内部治理结构与盈余管理外文文献翻译、中英文翻译、外文翻译

LNTU---Acc

附录A

内部治理结构与盈余管理

瑞安戴维森，珍妮古德温-斯图尔特，帕梅拉肯特

本文探讨了公司的内部治理结构对盈余管理的约束作用。这是假设盈余管理系统地涉及到公司内部治理机制的各个方面的前提下进行的研究，研究包括董事会的力量，审计委员会，内部审计职能的变化与外部审计师的选择四个方面。基于横截面模型以2000年末在澳大利亚上市的434家公司为样本，将可控性应计利润作为衡量盈余管理的水平，发现董事会及审计委员会的非执行董事的人数越多盈余管理的可能性越低。内部审计职能和审计机构的选择与盈余管理没有显著的相关性。我们进一步分析还发现，利用收入的增加作为盈余管理的替代变量时，盈余管理和审计委员会的存在具有负相关关系。

关键词：审计委员会；公司治理；盈余管理；内部审计职能

1 前言

最近在澳大利亚及海外的操纵会计行为的案件表明公司治理机制的重要性，强有力的公司治理涉及到与公司绩效水平监测的一个适当的平衡(Cadbury,1997)。在本论文中，我们以澳大利亚的公司治理为例探索治理机制与盈余之间的关系，因此，我们的重点是治理的监督作用。我们研究的是独立的董事局（ShleiferandVishny，1997），独立委员会主席，一个有效的审计委员会（MenonandWilliams，1994年），内部审计（Clikeman，2003年）和外部审计师的选择使用（贝克尔埃塔尔，1998；弗朗西斯埃塔尔，1999）对盈余管理产生的影响。在此之前的研究已经调查了治理机制可以减少欺诈性财务报告的产生（比斯利，1996; Dechowetal，1996年）。这些研究认为有效的治理机制和真实的财务报告与违反一般公认会计原则（GAAP）呈负相关关系。不过，相对较新的研究领域是公司治理与盈余管理。Peasnell等（2000）研究表明盈余管理与董事会的独立性是负相关的，而另一些研究发现审计委员会与盈余管理之间存在显着的关系（Chtourouetal.2001; Xieetal，2001）。澳大利亚公司内部治理结构和盈利管理实践检验是具有前提条件的，而Peasnell使用的数据主要是研究美国的。因此，本文探讨的内部治理与盈余管理之间的关系是在一个较少监管和自愿选择的治理体制环境下进行的（VonNessen，2003年）。

在澳大利亚，在本研究中（2000年）的时间点上，上市公司不要求有一个具有审计职能的内部审计委员会。

此外，企业监管者青睐以原则为基础的治理方法，而不是一个以规则为基础的方法（澳大利亚，2003年）。虽然在英国存在着类似的做法，Peasnelletal（2000）只研究盈余管理与外部董事在董事会的比例，以及审计委员会的存在关系。我们通过额外研究检验审计委员会规模、开会频率及独立审计人员人数对盈余管理的影响。我们也研究董事会的独立性，研究首席执行官和董事会主席的角色分离对盈余管理产生的影响、研究董事长与总经理职务的分离与盈余管理相关。本文的一项贡献是将内部审计作为一种管理机制列入很可能导致盈余管理水平下降的因素之中。虽然人们越来越重视内部审计在公司治理中发挥的作用，但之前的盈余管理研究没有将其纳入变量中。澳大利亚是一个理想的环境来研究这个问题，因为有证据表明，在澳大利亚很多上市公司没有内部审计职能，而报告表明内部审计的应用与公司规模、公司治理完善程度及风险管理相关。

我们的实证研究使用可控性应计项目来衡量盈余管理，证明盈余管理水平较低是与非执行董事在董事会的比例有关。我们还发现当审计委员会中大部分成员为非高管时盈余管理程度较低，当审计委员会中只有少数为非高管时其与盈余管理不相关。我们的研究结果不支持盈余管理与内部审计相关，也不支持是否使用五大会计师事务所的人员进行审计与是否存在盈余管理两者存在相关性。进一步测试，使用收入的变化代表盈余管理的变化，表明审计委员会与收益管理措施相关。这些结果具有重要的现实意义，因为各国政府、监管机构和标注制定者更加关心企业管制事宜。

本文的其余部分分为四节。第2部分介绍该项研究的理论背景和发展的假说。第3节概述了研究的假设。第4节研究报告的结果。第5节最后讨论了研究结果的影响，突出潜在的限制，并为未来的研究指明方向。

2理论背景和假设

2.1盈余管理

披露真实的会计信息是公司治理的核心，因为它能确保利益相关者行使其权利，同时保护他们的利益（经合组织，1999）。不过，盈余管理，被定义为扭曲一个公司真正的财务执行情况，它可能掩盖地下交易削弱公司检测机制（场埃塔尔，2001）出版的研究和实证测试了各种盈余管理发生的动机，大致包括代理成本、信息不对称和外部因素影响非缔约方。然而，我们主要关心的是某些公司治理结构限制盈余管理，而不是具体的鼓励

盈余管理出现的措施。虽然我们试图控制两个普遍应用盈余管理的动机：即，避免违反债务契约（DefondandJiambalvo，1991,1994）和避免政治成本，（WattsandZimmerman，1978；琼斯，1991年; Jiambalvo，1996年）。我们的方法是以董事会作为企业的代表性部分而不是确定一个强烈的带有盈余管理动机的子集。这样的公司往往是针对具体情况的子集（例如最近的经营模式的转变，敌意收购或新的资金筹集），而这些情况有可能是我们研究的内部治理机制的内生变量。

2.2内部治理结构

一个企业的内部治理结构包括建立监督和影响公司管理行为的职能和程序。设立这些机制的目的在于保持财务报表的可信度和规范性（Dechow等，1995）本文研究的是董事会董事，审计委员会，内部审计职能和外部审计师的选择对盈余管理的影响。

2.2.1董事会

法玛和詹森（1983年）认为董事会是公司治理结构中最重要的控制机制，因为它是内部治理结构的核心。从监督财务的角度，一个有效的董事会应该确保管理层作出的会计选择及其产生的影响的有效性。

从机构的角度看，董事会独立性是董事会发挥其有效的监督机制的保证（比斯利，1996；Dechow等，1996）。董事会独立性是指董事会中与公司执行董事没有任何关联的非执行董事所占的比重。独立董事是指不参与该公司的业务活动，作为一个局外人监督董事会董事（汉拉汉等人，2001）的假设：那些非主管上级的监测能力可以归结为激励，以维持在外部劳动力市场上的声誉。

目前出版的文献支持澳大利亚和国际公司治理准则，这些准则承认非执行董事的监督作用的重要性。这些文章建议董事会的组成方面的最佳做法是，至少一个非执行董事或独立董事占多数。这是经过研究的证据，如比斯利（1996年）认为，董事会独立董事的存在降低了财务报表舞弊的可能性，以及Dechow等（1996）报告认为，企业具有较大比例的非执行董事不太可能违反美国公认会计准则。基于这些发现，Peasnell和Chtourou 等（2000）预测，董事会的独立性可能与盈余管理负相关。然而他们并没有通过实证分析美国公司盈余管理与董事会独立性之间存在关系。因此，我们提出了如下假设：：盈余管理与董事会的独立性是负相关的

H

0,1

另一个重要特点是董事会是否有一个主席和首席执行长（CEO）的角色分离。然而亚瑟和泰勒（1993）指出，当CEO也是董事会主席时，董事会的执行能力及监测作用会

被削弱[10]。行政总裁被委任为主席一职可能导致权力的集中（比斯利，1996年）和可能的利益冲突，使公司治理结构水平下降。因此，我们提出了如下假设：

H

2,0

:盈余管理与行政总裁和董事会主席“两职合一”负相关

2.2.2 审计委员会

为了更有效地履行其职责，董事会可以委派董事会委员会的职责。就监督管理的财政自由裁量权而言，审计委员会确保保持公司财务报表的可信性从而最大限度的保障股东权利。这是因为审核委员会为财务报告提供了专门的监测。

在澳大利亚，政府的经济改革计划公司法（审计改革和公司信息披露）（澳大利亚联邦，2004年）提出了世界500强上市公司强制配置审计委员会的法案。此外，澳大利亚证券交易所（ASX）在2003年修订的上市规则中要求任何公司包括涉及标准普尔指标的上市公司，在其财政年度开始时具有审计委员会。然而，在2000年，没有规定上市公司必须具有审计委员会，只规定没有审计委员会的上市公司应在年度报告公司治理中披露这种情况原因。之前发表的文献表明审计委员会的有效性取决于委员会的独立性及会议的频率和大小。如果审计委员会成员也是该公司高管，则审计委员会是无法有效运行的。无论是公开发表的文献还是公司治理的报告都显示，审计委员会应完全是由非执行董事或独立董事组成。这是通过研究审计委员会独立性、活跃程度与财务报表舞弊的发生频率得出的结论。与此相反，克莱因（2002年）的报告发现，审计委员会中独立董事越多，盈余管理越差；当审计委员会完全由独立董事担任时，盈余管理与其没有关系。为了有效地监督管理财务权限，审计委员会将审阅财务报告，同时促进董事会、内部审计委员会与外部进行信息的交流。然而，科恩等人发现内部审计师的存在可以减少外部审计师与管理层的冲突。因此，审计委员会需要被激活使其有效地履行其职责，审计委员会通过在财政年度内举行委员会会议，增加开会次数可以提高其执行能力。研究发现，审计委员会开会频率与盈余管理呈负相关，美国证券交易委员会将可控性应计利润作为衡量盈余管理的标准。一些企业管理报告建议，审计委员会应至少包括三名成员。一个有效的审计委员会为公司提供了对盈余管理进行约束的方法。因此，我们提出了如下假设：

2:

H盈余管理与有效的审计委员会负相关。

2.2.3内部审计职能

除了审计委员会，企业可以自愿建立内部审计职能，以补充其现有的内部管治架构。

内部审计委员会可以提高公司风险管理，控制公司治理的进程和有效性，为公司提供了一个保证和咨询服务。审计工作的目标是与财务报告的审计委员会的监督职责对齐，内部审计将有利于审计委员会的有效运作。内部审计是为了改善公司内部治理流程而产生的。虽然传统内部审计的重点是控制和操作风险，但越来越多的文献表明应将重点集中于盈余管理和不恰当的财务报告。前安然公司副总裁认为，内部审计人员应寻求警告标志，如高级管理人员的不当压力，以满足盈利目标和补偿安排，可能会鼓励员工操纵盈余，以获得经济奖励。内部审计人员不仅要积极参与检测盈余管理，同时应采取积极的态度参与管理董事及财务过程。他们认为，审计委员会应积极参与管理不当收入的检测，从而提供有效意见。这些参数表明，内部审计职能的存在应与盈余管理水平较低有关。因此，提出以下假设：

3:

H盈余管理与内部审计存在负相关

2.2.4 外部审计

一个公司的审计人员的选择是公司内部治理机制的一部分，可能与盈余管理相联系。研究数据表明，大型会计师事务所被认为比小型会计师事务所执行高品质稽核。然而诸如美国和澳大利亚安然公司的例子可能并非如此，大公司更注重财务报告，小公司更注重监控过程。大型审计公司有更多的资源和知识检测盈余管理，但是他们也有更大的动力保护自己的名声来巩固自己的客户群。过去的研究表明，5大会计师事务所审计的公司盈余管理水平低于没有聘用5大的公司。因此，我们预计选择5大审计师的公司不太可能进行盈余管理。因此，提出以下假设：

H

4

：盈余管理与使用5会计师事务所审计人员负相关。

3 研究设计

本文选取2000年在澳交所上市的434家上市公司作为样本，采用琼斯横断面分析法进行分析。为了验证我们的假设，本文运用两次回归模型，一次用于计算可控性应计利润，第二次用于检验盈余管理与内部治理间的关系。我们还进行额外的测试，使用替代变量代替因变量和自变量的数目。

3.1样本选取

我们的初始样本包括568个公司，其数据可以在公司网站或数据库中找到。财务资料和有关的董事会及审计委员会的资料可以在年报中查询。然而，年度报告有关内部审计

的披露使用不是强制，因此，内部审计信息的获得可以从以下三种方法中选择一种：第一种方法是从昆士兰/毕马威中心联合主办的商业咨询取证数据库中获得相关数据；第二种方法是研究该公司的年度报告披露信息；最后，当这些公司不包括在数据库中或年度报告没有提及内部审计的，只能直接接触企业。文章排除了产业分类和治理结构或财务信息不完全的企业，行业分类从全球行业分类标准（GICS ）中获得, 最终获得本文的需要的434家上市公司样本。

3.2变量检测

3.2.1盈余管理

目前出版的文献中有几种盈余管理的方法，包括变更会计政策，改变可控性应计利润降低利润或盈利的微小变化。本文以可控性应计利润作为衡量盈余管理程度的指标。

企业盈利分为两个部分：一部分是已经实现的现金流入的盈利，即经营活动产生的现金净流量(Cash From operations ，CFO)，另一部分则是没有实现现金流入的盈利，由于这部分是按权责发生制原则确认的，但没实现现金流入，故称之为总体应计利润(Total Accruals, TA)。由于现金流量是企业实实在在发生的，企业难以对其进行操纵，因此假定盈余管理只能通过应计利润进行，但并不是全部的总体应计利润都能进行操纵。在总体应计利润各组成项目中，有些是按照现行会计规范强制处理的结果，有些则是利用现行会计选择的余地调剂、操纵的结果。因此，按照总体应计利润的可控程度又将其分为可控性应计利润(Discretionary Accruals, DA)和非可控性应计利润(Non-discretionary Accruals ，NDA)两部分。考察可控性应计利润的异常波动成为判别是否存在盈余管理的主要分析方法。研究的主要思路是根据估计期间的数据(假定不存在盈余管理)利用数学模型来预测非可控性应计项目，从而计算出可控性应计项目的值，通过统计分析，作为判断盈余管理是否存在的依据。

（1） 回归参数的估计

1,-t i A TA = a 11,1-t i A +a 21

,,-?t i t i A REV +a 31,,-t i t i A PPE +t ε （3-1） 式中：A 1,-t i 表示公司 i 第 t-1 年末的总资产；

t i REV ,?为公司 i 在第 t 年和第 t-1 年的主营业务收入的差额； t i REC ,?为公司 i 在第 t 年和第 t-1 年的应收账款净额的差额；

PPE

t i,

i公司第t年的固定资产；

式中各变量除以期初总资产是为了消除公司规模的影响

(2)非可控性应计利润的计算

运用得出的各参数估计值，代入下列模型计算出研究样本公司的以资产计量的非可控性应计利润。

NDA

t i,/A

t i,

=

1

α+

2

α（REC

REV?

-

?）/ A

t i,

+

3

αPPE

t i,

/ A

t i,

（3-2）

其中1α、2α、3α分别为a

1、a

2

、a

3

的估计值

NDA

t i,

：i公司第t年的非可控性应计利润（3）总应计利润

TA

t i,= NI

t i,

—CFO

t i,

NI

t i,

是公司 i 第 t 年净利润

CFO

t i,

是公司 i 第 t 年经营活动现金流量净额

(4)可控性应计利润的计算

根据研究样本公司的非可控性应计利润 NDA和总体应计利润 TA，计算可控性应计利润DA：

DA

t =TA

t

-NDA

t i,

TA

t i,

研究样本公司i第t年的应计利润总额

本文主要研究盈余管理和公司治理结构变量之间的关系，因此对于盈余管理的方向暂不予考虑，将可控性应计利润取绝对值，作为盈余管理的最终度量。

3.2.2公司内部治理结构变量

在本文的模型中，董事会独立性是通过两个虚拟变量衡量的。董事会大多数由非执行董事组成则取1，否则为0。如果董事会主席和首席执行官角色是分开的就取1，否则取0。一些非执行董事并非完全独立于管理层，因为他们除了董事之外可能还在公司扮演其他角色。因此，我们剔除那些在公司担任其他职务的董事。一些公司的信息披露不足，因此，我们只选择其中一些资料和报告都齐全的公司进一步进行分析。

如果一个公司在报告期内已经设立审计委员会则虚拟变量取1，否则为0。如上所述，审计委员会独立性不同，我们的模型就不同。为了测试内部审计职能的假设，当公司有自己的内部审计职能时虚拟变量取1，否则取0。同样的，当公司使用5大会计师事务所进

行审计时虚拟变量取1，否则取0。

3.2.3控制变量

众多学者的研究表明，若不控制影响盈余管理行为的其他因素，将不利于实证分析的正确性。因此，本文借引入一些能够对盈余管理产生影响的控制变量。

SIZE：年初总资产的对数。加入此变量用于控制公司规模对盈余管理的影响。通常，大公司的管理层拥有更广阔的空间来进行盈余管理行为。DEBT：资产负债率。公司的债务契约限制通常会对盈余管理行为产生影响，当公司面临较高的违约风险时，容易通过盈余管理行为来避免财务危机，而资产负债率通常作为债务契约中重要的限制性指标。

3.3回归模型

以下模型是用来检验前文所提出的假设：

DA=α+β1BDIND+β2INDCHAIR+β3AC+β4ACIND+β5ACMEET

+β

6

ACSIZE+β

7

IAF+IG5

4研究结果

通过多因素分析，可以得出一下结论：

1.本文的假设1（a）成立，董事会独立性与盈余管理负相关。但是假设1（b）不成立，即独立董事与盈余管理没有关系。这可能是由于当董事会本身独立于管理层时之外时董事会主席只能行使有限的监督权。

2.对于假设2，我们没有找到可控性应计利润与审计委员会独立性或审计委员会本身之间的关系。但发现审计委员会中非行政人员的增多会导致盈余管理下降。这一结论与克莱的研究结果一致，独立董事在审计委员会中比重增大时盈余管理会相应减少，但一个完全独立的审计委员会与盈余管理没有关系。

3.我们没有找到盈余管理与内部审计之间的关系或者使用5大会计师事务所与盈余管理之间的关系。虽然两个系数与假设一致为负但并不十分显著，因此我们认为假设3和假设4不成立。

4.在模型的七个控制变量中，有四个与盈余管理有显著相关关系。盈余管理与净收入的变化、净收入有显著关系。同时，盈余管理与企业规模、与市场相关的股权激励负相关。但我们没有发现大股东持股比例与盈余管理存在关系。

5.总结

通过本文的研究可以发现，盈余管理与董事会中独立董事比例存在负相关关系，证明了假设1（a）。研究结果并不支持假设1（b），即独立董事与盈余管理没有关系。对于假设2，考察审计委员会的存在和具体的审计委员会特征与盈余管理之间的关系。所有这些在模型一中都不被支持，其中审计委员会独立性是通过委员会中独立董事的比例进行衡量的。然而模型2发现审计委员会独立董事比例与盈余管理之间存在相关关系。进一步分析，以收入的增加替代盈余管理，发现审计委员会的存在与盈余管理相关。任何主要模型及额外模型得出的结论都不支持假设3和假设4。

本研究结果对那些尽量减少盈余管理方法及提高财务质量的人们来说具有重要作用。同时也暗示出应基于会计信息披露质量来优化公司内部治理结构的重要性。今后应加强对审计委员会的监督，强化公司内部审计职能，使其发挥更大的成效以减少盈余管理。

当然本文得出的结果受到一定的条件限制。以可控性应计利润作为盈余管理的替代指标是有据可查的，但是结果表明可控性应计利润并不能很好的代替盈余管理。文中对就业的措施的限制是为了强化内部控制的机制，对于独立董事更精细的分类能更好的提供董事会职能的信息。同样，目前的研究受到审计委员会代理缺乏有效性的限制。审计委员会的规模和开会的频率并不能很好的代替审计委员会应有的效率。因为我们只专注于企业是否使用内部审计，因此对于内部审计的检验也具有局限性。一个更精确的检验方法可以审查一个公司的内部审计地位、职能及其在公司治理中发挥的作用。更详细的内部审计信息需要通过更详细的调查获得，这需要对公司治理措施进行进一步的改进同时需要澳大利亚交易所的支持。

附录B

Internal governance structures and earnings

management

RyanDavidson ,JennyGoodwin-Stewart ,PamelaKent

Abstract

This paper investigates the role of a firm's internal governance structures constraint in earnings management. It is hypothesized that the practice of earnings management is systematically related to the strength of internal corporate governance mechanisms,including the board of directors ,the audit committee,the internal audit function andthe choice of external auditor. Based on a broad cross-sectional sample of 434 listed Australian firms,for the financial year ending in 200,a majority of non-executive directors on the board and on the audit committee are found to be significantly associated with a lower likelihood of earnings management,as measured by the absolute level of discretionary accruals. The voluntary establishment of an internal audit function and the choice of audit are not significantly related to a reduction in the level of discretionary accruals. Our additional analysis,using small increases in earnings as a measure of earnings management,also found a negative association between this measure and the existence of an audit committee.

Key words:Audit Committee;Corporate Governance;Earnings Management;Internal audit function

1 Introduction

Recent cases of inappropriate accounting practices,both in Australia and overseas,have focused attention on the need for strong corporate governance mechanisms. Strong governance involves balancing corporate performance with an appropriate level monitoring(Cadbury,1997). In the present paper,we explore the relationship between governance mechanisms and earnings management by firms in Australia and,hence,our focus is on the monitoring role of governance. The mechanisms we examine are an independent board of directors(ShleiferandVishny,1997),an independent board chair person,an effective audit committee(MenonandWilliams,1994),the use of internal audit(Clikeman,2003)and the choice of external auditor(Becker etal.,1998;Francis etal.,1999).

Prior research has investigated the role of governance mechanisms reducing fraudulent financial reporting(Beasley,1996;Dechowetal.,1996;Jiambalvo,1996).These studies have established a negative relationship between effective governance mechanisms and financial reporting decisions that are in breach of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles(GAAP). However,a relatively new area of research is the association between corporate governance and earnings management. Peasnell et al(2000) document that earnings management is negatively associated with the independence of the board of directors,while other studies find significant relationships between audit committee characteristics and earnings

management(Chtourouetal.,2001;Xieetal.,2001;Klein,2002a). The examination of the association between internal governance structures and the practice of earnings management in Australian firms is motivated by several factors. With The Exception of Peasnell et al.(2000),which uses data,existing research is predominantly US based. Therefore,we explore whether the internal governance-earnings management relationship holds in an institutional environmen where corporate governance is less regulated and choice of governance mechanisms is voluntary(V onNessen,2003). In Australia,at the time of the present study(2000),listed companies were not required to have an audit committee or an internal audit function. Furthermore,corporate regulators favour principles-based approach to governance rather than a rules-based approach(ASX,2003). Although a similar approach exists in the UK,Peasnelletal.(2000)examine only the relationships between earnings management and the proportion of outside directors on the board and the existence of an audit committee. We extend this research by exploring the effect of additional audit committee variables such as size and frequency of meetings as well as the independence of members. We also extend board independence to examine whether the separation of the chief executive and board chair roles is associated with earnings management. A further contribution is the inclusion of internal audit as a governance mechanism that is likely to be associated with a reduction in the level of earnings management. While there has been increasing emphasis on the role played in governance by internal audit,no prior earnings management studies have included this variable. Australia is an ideal setting to examine this issue as evidence suggests that many listed companies in Australia do not have an internal audit function. Goodwin and Kent(2003)report that the use of internal audit is associated with the size of the company and its commitment to strong corporate governance and risk management.

Our principal tests,using absolute discretionary accruals to measure earnings management,suggest that a lower level of earnings management is associated with the presence of non-executive directors on the board. We also find a negative association between earnings management and audit committees comprising a majority of non executives,but no relationship between earnings management and committees comprised solely of non-executives. Our results do not support a relationship between earnings management and the use of internal auditor the choice of a Big 5 auditor. Additional testing,using small positive changes in earnings as an indication of earnings management,suggests that audit committees are associated with this measure of earnings management.These results have important practical implications because of the heightened interest in corporate governance matters from governments,regulators and standard setters.

The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 provides the theoretical background for the study and develops the hypotheses.Section 3 outlines the research method used to test the hypotheses. It also discusses the measurement of earnings management through the estimation of discretionary accruals.Section 4 reports the present study's results. Section 5 concludes by discussing the implications of the research findings,highlighting potential limitations and considering future areas for research.

2 Theoretical background and hypotheses

2.1Earnings Management

The preparation and disclosure of true and fair financial information is central to corporate governance,as it provides stakeholders with a foundation to exercise their rights,in order to protect their interests(OECD,1999). However,earnings management,defined as the practice of distorting the true financial performance of (a) company' (SEC,1999,p.3),effectively weakens this monitoring mechanism as it might conceal poor underlying performance. The published literature has developed and empirically tested a variety of motivations for earnings management to occur(Fields etal.,2001). These fall broadly within the categories of agency costs,information asymmetries and externalities affecting non-contracting parties. However,we are primarily concerned with the extent to which certain corporate governance attributes limit the opportunity to manage earnings,rather than specific incentives for earnings management to occur. Although we attempt to control for two widely documented motives for earnings management;namely,avoiding breaching debt covenants(DefondandJiambalvo,1991,1994) and avoiding political costs(WattsandZimmerman,1978;Jones,1991;Jiambalvo,1996), our approach is to examine a board cross-section of firms rather than identifying a specific subset with strong incentives to engage in earnings management. Such subsets of firms are often context specific(e.g. recent managerial change,hostile takeover or new capital raising)and these contexts are likely to be endogenous to the internal governance mechanisms we examine.

2.2 Internal governance structure

The internal governance structure of a firm consists of the functions and processes established to oversee and influence the actions of the firm’s management. The role of these mechanisms in relation to financial reporting is to ensure compliance with mandated reporting requirements and to maintain the credibility of a firm’s financial statements(Dechow et al.,1995).The mechanisms that we examine in the present study are the board of directors,the audit committee,the internal audit function and the choice of external auditor.

2.2.1 Board of directors

Fama and Jensen(1983a,b)recognize the board as the most important control mechanism available because it forms the apex of a firm’s internal governance structure.In terms of monitoring financial discretion,an effective board of directors should ascertain the validity of the accounting choices made by management and the financial implications of such decisions(NYSE,2002).

From an agency perspective,the ability of the board to act as an effective monitoring mechanism is dependent upon its independence from management(Beasley,1996;Dechow et al.,1996).Board independence refers to the extent to which a board is comprised of non-executive directors who have no relationship with the firm beyond the role of director. A non-executive director is defined as a director who is not employed in the company’s business activities and whose role is to provide an outsider’s contribution and oversight to the board of directors(Hanrahan et al.,2001).A non-executive director who is entirely independent from management is expected to offer shareholders the greatest protection in monitoring management (Baysinger and Butler,1985).Fama and Jensen(1983a,b)posit that the superior monitoring ability of non-executives can be attributed to the incentive to maintain their reputations in the external labour market.

The published literature is supported by Australian and international corporate governance guidelines,which recognize the importance of the monitoring role of non-executive directors(AIMA,1997,1995;OECD,1999;NYSE,2002;ASX,2003;StandardsAustraliaInternation al,2003;Bosch Committee,1995;Cadbury Committee,1992).These guides suggest that best practice with respect to board composition is,at least,a majority of non-executive or independent directors.This is supported by research evidence such as Beasley(1996),who finds that the presence of independent directors on the board reduces the likelihood of financial

statement fraud,and Dechow et al.(1996),who report that firms with a greater proportion of non-executive directors are less likely to be subject to Securities and Exchange Commission(SEC)enforcement actions for violating US GAAP.Based on these findings,both Peasnell et al.(2000)and Chtourou et al.(2001)predict that board independence is also likely to be associated with a reduction in earnings management.While Peasnell et al.(2000)find empirical support for their prediction with respect to UK firms,Chtourou et al.(2001)fail to find an association between earnings management and board independence for a sample of US firms.Despite these conflicting results,we hypothesize a negative association between board independence and earnings management.Therefore,we test the following hypothesis: H1(a):Earnings management is negatively associated with the independence of the board of directors.

Another important characteristic of boards is whether there is a separation of the roles of the chairperson and the Chief Executive Officer(CEO).While Arthur and Taylor(1993)point out that the underlying economic determinants of separating these roles are not well understood,corporate governance guidelines assume that a board’s ability to perform a monitoring role is weakened when the CEO is also the chairperson of the board(e.g.Cadbury Committee,1992;ASX,2003;Standards Australia International,2003).The appointment of the CEO to the position of chair can lead to a concentration of power(Beasley,1996)and possible conflicts of interest,resulting in a reduction in the level of monitoring.This leads to the following hypothesis:

H1(b):Earnings management is negatively associated with the separation of the roles of CEO and board chair.

2.2.2Audit committee

In order to more efficiently perform their duties,boards of directors might delegate responsibilities to board committees.In relation to monitoring the financial discretion of management,it is the audit committee that is likely to provide shareholders with the greatest protection in maintaining the credibility of a firm’s financial statements.This is because of the specialized monitoring of financial reporting and audit activities provided by the audit committee.

In Australia,the Government’s Corporate Law Economic Reform Program(Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure)Act 2004(CLERP 9)(Commonwealth of Australia,2004)proposes mandatory audit committees for the Top 500 listed companies.Furthermore,the Australian Stock Exchange(ASX)amended its listing rules in 2003 to require any company that was included in the Standard and Poor’s 500/ASX .All Ordinaries Index at the beginning of its financial year to have an audit committee during that year.In addition,in March 2003,the ASX Corporate Governance Council released a best practice guide that recommends that all companies have an audit committee(ASX,2003).However,in the year 2000,there was no requirement mandating audit committees.The only rule in place was that listed company with no audit committee should disclose the reasons for this in a corporate governance statement in the company’s annual report.

Prior published literature indicates that the effectiveness of an audit committee is dependent,in part,on the extent to which the committee is independent,its frequency of meetings and its size. It is contended that audit committees are unable to function effectively when members are also executives of the firm(Lynn,1996;BRC,1999).Both the published literature and governance reports suggest that audit committees should consist exclusively of non-executive or independent directors(e.g.Menon and Williams,1994;BRC,1999;ASX,2003).This is supported by research that demonstrates a relationship between audit committee independence and a higher degree of active oversight and a lower incidence of financial statement fraud

(Jiambalvo,1996;McMullenandRaghundan,1996;Wright,1996).

In contrast,however,Klein(2002a)reports a negative relation between earnings management and a majority of independent directors on the audit committee,but finds no meaningful relationship between earnings management and an audit committee comprised solely of independent directors.

To effectively monitor the financial discretion of management,the audit committee is expected to review the financial reporting process,as well as to facilitate a flow of information among the board of directors,the internal and external auditors, and management(McMullen and Raghundan,1996).However,both Cohen et al.(2000)and Gibbins et al.(2001)report that external auditors are sceptical of the role that audit committees play in reducing conflicts between auditors and management. Hence,to effectively discharge their responsibilities,audit committees need to be active(Collier,1993;Hughes,1999)and to be of sufficient size.

Audit committee activity has been operationalized through the number of committee meetings held during the financial year,with the expectation that the more often a committee meets,the more likely it is to carry out its responsibilities.Studies have found that the frequency of audit committee meetings is negatively associated with both earnings management,as measured by discretionary current accruals(Xie et al.,2001),and the likelihood of enforcement action by the SEC.With regard to size,several corporate governance reports have proposed that the committee should consist of at least three members.

The existence of an effective audit committee provides a firm with an added layer of governance,which is expected to constrain earnings management behaviour.This leads to the following hypothesis.

H2:Earnings management is negatively associated with the presence of an effective audit committee.

2.2.3Internal audit function

In addition to the audit committee,firms can voluntarily establish an internal audit function to supplement their existing internal governance framework.If established, this function provides firms with an assurance and consulting service,which can improve the effectiveness of their risk management,control,and governance processes(IIA,1999).An internal audit function is also expected to facilitate the operation and effective functioning of the audit committee,as the goals of the audit function are closely aligned with the financial reporting oversight responsibilities of the audit committee(Scarbrough et al.,1998;Goodwin and Yeo,2001;Goodwin,2003).The formation of an internal audit function is endorsed by governance reports(NYSE,2002)and prior literature(Collier,1993;Goodwin and Kent,2003)as a means of improving internal governance processes.

Although traditionally internal audit has focused more on controls and operational risks,there has been increasing emphasis in the professional literature on the need to also focus on earnings management and inappropriate financial reporting(Eighme and Cashell,2002;Martin et al.,2002;Rezaee,2002;Clikeman,2003;Hala,2003).Sherron Watkins,former Enron vice president,believes that internal auditors should look for warning signs such as undue pressure from senior management to meet earnings targets and compensation arrangements that might encourage employees to manipulate earnings in order to receive financial rewards(Hala,2003).Clikeman (2003)argues that internal auditors should not only be actively involved in detecting earnings management,but that they should take a proactive approach to educating managers and directors about the dangers of the practice.Eighme and Cashell(2002) regard the role of internal audit in detecting earnings management as being a complementary one to that of external audit.They believe that both should be actively involved in the detection of inappropriate earnings management,thereby providing two unrelated opinions to the audit committee.

These arguments suggest that the presence of an internal audit function should be associated with a lower level of earnings management.Accordingly,the following hypothesis is proposed.

H3:Earnings management is negatively associated with the presence of an internal audit function.

2.2.4External audit

The choice of a firm’s auditor is another internal gover nance mechanism that is likely to be associated with earnings management.Research evidence suggests that the large audit firms are perceived to perform higher quality audits than smaller audit firms(DeAngelo,1981).While examples such as Enron in the USA and HIH in Australia might suggest otherwise,the large firms are considered to be more effective monitors of the financial reporting process compared to smaller firms.Krishnan(2003)argues that, not only do the large audit firms have more resources and expertise to detect earnings management,but they also have a greater incentive to protect their reputation because of their larger client base.Past studies demonstrate that clients of Big 5 auditors report lower levels of earnings management than clients of non-Big 5 auditors(Becker et al.,1998;Francis et al.,1999)[6]. Therefore,we expect that firms that choose a Big 5 auditor are less likely to engage in earnings management.This gives rise to the following hypothesis:

H4:Earnings management is negatively associated with the use of a Big 5 auditor.

3 Research design

The present study involves a cross-sectional analysis of 434 firms listed on the ASX for the financial year ending in 2000.To test our hypotheses,we use two primary models which regress absolute discretionary accruals on a set of governance and control variables.The two models differ only in their measure of audit committee independence.We also conduct additional tests,using alternative measures of both the dependent variable and a number of independent variables.

3.1.Sample selection

Our preliminary sample of 568 firms comprised companies for which annual reports were available either on the Connect database,on company websites or in hard copy.Financial information and information pertaining to boards of directors and audit committee characteristics were obtained from disclosures made in annua reports.However,annual report disclosure concerning the use of internal audit is not mandatory.Therefore,this information was obtained by one of three methods. The first method involved consulting the University of Queensland/KPMG Centre for Business Forensics database. The second method involved examining annual report disclosures.The final method involved directly contacting firms,which were either not included on the database or whose annual reports made no mention of an internal audit function.

To arrive at the final sample,exclusions were made on the basis of industry classification and insufficient governance or financial information.For the purpose of industry classification,the Global Industry Classification Standard(GICS)was adopted. Firms were classified according to the 59 GICS industries and,consistent with prior research,industries with less than 8 firms were eliminated.Firms in the financial sector were also excluded because of their unique working capital structures (Klein,2002a)and the added layer of governance imposed through regulation(Barnhart et al.,1994).Those firms with missing financial or governance information were also excluded,as were firms with extreme values for discretionary accruals. After these exclusions were made,the sample for the study was limited to

434 firms in 24 industries.

3.2.Measurement of the variables

3.2.1.Earnings management

The published literature has developed several tests of earnings management,including the assessment of accounting policy changes(Healy,1985;Sweeney,1994),specific accounting transactions(McNichols and Wilson,1988),discretionary accruals(Jones,1991)and small profits or small changes in earnings(Holland and Ramsay,2003).The present study uses discretionary accruals as the primary measure of earnings management while we also use small profits and small changes in earnings in our additional analysis.

Earnings management research has been dominated by studies that have followed the general discretionary accruals framework proposed by McNichols and Wilson (1988).This framework partitions accruals into non-discretionary and discretionary components on the assumption that a high level of discretionary accruals(DA) suggests that a firm is engaging in earnings management.The most frequently used method to decompose accruals is the modified-Jones model(Dechow et al.,1995). This model assumes that the non-discretionary component of total accruals(NDA) is a function of the change in revenues adjusted for the change in receivables and the level of property,plant and equipment,which drive working capital requirements and depreciation charges,respectively.

We use the cross-sectional version of the modified-Jones model(DeFond and Jiambalvo,1994;Becker et al.,1998;Bartov et al.,2000).Under this model,the level of discretionary accruals for a particular firm is calculated as the difference between the firm’s total accruals and its non-discretionary accruals(NDA),as estimated with equation: (1)1,-t i A TA = a 11,1-t i A +a 21

,,-?t i t i A REV +a 31,,-t i t i A PPE +t ε （3-1） where:

TA t i , =total accruals for firm i in industry j in year t,

t i REV ,?=change in revenue for firm i in industry j between year t-1 and t,

t

i REC ,?= the change in receivables for firm i in industry j between year t-1

and t. PPE t i , =gross property,plant and equipment for firm i in year t,

(2) NDA t i ,/A t i ,= 1α+2α（REC REV ?-?）/ A t i ,+3αPPE t i ,/ A t i , (3-2) The 2α coefficient(change in revenues)is predicted to be positive,as changes in revenues are expected to be positively related to changes in working capital accounts.The expected sign on 3α (property,plant and equipment)is negative,as the level of fixed assets is expected to drive depreciation expenses and deferred taxes(Klein,2002a).Having estimated non-discretionary accruals(NDA)from

equation(bove,the amount of discretionary accruals(DAC)for firm i in industry j for year tis calculated as the residual value from equation(3-3):

DA

t =TA

t

-NDA

t i,

(3-3)

We use a cash-flow approach to estimate total accruals as this is considered superior to the balance sheet approach(Hribar and Collins,2002).This approach involves deducting the cash flow from operations obtained from the statement of cash flows from the amount of net income(before extraordinary items)from the income statement.

3.2.2.Corporate governance variables

In our primary models,board independence is measured by two dummy variables,the first taking a value of 1 if the board of directors is comprised of a majority of non-executive directors and otherwise,and the second variable taking avalue of if the roles of the chairperson and CEO are separated and 0 otherwise.We acknowledge that some non-executive directors are not entirely independent from management as they might have a relationship with the firm in addition to their role as a director.Therefore,we attempt to refine this measure by eliminating those non-executive directors who are reported to have engaged in transactions with the company. Because inadequate disclosure by some companies results in a smaller sample,we test this measure on the subset of companies for which this information is available and report the results in our additional analysis.

The existence of an audit committee is identified by a dummy variable with a value of if the firm has an audit committee operating during the year and otherwise.As noted,our models differ in their measure of audit committee independence(ACIND).In model 1,ACIND is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when the committee is comprised entirely of non-executive directors and 0 otherwise.In model 2,ACIND takes the value of 1 when the committee is comprised of a majority of non-executive directors and 0 otherwise.

Other indicators of audit committee effectiveness,activity and size,are measured by the number of committee meetings held during the year(ACMEET),and the number of directors assigned to the audit committee(ACSIZE),respectively.To test the internal audit function hypothesis,a dummy variable is employed,taking a value of 1 if the firm has its own internal audit function or it outsources its internal audit activities,and 0 otherwise.Similarly,a dummy variable is used to test the external audit hypothesis,with a value of 1 when the firm uses a Big 5 auditor and 0 otherwise(BIG5).

3.2.3.Control variables

We control for the effect of possible confounding factors(Bartov et al.,2000) by including in our models variables that prior studies have found to be associated with earnings management or governance variables.To control for the existence of concentrated shareholdings that might improve monitoring(Agrawal and Knoeber,1996;Peasnell et al.,2000),we include a variable defined as the percentage of shares held by the largest substantial shareholder(SUBSH).15 Leverage(LEV), measured as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets,captures the incentives to practice earnings management when close to debt covenant violations(Beasley and Salterio,2001;Klein,2002a).The absolute change in earnings has been found to be positively associated with earnings management(Klein,2002a)and we measure this by the absolute change in net income between the current and prior periods scaled by total assets(ABSCH).We include the log of total assets(SIZE)to control for the effect of size as this has been found to be negatively associated with earnings management and positively associated with audit committee and board independence and the use of internal audit(Bartov et al.,2000;Klein,2002a;Goodwin and Kent,2003).Following Klein(2002a,b),absolute current

earnings(ABSNI),measured by the absolute value of net income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets,is also included;16 as is the market to book ratio(MKT),measured by market capital- ization divided by the book value of shareholders’equity.Klein(2002b)finds this latter variable to be related to board and audit committee independence.Finally,to alleviate the concern that the modified Jones model provides biased estimates of discretionary accruals when firms experience extreme earnings performance(Dechow et al.,1995),we include a control variable for extreme performance(EXTP).This variable takes a value of 1 if the firm is within either the top or bottom 10 per cent of the sample for performance(measured by net income divided by total assets),and 0 otherwise.

3.3.Regression models

where DA is the absolute value of discretionary accruals,as measured by thecross-sectional modified-Jones model and the remaining variables are as previously defined.

4 Results

Recall that the ability of the board of directors to monitor the financial discretion of management is expected to be a function of its independence,measured by board and chairperson independence. This provides support for Hypothesis 1a that earnings management is negatively associated with board independence.However,Hypothesis 1b is not supported as there is no evidence of a negative relationship between an independent board chair(INDCHAIR) and earnings management in either model.This result might be attributable to the limited additional oversight provided by a non-executive chairperson when the board itself is predominantly independent from management.The second hypothesis relates to the audit committee and its role in detecting and preventing earnings management.In model 1,we do not find any association between the level of discretionary accruals and the existence of an audit committee (AC),the committee’s independence(ACIND)or its effectiveness(ACMEET and

ACSIZE).Model 2,however,finds a negative association between areduction in earnings management and a majority of non-executives on the committee. These results are consistent with those of Klein(2002a)who finds that a majority of independent directors on the audit committee is related to a reduction in earnings management,but that an entirely independent committee has no meaningful relation with earnings management.We do not find an association between earnings management and the existence of an internal audit function(IAF)or the use of a Big 5 auditor in either model.Although both coefficient are negative as predicted,neither is statistically significant and, therefore,we do not find support for Hypothesis 3 or Hypothesis 4.Of the seven control variables included in the models,five are statistically significant.Earnings management is strongly associated in the predicted direction with the absolute change in net income(ABSCH),absolute net income(ABSNI)19 and leverage(LEV).It is also negatively associated with firm size(SIZE)and positively associated with market to book ratio of equity(MKT).However,we do not find an association between the proportion of shares held by a substantial shareholder (SUBSH)or extrem performance(EXTP).

Several additional tests are performed to ascertain the credibility of the initial analysis.The first set of tests,comprising three iterations,repeats the regression models with alternative definitions of board and audit committee independence.Iteration 1 uses the proportion of non-executive directors on the board as the measure of independence.The coefficient is negative and significant in both models,supporting the relationship between board independence and earnings management. Iteration 2 examines audit committee independence in the same manner as iteration1,with substantively similar results to those reported.Iteration 3 attempts to refine the measure of independence by removing those non-executive directors with related party transactions.As a result of inadequate disclosures,our sample is reduced to 420 firms.Our results are qualitatively similar to those reported for model 1,with board independence significant at p=0.050.However,the measure of audit committee

independence for model 2(a majority of independent directors on the committee)is not significant in this iteration.

We also examine the sensitivity of audit committee meetings(ACMEET)and audit committee size(ACSIZE)to specific cut-offs.First,we substitute ACMEET with a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the audit committee met at least twice during the financial year,and 0 otherwise.We then repeat the analysis with three meetings per year as the cut-off.The coefficients are consistent with the original models.We also apply a similar dummy variable to ACSIZE,taking a value of 1 if the audit committee is comprised of at least three directors and 0 otherwise.However,the results are not sensitive to this cut-off point.

Final tests of robustness pertain to industry classification.To address the concern raised in W ells(2002)that the estimation of discretionary accruals for‘Gold’firms is potentially biased,because of the nature of their operations,the main regression models are re-estimated in two ways.The first involves including a dummy variable, taking the value of one if the firm is classified in the GICS subindustry‘Gold’,and zero otherwise.The second approach involves eliminating all Gold firms from the sample.The findings from both approaches are qualitatively similar to the original results.

Our analysis focuses on absolute discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management.This measure is non-directional,capturing both upwards and downwards earnings management.Therefore,we conduct additional tests that focus only on upwards earnings management.First,we re-run our prior tests using signed discretionary accruals as the dependent variable.Although we obtain qualitatively similar results for the control variables,none of the corporate governance variables are statistically significant.

5.Conclusion

The significant negative relationship between earnings management and the presence of a board comprised of a majority of non-executive directors provides support for Hypothesis 1a.21 The findings do not support Hypothesis 1b concerning an association between an independent chairperson and earnings management.With respect to Hypothesis 2,which investigates the relation between the existence of an audit committee and specific audit committee characteristics and earnings management, none of the proposed variables are supported by model 1,where audit committee independence is measured as all committee members being non-executives.However,model 2 does find support for an association between an audit committee comprising

a majority of non-executives and a reduction in earnings management.22 Our additional analysis,using small increases in earnings as a possible measure of earnings management,finds a relation between the existence of an audit committee and the dependent variable.Neither Hypothesis 3 relating to the internal audit function nor

Hypothesis 4 relating to the choice of a Big 5 auditor are supported in our primary model or any of our additional testing. The results of the present study have implications for regulators

who are concerned to minimize opportunities for earnings management and to improve financial reporting quality.There are also implications for companies seeking to strengthen their corporate governance with respect to financial reporting.In particular,therewould appear to be scope for strengthening the effectiveness of audit committees and making greater use of internal audit as mechanisms to reduce earnings management.

The results and implications of the present study are subject to several limitations, most of which suggest the need for further research.Problems associated with the use of discretionary accruals as a measure of earnings management are well documented (Klein,2002a).The fact that our alternative measure,small increases in earnings, gives differing results might indicate that our measures are not good proxies for earnings management.A second limitation relates to the measures employed to test the strength of the internal governance mechanisms.A more refined classification of director independence might provide a more informative measure of board monitoring ability.Similarly,the present study is limited by the lack of suitable proxies to operationalize audit committee effectiveness.The proxies adopted in the present study,particularly audit committee size and the frequency of committee meetings, might not be powerful enough measures of audit committee effectiveness.Other characteristics such as the financial expertise of members,the existence of an audit committee charter or the number of meetings with the external auditor might be better measures of effectiveness.The internal audit measure also has limitations as we focus only on whether a company uses internal audit.A more refined measure could examine the status of internal audit within the firm,the role that the function plays in corporate governance and its interaction with the audit committee.While more detailed internal audit information would need to be obtained by survey,refinements to the other governance measures are likely to become more readily available as a result of CLERP 9 and the ASX best practice recommendations.

旅游服务贸易外文翻译文献

旅游服务贸易外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)

旅游服务贸易的国际竞争力：罗马尼亚的案例 引言 旅游业是唯一的可以为任何发展水平的国家提供贸易机会的服务活动。然而，它也是一个很大程度因为国家的能力和在全球经济中的表现而又有明确的利益分配不均行业，而这又需要提高自己的竞争力。 自20世纪90年代初，罗马尼亚旅游业经历了出口量，生长速率和结构的重大变化。这些不同的波动都影响了罗马尼亚在国际旅游市场上相对的竞争地位并引起了其旅游贸易平衡的变化。同时，新的和更多的错杂的欧式建筑，引起了罗马尼亚的区域旅游竞争力的显著变化。 在此背景下，本文试图提出一个框架，以竞争力和旅游贸易表现之间的关系为重点，来评估罗马尼亚的旅游服务贸易的国际竞争力。 一、国际竞争力视角：国际竞争力之与国际旅游业的相关性 国际竞争力的概念，尽管有争议，难以捉摸，但现在已经得到认可，并继续吸引世界各地的学者和决策者的关注。 到目前为止，为提高国际竞争力已采取措施，都被认为是在经济层面进行的(加瑞利，2003)通常是指一个国家生产的商品和服务，以满足国际市场的考验，并同时保持和增加公民的收入的能力(欧洲委员会，2007)。 由于竞争力最终取决于一国企业在国内和国际的市场成功，所以对竞争力的注意力都集中在企业层面的竞争力上(波特，1990)，对于此的普遍理解是指“……该公司保持，并更好的是，扩大其全球市场份额，增加和扩大利润的能力” (克拉克和盖，1998, 经济合作与发展组织，1993)。 因此，虽然广泛流传但是国际竞争力作为与国家经济和其国际贸易相关

的理论基础已经不太在学术文献进行分析。因此，一个国家国际竞争力的性质，效益和局限性仍然含糊不清(科尔德威尔，2000,克鲁格曼，1994, 1996)。 国际竞争力，是指一个国家在货物和服务贸易方面巩固和保持贸易优势相对于世界其他地区的贸易优势。 每当一个国家的经济福利通过贸易流量的增加，或通过从初始平衡状态的贸易条件的改变而增加，他的国际竞争力都会得到提高(科尔德威尔，2000)。 贸易理论表示，经济福利依赖于一个国家有比较优势的货物和服务的生产。这实际上意味着当生产符合一国的比较优势的情况时国际竞争力能得到保障。如果一国能在国际上表现良好并在出口市场竞争成功，这可能就是他们健全的国际竞争力的标志。 因此，在国际上，竞争力定义为一个经济体能够吸引其出口需求和投资供给需求的能力和在所有社会规范内提升公民生活水平的能力。这反过来又取决于宏观和微观经济政策，影响生产的经济生产率要素和经营成本的法规和制度。 一个可用的文献回顾和实证证据支持国际竞争力可以解释为在一定程度上，一个国家的出口能力这一观点(道乐和沃尔夫，1993, 格博格等. 2004)。还有就是，事实上，是出口表现和国际竞争力之间的循环关系。出口是国际竞争力的第一衡量指标。出口情况的改善会导致了一个国家的竞争力提升。这种效果是一个企业的技能，知识，创新和运用新技术并能够在一个成功的商业方式中利用技术机会等的结果。 另一方面，为了在竞争激烈的全球市场努力成功实现出口，一个国家被迫提高竞争力。更具竞争力的国家，它的经济更强大。因此，它更有能力在全球市场竞争，以吸引具有较高的知识，技能，水平人们去购买新技术等，

企业创新战略外文翻译文献

企业创新战略外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译) 翻译之一： Choosing an innovation strategy: theory and practice Author：Joseph T. Gilbert Nationality：America Derivation：Business Horizons, Nov-Dec, 1994 Innovations come as both inventions and adoptions. They come in many types and vary greatly in complexity and scope. Companies attempting to

make a profit cannot continue for long periods without innovating. If they try, their customers will leave them for firms with more up-to-date products or services. It is an observed fact that different companies take different approaches to the use of innovation in attempting to improve their performance. Both academic and practitioner publications in recent years have contained a great deal of writing about innovation, the subjects of which have ranged from comparisons of national patterns of innovation to studies of individual innovations. However, little has been published regarding one issue of both theoretical and practical importance: the innovation policy or strategy of individual firms. Business strategy as a field of study is concerned with how a company competes in its chosen business. It deals with the analysis of a firm's strengths and weaknesses and the opportunities and threats presented by the firm's environment. Strategy looks toward consistent execution of broad plans to achieve certain levels of performance. Innovation strategy determines to what degree and in what way a firm attempts to use innovation to execute its business strategy and improve its performance. To choose an innovation strategy, managers might logically start by thinking about various kinds of innovations and their requirements. We shall discuss three major features of innovation, and analyze each in terms of distinct opposites, even though innovations found in the real world more often appear at various points between these opposites. Innovation is sometimes used in a limited sense to refer only to inventions (products, services, or administrative procedures that no other firm has introduced). More often, however, it applies in a more general sense that includes both invention as described above and imitation (adoption by a firm of a product, service, or administrative procedure that is not an invention but is new to that firm). We use the term in this second sense. Innovations can be characterized in a variety of ways. In the following

酒店服务质量管理外文文献翻译

文献出处：Borkar S, Koranne S. Study of Service Quality Management in Hotel Industry [J]. Pacific Business Review International, 2014, 6(9): 21-25. 原文 Study of Service Quality Management in Hotel Industry Borkar; Sameer Abstract It is an attempt to understand the role of quality improvement process in hospitality industry and effectiveness in making it sustainable business enterprise. It is a survey of the presently adopted quality management tools which are making the hotels operations better focused and reliable and meet the customer expectations. Descriptive research design is used to know the parameters of service quality management in hospitality industry. Exploratory research design is undertaken to dig out the service quality management practices and its effectiveness. Data analysis is done and presented; hypothesis is tested against the collected data. Since the industry continuously tries to improve upon their services to meet the levels of customer satisfaction; Study presents tools for continuous improvement process and how it benefits all the stake holders. It can be inferred from the study that the hotel implement continuous improvement process and quality management tools to remain competitive in the market. The study involves hotels of highly competitive market with limited number of respondents. This limits the study to hotel industry and has scope of including other hospitality service providers as well. Keywords:Customer Satisfaction, Perception, Performance Measurement, Continuous, Improvement Process. Introduction It has brought paradigm shifts in the operations of hospitality industry. The overall perspective of the industry is changed due to introduction of new techniques

指纹识别系统(文献综述)

指纹识别方法的综述 摘 要: 对在指纹的预处理和特征提取、指纹分类、指纹的匹配过程中的方向图、滤波器、神经网络等关 键性原理和技术做了详细的说明,并对在各个过程中用到的方法做了进一步的比较,讨论了各种方法的优越性。 0 引 言 自动指纹识别是上世纪六十年代兴起的,利用计算机取代人工来进行指纹识别的一种方法。近年 来,随着计算机技术的飞速发展,低价位指纹采集仪的出现以及高可靠算法的实现,更使得自动指纹识 别技术越来越多地进入到人们的生活和工作中,自动指纹识别系统的研究和开发正在成为国内外学术 界和商业界的热点。相对于其他生物特征鉴别技术例如语音识别及虹膜识别,指纹识别具有许多独到 的优点,更重要的是它具有很高的实用性和可行性,已经被认为是一种理想的身份认证技术,有着十分 广泛的应用前景,是将来生物特征识别技术的主流。 1 指纹取像 图 1 是一个自动指纹识别系统AFIS(Automated Fingerprint Identification System) 的简单流程。 → → → ↓ ↑ ———— 将一个人的指纹采集下来输入计算机进行处理是指纹自动识别的首要步骤。指纹图像的获取主要利用设备取像,方便实用,比较适合AFIS 。利用设备取像的主要方法又利用光学设备、晶体传感器和超声波来进行。光学取像设备是根据光的全反射原理来设计的。晶体传感器取像是根据谷线和脊线皮肤与传感器之间距离不同而产生的电容不同来设计的。超声波设备取像也是采用光波来取像,但由于超声波波长较短,抗干扰能力较强,所以成像的质量非常好。 2 图像的预处理与特征提取 无论采取哪种方法提取指纹,总会给指纹图像带来各种噪声。预处理的目的就是去除图像中的噪 音,把它变成一幅清晰的点线图,以便于提取正确的指纹特征。预处理是指纹自动识别过程的第一步, 它的好坏直接影响着指纹识别的效果。常用的预处理与特征提取( Image Preprocessing and Feature Ex 2 t raction) 方法的主要步骤包括方向图计算、图像滤波、二值化、细化、提取特征和后处理。当然这些步骤 可以根据系统和应用的具体情况再进行适当变化。文献[ 1 ]提出了基于脊线跟踪的方法能够指纹取像 图像预处理 特征提取 指纹识别 数据库管理

公司治理相关文献综述

《公司治理机制理论研究文献综述》-郑志刚 公司治理机制是解决现代公司由于控制权和所有权分离所导致的代理问题的各种机制的总称,它既包括公司治理的法律和政治途径、产品和要素市场竞争、公司控制权市场、职业关注等外部控制系统,同时包括激励合约设计、董事会、大股东治理、债务融资等内部控制系统。 研究意义 公司治理所要研究和解决的问题是如何使资金的提供者按时收回投资并获得合理的回报。它构成建立在高度专业化分工基础上的现代公司制度运行的核心。对公司治理问题的研究显然对于提高中国现代公司的治理效率,从而最终推进企业改革不仅具有重要的理论意义,同时还具有重要的现实意义。 一、外部控制系统 外部控制系统指的是尽管机制的实际实施超出了公司资源计划的范围,仍然可以用来实现公司治理目标的各种公司治理机制总称,它包括公司治理的法律和政治途径、产品和要素市场竞争、公司控制权市场、声誉市场等。 1.公司治理的法律和政治途径 ①公司治理的法律途径在公司治理机制中处于基础性地位。 ②此外,政治因素的考虑对一国法律的制定产生深刻的影响。由于对于大多数国家的法律而言,对雇员的保护与对投资者的保护负相关,因而,法律规定是谋求高投资者保护程度的企业家与谋求高雇员保护程度的雇员的政治妥协。 ③公司治理体系的不同更多的是意识形态的因素,而不是单纯由经济因素造成的。 2.产品和要素市场竞争

①产品(要素)市场竞争不仅是市场经济条件下,改善整体经济效率十分强大的力量,同时,它在公司治理方面也发挥重要作用 ②产品和要素市场的监督力量对于新的和存在因量经济租或准租的活动而言十分微弱。 3.公司控制权市场 所谓的公司控制权市场是指建立在现代放熟的资本市场的有效运作基础之上,通过包括公司舞管、杠杆收购以及公司重组等在内的公司战略而实现的公司资产控制权力转移的各种市场行为的总称。这里的接管包括兼并、敌意和友好要约收购以及代理权竞争等。 接管实际发生的另一个必要条件是,接管者能够战胜目标公司经理人的“反接管”措施。 对接管的主要批评是,接管的收益来自享受的税收优惠、与原公司经理人、雇员终止合同,以及非效率的资本市场在价值评估中的错误 对以接管为代表的公司控制权市场的争论表明,公司控制权市场单独同样不是一个约束经理人的有效机制。 4.声誉市场与职业关注 市场交换的经济范式的一个隐含假设是,存在一个政府来定义产权,并执行合约。即使不存在第三方,声誉或品牌作为私人机制,同样可以向当事人提供履行合约的激励。职业关注所提供的隐性激励不仅适用于经理人,同时适用于董事。风险的规避与折旧成为市场约束激励的能力的限制。因此,对未来职业的关注可能既是有利的,同时,也可能是有害的,这要取决于企业与个人利益的协调程度。二、内部控制系统

服务贸易自由化机制外文文献翻译2014年译文4000字

文献出处：Barattieri A. The mechanism of service trade liberalization[J]. Journal of International Economics, 2014, 92(1): 1-13. （声明：本译文归百度文库所有，完整译文请到百度文库。） 原文 The mechanism of service trade liberalization Barattieri A Abstract In this paper, Service trade liberalization is the key areas of the United States to promote the TPP negotiations, the United States in the negotiations are pushing mechanism of a high standard of service trade liberalization. In this paper the progress of the TPP negotiations and services trade issues important position, on the basis of the acceptance, architecture design, focus on services, regulatory consistency four aspects in the TPP uncovers the "high standards" service trade liberalization mechanism establishment. American "high standards" service trade liberalization mechanism is tailored to the interests of the United States, actually services in the service of the United States. These mechanisms are through to strengthen and promote the TPP platform, forming reversed transmission to other countries. Key words: the TPP; The United States; Service trade liberalization; High standards; Mechanism design America is the first largest exporter global trade in services, and for many years, continues to service trade surplus. Competitive advantage based on service industry and service industry The importance of promoting American exports, jobs and economic growth, the United States in the multilateral, bilateral and regional multiple layers jointly promoting service trade liberalization. In the Uruguay round negotiations, the United States has overcome many obstacles, for the first time to include the Service Trade in multilateral negotiations, contributed to the general Agreement on Trade in services (the Genre - al Agreement on Trade and Service,

营销策略外文翻译文献

营销策略外文翻译文献 (文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)

译文: 营销策略 内容提要：为了组织的销售能是成功的，它需要根据一个营销策略计划来帮助保证其努力的目标和宗旨与市场的需要想吻合。营销策略审查市场以确定潜在顾客的需要，竞争者的战略和市场地位，并且尝试制定出一套能使组织在市场上获取或维护竞争优势的相关战略。有一些因素会对营销策略计划的发展造成冲击性的影响，它包括内部因素例如组织的财产、技能和组织文化，外在因素例如各种各样的市场驱动者、市场或产业运作方式、战略窗口和竞争的本质。一个优选的营销策略计划也需具备一套意外情况防备策略以应对市场治理及组织生产能力的不确定性。 关键词：竞争优势竞争策略市场地位市场份额营销销售计划组织文化营销策略 营销策略简述 无论组织的产品或服务多么好，除非它们的价值能被传达给潜在的顾客，否则组织依然无法实现它的使命。这种传达和交流是组织内市场营销功能的职责。根据美国市场协会，营销是“一个组织效能和一套创造过程、交流和传达产品价值给顾客、处理与顾客关系的有益于组织和它的利益共享者的方式”。营销作用包括相辅相成的两方面。营销策略在市场上审查市场来确定潜在顾客和竞争者本质的需要，并且试图开发

出在市场上将使组织获取或维护竞争优势的战略。操作的营销被建立在营销策略作用和贯彻各种各样的计划和策略(包括适当的混合营销的发展)吸引顾客和促进顾客忠实的基础之上的。 产品和服务营销的方法 有很多的方式能用来销售你的产品或服务包括做广告，直接响应、推销活动和宣传。然而，除非你能了解顾客、市场和产业的需要并且竞争的优势和劣势，否则这些方法是不太可能成功的。营销策略帮助一个组织尖化它的焦点和在市场顺利地竞争。营销策略与二个组分有关：目标市场和用最佳的方式传达你的产品价值或服务到那个市场。一个可实行的销售方针的发展取决于几个关键维度。首先，与组织之内的所有全球性战略一样，一个成功的销售方针需要由在组织之内的最高管理层签名。销售方针本质上也具有政治性的色彩：在组织之内的强有力的单位在最佳的销售方针也许不同意，并且协议也许需要谈判达成。销售方针也许受组织文化的也影响，并且那得假定这发生。例如，如果组织总是销售它的装饰物给商业主管，它也许就看不到组织之内的低层人员甚至是成人或少年的个人消费潜力。 实施战略销售计划发展的因素 存在一些能冲击战略销售计划发展的因素，这些因素首先包括组织已经拥有或它可能欣然获取的财产和技能。例如，如果组织拥有一个重大编程的部门，就为它能做和销售应用软件提供了可行性的条件。然而，如果这些人员已经在其他工作介入并且不能自由研究一个新的软件项目，并且组织没能力聘用另外的程序员，起始一条新的软件线是不妥当

供应商质量管理文献翻译(外文翻译-中英对照)

互利共赢的供应商质量控制 前言 近年来，随着对供应链的重视，供应商管理正逐渐成为企业和学术界的关注对象，IS0９000族标准以及QS 9０00标准都对供应商的管理提出了相应的要求，与供应商管理有关的研究成果正逐渐增多，一些软件巨头也推出了供应商关系管理的软件，但是在这些研究成果和应用软件中，涉及到的供应商质量控制的内容只是一些最基本的要求，而供应商质量控制恰恰是供应商管理的最基本、最重要的内容。另一方而，质量管理界对质量控制的研究取得了大量的成果，遗憾的是这些成果大多依然局限于企业的内部控制，仅仅研究从企业内部各环节如何改善产品的质量，而基于供应链的角度来研究质量控制的成果尚不多见。因此，系统地研究经济全球化形势下供应商质量控制的理论与方法，将有助于推动我国企业产品质量的快速提高和供应链竞争优势的形成与巩固。 1、质量与企业共存 质量一直是一个随着时代的变化而不断变化的概念,人们对质量的认识也往往因关注点不同而有所不同。如，早在1908年，通用汽车公司的工程师们在皇家汽车俱乐部会员们的面前拆解了3辆凯迪拉克轿车，并把这些零件混在一起,而后从中选择零件重新组装成车，然后驾车绝尘而去。这令在场的会员极为震惊，认为凯迪拉克车质量之高令人惊叹。显然在当时，汽车零件具有互换性是一种了不起的质量特性,这也是福特公司的Ｎ型车和T型车取得辉煌成功的重要原因.时至今日，即使农用三轮车的零部件也具有极高的互换性，零部件的标准化和互换性已经是理所当然的事情，不再是吸引顾客的重要质量特性.可见质量的内涵是不断变化的.那么究竟什么是质量呢？ （１)市场竟争就是企业间对“顾客”的争夺，在日益激烈的“顾客"争夺战中，质量、价格、交付（交付日期、方式和手段）和服务是企业常用的四个法宝，其中质量是根本，离开质量其他三项将变得毫无意义，因此可以说质量己成为市场竞争的焦点.它反映了产品是否能够反映顾客需求、能否满足顾客需求，从面决定了产品的市场前途。有鉴于此，质量己成为一项全球性运动,世界上所有优秀企业无一不把质量作为企业战略的关键内容，从战略的角度来规划质量。 （2）对于企业经营者来说,认识到质量对企业的重要意义只是经营企业的第一步,重要的是如何利用科学的方法来保证产品和服务的质量，使顾客满意，来保证过程和工作的质量来获互利共炭的供应商质量控制得良好的业绩。 众所周知,企业管理是社会生产力发展到一定程度的历史产物,质量管理作为企业管理的组成部分,同样也是社会发展的客观要求，特别是顾客处于主导地位的今天,要使顾客满意，就必须有过硬的产品质量和服务质量，这就要求企业积极推行先进的质量管理理论与方法，不断进行质量管理创新. ２、企业与供应商质量控制 随着生产社会化的不断发展，企业的生产活动分工越来越细,专业化程度越来越强，促使生产技术水平越来越高,产品质量得到大幅度改善。通常，某一产品不可能由一个企业从最初的原材料开始加工直至形成顾客最终使用的产品，往往是通过多个企业分工协作来完成.另外，先进生产方式的广泛应用,如准时生产、敏捷制造、零库存等，使企业与供应商的关系愈加紧密，企业与供应商的关系也由单纯的买卖关系向互利共底的合作关系演变。 ISO 900０族标准自1987年诞生以来受到了世界各国的一致追捧,全球约５0多万家企业通过ISO90０1质量管理体系认证足以说明这套管理标准在引领国际管理潮流方面的巨大成功。在备受企业欢迎的新版标准ＩSO9000：2０00中，互利的供应商关系被作为八项质量管理原则之一，充分体现了供应商关系管理在企业经营实践中的作用和价值。企业要贯彻这一原则,就必须

虹膜识别外文翻译文献

虹膜识别外文翻译文献 虹膜识别外文翻译文献 (文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译) 外文： The first chapter 1.1 The research background of iris recognition Biometrics is a technology for personal identification using physiological characteristics and behavior characteristics inherent in the human body. Can be used for the biological characteristics of biological recognition, fingerprint, hand type face, iris, retina, pulse, ear etc.. Behavior has the following characteristics: signature, voice, gait, etc.. Based on these characteristics, it has been the development of hand shape recognition, fingerprint recognition, facial recognition, iris recognition, signature recognition and other biometric technology, many techniques have been formed and mature to application of. Biological recognition technology in a , has a long history, the ancient Egyptians through identification of each part of the body size measure to carry out identity may be the earliest human based on the earliest history of biometrics. But the modern biological recognition technology began in twentieth Century 70 time metaphase, as biometric devices early is relatively expensive, so only a higher security level atomic test, production base.due to declining cost of microprocessor and various electronic components, precision gradually improve, control device of a biological recognition technology has been gradually applied to commerce authorized, such as access control, attendance management, management system, safety certification field etc.. All biometric technology, iris recognition is currently used as a convenient and accurate.

会计内部控制中英文对照外文翻译文献

会计内部控制中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译) 内部控制系统披露—一种可替代的管理机制 根据代理理论，各种治理机制减少了投资者和管理者之间的代理问题（Jensen and Meckling，1976； Gillan，2006）。传统上，治理机制已经被认定为内部或外部的。内部机制包括董事会及其作用、结构和组成（Fama，1980；Fama and Jensen，1983），管理股权(Jensen and Meckling，1976)和激励措施，起监督作用的大股东(Demsetz and Lehn，1985)，内部控制系统(Bushman and Smith，2001)，规章制度和章程条款(反收购措施)和使用的债务融资（杰森，1993）。外部控制是由公司控制权市场(Grossman and Hart,1980)、劳动力管理市场（Fama,1980）和产品市场（哈特,1983）施加的控制。 各种各样的金融丑闻，动摇了世界各地的投资者，公司治理最佳实践方式特别强调了内部控制系统在公司治理中起到的重要作用。内部控制有助于通过提供保证可靠性的财务报告，和临时议会对可能会损害公司经营目标的事项进行评估和风险管理来保护投

资者的利益。这些功能已被的广泛普及内部控制系统架构设计的广泛认可，并指出了内部控制是用以促进效率，减少资产损失风险，帮助保证财务报告的可靠性和对法律法规的遵从（COSO,1992）。 尽管有其相关性，但投资者不能直接观察，因此也无法得到内部控制系统设计和发挥功能的信息，因为它们都是组织内的内在机制、活动和过程（Deumes and Knechel,2008）。 由于投资者考虑到成本维持监控管理其声称的（Jensen and Meckling，1976）,内部控制系统在管理激励信息沟通上的特性，以告知投资者内部控制系统的有效性,是当其他监控机制（该公司的股权结构和董事会）比较薄弱，从而为其提供便捷的监控（Leftwich et等, 1981）。存在的替代机制一直是人们在不同公司治理文献中争论的话题（Rediker and Seth, 1995；Fernandez and Arrondo，2005），基于威廉姆森（1983年）的替代假说认为，特定控制机制的边际作用取决于其在公司治理制度的相对重要性。 在本文中，我们认为披露内部控制系统的特点是在管理者选择的监控机制时存在一个可替代治理机制。Leftwich（1981）认为“管理者选择一个监控包，监测包的组成取决于各种监控机制的成本与效益”（P.59）。 特别是，我们重点关注内部控制系统和监控包的另外两个机制 (公司的所有权结构和董事会) 间的关系，根据有关文献（Jensen and Meckling，1976；Fernandez and Arrondo，2005；Gillan，2006）它们在管理行为监控方面发挥相关作用。我们假设认为，内部控制系统的特性取决于激励由企业的股权结构和董事会发挥监督作用。 因此,我们研究了三年间在四个不同的证券交易所上市（伦敦、巴黎、法兰克福和米兰）160家欧洲公司内部控制系统披露程度，通过利用这个国际范例,我们能够描绘出不同的体制环境的某些功能。 我们发现证据表明内部控制系统披露代替了监测方面所发挥的作用与所有制结构、制度所有权、在董事会上独立董事比例和会计审计委员会的专家成员的比率相关。 我们再加上通过内部会计控制的披露所发挥的管理作用，采用以往文献的完整披露架构，使我们能够详细地从内容和信息管理的程度上内制披露上进行交流。而公司治理的最佳做法要求披露内部控制系统的特性，他们没有提供管理应该披露和披露程度的指令。这样的管理缺乏指示使内部控制系统存在随意性。 本文提供了实证支持威廉姆森（1983年成立）在不同的治理机制下的替代假说，它有相应的政策含义。虽然大多数公司治理研究考虑一个互补的披露机制管理采用强化公

中英金融服务贸易国际竞争力比较研究【文献综述】

毕业论文文献综述 国际经济与贸易 中英金融服务贸易国际竞争力比较研究 金融服务贸易国际竞争力相关理论综述 服务贸易是以服务作为交易标的的一种贸易行为。《服务贸易总协定》(GATS)所界定的国际服务贸易是指以过境交付、境外消费、商业存在和自然人流动这四种形式进行的各国间的服务交易。该定义已成为有一定权威性和指导性的定义为各国接受。 根据《服务贸易总协定》中的服务部门清单，可以将服务贸易分为12类：商业性服务，销售服务，金融服务，娱乐服务，通讯服务，教育服务，卫生服务，运输服务，建筑服务，环境服务，旅游服务和其他服务。而对于金融服务贸易，国内外并没有确切的定义。本文将对金融服务贸易国外及国内有代表性的研究进行综述。 一、GATS与OECD对金融服务贸易的定义 根据GATS的定义，金融服务贸易是指由一成员国的金融服务提供者所提供的任何金融性质的服务。它包括两个部分：所有保险和保险相关的服务、银行和其他金融服务（保险除外），其中其他金融服务指证券和金融信息服务。 经济合作和发展组织（OECD）对金融服务贸易的定义为由金融机构提供服务的收入，或者接受付出的支持，包括得到的和付出的直接投资收益（未分配收益和利息）；从其他金融投资得到的和付出的收益（得到的和付出的利息和红利）；得到的、付出的手续费和佣金。 可见，经济合作和发展组织对金融服务贸易的界定强调了金融服务贸易交易的提供方，而忽略了金融服务贸易的消费方。金融服务贸易的发展主要是以此换取其他贸易领域的发展，而且金融服务贸易可以促进本国金融业与国际金融业的接轨，从而在国际竞争中促进本国金融业的发展。 二、国外对金融服务贸易相关研究 对于金融服务贸易研究，国外学者从不同角度出发，有不同的看法。 列为恩（1996）认为，各种金融服务可以实现五种基本功能：方便商品和劳务的交易；易于风险管理；加速资源流动；获取信息，评估企业和配置资本；提供公司法人治理。同时，更多的相关文献表示，金融中介可以降低由于信息不对称产生的管理成本（戴蒙德1984；威廉森1987）也可以对规模经济产生积极的效应。 莫施里安（Moshirian 1994）认为，金融服务贸易和制造业类似，一些基本要素赋予了

战略管理参考文献

战略管理研究参考文献 （总目录） 项保华2003-5-31 重要说明：本目录经过多届博士生的共同努力，于2003年5月整理完成，主要提供本人指导的战略管理研究方向的博士生学习参考之用。可以认为，只要通读了本目录的大部分文献，必将能够对战略管理领域的当前及经典理论、方法有比较系统的把握。若能在此基础上潜心感悟，加强与同行的交流探索，定可具备解决具体战略理论与实践问题的创新思路与实用技能，从而顺利完成博士学位论文的选题与撰写。作为战略管理研究方向博士生培养的业务目标定位为，通过对战略理论与实践的系统学习，达到胜任国内重点高等院校战略领域的教学、研究、咨询工作之要求。所以，对于硕士生以及非战略管理研究方向的博士生而言，不作全面通读本目录文献之要求，各位可以根据自己的兴趣，从本目录中选取部分文献阅读，以作为参与战略课程学习之补充。 学习建议：以具体老师为师的范围终有限，而以文献为师则可延请古今中外名家赐教，广泛借鉴吸收多方面的见解。多读、多思、多写，书山无路勤为径，以学为乐恒则成！谨以此与各位共勉！ 1、中文部分 为人经世 ?孔子, 论语（网上下载） ?老子, 道德经（网上下载） ?孙子, 孙子兵法（网上下载） ?马基雅维里（1469-1527）, 君主论, 中国社会出版社, 1999 ?葛拉西安（1601-1658）, 智慧书——永恒的处世经典（网上下载） ?何兆武, 西方哲学精神, 清华大学出版社, 2002 ?墨顿·亨特, 心理学的故事, 海南人民出版社, 1999 ?维克托·E.弗兰克尔, 人生的真谛, 中国对外翻译出版公司, 1994

? E. 迈尔, 生物学思想发展的历史, 四川教育人民出版社, 1990（网上下载） ?威尔逊, 新的综合：社会生物学（李昆峰编译）, 四川人民出版社, 1985（网上下载） 战略总论 ?项保华, 战略管理——艺术与实务（第3版）, 华夏出版社, 2003 ?明茨伯格等, 战略历程：纵览战略管理学派, 机械工业出版社, 2002 ?拜瑞·J·内勒巴夫；亚当·M·布兰登勃格, 合作竞争（Co-Opetition）, 安徽人民出版社, 2000 ?迈克尔·波特, 竞争战略（原著1980年出版）, 华夏出版社, 2003 ?迈克尔·波特, 竞争优势（原著1985年出版）, 华夏出版社, 2003 ?迈克尔·波特, 国家竞争优势（原著1990年出版）, 华夏出版社, 2002 ?迈克尔·波特等, 未来的战略, 四川人民出版社, 2000 ?格里·约翰逊；凯万·斯科尔斯, 公司战略教程, 华夏出版社, 1998 ?小乔治·斯托尔克等, 企业成长战略, 中国人民大学出版社、哈佛商学院出版社, 1999 专题探讨 ?保罗·索尔曼、托马斯·弗利德曼, 企业竞争战略, 中国友谊出版公司, 1985 ?罗伯特·艾克斯罗德, 对策中的制胜之道：合作的进化, 上海人民出版社, 1996 ?约瑟夫·巴达拉克, 界定时刻——两难境地的选择, 经济日报出版社、哈佛商学院出版社, 1998 ?芝加哥大学商学院、欧洲管理学院、密歇根大学商学院、牛津大学赛德商学院, 把握战略：MBA战略精要, 北京大学出版社, 2003 ?哈默尔、普拉哈拉德, 竞争大未来, 昆仑出版社, 1998 ?尼尔·瑞克曼, 合作竞争大未来, 经济管理出版社, 1998 ?卡尔·W.斯特恩、小乔治·斯托克, 公司战略透视, 上海远东出版社, 1999 ?乔尔·布利克、戴维·厄恩斯特, 协作型竞争, 中国大百科全书出版社, 1998

质量管理文献综述

关于企业质量管理文献综述 摘要：随着新世纪的到来，特别是我国加入WTO后，中国将进一步融入世界经济的主流，质量将成为我国广大企业抓住机遇、迎接严峻挑战的关键。要拓展海外市场，必须靠有竞争力的质量；要保护国内的市场，不再有高关税和政府的过渡保护，也要靠质量的较量。随着科学技术的进步，质量管理的理论和方法有了更大发展。本文综合了质量管理的发展历程，并简要评价，提出看法，以便为企业的质量管理和理论研究提供参考。 关键词：质量管理、管理改进 21世纪是质量的世纪”。随着经济全球化和信息革命的迅猛发展，竞争日益加剧。在“数量”问题已解决的今天，人们将越来越追求和依赖于高质量的产品和服务，而且质量的领域不断拓宽，生活的质量、环境的质量、文化的质量、经济增长的质量更加受到全社会的关注。质量已成为竞争的焦点，不仅关系到企业的生存发展，而且影响到国家经济实力的增强和民族的形象。质量已成为全球经济发展战略的核心问题。 一、质量管理理论的回顾 （一）、质量管理的发展阶段 （1）质量检验阶段（20世纪20-30年代） 生产力迅猛发展，生产过程分工细化、日益复杂，许多美国企业按照泰勒的管理模式，纷纷设立检验部门，使检验与生产分离开来，其最大特点为“事后把关”。（2）统计质量阶段（20世纪40-50年代） 早在20世纪20年代，美国贝尔实验室工程师休哈特就提出“控制与预防缺陷”的概念。主要是利用数理统计原理，预防产生废品并检验产品质量，在方式上由专业质量控制工程师和技术人员承担。但这种方法只是保证生产过程中的产品质量，而不能提高产品本身的质量。 （3）全面质量管理阶段（20世纪60年代至今） 美国的费根堡姆提出，“全面质量是为了能够在最经济的水平上，并考虑到充分满足顾客要求的条件下进行生产和提供服务，将企业各部门研制质量、维持质量和提高质量的活动构成为一体的一种有效体系”。 （二）、质量管理的理论流派 1、事后检验 20世纪，美国工程师泰勒提出“科学管理理论”，1911 年泰勒出版了专